Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing & Drain SSS , 2016 NMSC 9 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                  I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'04- 13:11:56 2016.03.29
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 
    2016-NMSC-009
    Filing Date: February 18, 2016
    Docket No. S-1-SC-33969
    SAFEWAY, INC.,
    Defendant/Cross-Claimant-Respondent,
    v.
    ROOTER 2000 PLUMBING AND DRAIN SSS,
    Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Petitioner.
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
    Louis E. DePauli, Jr., District Judge
    Butt Thornton & Baehr PC
    Emily A. Franke
    Jane Laflin
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Petitioner
    Madison & Mroz, P.A.
    Gregory D. Steinman
    Minal P. Unruh
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Respondent
    OPINION
    MAES, Justice.
    {1}    This appeal arises out of a cross-claim for contractual and traditional indemnification.
    The complaint alleged that Plaintiffs, Briana Fierro and Jason Fierro, suffered injuries when
    a baby changing table collapsed in a Safeway store, and that the collapse was the result of
    negligence on the part of Safeway, Inc. (Safeway) and Rooter 2000 Plumbing and Drain SSS
    (Rooter). The central issue is whether the right to traditional indemnification is available
    1
    notwithstanding New Mexico’s adoption of comparative fault where the jury compared and
    apportioned fault among concurrent tortfeasors. After reviewing the genesis of traditional
    indemnification and the adoption of contribution and comparative negligence, we hold that
    traditional indemnity does not apply when the jury finds a tortfeasor actively at fault and
    apportions liability using comparative fault principles. The second issue on appeal is whether
    the duty to insure and defend provision of the Standard Service Provider Terms and
    Conditions Agreement (Agreement) between Rooter and Safeway is void and unenforceable
    under NMSA 1978, Section 56-7-1 (1971, amended 2005). We hold that it is. Therefore, we
    reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
    favor of Plaintiffs.
    I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {2}      Safeway owns and operates a grocery store in Gallup, New Mexico. Thirteen months
    after Rooter installed a diaper changing table in Safeway’s Gallup store bathroom, Briana
    Fierro and her baby, Jaye Fierro (Plaintiffs), suffered personal injuries when the changing
    table became dislodged and fell from the wall because the butterfly bolts were apparently
    installed backwards. Plaintiffs’ initial complaint against Safeway alleged negligence and
    personal injuries resulting from the faulty changing table. Plaintiffs filed a second amended
    complaint naming Rooter as a defendant and alleging that Rooter was negligent in its
    installation of the baby changing station. Plaintiffs further alleged negligence per se, strict
    liability, breach of implied warranty, and claims under the doctrine of respondeat superior
    against all defendants. Safeway filed a cross-claim against Rooter seeking defense,
    indemnification, contribution, and damages pursuant to both New Mexico common law and
    the Agreement signed by both parties. The relevant provision of the Agreement provides
    that:
    [Rooter] shall indemnify, defend and hold [Safeway] harmless from and
    “against;” any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities, and expenses
    (including the costs of investigation and attorney’s fees) in connection with
    any claim or cause of action arising from any act or omission of [Rooter;], its
    employees, agents, and representatives, in the performance of its obligations
    under this Agreement, except where the claim, loss or damage is caused by
    the sole negligence of [Safeway].
    The Agreement also stated that Rooter was to name Safeway as an additional insured under
    its insurance policy. Both Rooter and its insurance carrier refused to defend or indemnify
    Safeway. Rooter took the position that New Mexico’s anti-indemnification statute, Section
    56-7-1, voided any obligation it had to Safeway, and Rooter’s insurance company denied
    coverage because it had not been named as an insured on the Rooter policy; thus the policy
    did not cover Safeway.
    {3}     Rooter then filed a motion for summary judgment on Safeway’s cross-claim,
    asserting that Safeway had no right to indemnification. The district court found as a matter
    2
    of law that there is no dispute that Safeway will not have to pay for any negligence that is
    found to have been committed by Rooter. Safeway did not object to or dispute the district
    court’s finding. The district court granted Rooter’s motion for summary judgment, finding
    that the Agreement’s contractual indemnification requirements were void and unenforceable
    as a matter of New Mexico law, foreclosing Safeway’s rights to indemnity, defense, and
    insurance. In granting Rooter’s motion for summary judgment, the district court thereby
    dismissed Safeway’s claim for contractual indemnification.” The district court did not
    indicate whether it applied the original 1971 of the anti-indemnification statute, or the
    version as amended in 2003 that specifically invalidates agreements to insure and defend
    against an indemnitee’s negligence, when it concluded that the contractual indemnification
    was void. See NMSA 1978, Section 56-7-1(A) (2003, as amended in 2005). The district
    court further found that Plaintiffs were not seeking liability or damages from Safeway for
    Rooter’s acts or omissions and thus similarly dismissed Safeway’s claim for common law
    indemnification. The district court determined that Safeway could request that Rooter be
    included on a special verdict form for the purpose of allocating fault.
    {4}      Plaintiffs ultimately settled all of their claims against Rooter, so those two parties
    filed a joint motion to dismiss all claims against Rooter, which the district court granted. The
    case then proceeded to trial on Plaintiff’s claims against Safeway. At the close of evidence,
    the jury returned a comparative fault special verdict form.
    {5}     The special verdict form submitted to the jury asked four questions. The first asked,
    “[w]as [Safeway] negligent?” The jury answered yes. The second question asked, “[w]as any
    negligence of [Safeway] a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and damages?” Again, the jury
    answered yes. The third question and answer established the total damages suffered by
    Plaintiff to be $450,000. The fourth question asked the jury to do the following:
    Question No. 4: Compare the negligence of the following persons or
    entities and find a percentage for each. The total of the percentages must
    equal 100%, but the percentage for any one or more of the persons or entities
    named may be zero [if] you find that such person or entity was not negligent
    or that any negligence on the part of such person or entity was not a cause of
    damage.
    Safeway                 ________%
    Rooter 2000             ________%
    100% TOTAL
    The jury entered “40” for Safeway’s negligence because as alleged in Plaintiff’s Uniform
    Jury Instruction 13-302 NMRA, Safeway either failed to exercise ordinary care to (1)
    provide proper hardware to Rooter, (2) supervise the installation of the baby changing table,
    or (3) conduct reasonable inspection of the table during the ensuing thirteen months. The
    3
    jury entered “60” for Rooter’s negligence.
    {6}      Safeway appealed to the Court of Appeals for review of the district court’s order
    granting summary judgment in favor of Rooter, thus denying Safeway’s cross-claim against
    Rooter for common law indemnification, as well as Safeway’s cross-claims alleging Rooter
    had a contractual duty to indemnify, defend, and insure Safeway. The Court of Appeals,
    considering New Mexico’s common law of indemnity, and the importance of the instant
    jury’s apportionment of fault amongst Safeway and Rooter, determined that “[t]he fact that
    the jury apportioned fault between the parties at trial does not strip away Safeway’s common
    law right of indemnification to obtain full recovery for damages assessed against it from
    Rooter, assuming that Safeway is found by the jury to be a passive tortfeasor.” Safeway, Inc.
    v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing & Drain SSS, 
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶ 23, 
    297 P.3d 347
     (citations
    omitted). Because the Court of Appeals determined that there were still genuine issues of
    material fact regarding whether Rooter owed Safeway a common law right of
    indemnification, and whether Rooter’s duty to insure Safeway was breached, it reversed the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Id. ¶¶ 24, 30-31.The Court of Appeals also
    held that the 1971 version of Section 56-7-1 applied to the parties’ contract and that the
    statute voided Rooter’s “agreement to indemnify but not its agreement to defend and insure.”
    Safeway, 
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶¶ 1, 26-27.
    {7}     Rooter appealed the following two issues to this Court pursuant to Rule 12-502
    NMRA: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there are genuine issues of
    material fact regarding whether Safeway has any common law right to indemnification
    against Rooter where Rooter had settled and satisfied its proportionate share of liability with
    the Plaintiffs; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Rooter owes
    Safeway its defense fees and costs even though the contractual indemnification provision
    between Safeway and Rooter is void and unenforceable as a matter of law. We granted
    certiorari. Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing & Drain SSS, 
    2013-NMCERT-001
     (No.
    33,969, Jan. 28, 2013).
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    {8}     This appeal requires this Court to review a lower court’s grant of summary judgment.
    “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and
    the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
    
    1998-NMSC-046
    , ¶ 6, 
    126 N.M. 396
    , 
    970 P.2d 582
     (citation omitted). A lower court’s grant
    or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See 
    id.
     “The validity of an
    indemnification agreement and interpretation of statutes raises issues of law, which we
    review de novo.” J.R. Hale Contracting Co., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R., 
    2008-NMCA-037
    , ¶
    62, 
    143 N.M. 574
    , 
    179 P.3d 579
     (citation omitted). All issues raised in this appeal are legal
    issues, which we review de novo.
    III.   DISCUSSION
    4
    {9}     Rooter argues that because it satisfied its proportionate share of negligence with the
    Plaintiffs, and because Safeway was never held liable for Rooter’s negligence, Safeway does
    not have a right to traditional indemnification against Rooter. Rooter further asserts that
    traditional indemnification is inapplicable where fault can be apportioned under comparative
    negligence principles to the party seeking indemnification. Rooter, therefore, concludes that
    because each party was held liable for their proportionate share of the fault, there is no basis
    for traditional indemnification and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was
    proper.
    {10} Safeway responds that it is entitled to traditional indemnification from Rooter
    because a jury’s apportionment of fault does not preclude Safeway’s right to common law
    indemnification against Rooter. Safeway argues that “[n]otwithstanding the doctrine of
    comparative negligence, New Mexico still adheres to traditional and proportional indemnity
    principles in some circumstances.” Such circumstances include vicarious liability cases, to
    which Safeway analogizes to the nondelegable duty doctrine that also being the theory under
    which Plaintiffs had originally sought damages.
    {11} The doctrines of indemnity are perplexing as a result of their often misunderstood
    relationship to contribution. Indeed, the parties in this case often confuse or incorrectly
    interchange traditional and proportional indemnity in their arguments. In addition, our shift
    from contributory negligence to comparative negligence and several liability has further
    confused the doctrines. We take this opportunity to clarify the relationships between
    traditional indemnification, proportional indemnification, contribution, and comparative
    negligence. We refer to common law indemnification, sometimes called equitable
    indemnification, as traditional indemnification for the sake of clarity and consistency.
    A.     The origins of traditional indemnity sought to mitigate the common law rule
    against contribution among tortfeasors
    {12} The common law did not permit contribution or any form of pro rata contribution
    among tortfeasors. See Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 
    1969-NMSC-089
    , ¶
    6, 
    80 N.M. 432
    , 
    457 P.2d 364
    ; Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
    (K.B. 1799). The basic theoretical bar at common law to any apportionment among those
    who committed torts, whether by indemnity or by contribution, was the unwillingness of the
    law as a matter of policy to make relative value judgments of degrees of culpability. See 42
    C.J.S. Indemnity, § 27 (2015). Additionally, tort law was considered punitive, thus
    distribution among tortfeasors diluted its impact. See Francis H. Bohlen, Contribution and
    Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 
    21 Cornell L. Rev. 552
    , 557-59 (1936)(footnotes omitted).
    Commentators and scholars criticized the doctrine’s all-or-nothing philosophy terming it a
    “chronic invalid who will not die.” W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of
    Torts § 65, at 453 (5th ed. 1984).
    {13} As a result of the common law rule against contribution, courts resorted to the
    doctrine of indemnity to mitigate the harshness of the no-contribution rule. See Schneider
    5
    Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 
    843 P.2d 561
    , 573 (Wyo. 1992) (“[Traditional] indemnity’s
    growth may be directly traced to a reaction to the common law prohibition of contribution.”
    (citation omitted)). This Court likewise “realized that the bar against contribution often
    worked inequities,” which “led to the recognition of actions for indemnification which
    provided for a complete shifting of liability from one party to another in cases where a party
    was held only vicariously liable.” Otero v. Jordan Rest. Enters., 
    1996-NMSC-047
    , ¶ 9, 
    122 N.M. 187
    , 
    922 P.2d 569
     (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
    {14} Courts began to discover, however, that the bar to contribution among fault-bearing
    tortfeasors worked injustice in certain other cases in which the indemnitee, while to some
    degree personally at fault, was much less culpable than the indemnitor. Some courts thus
    expanded indemnity to include cases where the difference in relative degrees of fault was
    so great that the negligence of one tortfeasor could be judged “active” in relation to the
    “passive” negligence of the other. See Am. Motorcycle Ass’n v. Super. Ct., 
    578 P.2d 899
    , 908
    (Cal. 1978) (“[T]he equitable indemnity doctrine originated in the common sense proposition
    that when two individuals are responsible for a loss, but one of the two is more culpable than
    the other, it is only fair that the more culpable party should bear a greater share of the loss.”);
    Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 
    282 N.E.2d 288
    , 292-95 (N.Y. 1972) superseded by statute as
    stated in N.Y. Hosp. Medical Ctr. Of Queens v. Microtech Contracting Corp., 
    5 N.E.3d 993
    ,
    998 (N.Y. 2014) (discussing origins of distinction between active and passive tortfeasors and
    role played by common-law lack of contribution).
    {15} New Mexico first adopted the active/passive and in pari delicto tests in the 1940s and
    continues to follow these doctrines today. See Krametbauer v. McDonald, 
    1940-NMSC-049
    ,
    ¶¶ 43, 50, 
    44 N.M. 473
    , 
    104 P.2d 900
     (holding that indemnity was not allowed because
    negligence of both parties was “active”). Acting in pari delicto simply refers to the parties
    being “negligent in an equal degree.” Trujillo v. Berry, 
    1987-NMCA-072
    , ¶ 7, 
    106 N.M. 86
    ,
    
    738 P.2d 1331
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The right to traditional
    indemnification “involves whether the conduct of the party seeking indemnification was
    passive and not active or in pari delicto with the indemnitor.” Amrep Southwest, Inc. v.
    Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc. (In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig.), 1995-
    NMSC-020, ¶ 10, 
    119 N.M. 542
    , 
    893 P.2d 438
     (Amrep).
    Active conduct ‘is found if an indemnitee has personally participated in an
    affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions
    by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to perform a precise duty which
    the indemnitee had [a duty to perform]’. Passive conduct occurs when the
    party seeking indemnification fails to discover and remedy a dangerous
    situation created by the negligence or wrongdoing of another.
    Id. ¶ 12 (citations omitted). “In essence, traditional indemnification is a judicially created
    common-law right that grants to one who is held liable an all-or-nothing right of recovery
    from a third party . . . .” Id. ¶ 7.
    6
    {16} New Mexico also enacted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
    (UCATA) in 1947 as another method to avoid the harshness of the rule against contribution
    without changing the underlying law of joint and several liability. See NMSA 1978, §§
    41-3-1 to -8 (1947, as amended through 1987). The purpose of this Act was “to provide for
    a proportionate allocation of the burden among tortfeasors who are liable”, Rio Grande Gas
    Co., 
    1969-NMSC-089
    , ¶ 6 (citations omitted), and “to prevent [the injured person] from
    relieving one joint tortfeasor of the obligation of contribution except where the injured
    person has also released the other tortfeasors from [their] pro rata share of the common
    liability”. See Garrison v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 
    1964-NMSC-099
    , ¶ 6, 
    74 N.M. 238
    ,
    
    392 P.2d 580
     (omission in original) (citation omitted); see also Burt v. W. Jersey Health Sys.,
    
    771 A.2d 683
    , 687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“The Joint Tortfeasors Contribution
    Law is also designed to ‘alleviate the evident harshness and inequity of the common-law
    rule . . . pursuant to which there was no right of joint tortfeasors to seek allocation among
    themselves of the burden of their fault.’” (citation omitted)). The UCATA expressly reserved
    the right to indemnity in New Mexico. See Section 41-3-6 (providing that this Act “does not
    impair any right of indemnity under existing law”).
    {17} In conclusion, both traditional indemnity and the UCATA sought to soften the all-or-
    nothing rule of common law contributory negligence. Traditional indemnification and the
    active/passive test evolved as a restitutionary device designed to ensure that the most
    culpable party, as between the two wrongdoers, bore the ultimate loss. In contrast, whereas
    traditional indemnification implies shifting 100% of the loss to the passive tortfeasor,
    contribution contemplates a shift of only part of the loss to the other tortfeasor. See Rio
    Grande Gas Co., 
    1969-NMSC-089
    , ¶ 13 (“[T]he difference between indemnity and
    contribution in cases between persons liable for an injury to another is that, with indemnity,
    the right to recover springs from a contract, express or implied, and enforces a duty on the
    primary wrongdoer to respond for all damages; with contribution, an obligation is imposed
    by law upon one joint tortfeasor to contribute his share to the discharge of the common
    liability.”).
    B.     New Mexico adopts comparative fault and several liability but retains the rights
    to indemnity and contribution
    {18} The move to comparative negligence began with this Court’s ruling in Scott v. Rizzo,
    
    1981-NMSC-021
    , ¶ 30, 
    96 N.M. 682
    , 
    634 P.2d 1234
    , superseded by statute as stated in
    Delfino v. Griffo, 
    2011-NMSC-015
    , ¶ 23, 
    150 N.M. 97
    , 
    257 P.3d 917
    . This Court established
    a system of comparative fault which, rather than barring a plaintiff’s recovery completely
    if the plaintiff was at fault, allows liability for damages to be split amongst negligent actors
    who contribute to a harm suffered.
    The thrust of the comparative negligence doctrine is to accomplish (1)
    apportionment of fault between or among negligent parties whose negligence
    proximately causes any part of [a] loss or injury, and (2) apportionment of
    the total damages resulting from such loss or injury in proportion to the fault
    7
    of each party.
    Id. ¶ 20.
    {19} Comparative negligence limits a party’s liability in such a way that joint and several
    liability does not: “[A]ll parties [are] fully responsible for their own respective acts to the
    degree that those acts have caused harm,” and a “jury must ascertain the percentage of
    negligence of all participants to an occurrence,” so that no party is held liable under
    comparative negligence for the harm that party did not inflict. Garcia v. Gordon, 2004-
    NMCA-114, ¶ 8, 
    136 N.M. 394
    , 
    98 P.3d 1044
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). The Scott court noted that the pure form of comparative negligence has three
    benefits: (1) it denies recovery for one’s own fault; (2) it permits recovery to the extent of
    another’s fault; and (3) it holds parties responsible to the degree that they have caused harm.
    See 
    1981-NMSC-021
    , ¶ 29.
    {20} Not long after Scott, the Court of Appeals held that “[j]oint and several liability is not
    to be retained in our pure comparative negligence system on a theory of one indivisible
    wrong. The concept of one indivisible wrong, based on common law technicalities, is
    obsolete, and is not to be applied in comparative negligence cases in New Mexico.” Bartlett
    v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 
    1982-NMCA-048
    , ¶ 33, 
    98 N.M. 152
    , 
    646 P.2d 579
     (citation
    omitted), superseded by statute as stated in Payne v. Hall, 
    2006-NMSC-029
    , ¶ 11, 
    139 N.M. 659
    , 
    137 P.3d 599
     (citation omitted).
    {21} The New Mexico Legislature codified the principles of Scott and Bartlett in 1987.
    See NMSA 1978, §§ 41-3A-1 to -2 (1987); Reichert v. Atler, 
    1992-NMCA-134
    , ¶ 34, 
    117 N.M. 628
    , 
    875 P.2d 384
     (“Following our Supreme Court’s decision in Scott and this Court’s
    decision in Bartlett, our [L]egislature enacted legislation continuing the doctrine of joint and
    several liability in certain situations.” (Footnote and citation omitted)). The statute provides
    that:
    In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the
    doctrine imposing joint and several liability upon two or more wrongdoers
    whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished
    except as otherwise provided hereafter. The liability of any such defendants
    shall be several.
    Section 41-3A-1(A). The same section further provides that a defendant who is severally
    liable shall be liable only for the amount of harm that the defendant’s damage caused, and
    not jointly liable for any harm another party caused:
    In causes of action to which several liability applies, any defendant who
    establishes that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury
    shall be liable only for that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as
    damages to the plaintiff that is equal to the ratio of such defendant’s fault to
    8
    the total fault attributed to all persons, including plaintiffs, defendants and
    persons not party to the action.
    Section 41-3A-1(B).
    {22} The Legislature reserved the application of joint-and-several liability to the following
    specific situations:
    (1) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting
    injury or damage;
    (2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one
    person vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of
    the total liability attributed to those persons;
    (3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a
    defective product, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to
    those persons; or
    (4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a
    sound basis in public policy.
    Section 41-3A-1(C).
    {23} This Court has applied Section 41-3A-1 to mean that, “[u]nder our comparative
    negligence system, each negligent party is charged an amount representing its percentage
    of fault.” Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 
    1998-NMSC-027
    , ¶ 11, 
    125 N.M. 643
    , 
    964 P.2d 807
     (citing Section 41-3A-1(B)). Tortfeasors must now accept responsibility for damages
    commensurate with their own relative culpability unless one of the specified exceptions to
    joint and several liability apply. See Otero, 
    1996-NMSC-047
    , ¶ 11 (“New Mexico tort law
    is premised on the notion that each concurrent tortfeasor should bear responsibility for an
    accident in accordance with his or her fault.”).
    {24} Several liability incorporates the Scott/Bartlett approach of limiting several liability
    to particular causes of action. Section 41-3A-1(A) states that the doctrine of several liability
    applies to “any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies,” unless
    the statute provides an exception. In this context, comparative fault is the affirmative defense
    that reduces the defendant’s liability by the percentage of fault attributable to the
    plaintiff—the doctrine created in Scott. Unless a provision of the statute provides otherwise,
    several liability applies to any cause of action to which the partial affirmative defense of
    comparative negligence applies to plaintiff’s cause of action.
    {25} In addition, this Court modified traditional indemnification in 1995 by adopting
    proportional indemnity, “under which a defendant who is otherwise denied apportionment
    9
    of fault may seek partial recovery from another at fault.” Amrep, 
    1995-NMSC-020
    , ¶ 36.
    Amrep reasoned proportional indemnification goes hand-in-hand with New Mexico’s
    adoption of comparative fault.
    [T]o establish an equitable system in which a defendant who cannot raise the
    fault of a concurrent tortfeasor as a defense because of the plaintiff’s choice
    of remedy, we adopt the doctrine of proportional indemnification . . . [to fill]
    a void in the overall picture that contemplates proration of liability among all
    those at fault. . . . By embracing proportional indemnification, this Court
    takes comparative fault and several liability another logical step.
    Id. ¶¶ 36, 40-41. Proportional indemnification applies when the one seeking indemnification
    “has been adjudged liable for full damages on a third-party claim that is not susceptible
    under law to proration of fault among joint tortfeasors.” Id. ¶ 38. “[P]roportional
    indemnification applies only when contribution or some other form of proration of fault
    among tortfeasors is not available.” Id. ¶ 39. “[P]roportional indemnification does not apply
    when [the UCATA] provides for proration of damages among joint tortfeasors.” Id. ¶ 37
    (citation omitted). For example, actions for negligence are governed by comparative fault,
    which apportions fault among tortfeasors, so traditional indemnity principles apply because
    each tortfeasor is liable only for his or her share of the fault and will never pay more
    damages than his or her share. On the other hand, when a plaintiff chooses to sue under
    breach of contract, a defendant “should be able to seek proportional indemnification for that
    percentage of fault attributable to” another. Id. ¶ 41.
    {26} Therefore, indemnification now takes several forms in New Mexico. “[T]raditional
    indemnification is a judicially created common-law right that grants to one who is held liable
    an all-or-nothing right of recovery from a third party . . . .” Id. New Mexico also recognizes
    proportional indemnification, which allows defendants to recover from a third-party for the
    portion of a plaintiff’s loss which the third-party’s conduct caused, even when the law does
    not apportion fault amongst tortfeasors under a theory of comparative fault. “When
    applicable, proportional indemnification allows a defendant to seek partial recovery from
    another for his or her fault.” N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-
    067, ¶ 23, 
    145 N.M. 316
    , 
    198 P.3d 342
    . And, although joint-and-several liability was for the
    most part abolished when New Mexico adopted a comparative fault regime,
    joint-and-several liability has been retained in certain matters by statute, which allows a
    tortfeasor to seek contribution or indemnification from a fellow tortfeasor. See § 41-3A-1.
    C.     Traditional indemnity does not apply when the jury finds a tortfeasor actively
    at fault and apportions liability using comparative fault principles
    {27} The parties differ as to the effect Amrep has on a party’s right to traditional
    indemnification. Safeway asserts that this Court made it clear that traditional indemnification
    was to survive the adoption of comparative fault and proportional indemnification. Rooter,
    however, argues that Amrep specifically indicated that traditional indemnification is not
    10
    applicable where fault for negligence is to be apportioned under New Mexico’s system of
    comparative fault.
    {28} Because recovery under traditional indemnification requires at least one active
    tortfeasor and one passive concurrent tortfeasor, the remedy only applies in a limited number
    of tort cases premised on vicarious or derivative liability. For example, the Restatement
    (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22 (Am. Law Inst. 2000) provides:
    (a) When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm
    and one of them discharges the liability of another in whole or in part by
    settlement or discharge of judgment, the person discharging the liability is
    entitled to recover indemnity in the amount paid to the plaintiff, plus
    reasonable legal expenses, if:
    (1) the indemnitor has agreed by contract to indemnify
    the indemnitee, or
    (2) the indemnitee
    (I) was not liable except vicariously for the
    tort of the indemnitor, or
    (ii) was not liable except as a seller of a
    product supplied to the indemnitee by the indemnitor
    and the indemnitee was not independently culpable.
    (b) A person who is otherwise entitled to recover indemnity
    pursuant to contract may do so even if the party against whom indemnity is
    sought would not be liable to the plaintiff.
    The Restatement (Third) of Torts is consistent with our past observations in Amrep that:
    [t]he right to indemnification may arise through vicarious or derivative
    liability, as when an employer must pay for the negligent conduct of its
    employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior or when a person is
    directed by another to do something that appears innocent but is in fact
    wrongful. Further, traditional indemnification principles apply in both
    negligence and strict liability cases involving persons in the chain of supply
    of a product, and in breach of warranty cases.
    
    1995-NMSC-020
    , ¶ 9 (citations omitted); see also Otero, 
    1996-NMSC-047
    , ¶¶ 3 n.2, 14
    (affirming the district court’s finding that a restaurant “would be entitled to indemnification
    from the contractor and architect for whose negligence [the restaurant] is liable” because
    “[t]his reasoning accords with the general rule that one held vicariously liable has an action
    11
    for traditional indemnification against the person whose act or omission gave rise to the
    vicarious liability.” (citations omitted)).
    {29}     In each one of these factual scenarios, traditional indemnification would allow a
    party who has been found liable without active fault to seek restitution from someone who
    was actively at fault. Importantly, a finding of negligence does not necessarily mean a
    finding of active conduct. For example, if a claim alleges that a contractor failed to discover
    and remedy a dangerous condition, that is passive conduct—if the contractor in the exercise
    of ordinary care could not have discovered the dangerous condition—and traditional
    indemnification would be available from the active concurrent tortfeasor who created the
    dangerous condition. See Amrep, 
    1995-NMSC-020
    , ¶¶ 12-13 (defining passive conduct and
    providing an example to distinguish passive conduct from active conduct in failing to
    discover and remedy a dangerous situation). Alternatively, if the contractor discovered, or
    should have discovered, the dangerous condition and did not remedy the dangerous
    condition, that is active conduct, and traditional indemnification is not available. See id. ¶
    19. In strict liability cases, only if the retailer was blameless—passive conduct—is the
    retailer entitled to full indemnification from the manufacturer. See id. ¶ 24.
    {30} Retaining traditional indemnification is consistent with the equitable goals of our
    comparative fault regime. Id. ¶ 36. Comparative fault ensures that all actively negligent
    parties pay for their respective faults. See id. ¶ 37. Traditional indemnification ensures that
    a party who is not actively at fault can force the actively at fault party to pay. See id. ¶ 10.
    {31} Comparative fault is inapplicable under true vicarious and derivative liability
    scenarios because the “ ‘vicariously liable party has not committed any breach of duty to the
    plaintiff but is held liable simply as a matter of legal imputation of responsibility for
    another’s tortious acts.’ ” Valdez v. R-Way, LLC, 
    2010-NMCA-068
    , ¶ 7, 
    148 N.M. 477
    , 
    237 P.3d 1289
     (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. § 13 cmts. b, c).
    The Legislature therefore excluded true vicarious and derivative liability from several
    liability because those whose liability is only vicarious are only liable because “someone
    else’s fault is imputed to them by operation of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted). Our Legislature left traditional indemnification as the only scheme for a
    passive joint tortfeasor to recover from the active joint tortfeasor under the four categories
    of vicarious and derivative liability listed above. See id. ¶ 6.
    {32} Preserving traditional indemnification by limiting its application to situations of
    vicarious and derivative liability situations where the indemnitee is not actively negligent,
    is consistent with the approach adopted by a majority of jurisdictions that have adopted
    comparative fault; these jurisdictions follow the indemnification principles summarized in
    the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability.1 Previously, under the
    1
    See, e.g., Mizuho Corp. Bank (USA) v. Cory & Assocs., Inc., 
    341 F.3d 644
    , 652-653
    (7th Cir. 2003) (applying Illinois law); Nichols v. CitiGroup Global Mkts., Inc., 
    364 F. Supp. 12
    Restatement (Second) of Torts, an actively negligent concurrent tortfeasor could recover
    from a more actively negligent concurrent tortfeasor in traditional indemnification. See
    Restatement (Second) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. § 886B (Am. Law Inst. 1979). For
    example, an indemnitee would have a right to indemnity when the “indemnitor supplied a
    defective chattel or performed defective work upon land or buildings as a result of which
    both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to
    discover the defect.” Restatement (Second) of Torts: §886B(2)(d) (emphasis added).
    {33} Therefore, we reiterate that traditional indemnity survives and co-exists with
    comparative negligence, several liability, and proportional indemnification in New Mexico
    because it “addresses other considerations of contractual right or of restitution to which a
    passive wrongdoer is entitled.” Amrep, 
    1995-NMSC-020
    , ¶ 40. We also adopt the Section
    22, Restatement (Third) of Torts, in place of Section 886B, Restatement (Second) of Torts,
    because it correctly limits the application of traditional indemnity to cases truly premised on
    vicarious or derivative liability.
    {34} Accordingly, traditional indemnity is not applicable in this case because Plaintiffs
    clearly advanced, and the jury found, theories of liability that alleged Safeway to be an
    active tortfeasor. The parties agreed at a summary judgment motion hearing that Safeway
    would not have to pay for any negligence that is found to have been committed by Rooter
    and that is exactly what occurred. The district court therefore instructed the jury on the
    following four active negligence theories: (1) failure to provide proper instructions and
    hardware for the baby changing station installation, (2) failure to supervise the station
    installation, (3) failure to inspect the station after installation, and (4) failure to periodically
    inspect the station between the time of installation and the time of Plaintiff’s injury. Safeway
    acknowledges as much in its docketing statement, and concedes that in the comparative
    negligence context, it has no right to indemnification from Rooter for its own active
    negligence.
    {35} Further, this is not a true vicarious or derivative liability case that would entitle
    Safeway to traditional indemnity because the jury found Safeway actively at fault. Safeway
    and Rooter were adjudged liable for their proportion of fault–40% Safeway, 60% Rooter. To
    hold either party liable for more or less of their fault would be inequitable and contrary to
    the goals of both comparative negligence and traditional indemnity. Therefore, we reverse
    2d 1330, 1339-40 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (applying Alabama law); Orient Overseas Container
    Line v. John T. Clark & Sons of Boston, Inc., 
    229 F. Supp. 2d 4
    , 15 (D. Mass. 2002)
    (applying Massachusetts law); Barry v. Hildreth, 
    9 A.D.3d 341
    , 342, 
    780 N.Y.S.2d 159
    , 161
    (N.Y.App. Div. 2004); Bowyer v. Hi-Lad, Inc., 
    609 S.E.2d 895
    , 914 (W.Va. 2004); Horowitz
    v. Laske, 
    855 So.2d 169
    , 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v.
    Lee, 
    784 N.E.2d 566
    , 575-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Med James, Inc. v. Barnes, 
    61 P.3d 86
    (Kan. Ct. App. 2003); Hamway v. Braud, 
    838 So.2d 803
    , 806-07 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Carr
    v. Home Ins. Co., 463, 
    458 S.E.2d 457
     (Va. 1995).
    13
    the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court’s dismissal of Safeway’s cross-claim for
    traditional indemnification.
    D.     Rooter does not have a duty to defend under the Agreement because the whole
    indemnification clause is void and unenforceable under the 1971 version of
    Section 56-7-1 and is against public policy
    {36}   As mentioned above, the Agreement between Rooter and Safeway provided that:
    [Rooter] shall indemnify, defend and hold [Safeway] harmless from and
    against; any and all claims, losses, damages, liabilities, and expenses
    (including the costs of investigation and attorney’s fees) in connection with
    any claim or cause of action arising from any act or omission of [Rooter,] its
    employees, agents, and representatives, in the performance of its obligations
    under this Agreement, except where the claim, loss or damage is caused by
    the sole negligence of [Safeway].
    {37} This Court must determine whether the contractual provision requiring Rooter
    to defend and maintain liability insurance and name Safeway as an additional insured is
    enforceable under Section 56-7-1.
    {38} “Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In
    doing so, we examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was
    promulgated . . . .” State v. Office of Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 
    2012-NMSC-029
    , ¶ 13, 
    285 P.3d 622
     (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under the rules of statutory
    construction, [w]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must
    give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” First Baptist
    Church of Roswell v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 
    2015-NMSC-004
    , ¶ 9, 
    345 P.3d 310
     (alteration
    in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We also “look at the overall
    structure and function of the statute, as well as the public policy embodied in the statute.”
    Delfino, 
    2011-NMSC-015
    , ¶ 12 (citations omitted) ; see also State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of
    Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
    1981-NMSC-031
    , ¶ 14, 
    95 N.M. 588
    , 
    624 P.2d 530
     (“In ascertaining the legislative intent, we look not only to the language used in [a]
    statute, but also to the object sought to be accomplished and the wrong to be remedied.”
    (citation omitted)).
    {39}    The 1971 version of Section 56-7-1 provides:
    Any provision, contained in any agreement relating to the construction,
    installation, alteration, modification, repair, maintenance . . . of any real
    property . . . by which any party to the agreement agrees to indemnify the
    indemnitee, or the agents and employees of the indemnitee, against liability,
    claims, damages, losses or expenses, including attorney fees, arising out of
    bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by, or resulting from,
    14
    in whole or in part, the negligence, act or omission of the indemnitee, or the
    agents or employees of the indemnitee, or any legal entity for whose
    negligence, acts or omissions any of them may be liable, is against public
    policy and is void and unenforceable . . .
    In 2003, Section 56-7-1 was amended to specifically include agreements to insure and
    defend against the indemnitee’s negligence, stating: “A provision in a construction contract
    that requires one party to indemnify, hold harmless, insure or defend the other party to the
    contract” against liability for the negligence, act or omission of the indemnitee “is void,
    unenforceable and against the public policy of the state.” NMSA 1978, Section 56-7-1(A)
    (2003, amended 2005). The Court of Appeals held that the 1971 version of Section 56-7-1
    applies in this case and that issue is not disputed. See Safeway, 
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶ 27.
    Because the agreement was signed by the parties on November 26, 2002, we agree.
    {40} The Court of Appeals concluded, though, that while the indemnification provision
    under the contract was void and unenforceable under NMSA 1978, Section 56-7-1 (1971,
    amended 2005), Rooter still had a duty to defend Safeway. Safeway, 
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶¶
    26-27, 29. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the duty to defend is “distinct and separate
    from an agreement to indemnify” and that the 1971 version of Section 56-7-1 did not
    prohibit such agreements. Safeway, 
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶ 28 (citation omitted). The Court of
    Appeals further noted that Section 56-7-1 (1971) does not preclude defend and insure
    provisions in construction contracts, unlike the 2003 version of Section 56-7-1. Safeway,
    
    2013-NMCA-021
    , ¶ 26.
    {41} Rooter cites Sierra v. Garcia, 
    1987-NMSC-116
    , 
    106 N.M. 573
    , 
    746 P.2d 1105
     to
    support its assertion that Section 56-7-1 voids the entire contractual agreement, and not
    merely part of it. In contrast, Safeway argues that pursuant to City of Albuquerque v. BPLW
    Architects & Eng’rs, Inc., 
    2009-NMCA-081
    , 
    146 N.M. 717
    , 
    213 P.3d 1146
    , (BPLW) the
    indemnity provision can be read out of the agreement leaving the defense provision intact
    because Rooter’s duty to defend and insure is separate and distinct from Rooter’s duty to
    indemnify Safeway.
    {42} In Sierra, a general contractor was sued for the wrongful death of a subcontractor’s
    employee and filed a third-party complaint against the subcontractor asserting that the
    subcontractor had agreed to indemnify the general contractor. 
    1987-NMSC-116
    , ¶ 1. The
    agreement between the contractor and general contractor provided that “Subcontractor shall
    defend at its own cost and indemnify and hold harmless Contractor and Owner, their agents
    and employees from any and all liability, damages, losses, claims and expenses, however
    caused resulting directly or indirectly from or connected with the performance of this
    subcontract.” Sierra, 
    1987-NMSC-116
    , ¶ 4. This Court rejected the notion that portions of
    the agreement could be read out in order to render any part of the provision enforceable. Id.
    ¶¶ 6, 10. Instead, Sierra held “that the contract is voided in its entirety by . . . [Section 56-7-
    1 (1971, amended 2005)].” Id. ¶ 10.
    15
    {43} BPLW involved a “dispute over an indemnification clause in a contract between the
    City of Albuquerque and BPLW Architects & Engineers, Inc.” after a pedestrian was injured
    at the facility. BPLW, 
    2009-NMCA-081
    , ¶ 1. The City requested that BPLW provide its
    defense pursuant to the agreement, which BPLW denied. 
    Id.
     In examining whether BPLW
    was contractually obligated to defend the City, the Court of Appeals examined the language
    of the defend and indemnify clause, which provided that BPLW agreed “to defend,
    indemnify, and hold harmless the City . . . against all suits . . . brought against the City
    because of any injury or damage received or sustained by any person . . . arising out of or
    resulting from any negligent act, error, or omission of [BPLW] . . . arising out of the
    performance of this Agreement.” Id. ¶ 14 (alteration and omissions in original). The Court
    of Appeals concluded that “there [was] no language in the contract that limit[ed] BPLW’s
    duty to defend the City” and that “the plain language of [the] clause indicate[d] that the duty
    to defend applies to all suits against the City arising out of a negligent act, error, or omission
    of BPLW arising out of the performance of the agreement.” Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals
    held that “BPLW ha[d] a duty to defend the City, even if only the City [was] alleged to be
    negligent, as long as the cause of action [arose] from the alleged negligent act, error, or
    omission of BPLW.” Id. ¶ 15. The Court noted that this interpretation of the contract
    furthered the policy behind both versions of Section 56-7-1, which is to promote “safety in
    construction projects by holding each party to the contract accountable for injuries caused
    by its own negligence.” Id. ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
    {44} The Agreement in this case does not require Rooter to defend Safeway only for
    claims arising out of Rooter’s negligence in performance of the contract. Instead, the
    Agreement also requires a defense of Safeway for Safeway’s own negligence, “except where
    the claim, loss or damage is caused by the sole negligence of [Safeway].” Sierra made clear
    that the anti-indemnity statute voids the entire contractual agreement, not merely part of it,
    when the clause requires the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee’s
    own negligence. This case and Sierra are distinct from BPLW because BPLW only had to
    indemnify the city against suits “arising out of or resulting from any negligent act, error, or
    omission of [BPLW].” BPLW, 
    2009-NMCA-081
    , ¶ 14.
    {45} The indemnification provision in this case is statutorily void and unenforceable
    because it requires Rooter to indemnify Safeway for Safeway’s own negligence. Similarly,
    as a matter of both law and policy, Rooter should not have to pay for Safeway’s legal
    defense caused by Safeway’s own fault where Rooter settled with Plaintiffs for its share of
    fault. As noted by BPLW,
    Both the current version and the version in effect at the time the contract was
    executed, however, have the same effect because both ensure that an
    indemnitor only has to indemnify for causes of action that arise from the
    indemnitor’s own negligent conduct. In addition, both versions of the statute
    are based on a public policy promoting safety in construction projects by
    holding each party to the contract accountable for injuries caused by its own
    negligence.
    16
    
    2009-NMCA-081
    , ¶ 19 (citation omitted). This public policy is frustrated if we order Rooter
    to pay Safeway’s defense costs for Safeway’s own negligence that the jury clearly found and
    appropriately apportioned using comparative fault. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of
    Appeals on the issue of the contractual duty to defend and affirm the district court’s grant
    of summary judgment.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    {46} We hold that traditional indemnity is not applicable in this case because the jury
    apportioned fault under comparative negligence principles. And because we hold that
    Rooter’s contractual duty to indemnify, defend, and insure Safeway under the Agreement
    is unenforceable, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that Section 56-7-1 (1971, as
    amended through 2005) did not render the defense and insurance requirements of the
    Agreement void and unenforceable. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that Rooter owed no common law or
    contractual duties to Safeway. This case is remanded to the district court for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    {47}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________________________
    PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice
    ____________________________________
    EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
    ____________________________________
    CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
    JUDITH NAKAMURA, Justice, not participating
    17