STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN S. HILKEVICH (99-09-0470, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3160-17T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JOHN S. HILKEVICH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________
    Submitted June 4, 2019 – Decided June 27, 2019
    Before Judges Yannotti and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 99-09-
    0470.
    John S. Hilkevich, appellant pro se.
    Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz,
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial, on February 22, 2018, of
    what defendant claimed was a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
    In September 1999, defendant was charged in a twenty-three count
    indictment with two counts of aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
    2(a)(2)(b); one count of aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(c),
    and other sexual offenses involving three male victims, who were at the time
    between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.
    Defendant was convicted on two counts of aggravated sexual assault and
    most of the lesser offenses. We reversed defendant's convictions and remanded
    for a new trial. State v. Hilkevich, No. A-3632-00 (App. Div. March 5, 2003)
    (slip op. at 13).
    Defendant was retried. One of the alleged victims elected not to testify
    and the charges regarding that individual were dismissed. Defendant was found
    guilty on two counts of aggravated sexual assault and eight lesser charges. The
    trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive fifteen-year terms of
    imprisonment, each with five years of parole ineligibility. The court merged or
    imposed concurrent sentences on the other convictions.
    Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction.         We affirmed
    defendant's convictions and the sentences imposed for endangering the welfare
    A-3160-17T4
    2
    of a child and aggravated criminal sexual contact, but vacated the sentences on
    the aggravated sexual assault convictions because the trial court had not
    adequately explained its reasons for those sentences. State v. Hilkevich, No. A-
    3169-06 (App. Div. April 8, 2008) (slip op. at 32). We remanded the matter for
    resentencing on those counts.     Ibid. The Supreme Court thereafter denied
    defendant's petition for certification. State v. Hilkevich, 
    199 N.J. 131
     (2009).
    In July 2008, the trial court resentenced defendant on the two aggravated
    sexual assault convictions.    The court sentenced defendant to consecutive,
    fifteen-year prison terms, each with five years of parole ineligibility. Defendant
    appealed. We affirmed the sentences. State v. Hilkevich, No. A-0592-08 (App.
    Div. March 12, 2010) (slip op. at 9). The Supreme Court denied defendant's
    petition for certification. State v. Hilkevich, 
    202 N.J. 346
     (2010).
    In March 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
    (PCR). He asserted, among other claims, that the trial court and prosecutor
    knowingly and unlawfully engaged in misconduct, which had a negative impact
    upon the verdict and sentence, and that he was denied the effective assistance of
    counsel at sentencing.
    The PCR court found that defendant's claims were either barred by Rule
    3:22-5 because they had been adjudicated previously, or were without merit.
    A-3160-17T4
    3
    The court also found that defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
    on his petition, and entered an order dated April 25, 2014, denying PCR.
    Defendant appealed.
    We affirmed the denial of PCR. State v. Hilkevich, No. A-4984-13 (App.
    Div. January 25, 2017) (slip op. at 2). The Supreme Court denied defendant's
    petition for certification. State v. Hilkevich, 
    231 N.J. 177
     (2017). The Court
    also denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. State v. Hilkevich, 
    232 N.J. 66
     (2018).
    In January 2018, defendant filed what he claimed was a motion to correct
    an illegal sentence. By letter dated February 22, 2018, the trial court informed
    defendant that if defendant's application was a motion to reduce or change his
    sentence, it had not been filed within the time required by Rule 3:21-10(a), and
    the motion did not come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Rule 3:21-
    10(b).
    The court also stated that if the application was a petition for PCR, the
    application did not meet the requirements for a second or subsequent PCR
    petition under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2). In addition, the court observed that sentencing
    issues that defendant raised in his application had been raised previously on
    direct appeal, and the court had affirmed defendant's sentences. See Hilkevich,
    A-3160-17T4
    4
    No. A-0592-08 (slip op. at 4-5, 9). The court denied defendant's application.
    This appeal followed.
    On appeal, defendant argues:
    Point I: As per R. 3:22-2(c) there is no time limit on
    appeal from illegal sentences which may be ordered
    corrected at any time on motion or by the court acting
    sua sponte[.] (State v. Paladino, 
    203 N.J. Super. 537
    (App. Div. 1985), State v. E.W., 
    413 N.J. Super. 70
    , 77-
    78 (App. Div. 2010)[).]
    Point II: The New Jersey Rules of Evidence must
    apply to all court proceedings at which evidence is
    newly produced including defendant's resentencing
    hearing at which they were ignored[.] (State v. Roth,
    
    95 N.J. 334
    , 365-366 (1984), Stoelting v. Hauck, 
    32 N.J. 87
    , 103 (1960)[).]
    Point III: Sentencing based on judge-found rather than
    on jury-found facts have been stricken as
    unconstitutional which applies to defendant's
    sentence[.] (State v. Natale, 
    184 N.J. 458
     (2005))[.]
    Point IV: In determining a sentence the court cannot
    allude to any consideration that defendant maintained
    his innocence at trial[.] (State v. Poteet, 
    61 N.J. 493
    (1972)[.]
    Point V: Defendant was illegally represented at
    resentencing hearing[.] (Halbert v. Michigan, 
    545 U.S. 605
     (2005) (Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. at 7)[.]
    Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that defendant's
    arguments are without merit.
    A-3160-17T4
    5
    Rule 3:21-10(a) allows a defendant to file a motion to reduce or change a
    sentence, but the motion must be filed no later than sixty days after the date of
    the judgment of conviction. Defendant did not file his motion within the time
    required by Rule 3:21-10(a), but argues that his motion falls within the exception
    under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), which allows a motion to correct a sentence not
    authorized by the Code of Criminal Justice (Code) to be filed at any time.
    Defendant does not argue, however, that the sentence imposed here was
    not authorized by the Code. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that,
    to the extent defendant was seeking to reduce or change his sentence, the motion
    was not filed within the time required by Rule 3:21-10(a).
    The court also correctly determined that if defendant's application is
    considered to be a PCR petition, defendant did not meet the criteria for a second
    or subsequent PCR petition under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2). Rule 3:22-4(b) provides
    that such a petition will be dismissed unless
    (1) it is timely under [Rule] 3:22-12(a)(2); and
    (2) it alleges on its face either:
    (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
    constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
    petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
    Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
    during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or
    A-3160-17T4
    6
    (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could
    not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
    of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the
    ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the
    evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable
    probability that the relief sought would be granted; or
    (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
    ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
    defendant on the first or subsequent application for
    post-conviction relief.
    Defendant's application was filed in January 2018. The application was
    not, however, filed within the time prescribed by Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which
    requires a second or subsequent PCR petition to be filed within one year after
    the latest of:
    (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
    was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
    Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
    has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
    and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
    on collateral review; or
    (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief
    sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could
    not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
    of reasonable diligence; or
    (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
    application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
    assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
    the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
    relief is being alleged.
    A-3160-17T4
    7
    We note that in this appeal, defendant argues that he was illegally
    represented at the resentencing hearing, which took place on July 11, 2008.
    According to defendant, in May 2008, his father hired a law firm to serve as
    defense counsel. Defendant claims that in 2006, the firm hired an attorney, who
    had previously served as a clerk for a Superior Court judge in Burlington
    County. Defendant asserts that the attorney who represented him at the first trial
    later became a judge in Burlington County.
    Defendant claims that the newly-hired attorney somehow "was privy to
    the casual, off-record back-room exchanges of opinions and comments between
    judges and clerks." Defendant asserts that had he known of the firm's "insider
    knowledge of the case," and that the newly-hired attorney was a "member" of
    the Burlington County judiciary, the firm would not have been hired to represent
    him at the resentencing.
    Defendant also claims that the attorney from the firm was present for the
    sentencing hearing, but allegedly never spoke. According to defendant, the
    attorney introduced another attorney, whom defendant refers to as "surprise
    counsel." Defendant asserts that he was not present for the resentencing hearing,
    and he learned of the "illegalities that transpired" there only after he obtained
    the transcript of that proceeding.
    A-3160-17T4
    8
    Suffice it to say, defendant's allegations have no support whatsoever in
    the record. There is no evidence of any "off-record back-room exchanges of
    opinions and comments" by defendant's attorney at the first trial and any other
    judge in the Burlington County vicinage regarding this case. There also is no
    evidence that the attorney who had served as the judge's law clerk and later
    joined the firm representing defendant heard any such "opinions and comments"
    about defendant's case while working in the judiciary. Furthermore, there is no
    evidence that the former law clerk had any involvement in the resentencing
    proceeding.
    In any event, defendant failed to establish that he raised these and his other
    claims regarding the sentence within the time prescribed by Rule 3:22-12(a)(2).
    His claims are not based on any new principle of constitutional law, he is not
    asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in a prior PCR proceeding, and he has
    not established that he filed his latest petition within one year after learni ng of
    the so-called facts that support his claims.
    Moreover, as the PCR court noted, defendant previously appealed from
    the sentences imposed in the July 2008 resentencing and we affirmed those
    sentences. Hilkevich, No. A-0592-08 (slip op. at 9). Defendant's additional
    claims regarding the sentences are either barred by Rule 3:22-4(a) or Rule 3:22-
    A-3160-17T4
    9
    5 because the claims had either been expressly adjudicated or could have been
    raised in a prior proceeding.
    Affirmed.
    A-3160-17T4
    10