New Energy Econ. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n , 2018 NMSC 24 ( 2018 )


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    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'04- 15:40:15 2018.05.01
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 2018-NMSC-024
    Filing Date: March 5, 2018
    Docket No. S-1-SC-35697
    NEW ENERGY ECONOMY, INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION COMMISSION,
    Appellee,
    and
    PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO,
    NEW MEXICO INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSUMERS, and
    WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES,
    Intervenors-Appellees.
    In the Matter of the Application of
    Public Service Company of New Mexico for
    Approval to Abandon San Juan Generating
    Station Units 2 and 3, Issuance of Certificates
    of Public Convenience and Necessity for
    Replacement Power Resources, Issuance of
    Accounting Orders and Determination of
    Related Rate-Making Principles and Treatment,
    NMPRC Case No. 13-00390-UT
    APPEAL FROM THE NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION COMMISSION
    New Energy Economy
    Mariel Nanasi
    Santa Fe, NM
    Freedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Urias & Ward, P.A.
    John Warwick Boyd
    1
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellant
    Michael C. Smith
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellee
    PNM Resources, Inc.
    Patrick V. Apodaca
    Benjamin John Phillips
    Stacey J. Goodwin
    Albuquerque, NM
    Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP
    Patrick T. Ortiz
    Santa Fe, NM
    Keleher & McLeod, P.A.
    Thomas C. Bird
    Albuquerque, NM
    Miller Stratvert, P.A.
    Richard L. Alvidrez
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Intervenor Public Service Company of New Mexico
    Peter Jude Gould
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Intervenor New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers
    Western Resource Advocates
    Steven S. Michel
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Intervenor Western Resource Advocates
    Paul F. Hultin
    Santa Fe, NM
    Heard Robins Cloud LLP
    2
    Justin Ross Kaufman
    Rosalind Bell Bienvenu
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Amicus Curiae 350 New Mexico
    OPINION
    NAKAMURA, Chief Justice.
    {1}     New Energy Economy, Inc. (NEE) appeals from a final order issued by the New
    Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC). NEE contends that the PRC violated New
    Mexico law by approving a contested stipulation granting the Public Service Company of
    New Mexico (PNM) certificates of public convenience and necessity (CCNs) to acquire new
    generation resources and by filing a notice proposing to dismiss the protests to PNM’s 2014
    integrated resource plan (IRP). NEE’s arguments are predicated on a mistaken
    understanding of the law and ask us to accept factual assertions that were rejected below.
    We affirm the PRC’s final order.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    {2}     The record in this case is comprised of seventy-six volumes that contain nearly
    50,000 pages. It is, as PNM points out, “massive.” Any attempt at a comprehensive account
    of the background of this direct appeal would be unproductive. A brief overview of the facts
    and procedure follows immediately below. Supplemental facts are provided as necessary
    in the course of our discussion.
    {3}      The federal Clean Air Act (the Act) includes provisions designed to preserve
    visibility standards by imposing limitations on haze-causing emissions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,
    7491-92 (2012); see generally Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. U.S. E.P.A., 
    815 F.3d 519
    , 524-28
    (9th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the legislative and regulatory framework underlying the
    federal government’s efforts to address regional haze). The Act and the regulations adopted
    by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce it require states to develop state
    implementation plans to control and minimize sources of haze-causing emissions. See
    generally 
    Arizona, 815 F.3d at 524-27
    (discussing the responsibilities placed upon the states
    by the Act). If a state fails to submit a state implementation plan or submits a plan that is
    inadequate, the Act permits the EPA to impose a federal implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. §
    7410(c)(1); see generally 
    Arizona, 815 F.3d at 524-27
    .
    {4}     PNM is a part-owner of the San Juan Regional Generation Station (San Juan), a four-
    unit, coal-fired power plant near Farmington, New Mexico that is a source of emissions that
    cause or contribute to haze. The EPA rejected New Mexico’s state implementation plan to
    control and minimize haze-causing emissions at San Juan and proposed a federal
    implementation plan that would require PNM to install “extremely costly” emission controls
    3
    on all four of the San Juan units.
    {5}     Various stakeholders, including several New Mexico state agencies, the Governor
    of New Mexico, tribal leadership, and PNM, engaged in discussions and held open public
    meetings to identify an alternative to the federal implementation plan that would ensure New
    Mexico’s compliance with the federal haze standards. Ultimately, an agreement was reached
    and a revised state implementation plan was submitted to the EPA proposing the following
    course of action: PNM would retire San Juan Units Two and Three, install less-costly
    pollution controls on San Juan Units One and Four, and replace the lost generation capacity
    from the retirement of San Juan Units Two and Three with generation from other resources
    that minimize impacts on visibility. The EPA accepted the revised state implementation
    plan. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans New Mexico, 79 Fed. Reg.
    26909, 26909-21 (May 12, 2014). In the wake of the EPA’s acceptance, the focus of the
    various stakeholders turned to what resources PNM would utilize to replace the generation
    capacity lost as a consequence of the retirement of the two units. This question was
    extensively litigated before the PRC as PNM is required to obtain PRC approval to abandon,
    acquire, or construct generation resources. NMSA 1978, § 62-6-12(A)(4) (1989); NMSA
    1978, § 62-9-1(A) (2005); NMSA 1978, § 62-9-5 (2005). These statutes governing the
    PRC’s oversight of generation resources are examined more closely in our discussion.
    {6}    In December 2013, PNM filed an application with the PRC to retire San Juan Units
    Two and Three and for CCNs to utilize two sources to replace the generation capacity lost
    from the retirement of the two units: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Palo Verde)
    Unit Three and additional generation capacity from San Juan Unit Four.1 The PRC
    appointed a hearing examiner (HE) to address the merits of PNM’s applications. See
    1.2.2.29(B) NMAC (“In all proceedings, the [PRC] may designate a hearing examiner . . . to
    preside over the proceeding.”); 17.1.2.9(C) NMAC (“The [PRC], upon receipt of an
    application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, shall fix a time for a public
    hearing.”). NEE and sixteen other parties, including several New Mexico governmental
    agencies, environmental advocates, and industrial and consumer advocates, joined the
    proceedings as intervenors.
    {7}     In October 2014, after discovery had been provided and numerous witnesses and
    subject-matter experts testified at multiple hearings, PNM, along with several parties,
    submitted a stipulation that proposed a resolution to the proceedings. NEE and several other
    parties contested the stipulation. Additional hearings were conducted and the HE issued a
    thorough and detailed recommendation advising the PRC to reject the stipulation.
    {8}    The HE concluded that the stipulation was fatally flawed because PNM had not
    1
    PNM indicated that it could also utilize solar and gas resources and filed separate
    independent applications with the PRC to construct a solar photovoltaic facility and a gas
    peaking plant to make up for the capacity lost due to the retirement of the units at San Juan.
    4
    shown that San Juan Unit Four was a reliable replacement generation resource. Nevertheless,
    the HE concluded that PNM should receive a CCN to obtain replacement generation from
    Palo Verde Unit Three and determined that the stipulation as a whole should be approved
    if PNM and the other stipulating parties demonstrated that San Juan Unit Four could be
    relied upon as a replacement generation resource. PNM and the other stipulating parties
    acted on the HE’s guidance and submitted a supplemental stipulation in August 2015 that
    addressed the HE’s concerns. NEE contested the supplemental stipulation, but this time was
    joined by only one other party.
    {9}     Hearings were again conducted and the HE issued another thorough and detailed
    recommendation in which all of NEE’s objections to the supplemental stipulation were
    addressed. The HE was satisfied that PNM had demonstrated that it had adequate
    replacement resources and had resolved the issues that had previously concerned the HE
    with respect to San Juan Unit Four. The HE recommended that the PRC accept the
    supplemental stipulation with minor modifications that are not relevant here. The HE also
    recommended that the PRC accept a provision within the supplemental stipulation stating
    that “protests of PNM’s 2014 IRP should be closed without further [PRC] action in that
    docket.”
    {10} The PRC issued a final order on December 16, 2015 accepting the HE’s
    recommendations. NEE appeals the PRC’s final order. We have jurisdiction over the appeal
    under NMSA 1978, Section 62-11-1 (1993) (“Any party to any proceeding before the
    commission may file a notice of appeal in the supreme court asking for a review of the
    commission’s final orders.”).
    II.    DISCUSSION
    {11} NEE argues that “[t]he PRC’s order violates NM statutes and PRC regulations”
    because “[t]he PRC accepted PNM’s limited alternatives in violation of the law.” In support
    of its position, NEE makes many arguments that this Court finds are unpersuasive or entirely
    without merit. We begin our discussion by examining the applicable statutory and
    regulatory standards implicated by NEE’s arguments. We then review the administrative
    record and describe how these standards were applied in this case. Next, we identify the
    standard of review that governs our review of NEE’s arguments and clarify what we meant
    when we explained in the collateral mandamus proceeding NEE initiated that we would
    review this appeal with “heightened scrutiny.” Finally, we turn to NEE’s specific
    arguments.
    A.     Statutory and Regulatory Standards
    1.     IRPs
    {12} The Efficient Use of Energy Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 62-17-1 to -11 (2005, as amended
    through 2013), requires “public utilities supplying electric or natural gas service to
    5
    customers [to] periodically file an [IRP] with the [PRC].” Section 62-17-10; see also § 62-
    17-2(I) (“[P]ublic utility resource planning to meet New Mexico’s energy service needs
    should be identified and evaluated on an ongoing basis in accordance with the principles of
    integrated resource planning.”). These IRPs
    shall evaluate renewable energy, energy efficiency, load management,
    distributed generation and conventional supply-side resources on a consistent
    and comparable basis and take into consideration risk and uncertainty of fuel
    supply, price volatility and costs of anticipated environmental regulations in
    order to identify the most cost-effective portfolio of resources to supply the
    energy needs of customers.
    Section 62-17-10. “The preparation of resource plans shall incorporate a public advisory
    process.” 
    Id. The PRC
    has promulgated regulations to effectuate the IRP provisions. 17.7.3
    NMAC (04/16/2007, as amended through 08/29/2017).
    {13} Under 17.7.3.9 NMAC, utilities must file an IRP with the commission every three
    years. Each IRP is to employ a twenty-year planning horizon. 17.7.3.7(K) NMAC. An IRP
    should seek to identify “resource options” and determine “the most cost effective resource
    portfolio and alternative portfolios[.]” 17.7.3.9(B)(4),(7) NMAC.            Additionally,
    17.7.3.9(G)(1) NMAC provides as follows:
    To identify the most cost-effective resource portfolio, utilities shall evaluate
    all feasible supply, energy storage, and demand-side resource options on a
    consistent and comparable basis, and take into consideration risk and
    uncertainty (including but not limited to financial, competitive, reliability,
    operational, fuel supply, price volatility and anticipated environmental
    regulation). The utility shall evaluate the cost of each resource through its
    projected life with a life-cycle or similar analysis. The utility shall also
    consider and describe ways to mitigate ratepayer risk.
    Other statutes govern the circumstances under which a utility may procure, construct, or
    abandon generation resources.
    2.     CCNs
    {14} Utilities must obtain PRC approval whenever they seek to acquire an existing
    generation resource or abandon a generation resource. Section 62-6-12(A)(4) (“With the
    prior express authorization of the commission, but not otherwise . . . any public utility may
    sell, lease, rent, purchase or acquire any public utility plant or property constituting an
    operating unit or system or any substantial part thereof[.]”); Section 62-9-5 (“No utility shall
    abandon all or any portion of its facilities . . . without first obtaining the permission and
    approval of the commission. The commission shall grant such permission and approval,
    after notice and hearing, upon finding that the continuation of service is unwarranted or that
    6
    the present and future public convenience and necessity do not otherwise require the
    continuation of the service or use of the facility[.]”). Utilities must obtain a CCN from the
    PRC to construct or operate any new generation resource. Section 62-9-1(A) (“No public
    utility shall begin the construction or operation of any public utility plant or
    system . . . without first obtaining from the commission a certificate that public convenience
    and necessity require or will require such construction or operation.”). The PRC has
    interpreted “public convenience and necessity” to entail a net public benefit. In re Valle
    Vista Water Util. Co., 212 P.U.R. 4th 305, 309 (2001).
    {15} Throughout its briefing, NEE cites to the statutes and administrative regulations
    governing the IRP process as support for its arguments that the HE and PRC committed error
    in the stipulation and supplemental stipulation proceedings, which were initiated to resolve
    PNM’s CCN applications. NEE provided no explanation why it was citing the IRP
    regulations in its challenge to the conclusions reached in the CCN proceedings. It was only
    after we reviewed the administrative records in the proceedings arising from PNM’s 2011
    and 2014 IRPs that we understood why NEE points to the IRP standards as grounds to object
    to the CCN determination. NEE did not direct us to these records and, yet, they are essential
    to understanding NEE’s arguments and the proceedings below. The agreements PNM and
    the stipulating parties reached in the CCN proceedings to ensure compliance with the revised
    state implementation plan proposed to resolve the 2014 IRP protests. We now review those
    records and the administrative proceedings.
    B.     The Administrative Record
    {16} PNM filed its 2011 IRP with the PRC in July 2011. NEE and several of the
    intervenors in the present appeal filed protests, and in August 2011 the PRC set hearings on
    those protests. At a prehearing conference, PNM and several other parties made a request
    for mediation, which was granted. Mediation was scheduled for June 2012; however, at the
    end of May 2012, PNM and several of the protestors filed an unopposed motion to vacate
    the mediation. The motion explained that “continuation of the mediation process at this time
    would not be productive.” The movants asked NEE its position on the motion and NEE did
    not oppose it.
    {17} In September 2013, PNM filed a notice of material change with the PRC. See
    17.7.3.10 NMAC (“The utility shall promptly notify the commission and participants of
    material events that would have the effect of changing the results of the utility’s IRP had
    those events been recognized when the IRP was developed.”). PNM stated that the EPA’s
    acceptance of the revised state implementation plan constituted “a material change in
    circumstance that has the effect of changing certain results of the 2011 IRP.” PNM further
    stated that the material change prompted it to “accelerate[] aspects of the development of its
    2014 IRP” and to seek approval of a “regulatory plan to comply with the [revised state
    implementation plan], including any needed revisions to the four-year action plan in the
    2011 IRP.” Two days after PNM filed this notice of material change, the PRC (upon its own
    motion) filed a notice proposing to dismiss the 2011 IRP protest proceedings for lack of
    7
    activity. The parties protesting the 2011 IRP were permitted an opportunity to file a motion
    explaining why the 2011 IRP protest docket should remain open, but no such motion was
    filed and the 2011 IRP hearings were closed.
    {18} The CCN proceedings from which NEE pursued this present appeal began in
    December 2013 when PNM filed its application for the CCNs required to comply with the
    revised state implementation plan. PNM submitted its 2014 IRP to the PRC in July 2014,
    while the CCN proceedings were ongoing. NEE and several of the intervenors in this
    present appeal filed protests to PNM’s 2014 IRP. NEE’s protest acknowledged the overlap
    between the issues in the CCN proceedings and the 2014 IRP protest proceedings and
    contended that the public’s interest in efficient adjudication would be best served by
    addressing the 2014 IRP matters after the CCN case was resolved. The PRC agreed and
    concluded that the 2014 IRP protest hearings would be held in abeyance until the CCN
    proceedings were finalized.
    {19} At the conclusion of the CCN proceedings, the HE determined that the replacement
    generation resource portfolio identified in the supplemental stipulation provided a net public
    benefit—the applicable standard PNM had to satisfy to receive a CCN. The modified
    stipulation
    (1)     allows PNM and the state of New Mexico to comply with federal law by
    retiring San Juan Units Two and Three;
    (2)     eliminates a significant amount of coal-fired generation at San Juan—half the
    power plant’s capacity—thereby cutting greenhouse gas emissions, dust emissions, and
    water use in half;
    (3)     saves PNM customers approximately $340 million by incorporating new
    ownership and coal supply agreements;
    (4)     yields additional savings for ratepayers of up to $38 million due to an agreed
    reduction in the rate-base value of Palo Verde Unit Three;
    (5)     utilizes existing resources to maintain the reliability of PNM’s system;
    (6)     commits PNM to incorporating more renewable energy production in its
    energy supply and requires PNM (starting in 2020) to acquire solar or wind credits or
    allowances, which will help satisfy requirements of both the federal Clean Power Plan and
    New Mexico Renewable Energy Act, NMSA 1978, Section 62-16-1 to -10 (2004, as
    amended through 2014);
    (7)     requires PNM to issue and evaluate a request for proposals for all energy
    sources identified in the 2017 IRP using a hypothetical assumption that San Juan will no
    longer operate after 2022;
    (8)     provides for a 2018 PRC review of the future of San Juan in New Mexico’s
    energy supply that will allow for the resolution of uncertainties regarding longer-term coal
    costs, environmental regulations, and San Juan ownership interests beyond the expiration
    of the current ownership commitments in 2022;
    (9)     requires PNM to obtain firm pricing and other terms before extending its
    existing coal-supply agreement beyond 2022;
    8
    (10) minimizes the impact closing San Juan will have on San Juan County and
    northwest New Mexico, which depend on San Juan as a source of employment by
    “provid[ing] an additional 4 1/2 years beyond the 2017 [partial] closure for the region and
    PNM customers to economically prepare and adjust” in the event that PNM shuts down, or
    partially shuts down, the remaining San Juan units; and
    (11) requires PNM to contribute $250,000 at shareholder expense rather than
    ratepayer expense to a Good Neighbor Fund that assists low-income customers with their
    utility bills.
    {20} The HE also recommended that the PRC approve the provision in the supplemental
    stipulation recommending dismissal of the 2014 IRP protest proceedings and stated “that
    there will likely be no valid purpose to proceed with the 2014 IRP proceeding.” This
    determination is supported by several findings: (1) “[e]ach of [PNM’s] 20-year analyses
    showed that the replacement [generation] power portfolio that includes the 134 MW of Palo
    Verde Unit 3 and the additional 132 MW of San Juan Unit 4 is the most cost effective
    portfolio of the alternatives analyzed”; (2) “the review conducted for the CCNs requested
    in this proceeding has been equivalent to an IRP review”; (3) the CCNs at issue in PNM’s
    application “resolve PNM’s new resource needs for the four year period of the action plan
    in the 2014 IRP”; and (4) the supplemental stipulation requires PNM to commit to certain
    future resource planning obligations. These future obligations will require PNM to file “with
    the [PRC, after July 1, 2018 but no later than December 31, 2018,] to determine the extent
    to which the San Juan station should continue serving PNM’s retail customers’ needs after
    June 30, 2022[,]” and will require PNM to conduct a request for proposals as soon as
    practicable after the filing of its 2017 IRP to identify the most cost-effective resource
    portfolio using the assumption that San Juan will not continue to operate beyond 2022.
    These future obligations are imposed upon PNM not because the stipulating parties wished
    to delay review, but because crucial information regarding the future of coal supply for San
    Juan would likely be resolved by 2018 and this, in turn, would permit the multiple owners
    of San Juan to have a far clearer sense about whether they each, individually, wish to
    continue operation of San Juan.
    {21} Despite the abundance of evidence supporting closure of PNM’s 2014 IRP, the HE
    emphasized that “the [PRC] cannot properly act in this [CCN] docket to close a separate
    docket” and instead recommended “that the [PRC], based upon the approvals it will have
    granted here, issue a Notice of Proposed Dismissal in the 2014 IRP docket, as it did in the
    2011 IRP case.” The PRC accepted this recommendation and a notice of proposed dismissal
    was filed in the 2014 IRP docket. NEE filed a request to hold the 2014 IRP proceedings in
    abeyance or dismiss them without prejudice, but the PRC has not filed an order granting or
    denying this request. The last filing in the 2014 IRP docket was a notice of material event
    filed by PNM in July 2016.
    C.     Standard of Review
    {22}   This appeal arises from a final order approving a contested supplemental stipulation.
    9
    The New Mexico Administrative Code identifies the procedures the PRC must follow when
    adjudicating a contested stipulation. 1.2.2.20(B) NMAC. Our case law provides the
    substantive legal standards that must be met to permit the PRC to approve a contested
    stipulation. Our case law instructs that the PRC
    can adopt a contested stipulation by, first, affording any non-stipulating party
    an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the stipulation . . . and second,
    making an independent finding, supported by substantial evidence in the
    record, that the stipulation does indeed resolve the matters in dispute in a way
    that is fair, just and reasonable and in the public interest.
    Attorney Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 1991-NMSC-028, ¶ 15, 
    111 N.M. 636
    , 
    808 P.2d 606
    . The hearings below were conducted in conformity with the governing regulation and
    the HE correctly identified the substantive legal standards necessary to resolve the merits of
    the contest and determined that both prongs of the two-part test were met. The PRC
    accepted the HE’s determination.
    {23} NEE does not argue that it was denied an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the
    contested supplemental stipulation, and this is for good reason. All interested stakeholders
    were given more than adequate opportunity to participate in the extensive administrative
    proceedings below. NEE’s arguments are directed solely at the factual basis upon which the
    HE’s and PRC’s decisions rest and the lawfulness of the PRC’s decision to accept the HE
    recommendation to approve the contested supplemental stipulation. The standards we apply
    to these types of arguments are well-settled.
    {24} Generally speaking, we review the PRC’s determinations to decide whether they are
    “arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, outside the scope of the
    agency’s authority, or otherwise inconsistent with law, with the burden on the appellant to
    make this showing[.]” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n
    (NMIEC), 2007-NMSC-053, ¶ 13, 
    142 N.M. 533
    , 
    168 P.3d 105
    (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted); see NMSA 1978, § 62-11-4 (1965). This general rule is subject to
    further refinement.
    {25} We must assess whether the PRC’s decision presents a question of fact, a question
    of law, or some combination of the two. Albuquerque Bernalillo Cty. Water Util. Auth. v.
    N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n (ABCWUA), 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 17, 
    148 N.M. 21
    , 
    229 P.3d 494
    . “With respect to questions of fact, we look to the whole record to determine whether
    substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision.” NMIEC, 2007-NMSC-053, ¶ 24.
    “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [PRC’s] decision and draw every
    inference in support of the [PRC’s] decision[.]” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    When fact finding
    is necessarily predicated on matters requiring expertise, our deference is substantial. See
    ABCWUA, 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 50 (“The PRC’s decisions requiring expertise in highly
    technical areas, such as utility rate determinations, are accorded considerable deference.”
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As to matters of law, if it is clear that our
    10
    Legislature delegated to the PRC (either explicitly or implicitly) the task of giving meaning
    to interpretive gaps in a statute, we will defer to the PRC’s construction of the statute as the
    PRC has been delegated policy-making authority and possesses the expertise necessary to
    make sound policy. See generally I Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise §§
    3.2-3.3, at 159-61 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the nature of judicial review of agency policy
    decisions); accord City of Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-028,
    ¶ 16, 
    134 N.M. 472
    , 
    79 P.3d 297
    (“[I]t is presumed, in the context of administrative matters
    that the Legislature has delegated to an agency, that the Legislature intended for the agency
    to interpret legislative language, in a reasonable manner consistent with legislative intent,
    in order to develop the necessary policy to respond to unaddressed or unforeseen issues.”).
    “However, we are not bound by the [PRC’s] interpretation and we may substitute our own
    independent judgment for that of the [PRC] if the [PRC’s] interpretation . . . is unreasonable
    or unlawful.” ABCWUA, 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 51 (omission in original) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    {26} NEE’s arguments require us to overlay these well-settled standards to the PRC’s
    determination to accept the contested stipulation. In practical terms and as will be made
    evident in the course of our discussion of NEE’s specific arguments, this means we must
    determine whether the findings that prompted the PRC to accept the contested stipulation
    are supported by substantial evidence and whether the PRC’s decision to accept the
    contested stipulation as a reasonable and just resolution of the CCN proceedings was a
    lawful and permissible exercise of its discretion. One final preliminary matter requires our
    attention before turning to NEE’s arguments: our statement that we would review this case
    with “heightened scrutiny.”
    {27} During the course of the administrative proceedings, NEE filed a petition for a writ
    of mandamus asking this Court to order several of the PRC Commissioners to recuse
    themselves from participation in the CCN proceedings on grounds that the commissioners
    allegedly engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications with PNM and were
    purportedly biased in favor of PNM. We rejected NEE’s petition, did not accept its
    contention that the commissioners were biased, but nevertheless indicated that we would
    review the record in the stipulation proceedings, when and if an appeal was taken, with
    “heightened scrutiny.” We have done just that.
    {28} NEE’s arguments and the factual predicates upon which those arguments are based
    have been carefully scrutinized. NEE is entitled to nothing more. NEE is mistaken when
    it suggests that our decision to apply “heightened scrutiny” shifted the burden in this appeal
    to PNM and the PRC to demonstrate the validity of the administrative action. This is not the
    case. Similarly, NEE’s assertion that we will not, in this case, “accord the deference
    traditionally accorded” to the PRC is also incorrect.
    D.      NEE’s Arguments
    1.     PRC Oversight
    11
    {29} NEE contends that “[t]he final order that approved the modified stipulation was
    arbitrary and capricious because it removed PRC oversight or postponed it.” More
    specifically, NEE protests that the PRC impermissibly “treated the CCN hearing as a
    replacement for the required IRP stakeholder engagement and resource evaluation process.”
    NEE objects that this amounts to little more than “an end run around the law.” These claims
    do not withstand scrutiny.
    {30} The IRP provisions require PNM to demonstrate the merits of its 2014 IRP as
    measured by the standards articulated in Section 62-17-10 and clarified in the applicable
    provisions of the administrative code and require the PRC to permit public participation in
    its review of PNM’s 2014 IRP. Section 62-17-10; 17.7.3.9(H) NMAC. In the CCN
    proceedings, the HE expressly determined that the replacement generation resource portfolio
    identified in the supplemental stipulation satisfied the statutory and regulatory IRP standards
    and the process by which this determination was made incorporated ample public
    participation. The PRC did not violate or shirk its statutorily-imposed responsibilities by
    proposing, in the CCN proceedings, to dismiss the protests to PNM’s 2014 IRP. All parties
    recognized that the issues addressed in the CCN proceedings were the very same issues at
    the heart of the 2014 IRP protest proceedings. NEE gives us no reason to conclude that the
    PRC was required to hold duplicative proceedings. The final order did not “remove” or
    “postpone” the PRC’s review of PNM’s 2014 IRP.
    2.     Strategist
    {31} NEE argues that the HE erred in determining that the replacement generation
    resource portfolio identified in the supplemental stipulation was the most cost effective
    because the HE relied on data from PNM that was in turn produced by PNM’s alleged
    manipulation of Strategist, the software suite PNM used to determine the most cost-effective
    replacement generation resource portfolio. NEE insists that “[i]t is impossible to examine
    PNM’s submissions and find any explanation or quantification of the relative costs of
    feasible resources, as the law requires.” These claims are inconsistent with the record.
    The HE found that
    PNM’s Strategist analyses in the January and October hearings assessed the
    costs to operate and maintain a large number of potential resource portfolios
    to replace San Juan Units 2 and 3. [PNM’s expert witness] Mr. O’Connell
    stated that the Strategist modeling considered solar, wind, natural gas, coal
    and nuclear generation alternatives and assumed the continued growth of
    PNM’s energy efficiency and distributed generation programs. He said the
    Strategist modeling evaluated thousands of potential combinations of these
    resources.
    PNM’s Strategist runs also evaluated replacement power portfolios
    for a three- and four-unit shutdown. The evaluation of the three-unit
    12
    shutdown was performed in response to a bench [memorandum] request
    issued during the January hearings.
    The HE specifically listed each of the varying types of resources PNM considered in its
    modeling. The HE’s findings were supported by the testimony of Patrick J. O’Connell,
    PNM’s director of planning and resources. The HE had the discretion to accept or reject Mr.
    O’Connell’s testimony and his determination that the replacement generation resource
    portfolio was the most cost effective was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
    {32} NEE also argues that PNM utilized Strategist to evade the requirement that it
    consider the cost of resources on a “consistent and comparable” basis. NEE contends that
    PNM used differing values for Palo Verde Unit Three in different Strategist evaluations and
    that the HE erred by accepting these evaluations. We reject this claim. The HE accepted
    PNM’s use of different values for different Strategist runs because he concluded that “it was
    reasonable to consider cost savings realized under the stipulations solely for the stipulation
    portfolio.” The HE’s determination that PNM’s Strategist modeling correctly included the
    cost savings is a determination requiring expertise and technical competency we are in no
    position to second-guess.
    3.     Consideration of Renewable Resources
    {33} NEE argues that “PNM failed to consider or reasonably assess resources such as
    wind, solar and gas, which are less costly and less risky than coal or nuclear[,]” and contends
    that solar and wind are less expensive resources than either the nuclear power produced by
    Palo Verde or the coal power produced by San Juan. As the discussion in the previous
    section shows, PNM did consider renewable resources when attempting to determine the
    most cost-effective replacement generation resources. The evidence presented persuaded
    the HE that utilizing Palo Verde Unit Three and obtaining additional power from San Juan
    Unit Four was the most cost-effective choice. We will not second-guess this determination.
    4.     Resource Costs
    {34} NEE argues that “solar and wind generation facilities produce energy at a lower cost
    than coal-fired and nuclear power plants[.]” NEE then discusses what costs should have
    been assigned to varying resources at a “levelized cost” to establish that “wind, solar and gas
    . . . are less costly . . . than coal or nuclear.” PNM responds that levelized cost analyses are
    inappropriate “when comparing technologies with different production profiles, such as
    dispatchable generation to variable or intermittent generation.” The question of what cost
    the HE should or should not have assigned to any given resource is a paradigmatic fact
    inquiry that requires technical expertise to comprehend and resolve. NEE’s arguments give
    us no reason to second-guess the HE’s cost assessment for any given resource.
    5.      Van Winkle
    13
    {35} NEE argues that the “only cogent, accurate and understandable assessment of relative
    generation resource costs on a consistent and comparable basis in the record was provided
    by NEE’s David Van Winkle.” This argument ignores the fact that the HE expressly
    determined that Van Winkle’s opinion is “not convincing” and that his analysis “over-
    simplif[ied] the resource selection process and exclude[d] significant costs.” The HE went
    further and expressly noted that, while
    NEE witness, Mr. Van Winkle has educational and work experience in
    electrical engineering and an impressive familiarity with PNM’s finances and
    generation resources[, h]e does not have professional experience in the
    electric power industry planning . . . such that the depth of his experience is
    not sufficient to accept his opinions on the design of a system over the
    opinions of witnesses with such experience.
    The HE also pointed out that “on cross-examination, [Mr. Van Winkle] agreed that his
    alternatives might not be feasible.” The PRC was not bound by Van Winkle’s opinion and
    its decision was otherwise supported by substantial evidence in the record . See Attorney
    Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm ’n, 1984-NMSC-081, ¶ 15, 
    101 N.M. 549
    , 
    685 P.2d 957
    (“The [PRC] is not bound by the opinions of experts so long as the Commission’s ultimate
    decision is supported by substantial evidence.”).
    6.     Burden Shifting
    {36} NEE argues that “the PRC unlawfully shifted the burden of proof.” NEE clarifies
    that the HE “effectively excused PNM’s failure to carry its burden of proof regarding cost
    and feasibility by concluding (incorrectly) that NEE witness Van Winkle failed to prove the
    existence of other feasible [alternatives].” According to NEE, PNM wrongly declined to
    evaluate Van Winkle’s proposed alternatives using Strategist and, in failing to do so, PNM
    never meaningfully considered the costs of certain alternative energy resources that NEE
    supported as replacement portfolio candidates. According to NEE, the HE “effectively
    turned the regulatory process case on its head, making PNM the regulator, by allowing PNM
    to decide what alternatives it is going to present to the [PRC] and allow it to consider, while
    dismissing any effort by an intervenor to suggest that other alternatives should be
    considered.” We do not accept this line of reasoning.
    {37} PNM was not required to assist the witnesses of its adversary. The HE rejected Van
    Winkle’s opinion and he was free to do so. See Attorney Gen., 1984-NMSC-081, ¶ 15.
    PNM also proved that there were significant benefits that flowed from the supplemental
    stipulation and the replacement generation resources identified there. Those many benefits
    are summarized above and need not be restated. The HE determined that these many
    benefits established that the CCNs requested by PNM provided a net public benefit. The HE
    did not turn the regulatory framework on its head.
    7.     Request for Proposals (RFP)
    14
    {38} NEE objects that PNM “unilaterally decided to not investigate the market through
    an appropriate competitive [RFP] process to identify . . . alternatives [to San Juan Unit Four
    and Palo Verde Unit Three].” NEE contends that an RFP “is the normal, well-established
    and Commission-accepted method for utilities to show that their resource proposals are the
    most cost-effective options available to satisfy a demonstrated service need.” NEE further
    claims that the PRC’s decision to not require PNM to conduct an RFP necessarily means that
    the PRC “lacked reliable and ‘substantial evidence’ to reasonably conclude PNM[’s]
    proposals were the most cost effective options currently available to satisfy PNM’s service
    needs” and that the PRC “failed to exercise its authority . . . to reasonably protect the public
    interest.” The evidence presented and accepted by the HE and PRC undermines these
    arguments.
    {39} The HE rejected the argument that PNM was required to conduct an RFP and the
    PRC accepted this determination. The PRC pointed out that NEE had not “cited any law that
    requires or authorizes the [PRC] to order a utility to issue an RFP.” Both the PRC and the
    HE also determined, based on the testimony presented in the stipulation and supplemental
    stipulation proceedings, that requiring PNM to conduct an RFP would have been
    counterproductive and could have steered the parties away from the “most preferable
    solution.” The HE expressly questioned and had doubts about the testimony of Ronald Lehr,
    NEE’s witness and “[t]he primary witness urging the [PRC] to require the use of RFPs.”
    {40} Lehr, the HE pointed out, had very little knowledge about the details of the resources
    proposed in the supplemental stipulation, New Mexico law, or the resource needs of PNM’s
    system. The PRC, in turn, emphasized the testimony of New Mexico Attorney General
    witness Andrea Crane. Crane testified that it would have been impractical to order PNM to
    undertake an RFP and NEE’s suggestion to the contrary greatly oversimplified the
    complexity of what PNM and the other parties joining in the stipulation and modified
    stipulation were trying to achieve. This evidence reflects that the HE and PRC determined
    that an RFP was neither required nor appropriate. We will not second-guess this
    determination.
    8.      Ratepayer Risks
    {41} NEE contends that “the PRC did not require PNM to adequately assess and mitigate
    ratepayer risks[.]” NEE submits that “significant unknowns and unquantified risks that
    include financial, reliability, operational, and anticipated environmental regulations exist
    with both San Juan coal and Palo Verde nuclear and were virtually ignored, contrary to NM
    statute and PRC regulation.” These arguments are inconsistent with the record and insist
    that the PRC embrace policy choices the PRC was free to reject.
    {42} The HE explicitly noted the varying mechanisms in the supplemental stipulation that
    ameliorated the risks associated with nuclear power generation and utilization of Palo Verde
    Unit Three specifically. It is necessary to reference only a few of those mechanisms. The
    supplemental stipulation requires PNM to contribute $11 million to the decommissioning
    15
    trust for Palo Verde Unit Three and addresses how costs will be shared between ratepayers
    and investors in the event decommissioning costs exceed a certain threshold. It “prohibits
    PNM from recovering the costs associated with the storage and disposal of spent fuel from
    the operation prior to January 1, 2018.” It also requires PNM to pass along to ratepayers
    certain refunds PNM receives from the United States Department of Energy. NEE’s
    contention that PNM should not be permitted to derive additional capacity from San Juan
    Unit Four because there is simply too much risk associated with coal power generation
    ignores the fact that the reason PNM applied for a CCN for additional power from San Juan
    Unit Four was to close San Juan Units Two and Three and eliminate the risks and adverse
    impacts associated with continued use of all four San Juan units.
    {43} The HE was free to perform his own calculation of the costs and benefits of the
    supplemental stipulation and did so. The PRC’s decision to accept the HE’s cost benefit
    analysis is a quintessential policy determination with which we will not interfere. See Doña
    Ana Mut. Domestic Water Consumers Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n,
    2006-NMSC-032, ¶ 16, 
    140 N.M. 6
    , 
    139 P.3d 166
    (“[T]he PRC has been granted
    policy-making authority in several areas.”).
    9.     David Rode
    {44} NEE contends that the PRC erred when it rejected the testimony of David Rode, a
    witness called by the PRC staff to testify as to “the risk and portfolio selection analyses
    prepared by PNM.” NEE asserts that “[n]one of [Rode’s] challenges to PNM’s limited
    evaluation process and self-serving adoption of [San Juan Unit Four] and [Palo Verde Unit
    Three] was ever addressed by the [HE] or the [PRC].” This claim is inconsistent with the
    record.
    {45} In its final order, the PRC expressly noted that Rode’s pre-filed testimony was
    prepared prior to the lengthy proceedings that led to the modified stipulation and determined
    that his testimony was not relevant. Moreover, the record reflects that PNM did consider
    and address Rode’s concerns; in fact, O’Connell addressed Rode’s concerns at some length.
    Ultimately, the PRC was persuaded that, to the extent Rode’s testimony was relevant at all,
    it supported the stipulating parties’ assessment that the supplemental stipulation was the best
    outcome. We will not second-guess this decision.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    {46} The PRC accepted the HE’s conclusion that the supplemental stipulation fairly and
    justly resolved the CCN proceedings. This conclusion was predicated on the HE’s finding
    that the resource portfolio identified in the supplemental stipulation provides a net public
    benefit. As our discussion shows, this finding was supported by an abundance of evidence.
    The PRC’s decision to file a notice proposing to dismiss the protests to PNM’s 2014 IRP
    was a lawful exercise of the PRC’s discretion. The merits of PNM’s 2014 IRP, as measured
    by the appropriate statutory and regulatory standards, were comprehensively considered
    16
    during the stipulation and supplemental stipulation proceedings and those proceedings were
    open and accessible to all. The PRC’s final order is affirmed.
    {47}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________________________
    JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Chief Justice
    WE CONCUR:
    __________________________________
    PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
    __________________________________
    EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
    __________________________________
    BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
    ___________________________________
    J. MILES HANISEE, Judge, sitting in designation
    17