Jones v. Heidel, Samberson ( 2010 )


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  •  1   This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please
    2   see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions.
    3   Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated
    4   errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does
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    6        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    7 EARL JONES,
    8          Plaintiff-Appellant,
    9 v.                                                                                    No. 30,333
    10 HEIDEL, SAMBERSON, NEWELL,
    11 COX & MCMAHON,
    12          Defendant-Appellee.
    13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY
    14 Thomas A. Rutledge, District Judge
    15 Earl Jones,
    16 Hobbs, NM
    17 Pro Se Appellant
    18 Butt, Thornton & Baehr
    19 Alfred L. Green, Jr.
    20 Albuquerque, NM
    21 for Appellee
    22                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
    23 SUTIN, Judge.
    1        In this legal malpractice case, Plaintiff Earl Jones appeals from the order of
    2 dismissal with prejudice, granting Defendant Heidel Law Firm summary judgment
    3 and dismissing the case with prejudice. [RP 120] Summary judgment was granted
    4 on the basis that Plaintiff’s claim for legal malpractice was filed outside the statute of
    5 limitations.
    6        The calendar notice proposed to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order. [Ct.
    7 App. File] Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition that we have duly
    8 considered. [MIO] Unpersuaded, however, we dismiss.
    9 DISCUSSION
    10        “Whether an order is a ‘final order’ within the meaning of the statute is a
    11 jurisdictional question that an appellate court is required to raise on its own motion.”
    12 Khalsa v. Levinson, 
    1998-NMCA-110
    , ¶ 12, 
    125 N.M. 680
    , 
    964 P.2d 844
    .
    13 “Determining whether [an] appeal was timely involves the interpretation of court
    14 rules, which we review de novo.” Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 
    2009-NMSC-009
    , ¶ 7, 145
    
    15 N.M. 650
    , 
    203 P.3d 865
    .
    16        The order of dismissal was filed on January 19, 2010. [RP 120] Plaintiff’s
    17 notice of appeal was filed on March 2, 2010. [RP 153] While Plaintiff filed the notice
    18 of appeal more than thirty days after the order of dismissal (see Rule 12-201(A)(2)
    19 NMRA), on January 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a timely post-judgment motion entitled
    2
    1 “motion for reversal to court’s orders of dismissal with prejudice on Defendant’s
    2 motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s memorandum in support of summary
    3 judgment” (Plaintiff’s motion). [RP 115-19] Pursuant to Rule 12-201(D), Plaintiff’s
    4 motion extends the time for filing the notice of appeal until thirty days after the post-
    5 judgment motion has been ruled upon.
    6        Although the order of dismissal was filed on the same day as Plaintiff’s motion
    7 and approximately one half hour thereafter, the order of dismissal cannot be
    8 considered to be a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion. The order of dismissal refers only to
    9 the hearing held on January 7, 2010, on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
    10 and it only grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. [RP 120] Moreover,
    11 on February 3, 2010, Defendant filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
    12 [RP 125] Thus, there is no indication in the record proper that the district court has
    13 ruled on Plaintiff’s motion.
    14        The district court was required to rule on the post-judgment motion, and it was
    15 not deemed denied by the passage of time. See Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v.
    16 Scottsdale Ins. Co., 
    2007-NMSC-051
    , ¶ 15, 
    142 N.M. 527
    , 
    168 P.3d 99
     (holding that
    17 changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated the automatic denial of post-
    18 judgment motions). The fact that the district court has not yet ruled on Plaintiff’s
    19 motion renders the order of dismissal non-final and Plaintiff’s appeal premature. See
    3
    1 Grygorwicz, 
    2009-NMSC-009
    , ¶ 8 (recognizing in the context of a foreclosure
    2 judgment that when a party makes a motion challenging the judgment, the judgment
    3 is not final until the district court rules on the motion); see also Rule 12-201(D)
    4 (providing that if a party files a timely post-judgment motion as set forth therein, the
    5 time for filing a notice of appeal begins to run from entry of an order disposing of the
    6 motion).
    7        Thus, this Court’s calendar notice proposed to dismiss the appeal. Plaintiff’s
    8 memorandum does not indicate that the district court has ruled on the motion for
    9 reconsideration, but urges this Court to consider the merits of his appeal any way.
    10 [MIO 2-3] This Court does not have jurisdiction to do so.          See, e.g., Collier v.
    11 Pennington, 
    2003-NMCA-064
    , ¶ 7, 
    133 N.M. 728
    , 
    69 P.3d 238
     (discussing that this
    12 Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-final order).
    13 CONCLUSION
    14        Accordingly, we dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal.
    15        IT IS SO ORDERED.
    16                                         __________________________________
    17                                         JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
    18 WE CONCUR:
    19 _______________________________
    4
    1 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge
    2 _______________________________
    3 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
    5