USCA11 Case: 22-10569 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 01/13/2023 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10569
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF OZARK,
Municipality,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00110-ECM-JTA
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10569
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Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Haywood Mizell appeals from the District Court’s grant of
a motion to dismiss his complaint alleging due process violations
by the City of Ozark (“the City”). The District Court granted the
City’s motion to dismiss Mizell’s claim for equitable relief based on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine. 1 The District Court dismissed Mizell’s claim for monetary
relief with prejudice as being barred by the statute of limitations.
Because Mizell does not address either ground for the District
Court’s dismissal in his brief, but instead reasserts his due process
claim, we affirm the District Court’s grant of the City’s motion to
dismiss Mizell’s claim for monetary relief. However, the District
Court erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied
to Mizell’s equitable claim. We vacate the District Court’s order in
that respect.
I.
In February 2021, Haywood Mizell, pro se, filed suit against
the City, alleging that the City seized his property at 285 Broad
Street in Ozark, Alabama—the historic “Holman House”—for
1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named for two Supreme Court cases:
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413,
44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
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22-10569 Opinion of the Court 3
public use without just compensation, in violation of his due pro-
cess rights. The bulk of Mizell’s complaint focuses on allegedly
fraudulent conduct by Wells Fargo, the mortgage holder, and a
wrongful foreclosure action Wells Fargo initiated against Mizell in
2013. The City purchased the property at the subsequent (and al-
legedly fraudulent) 2013 foreclosure sale. Mizell requested just
compensation for what he claims was the illegal seizure of his prop-
erty by the City.
The City filed a motion to dismiss Mizell’s claims under
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss argued (1) the
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mizell’s
claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) that Mizell’s claims
were barred by Alabama’s statute of limitations; (3) that Mizell’s
claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel; and (4) that Mizell failed to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.
The matter was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636. The magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
tion (“R&R”) recommended that the District Court grant the City’s
motion to dismiss and dismiss Mizell’s complaint without preju-
dice. The R&R stated that Mizell’s claim for equitable relief was
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Mizell’s injury
was caused by and inextricably intertwined with state court rul-
ings—namely the state proceedings that twice upheld the validity
of the foreclosure deed against Mizell. As such the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The R&R also stated that
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10569
Mizell’s claim for monetary relief was barred by Alabama’s two-
year statute of limitations. The R&R did not reach the City’s other
arguments.
Both parties objected. Mizell objected to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation to dismiss his claims; the City objected to
the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Mizell’s claims
for monetary relief without prejudice.
The District Court determined that two of Mizell’s objec-
tions to the R&R merited de novo review: Mizell’s objection to dis-
missal of his equitable claim under Rooker-Feldman and his objec-
tion to dismissal of his claim for monetary damages.
With respect to the former, the District Court held that “it
is clear that [Mizell] seeks injunctive and declaratory relief from a
2013 foreclosure proceeding in state court that resulted in the De-
fendant purchasing the property at issue.” Mizell v. City of Ozark,
2022 WL 463107, at *1 (M.D. Ala., Feb. 15, 2022). The District
Court found Rooker-Feldman applicable to Mizell’s equitable
claim because Mizell’s injury was caused by the underlying state
court proceeding that permitted the City to purchase Mizell’s fore-
closed property and that Mizell sought to have the District Court
reverse that state court decision. Id. at *2. As such, the Court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Regarding the latter objection, the District Court agreed
with the R&R that Mizell’s claim for monetary damages was barred
by Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations. Id. According to the
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22-10569 Opinion of the Court 5
Court, that statute of limitations began to run on February 19,
2013, when the City purchased the foreclosed property, because
that is when Mizell knew that he had been injured. Id. The District
Court differed from the R&R, however, in one respect: the District
Court opinion sustained the City’s objection to dismissing Mizell’s
claim for monetary relief without prejudice because the statute of
limitations had run. Id. The Court thus adopted the R&R but
modified it to dismiss Mizell’s claim for monetary damages with
prejudice. Id. Mizell timely appealed.
II.
Generally, we would review both Mizell’s equitable and
monetary claims de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favora-
ble to the plaintiff. Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1463, 1465
(1998) (reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction de novo); Henderson v. McMurray,
987 F.3d 997, 1001
(11th Cir. 2021) (reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim de novo). However, a legal claim or argument that has not
been briefed is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be ad-
dressed. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1330
(11th Cir. 2004).
An issue is also considered abandoned when “a party seeking
to raise a claim or issue on appeal [fails] to plainly and prominently
so indicate.” United States v. Jernigan,
341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.8
(11th Cir. 2003). An appellant abandons a claim when: (a) he makes
only passing references to it, (b) he raises it in a perfunctory manner
without supporting arguments and authority, (c) he refers to it only
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10569
in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument,” (d)
the references to the issue are mere background to the appellant’s
main arguments or are buried within those arguments, or (e) he
raises it for the first time in his reply brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
ridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681-683 (11th Cir. 2014).
Mizell proceeded pro se in this appeal. While we read briefs
filed by pro se litigants like Mizell liberally, issues not briefed on
appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned, just as if Mizell
had had counsel. Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.
2008). Neither do we address arguments raised for the first time in
a pro se litigant’s reply brief.
Id.
Here, Mizell abandons any argument he had that the District
Court erred in dismissing his claims for equitable and monetary re-
lief. The District Court based its dismissal of Mizell’s equitable
claim on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its dismissal of his mon-
etary claim on the statute of limitations. Mizell did not substan-
tively address either ground for dismissal in his principal brief. Ra-
ther than responding to the actions of the District Court, the bulk
of Mizell’s argument was focused on claims of fraudulent and de-
ceitful conduct by Wells Fargo and City of Ozark officials. While
Mizell arguably does address the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in his
reply brief, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in
a reply brief. Mizell has, therefore, abandoned any argument that
the District Court erred in its dismissal of his claims.
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22-10569 Opinion of the Court 7
III.
In its brief, the City encourages this Court to examine the
District Court’s reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in dis-
missing Mizell’s equitable claim. We review de novo a district
court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
a plaintiff’s claim in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Good-
man ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos,
259 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).
The City acknowledges that it based much of its motion to
dismiss Mizell’s equitable claim on the theory that the District
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.
According to the City, however, that motion was filed before this
Court decided Behr v. Campbell,
8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021). In
light of Behr, the City no longer believes Rooker-Feldman applies
and instead requests that this Court vacate the District Court’s
“without prejudice” dismissal of Mizell’s equitable claim based on
Rooker-Feldman and remand the action to the District Court with
instructions to dismiss the entire action with prejudice based on the
statute of limitations. Appellee’s Br. at 15-16.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
cannot review or reject state court judgments rendered before the
district court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doc-
trine is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting dis-
trict court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10569
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284,
125 S. Ct. 1517,
1521–22 (2005).
Rooker-Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,”
meaning it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district
courts whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal or tries
to call the appeal something else. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211 (citing May
v. Morgan Cnty.,
878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017)). The injury
to the plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. at 1211.
The question is not whether the whole complaint seems to chal-
lenge a previous state court judgment, but whether the resolution
of each individual claim requires review and rejection of a state
court judgment. Id. at 1213. In Behr, we warned that “district
courts should keep one thing in mind when Rooker-Feldman is
raised: it will almost never apply.” Id. at 1212.
Here, Mizell’s injury was not caused by the two Alabama
state judgments that upheld the foreclosure, but by the 2013 fore-
closure itself. Further, Mizell did not invite the District Court to
review and reject either of those judgments in his due process
claim. Instead, he requested compensation for what he deemed to
be a taking in violation of his due process rights. Therefore, the
District Court had jurisdiction over Mizell’s equitable claim and
erred in applying Rooker-Feldman.
The City requests that this Court vacate the District Court’s
“without prejudice” dismissal of Mizell’s equitable claim based on
Rooker-Feldman and remand the action to the District Court with
instructions to dismiss the entire action with prejudice based on the
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22-10569 Opinion of the Court 9
statute of limitations. The City correctly notes that an “appellee
may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any
matter appearing in the record, although his argument may in-
volve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insist-
ence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it.” Appellee’s Br. at
15 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig,
426 U.S. 479, 481,
96 S. Ct. 2158, 2159 (1976)). However, “an appellee who does not
cross-appeal may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarg-
ing his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his ad-
versary.” Lopez v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
914 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Jennings v. Stephens,
574 U.S. 271, 275,
135 S. Ct.
793, 798 (2015)). The City does just that.
Under the District Court’s order, Mizell’s equitable claim
was dismissed without prejudice. In other words, Mizell was free
to refile his equitable claim. The City argues that this Court should
vacate that order and instruct the District Court to convert its dis-
missal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice, meaning
that Mizell would no longer be able to refile his claim. We cannot
grant the City’s request because to do so would lessen Mizell’s
rights and enlarge the City’s without a cross-appeal.
However, the District Court did err in determining that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear Mizell’s equitable claim under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court does have jurisdic-
tion to hear that claim. As such, we vacate the District Court’s or-
der in that respect.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10569
IV.
The District Court order is AFFIRMED insofar as it dis-
misses Mizell’s claim for money damages as barred by the statute
of limitations and dismisses that claim with prejudice. The District
Court’s order is VACATED with respect to its dismissal of Mizell’s
claims for equitable relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction un-
der the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the matter is REMANDED
to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
