POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, ETC. VS. SALEM COUNTY (L-0018-20 and L-0025-20, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3533-19
    POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT
    ASSOCIATION LOCAL NO. 400,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    SALEM COUNTY and
    SALEM COUNTY SHERIFF'S
    DEPARTMENT,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    SALEM COUNTY and
    SALEM COUNTY SHERIFF'S
    DEPARTMENT,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,
    v.
    POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT
    ASSOCIATION LOCAL NO. 400,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Argued June 9, 2021 – Decided August 19, 2021
    Before Judges Ostrer, Accurso, and Enright.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Salem County, Docket Nos. L-0018-20 and
    L-0025-20.
    Christopher A. Gray argued the cause for appellant
    (Sciarra & Catrambone, LLC, attorneys; Matthew R.
    Curran and Christopher A. Gray, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    Joseph M. DiNicola, Jr., argued the cause for
    respondents (DiNicola & DiNicola, LLC, attorneys;
    Joseph M. DiNicola, Jr., on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff, Policemen's Benevolent Association Local No. 400, appeals
    from a Law Division decision in favor of Salem County vacating an arbitration
    award. Although the case has a somewhat tortured procedural history and the
    parties do not agree on much of anything, both acknowledge that questions of
    managerial prerogative, which are at the heart of this case, are the primary
    province of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission.
    Unfortunately, PERC has yet to weigh in on the issue. The County did
    not file a scope of negotiations petition in this matter until after the arbitration
    award when both parties had pending applications before the Law Division
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7. PERC directed the County to withdraw its scope
    A-3533-19
    2
    petition, following the policy it announced in In the Matter of Twp. of Ocean
    Bd. of Educ & Twp. of Ocean Teachers' Ass'n, P.E.R.C. No. 83-164, 9
    N.J.P.E.R. ¶ 397, 1983 N.J. PERC LEXIS 14 at 181 (1983), not to entertain a
    scope petition after the issuance of an arbitration award. In its 1983 decision,
    PERC explained that scope petitions filed after entry of an arbitration award
    waste time and money, "frustrati[ng] . . . the arbitration process and the parties."
    Id. at 6. The decision instructs an employer wishing "to preserve a 'dispute' over
    the legal arbitrability of an arbitration award," to file an action to vacate or
    modify the award under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, and ask the court "to transfer the
    scope of negotiations question to the Commission for resolution pursuant to
    Ridgefield Park [Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 
    78 N.J. 144
    , 153-
    55 (1978)]." Id. at 12.
    PERC's Ocean Township decision further makes clear the Commission
    "will, of course, entertain any scope of negotiations questions which a court
    refers to [it] as part of a statutory proceeding to review an arbitration award."
    Id. at 12-13. Our own cases endorse that procedure. Judge Pressler explained
    in City of Newark v. Newark Council 21, N.J. Civ. Serv. Ass'n, 
    320 N.J. Super. 8
    , 17 (App. Div. 1999), that
    it has long been settled that where grievance arbitration
    of a particular matter is challenged by the public
    A-3533-19
    3
    employer on the ground that the subject of the
    grievance constitutes a management prerogative and is
    hence not negotiable in the first instance, the
    jurisdiction of PERC is primary and the trial court
    should defer to PERC.
    Unfortunately that did not occur here. Instead, the County argued the Law
    Division judge should vacate the award because the arbitrator exceeded his
    power in issuing an award involving a non-negotiable — and thus non-arbitrable
    — issue. The PBA contended the County waived the negotiability issue by
    failing to file a timely scope petition with PERC. The judge determined the
    arbitrator erred in refusing to consider the negotiability issue on the basis that
    the County had not filed a scope petition with PERC. The judge found the "non-
    negotiability" argument was raised by the County in the arbitration, and that the
    arbitrator should have "address[ed] the In re Local 195[, IFPTE v. State, 
    88 N.J. 393
     (1982)] factors" and "weigh[ed] the interests of the parties as required by
    that controlling precedent."
    Performing that analysis herself, the judge found the challenged decision,
    a 2019 special order by the Sheriff reassigning the duties of transporting inmates
    from correction officers to sheriff's officers, was a non-negotiable, and therefore
    non-arbitrable, subject under the three-part In re Local 195 test. See 88 N.J. at
    A-3533-19
    4
    403-04. The judge accordingly entered an order vacating the award. The PBA's
    motion for reconsideration was denied.
    The PBA appeals, arguing the Law Division was without jurisdiction to
    rule on the negotiability issue, the County waived its right to obtain that
    determination from PERC, and the judge erred in finding the issue non-
    negotiable under In re Local 195. The County contends it had no obligation to
    negotiate whether corrections officers or sheriff's officers would be assigned
    transportation duties by the Sheriff, who oversees both categories of County
    employees, and thus the court was correct to find the arbitration award should
    be vacated, as the subject was not arbitrable.
    The County also argues that "[w]hile the authority on this issue suggests
    that the issue of negotiability is one left for PERC[,] there is no authority that
    prevents a party from challenging negotiability [in] court, if a scope of
    negotiability [petition] is not filed pre-arbitration." It contends that PERC's
    refusal to accept a directly-filed scope petition post-arbitration does not alter the
    fact that the arbitrator lacked the authority to treat the matter as an arbitrable
    grievance in the first place, making the award subject to vacation on the basis
    that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d) and Newark
    Council 21.
    A-3533-19
    5
    It is clear to us we have nothing to review in this appeal. Our Supreme
    Court has again reminded recently that PERC is "the forum for the initial
    determination of whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective
    negotiations." Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 
    241 N.J. 595
    , 614 (2020)
    (quoting State v. State Supervisory Emps. Ass'n, 
    78 N.J. 54
    , 83 (1978)). We
    cannot review the correctness of the trial court's decision as to the negotiability
    of this issue,1 and the trial court did not decide anything else.
    What obviously should have occurred here is that the County should have
    filed its scope petition pursuant to N.J.A.C. 19:13-2.1 before proceeding to
    arbitration and the arbitrator rendering his award. Although PERC's regulations
    do not require a scope petition to be filed before arbitration, Ridgefield Park
    would suggest that is the preferred procedure. See 78 N.J. at 154. PERC clearly
    has the authority to suspend an arbitration proceeding while it considers a scope
    1
    Although we are aware the Court in Board of Education of Township of
    Bernards v. Bernards Township Education Ass'n, 
    79 N.J. 311
    , 317-18 (1979),
    declined to remand a negotiability issue to PERC and decided the issue itself,
    the circumstances were very different. First, PERC had decided the same issue
    in a prior proceeding. 
    Id. at 317
    . Second, and perhaps more important, PERC
    was participating as amicus curiae in the case and asserted a remand to the
    Commission "would not add anything as this Court already has the benefit of
    PERC's thinking on the subject." 
    Id. at 317-18
    . There is no indication PERC
    has addressed this issue previously and, of course, PERC is not participating in
    this matter.
    A-3533-19
    6
    of negotiability question. Id. at 155. Short of that, the County should have done
    as PERC suggested in its 1983 Ocean Township decision, the case it referenced
    in its letter to County counsel directing the County to withdraw its scope petition
    post arbitration.
    The County should have asked the Law Division judge to transfer the
    scope of negotiations question to the Commission for resolution. Even absent
    such request, the judge should have declined to decide the negotiability question
    and referred that dispute to PERC. See Newark Council 21, 
    320 N.J. Super. at 17
    ; Bd. of Educ. of Plainfield v. Plainfield Educ. Ass'n, 
    144 N.J. Super. 521
    ,
    525-27 (App. Div. 1976). Although the PBA argues the County should be
    estopped from raising non-negotiability now by having failed to file a scope
    petition sooner, it has not brought a case to our attention so holding, and our
    courts have permitted claims of non-arbitrability to be raised after an arbitration
    award. See, e.g., Paterson Police PBA Local No. 1 v. City of Paterson, 
    87 N.J. 78
    , 84 (1981); Newark Council 21, 
    320 N.J. Super. at 17
    . The union's reliance
    on Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 
    62 N.J. 229
    , 234 (1973) is misplaced as the
    County raised non-negotiability both in the arbitration and in the Law Division.
    Because we conclude the preservation of PERC's primary jurisdiction over
    scope of negotiations issues requires transfer of the scope issue in this case to
    A-3533-19
    7
    PERC, we vacate the Law Division's order and transfer the matter to PERC for
    resolution of that issue. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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    8