State v. Woodley ( 2013 )

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 VIVIAN I. WOODLEY,
3 n/k/a VIVIAN I. CULLEN
4 Petitioner-Appellee,
5 v. NO. 31,917
6 SCOTT C. WOODLEY,
7 Respondent-Appellant.
8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY
9 John F. Davis, District Judge
10 Standridge & Navarro, P.C.
11 Amanda Navarro
12 Albuquerque, NM
13 for Appellee
14 Elizabeth Stacy Vencill
15 Albuquerque, NM
16 for Appellant
17 MEMORANDUM OPINION
18 GARCIA, Judge.
19 {1} Father appeals from the district court’s adoption of the domestic relations
1 hearing officer’s report and from the district court’s judgment regarding child support
2 and custody. The district court deviated from the child support guidelines. Father
3 also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to deny his motions to modify time-
4 sharing with the younger daughter and the court’s refusal to order counseling for the
5 youngest daughter. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
6 BACKGROUND
7 {2} Father and Mother divorced in 2006, and stipulated to a time-sharing agreement
8 for their two daughters. Under the agreement, both children maintained a primary
9 residence with Mother, and Father owed Mother $1070 per month in child support.
10 The parties followed the time-sharing agreement until September 2010, when Father
11 filed a motion to modify time-sharing alleging a significant and material change of
12 circumstance.
13 {3} In his motion to modify time-sharing, Father argued that it was in the elder
14 daughter’s best interests to reside primarily with him based on reports of physical
15 abuse in Mother’s house. He also argued that the younger daughter should have no
16 less than fifty percent time-sharing with Father. Father subsequently filed motions to
17 modify child support, and to order the parties’ youngest daughter to attend counseling.
18 A Domestic Relations Hearing Officer (the Hearing Officer) conducted four hearings
19 to address Father’s motions, and ultimately recommending granting Father’s motion
20 to modify time-sharing for the elder daughter and his motion to modify child support.
2
1 {4} The Hearing Officer recommended granting Father’s motion to modify time-
2 sharing with regard to the elder daughter because she was living primarily with Father
3 by the time of the final hearing in October 2011, and because both parties agreed to
4 maintain the status quo with regard to her physical custody. However, the Hearing
5 Officer found that the change in the oldest daughter’s primary residence did not
6 automatically affect the youngest daughter’s best interests and Father had failed to
7 prove otherwise. The Hearing Officer further explained that Father had failed to meet
8 his burden of proof with regard to counseling. As such, the Hearing Officer
9 recommended that the district court deny both of Father’s motions with regard to the
10 youngest daughter. Because of the elder child’s change in residence, the Hearing
11 Officer recommended granting Father’s motion to modify child support.
12 {5} The Hearing Officer used two separate worksheet (Table A) calculations as the
13 basis to recommend a monthly modified child support obligation. The Hearing
14 Officer determined that Mother owes Father $458 per month in child support for the
15 oldest daughter, and that Father owes Mother $659 per month in child support for the
16 youngest daughter. Neither party challenges the modification of child support or the
17 Hearing Officer’s Table A child support calculations on appeal. Thus, the Table A
18 statutory child support guidelines, which were followed by the Hearing Officer in this
19 case, are presumed to calculate the proper amount of child support. See Leeder v.
20 Leeder, 1994-NMCA-105, ¶ 6, 118 N.M. 603, 884 P.2d 494. However, the Hearing
3
1 Officer recommended a deviation from the child support guidelines because each child
2 also receives $459 per month from the Social Security Administration (SSA) as a
3 derivative social security benefit arising from Father’s disability.
4 {6} When Mother was the primary custodian of both children, Father satisfied his
5 child support obligation by having SSA pay both children’s disability benefit to
6 Mother, totaling $918 per month. Father was given credit for this benefit amount
7 against child support payments. When the elder daughter moved in with Father, both
8 parties agreed that her disability benefit amount then became payable to Father. Thus,
9 the derivative effect of Father’s disability entitled each party to receive $459 a month
10 from SSA for each child. The Hearing Officer recommended that these disability
11 payments were sufficient to fulfill both parties’ child support obligations.
12 {7} The district court adopted the Hearing Officer’s report in full. The district court
13 restated its intent to adopt the Hearing Officer’s report after Father objected to the
14 Hearing Officer’s report. Father timely filed a motion to reconsider and for a new
15 trial. The district court vacated the hearing on the motion to reconsider and for a new
16 trial because Father had filed a notice of appeal with this Court. This Court sua sponte
17 ordered a limited remand for the district court to address Father’s motion to reconsider
18 and for a new trial. Upon remand, the district court entered a final order adopting the
19 recommendations of the Hearing Officer.
20 DISCUSSION
4
1 A. Motion to Modify Child Support
2 {8} On appeal, Father contends that the district court erred in not awarding him
3 child support. NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-11.1 (2008) requires the district court to use
4 statutory guidelines to calculate a parent’s support obligation and declares that there
5 is a rebuttable presumption that the amount derived from this calculation is the
6 appropriate amount of the support obligation. The district court, however, may
7 deviate from the child support amount that would otherwise be payable under the
8 guidelines due to equitable circumstances. NMSA 1978, § 40-4-11.2 (1989). Father’s
9 appeal challenges the district court’s deviation from the child support guidelines based
10 upon its allocation of the SSI disability benefits payable for each child. Father
11 maintains the district court incorrectly attributed his disability benefits as a credit to
12 Mother, thus reducing her child support obligations. We agree.
13 {9} “The setting of child support is left to the sound discretion of the [district] court
14 as long as that discretion is exercised in accordance with the child support guidelines.”
15 Quintana v. Eddins, 2002-NMCA-008, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 435, 38 P.3d 203. “An abuse
16 of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions
17 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-
18 078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. “[E]ven when we review for an abuse of
19 discretion, our review of the application of the law to the facts is conducted de novo.
20 Accordingly, we may characterize as an abuse of discretion a discretionary decision
5
1 that is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v.
2 Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (alteration, internal
3 quotation marks, and citations omitted). We also review the court’s findings of fact
4 for substantial evidence. Styka v. Styka, 1999-NMCA-002, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 515, 972
5 P.2d 16.
6 {10} New Mexico courts have long recognized that SSA benefits received by a child
7 for a disability sustained by the non-custodial parent may be credited against the
8 non-custodial parent’s child support obligation during the period the benefits are
9 received. Mask v. Mask, 1980-NMSC-134, ¶ 6, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883; Pedersen
10 v. Pedersen, 2000-NMCA-042, ¶ 1, 129 N.M. 56, 1 P.3d 974; Romero v. Romero,
11 1984-NMCA-049, ¶ 5, 101 N.M. 345, 682 P.2d 201. The reasons for credit are plain.
12 SSA disability payments represent money which an employee has earned during his
13 employment and also that his employer has paid for his benefit into a common trust
14 fund under the Social Security Act. Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶ 23, 109
15 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (“Public assistance and social security constitute benefits
16 from a collateral source[.]”); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2013). These payments
17 are for the purpose of replacing income that is lost because of the employee’s inability
18 to work upon becoming disabled. See Connick v. Cnty. of Bernalillo, 1998-NMCA-
19 060, ¶ 5, 125 N.M. 119, 957 P.2d 1153 (“In essence, the New Mexico [Workman’s
20 Compensation] scheme is an industry insurance plan to compensate injured workers
6
1 for loss of earning capacity as determined by statute.”); Mask, 1980-NMSC-134, ¶ 6
2 (“Where a father who has been ordered to make child support payments becomes
3 totally and permanently disabled, and unconditional [SSA] payments for the benefit
4 of the minor children are paid to the divorced mother, the father is entitled to credit
5 for such payments by the government against his liability for child support under the
6 divorce decree.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Codling
7 v. Aztec Well Serv. Co., 1976-NMCA-044, ¶ 10, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d 6288 (explaining that lump sum disability payments are an exception to the legislative
9 scheme of the Workers’ Compensation Act because “[p]eriodic payments supply, in
10 a measure, the loss of a regular pay check”). The key fact is that the benefits paid to
11 the children are derived from the funds earned by the contributor and the person
12 seeking the credit has contributed the funds through deductions of wages.
13 {11} Both parties cite Mask and Pedersen as supporting their respective positions,
14 but neither case addresses the particular issue raised in this appeal. See Mask, 1980-
15 NMSC-134, ¶¶ 6, 7 (addressing whether a disabled parent should receive credit
16 against child support arrearages for SSA payments made on his behalf); Pedersen,
17 2000-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 1, 6 (holding that the district court must exercise its discretion
18 on a case-by-case basis, with the child’s standard of living a crucial factor, in allowing
19 a disabled parent credit against basic child support for SSA benefits paid directly to
20 the child as a result of the parent’s disability). In this case, the Hearing Officer’s
7
1 recommendation gave each party a $459 credit for the monthly disability benefit each
2 parent received as payee for the child in his or her respective primary placement.
3 Thus, in adopting the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, the district court gave
4 Mother credit toward her child support obligation even though she was the
5 non-custodial parent and the SSA disability benefits were earned by Father, who was
6 also the custodial parent for the child receiving those benefits.
7 {12} It defies both common sense and the principles of equity to hold that the
8 non-disabled parent is entitled to a credit for his or her child support obligation due
9 to the SSA disability payments made on behalf of the disabled parent. The SSA
10 disability benefits received on behalf of the parties’ minor children in this case are
11 merely a substitute for the wages Father would have received, but for his disability,
12 and from which his child support obligations would have been paid. Although the
13 benefits are payable directly to the children, the entitlement derives solely from
14 Father. See Mask, 1980-NMSC-134, ¶ 8 (“[T]he benefit inures directly to the child,
15 notwithstanding the prerequisite status of the parent.” (internal quotation marks and
16 citation omitted)). We have found no authority, and Mother points to none, which
17 allows a parent, who is not the disabled party through which the child is receiving
18 SSA benefits, a credit against its child support obligations.
19 {13} We conclude that Father’s derivative disability payments to the children do not
20 entitle Mother to any credit against her child support obligation. Holding otherwise
8
1 would excuse Mother’s entire child support obligation by using Father’s disability
2 funds from the SSA instead of her own funds. See id. (explaining that any windfall
3 from government payments should go to the children for whom the payments are
4 intended). Father, on the other hand, will be left with less money than the guidelines
5 intend because Mother’s child support obligation was calculated based upon both
6 parents’ gross income. Pedersen, 2000-NMCA-042, ¶ 2 (“[T]he child’s income
7 (whether from social security, his or her own earnings, from a trust established by
8 grandparents or other sources) is relevant solely as a ground for deviating from the
9 guidelines pursuant to Section 40-4-11.1.”). Thus, Father will have to cover Mother’s
10 obligation to support the elder daughter with his own funds even though the guidelines
11 contemplated that he receive $458 per month from Mother, irrespective of the SSA
12 payment to his elder daughter. Such an outcome is inconsistent with the purpose
13 stated by the Legislature for establishing child support guidelines: to provide for the
14 best interests of the child by determining an adequate level of support for children
15 commensurate with the parents’ income and resources. Section 40-4-11.1(B).
16 {14} Our reasoning does not, as Mother argues, convert the youngest daughter’s SSA
17 benefit into cash income for Father, treat the benefit as a payment directly from
18 Father, or credit Father for $918 of payments due to each daughter’s benefit.
19 Mother’s argument is premised on the notion that reversing the district court would
20 result in directly paying Father the derivative benefit as some form of income. This
9
1 framing does not match the reality. Absent the appropriate child support from Mother,
2 Father will be left with less money to support the child in his household, while mother
3 will be left with more. We do not purport to transfer the child’s derivative benefit to
4 Father; rather, we consider the implications of the derivative payment on the parties’
5 respective obligations. There is no windfall or undue financial advantage to Father
6 in this case.
7 {15} We have found no case that allows a parent, who is not the disabled or retired
8 party through whom the child is receiving SSA benefits, a credit against their child
9 support payments. As applied here, Mother may not directly benefit by receiving a
10 credit for the fruits of Father’s labor that has now been converted into an SSA
11 disability payment. Accordingly, in the absence of a proper deviation from the
12 calculation of child support established under the guidelines, Father is entitled to
13 receive the child support amount properly established under the guidelines from
14 Mother. We hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in adopting the
15 Hearing Officer’s modified computation of the child support due from Mother because
16 it was an improper deviation and allowed Mother a direct credit against her child
17 support obligation for a portion of Father’s SSA benefits paid to the eldest daughter.
18 After properly crediting Father for the SSA sums sent to Mother on behalf of the
19 younger daughter, Father owes Mother $201 per month and Mother owes Father $458
20 per month. These are the correct child support amounts to be paid by the parties and
10
1 we reverse the district court’s decision to affirm the Hearing Officer’s
2 recommendation. This matter is remanded to the district court to correctly modify the
3 parties child support obligations in accordance with this determination. We remand
4 this matter to the district court to correct the parties child support obligations in
5 accordance with this decision.
6 Motion to Modify Time-Sharing
7 {16} In his second point on appeal, Father claims that the district court erred in
8 denying his motion to modify the time-sharing arrangement for the younger daughter
9 because the district court’s finding that no substantial and continuing change in
10 circumstances had occurred was not supported by the evidence and was against the
11 weight of the evidence. In his motion to modify time-sharing, Father set out several
12 occurrences which he alleged constituted a material change of circumstance. The
13 Hearing Officer found that because the change of the elder daughter’s primary
14 residence was immaterial and Father had not personally witnessed the alleged
15 occurrences, Father failed to meet his burden of proof to modify the time-sharing
16 arrangement for the younger daughter.
17 {17} A court may modify a custody order only upon a showing that a substantial
18 change in circumstances that affects the best interests of the children has occurred
19 after the prior custody order was entered. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999-NMCA-135, ¶ 10,
20 128 N.M. 177, 991 P.2d 7. “We will overturn the [district] court’s custody decision
11
1 only for abuse of discretion, and we will uphold the court’s findings if supported by
2 substantial evidence.” Id. “To reverse the [district] court under an abuse-of-discretion
3 standard, it must be shown that the court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of all reason or
4 that the judicial action taken is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Edens v. Edens,
5 2005-NMCA-033, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295 (alteration, internal quotation
6 marks, and citation omitted). “When there exist reasons both supporting and
7 detracting from a [district] court decision, there is no abuse of discretion.” Talley v.
8 Talley, 1993-NMCA-003, ¶ 12, 115 N.M. 89, 847 P.2d 323.
9 {18} On appeal, Father argues that the Hearing Officer incorrectly refused to address
10 the best interests of the child in finding that Father failed to meet his burden of proof.
11 This argument is not supported by the record. The Hearing Officer expressly stated,
12 “[w]hen a change in child custody or time[-]sharing is sought, the moving party must
13 show a substantial change in circumstances and that the change affects the best
14 interest of the child.” See Jeantete v. Jeantete, 1990-NMCA-138, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 417,
15 806 P.2d 66. Father also points this Court to a list of events which he alleges
16 constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Father provides no record citations
17 to support his allegations or authority for his argument that these events met the
18 standard required to change the parties’ time-sharing agreement. See Murphy v. Strata
19 Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (“Absent a record,
20 we are left with the arguments in the briefs, and argument of counsel is not
12
1 evidence.”); Benavidez v. Benavidez, 2006-NMCA-138, ¶ 23, 140 N.M. 637, 145 P.3d
2 117 (refusing to address challenges to a district court’s findings when the challenges
3 are not supported by relevant and specific reasons and do not explain why the
4 evidence relating to the finding is insufficient). Moreover, Father’s assertion that
5 some of the evidence supporting his allegations was excluded as hearsay evidence is
6 not an assertion that the evidence supporting the district court’s judgment is not
7 sufficient. See Fox v. Doak, 1968-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 6-7, 78 N.M. 743, 438 P.2d 153.
8 {19} Father’s brief has failed to address the substance of all the evidence bearing on
9 the findings, or demonstrate how the evidence supporting the district court’s findings
10 fails to amount to substantial evidence. The Hearing Officer had Father’s allegations
11 before him and clearly laid out its reasoning for rejecting them. In adopting the
12 Hearing Officer’s recommendation, “[w]e must assume [that the district court]
13 carefully weighed all considerations which could have had a bearing upon the
14 question of what was for the best interest of the child.” Albright v. Albright, 1941-
15 NMSC-030, ¶ 9, 45 N.M. 302, 115 P.2d 59.
16 {20} “In cases such as this, we must rely strongly on the judgment and good sense
17 of the [district] judge.” Stone v. Stone, 1968-NMSC-116, ¶ 2, 79 N.M. 351, 443 P.2d
18 741. This Court will not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the trier
19 of fact on appeal. Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-NMSC-114, ¶ 7, 111 N.M. 137, 802
20 P.2d 1283; Dibble v. Garcia, 1982-NMCA-040, ¶ 18, 98 N.M. 21, 644 P.2d 535. It
13
1 does not appear that the district court abused its discretion when it agreed with the
2 Hearing Officer and rejected Father’s assertion of a substantial change in
3 circumstances. Based upon the record before us, we will not disturb the district
4 court’s findings and the ruling addressing the time-sharing arrangement for the
5 younger daughter.
6 B. Motion to Order Younger Daughter to Attend Counseling
7 {21} We next address Father’s argument that it was error for the district court to find
8 that Father failed to meet his burden of proof necessary to support his motion to order
9 counseling for the younger daughter. Father’s argument again outlines the facts in
10 favor of his motion and ignores the evidence favorable to the district court’s finding
11 of fact that was supported by the record. See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72,
12 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. Consistent with our rules of appellate procedure, we
13 will not address the merits of Plaintiff’s sufficiency of the evidence argument any
14 further. See Rule 12-213 NMRA; see also Aspen Landscaping, Inc., v. Longford
15 Homes of N.M., Inc., 2004-NMCA-063, ¶¶ 28-29, 135 N.M. 607, 92 P.3d 5316 (explaining that a party challenging a finding for lack of substantial evidence must
17 refer to “all of the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, followed by an
18 explanation of why the unfavorable evidence does not amount to substantial evidence,
19 such as is necessary to inform both the appellee and the Court of the true nature of the
14
1 appellant’s arguments”). As a result, we conclude that the district court’s findings and
2 conclusions regarding the denial of Father’s motion to order therapy for the younger
3 daughter are supported by substantial evidence. See Rule 12-213(A)(4); Nance v.
4 Dabau, 1967-NMSC-173, ¶ 8, 78 N.M. 250, 430 P.2d 747 (“Findings must be
5 attacked on the basis that there is no substantial evidence to support them. If not so
6 attacked, the findings must be accepted as the facts in the case.” (citation omitted)).
7 There is no need to address this matter any further.
8 CONCLUSION
9 {22} Accordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in
10 part. We remand this matter to the district court to adjust the parties child support
11 obligations in accordance with the our holding in this Opinion.
12 {23} IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 ___________________________________
14 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
15 WE CONCUR:
16 _________________________________
17 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
15
1 _________________________________
2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
16