State v. Tidey , 2018 NMCA 14 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                  I attest to the accuracy and
    integrity of this document
    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'05- 16:39:14 2018.01.30
    Certiorari Denied, December 14, 2017, No. S-1-SC-36756
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 2018-NMCA-014
    Filing Date: October 17, 2017
    Docket No. A-1-CA-34014
    STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    KENNETH TIDEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY
    Daniel Viramontes, District Judge
    Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
    Santa Fe, NM
    Tonya Noonan Herring, Assistant Attorney General
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellee
    Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
    J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellant
    OPINION
    GARCIA, Judge.
    {1}     Following a traffic stop that also resulted in an arrest and search, Defendant Kenneth
    Tidey was convicted of one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to
    distribute, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of driving with a
    suspended or revoked license. Defendant raised two different challenges based upon double
    1
    jeopardy grounds. First, Defendant challenges his two separate convictions of possession of
    drug paraphernalia. One conviction was based upon his possession of over ninety small
    plastic baggies and the second conviction was based upon his possession of a red straw with
    a burnt end. As a matter of first impression, we agree with Defendant that based upon the
    definition of containers used as drug paraphernalia statutes and the insufficient indicia of
    distinctness regarding the containers in his possession, the evidence does not support these
    two separate convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia. We vacate Defendant’s
    conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia that was based upon the numerous small
    plastic baggies and affirm his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia that was based
    upon the red straw with a burnt end. As a result, we determine that it is unnecessary to
    address Defendant’s second double jeopardy argument. This second argument challenges
    whether his drug paraphernalia conviction for possession of the numerous small plastic
    baggies and his separate conviction for possession of methamphetamine that was contained
    in a small plastic baggie violate double jeopardy. Defendant’s remaining arguments are
    unpersuasive and we affirm his remaining convictions.
    BACKGROUND
    {2}     On March 17, 2012, Lieutenant Conrad Jacquez, with the Deming, New Mexico
    Police Department, stopped Defendant’s vehicle in response to a tip advising that a driver
    of a gray Ford Crown Victoria was driving erratically, indicating a possible drunk or reckless
    driver. Lieutenant Jacquez requested Defendant’s driver’s license, registration, and
    insurance. Defendant handed Lieutenant Jacquez his New Mexico identification card. After
    running his identification, Lieutenant Jacquez determined that Defendant’s license had been
    revoked. Lieutenant Jacquez asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle, he advised
    Defendant of the reason for his arrest, and placed him under arrest for driving on a revoked
    license. Defendant did not exhibit any signs of intoxication.
    {3}     Prior to placing Defendant in the back of the police car, Lieutenant Jacquez asked
    Defendant if he had anything on his person that could hurt him. Defendant responded that
    he had a knife in one of his pockets. In searching for the knife, Lieutenant Jacquez pulled
    from Defendant’s left front pocket a large clear bag containing ninety-seven empty smaller
    clear bags with red lips painted on them, as well as an empty red straw with one burnt end.
    Not finding the knife, Lieutenant Jacquez then searched Defendant’s right front pocket and
    found a similar small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance and the knife.
    Lieutenant Jacquez testified at trial that the small bags, one inch by one inch with a zip-lock
    top (the baggies), are commonly used to package methamphetamine. He also testified that
    straws with burnt ends are another way to package methamphetamine or other narcotics and
    are never used for smoking. Lieutenant Jacquez did not find any instruments on Defendant
    for ingesting methamphetamine, such as needles or pipes.
    {4}     Upon placing Defendant in the back of the police vehicle, Lieutenant Jacquez asked
    if he could search Defendant’s vehicle. Around this time, the owner of the vehicle arrived,
    and she gave Lieutenant Jacquez consent to search the vehicle. Lieutenant Jacquez and a
    2
    second officer searched the vehicle and found a pack of cigarettes under the armrest in the
    front seat. Inside the cellophane wrapper of the pack, the officers found three small baggies
    of the same type found in Defendant’s pocket also containing a similar white powdery
    substance. At trial, a forensic crime expert testified that the four small baggies were tested
    and contained methamphetamine, but only three contained a “weighable amount.”
    {5}     The State filed a criminal information on May 1, 2012, charging Defendant with the
    following four counts: (1) trafficking in a controlled substance (by possession with intent to
    distribute), pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20(A)(3) (2006); (2) possession of drug
    paraphernalia, “straws”, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2001); (3)
    possession of drug paraphernalia, “plastic baggies,” pursuant to Section 30-31-25.1(A); and
    (4) driving with a suspended or revoked license, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-39
    (1993, amended 2013). Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser
    included offense of possession of a controlled substance (Count 1), both counts of possession
    of drug paraphernalia (Counts 2 and 3), and driving without a license (Count 4). Defendant
    now appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    {6}      Defendant makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) Defendant’s drug-related
    convictions violate double jeopardy, (2) the district court erred in denying Defendant’s
    motion to suppress evidence for a lack of reasonable suspicion, (3) the evidence presented
    at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, and (4) Defendant’s right to a
    speedy trial was violated.
    I.     Double Jeopardy
    {7}     Defendant makes two related double jeopardy arguments. First, he argues that his
    two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia violate double jeopardy as the acts
    were not sufficiently distinct to warrant two separate charges. Second, he argues that his
    convictions for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia violate
    double jeopardy because the jury instructions failed to distinguish between the empty
    baggies in Defendant’s pocket and the baggies that contained the white powdery substance
    tested to be methamphetamine.
    {8}     “A double jeopardy challenge is a constitutional question of law which [the appellate
    courts] review de novo.” State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 
    279 P.3d 747
    . The Fifth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to New Mexico by the
    Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits double jeopardy. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV, § 1. The
    prohibition “functions[,] in part[,] to protect a criminal defendant against multiple
    punishments for the same offense.” Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). Double jeopardy cases involving multiple punishments are classified
    as either “double-description case[s], where the same conduct results in multiple convictions
    under different statutes[,]” or “unit-of-prosecution case[s], where a defendant challenges
    3
    multiple convictions under the same statute.” 
    Id. A. Defendant’s
    Two Convictions for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia Violate
    Double Jeopardy
    {9}     Defendant challenges his two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia,
    pursuant to Section 30-31-25.1(A)—one for possession of the small baggies and the other
    for the red straw with a burnt end. We apply a unit-of-prosecution analysis, as we are
    examining multiple convictions under the same statute. See State v. Gallegos, 2011-NMSC-
    027, ¶ 31, 
    149 N.M. 704
    , 
    254 P.3d 655
    . In such cases, the appellate courts seek to determine,
    “based upon the specific facts of each case, whether a defendant’s activity is better
    characterized as one unitary act, or multiple, distinct acts, consistent with legislative intent.”
    State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 16, 
    140 N.M. 644
    , 
    146 P.3d 289
    . Bernal requires us to
    determine the unit-of-prosecution intended by the Legislature by employing a “two step”
    analysis. 
    Id. ¶ 14.
    First, we review the statutory language for guidance on the unit[-]of[-
    ]prosecution. If the statutory language spells out the unit[-]of[-]prosecution,
    then we follow the language, and the unit-of-prosecution inquiry is complete.
    If the language is not clear, then we move to the second step, in which we
    determine whether a defendant’s acts are separated by sufficient ‘indicia of
    distinctness’ to justify multiple punishments under the same statute. In
    examining the indicia of distinctness, courts may inquire as to the interests
    protected by the criminal statute, since the ultimate goal is to determine
    whether the [L]egislature intended multiple punishments. If the acts are not
    sufficiently distinct, then the rule of lenity mandates an interpretation that the
    [L]egislature did not intend multiple punishments, and a defendant cannot be
    punished for multiple crimes.
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted)
    {10} This Court has not previously applied the unit-of-prosecution analysis to a possession
    of drug paraphernalia case involving the simultaneous possession of more than one form of
    a container used for holding illegal drugs. The statute prohibiting possession of drug
    paraphernalia states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to use or possess
    with intent to use drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
    manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
    store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a
    controlled substance[.]” Section 30-31-25.1(A). The New Mexico Controlled Substances Act
    defines “drug paraphernalia” as
    all equipment, products and materials of any kind that are used, intended for
    use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing,
    harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing,
    4
    preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing,
    concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the
    human body a controlled substance or controlled substance analog in
    violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
    NMSA 1978 § 30-31-2(V) (2009). Neither the legislative definition nor Section 30-31-25.1
    indicate whether “paraphernalia” was intended to be construed as a singular or plural noun.
    The dictionary defines “paraphernalia” as “personal belongings,” both singular and plural
    in number. Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1638 (3d ed. 1993). Seeing no clear
    indication of a unit-of-prosecution in the statute, we look to the indicia-of-distinctness
    factors to determine whether Defendant’s convictions for two different types of containers
    violate double jeopardy.
    {11} To determine distinctness, our appellate courts have generally looked to “time and
    space considerations” of the defendant’s acts, and if such considerations proved unhelpful,
    whether the “quality and nature of the acts, or the objects and results involved” proved more
    useful. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our
    Supreme Court has summarized the factors to be considered as follows: “timing, location,
    and sequencing of the acts, the existence of an intervening event, the defendant’s intent as
    evidenced by his conduct and utterances, and the number of victims.” State v. DeGraff,
    2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 35, 
    139 N.M. 211
    , 
    131 P.3d 61
    . However, “even when analyzing
    whether an indicium of distinctness sufficiently separates the acts of the accused to justify
    multiple punishment, we remain guided by the statute at issue, including its language,
    history, and purpose, as well as the quantum of punishment that is prescribed.” Gallegos,
    2011-NMSC-027, ¶ 33 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
    {12} In a somewhat analogous unit-of-prosecution case, the Kansas Court of Appeals
    determined that the defendant’s multiple convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia
    arose from the same conduct and violated double jeopardy. See State v. Pritchard, 
    184 P.3d 951
    , 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (involving various items of paraphernalia that were used with
    the intent to manufacture a controlled substance and also with the intent to package it for
    sale). The Kansas court looked at similar factors to those utilized by this Court for
    determining whether, under a unit of prosecution test, the charges violate double jeopardy.
    See 
    id. at 957
    (addressing “(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether
    the acts occur at the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the
    acts, in particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh
    impulse motivating some of the conduct”). The Kansas court first reasoned that because
    there were no factual findings to distinguish the two counts, the evidence was seized from
    the same location, at the same time, and was intended for the same purpose—manufacturing
    and storage of methamphetamine—the two convictions arose from the “same conduct.” 
    Id. at 957-58.
    Next, when the Kansas court interpreted its manufacturing statute, the two
    convictions were determined to be “multiplicitous” and were for the “same offense.” 
    Id. at 958-59.
    We agree with the logic applied by the Kansas court, especially where a defendant
    could face tens or even hundreds of counts of drug paraphernalia charges if each individual
    5
    object or container found in a suspects possession during one encounter with law
    enforcement authorities constitutes a separate and distinct container-based paraphernalia
    offense.
    {13} In this case, there was also an insignificant indicia of distinctness presented to justify
    convicting Defendant of two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 30-
    31-25.1(A). First, Lieutenant Jacquez simultaneously found the objects available for use as
    containers for methamphetamine together in Defendant’s left front pocket, the empty baggies
    and the red straw with a burnt end. Both paraphernalia counts were based upon Lieutenant
    Jacquez’s testimony that both objects were used for packaging, not for consumption or
    manufacturing. The single jury instruction given for both counts required the jury to find that
    Defendant intended to use the objects to “pack, repack, store, contain or conceal a controlled
    substance.” Furthermore, there is no indication in the record of an intervening act, multiple
    victims, or any other factor that would distinguish Defendant’s act of simply possessing
    separate containers for holding the methamphetamine that was also found in Defendant’s
    possession.
    {14} The State argues that the unit-of-prosecution language in this case is clear from the
    face of the statute and includes “every distinct item” that is used or intended to be used in
    violation of the Controlled Substance Act. The State primarily relies on our analysis in State
    v. Leeson, in which this Court concluded that the unit-of-prosecution for sexual exploitation
    of children, by manufacturing pornography, was clear from the statute. 2011-NMCA-068,
    ¶ 17, 
    149 N.M. 823
    , 
    255 P.3d 401
    . This Court reasoned that the Legislature’s more specific
    definitions of the terms “manufacture,” “obscene,” and “visual or print medium” supported
    the conclusion that the scope of conduct constituting a violation of the statute was “readily
    discernible” so as to make each photograph manufactured by the defendant a separate and
    “discrete violation of the statute.” 
    Id. ¶¶ 16-17
    (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
    the State neglects to address the clear distinction from Leeson that was recognized by our
    Supreme Court in cases involving the possession of child pornography. See State v. Olsson,
    2014-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 1-2, 
    324 P.3d 1230
    (recognizing that multiple images of child
    pornography contained in three separate binders and an external computer hard drive could
    only be charged as one count of possession under the applicable statute). The possession
    statute’s ambiguity regarding pornographic images located in various types of containers and
    the application of the rule of lenity resulted in a single conviction in Olsson. 
    Id. We recognize
    below that the statutory definitions applicable in the present drug paraphernalia
    case are distinguishable from the statutory wording that criminalizes the possession or
    manufacture of child pornography. See Section 30-31-2(V) (setting out a non-exclusive list
    of definitions for drug paraphernalia). As a result, it would be difficult to draw any strict
    analogies from the child pornography cases when addressing the distinct statutory wording
    used for drug paraphernalia under Section 30-31-2(V).
    {15} The Legislature specifically included a comprehensive list of defined items, although
    not all inclusive, that constitute drug paraphernalia. See § 30-31-2(V)(1)-(12). Critical to the
    present case, one defined form of paraphernalia is “containers and other objects used,
    6
    intended for use or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances or
    controlled substance analogs[.]” Section 30-31-2(V)(10). When we review the definitions
    contained in Section 30-31-2(V), they clearly fail to support the State’s unit of prosecution
    argument. Instead, the plural words “containers and other objects used” as paraphernalia for
    storing a controlled substance support a single charge for Defendant’s numerous
    containers—the empty baggies and the red straw with a burnt end. Section 30-31-2(V)(10).
    If we were to accept the State’s argument that the Legislature intended to prosecute each
    individual object used as a “container” to hold the illegal controlled substance, then each
    small baggie in Defendant’s pocket, all ninety-seven of them, would be the basis for a
    separate paraphernalia charge and conviction. Based upon the statutory language and
    definitions used by the Legislature, we agree with Defendant that the multiple containers
    available to hold the methamphetamine in Defendant’s possession, must be charged as one
    single count of possession of drug paraphernalia. We reject the State’s argument to the
    contrary.
    {16} Alternatively, this Court could also recognize Defendant’s argument that there is
    insufficient indicia of distinctness regarding the paraphernalia containers found in his pocket
    and apply the rule of lenity. See State v. Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 15, 
    127 N.M. 504
    , 
    984 P.2d 185
    (“[I]f the defendant commits discrete acts violative of the same statutory offense,
    but separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness, then a court may impose separate,
    consecutive punishments for each offense. With a sufficient showing of distinctness,
    application of the rule of lenity would not be required.” (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted)). “[T]he rule of lenity . . . favor[s] a single unit[-]of[-]prosecution and
    disfavor[s] multiple units of prosecution.” 
    Id. ¶ 22.
    The State did not argue that the two
    forms of paraphernalia containers found in Defendant’s pocket could also be used for other
    distinct purposes such as ingesting, smoking, or injecting methamphetamine. If necessary,
    the rule of lenity would also support Defendant’s argument that these two types of containers
    only supported one container-based count of possession of drug paraphernalia.
    {17} We now reverse and vacate Defendant’s conviction for possession of drug
    paraphernalia based upon the ninety-seven empty “baggies” in Defendant’s pocket because
    they have the least indicia of distinctiveness from each other and the similar baggies that
    contained a white powdery substance used as the substantive evidence in Defendant’s
    conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. We affirm
    Defendant’s drug paraphernalia conviction arising from the plastic straw with the burnt
    end—due to its more distinctive characteristics as another type of container to hold illegal
    drugs, as well as its distinguishment from the baggies actually used to hold Defendant’s
    methamphetamine that was found in his right front pocket and the pack of cigarettes.
    B.     Defendant’s Separate Convictions for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and
    Possession of a Controlled Substance, Methamphetamine, Do Not Violate
    Double Jeopardy
    {18}   Defendant argues that his convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, baggies,
    7
    and possession of methamphetamine found inside similar baggies violate double jeopardy.
    Defendant asserts that if the jury based his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia
    on the small baggies actually containing methamphetamine, then the convictions for
    possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia could violate double
    jeopardy under our decision in State v. Almeida. See 2008-NMCA-068, ¶ 21, 
    144 N.M. 235
    ,
    
    185 P.3d 1085
    (concluding, in a double-description case, that “the [L]egislature did not
    intend to punish a defendant for possession of a controlled substance and possession of
    [drug] paraphernalia when the paraphernalia [charge] consists of only a container that is
    storing a personal supply of the charged controlled substance.”); see also State v. Foster,
    1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 27, 
    126 N.M. 646
    , 
    974 P.2d 140
    (recognizing that “the Double Jeopardy
    Clause . . . require[s] a conviction under a general verdict to be reversed if one of the
    alternative bases for conviction provided in the jury instructions is legally inadequate
    because it violates a defendant’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy”
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
    Montoya, 2012-NMSC-010, ¶ 58, 
    345 P.3d 1056
    .
    {19} In the present case, Defendant failed to assert that his second double jeopardy
    argument was based upon the drug paraphernalia conviction arising from red straw with a
    burnt end. As a result, we have now removed the factual predicate necessary for Defendant’s
    argument that he premised on our holding in Almeida. See 2008-NMCA-068, ¶ 21 (focusing
    on the same pipe containing the defendant’s controlled substance as the basis for both the
    possession of a controlled substance and the drug paraphernalia charges). Because Defendant
    does not argue that the jury was confused by the red straw evidence or that this evidence was
    an improper alternative basis to convict Defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia, it
    is unnecessary to address Defendant’s second argument—a reversal of the second drug
    paraphernalia conviction that was based upon the jury instruction and the jury’s potential
    confusion with the small baggies that were both empty and full. See Foster, 1999-NMSC-
    007, ¶ 27 (holding that “due process does not require a general verdict of guilty to be set
    aside so long as one of the two alternative bases for conviction is supported by substantial
    evidence[.]” ( emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
    II.    The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
    {20} Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
    because Lieutenant Jacquez lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle. “The
    Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and
    seizures by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons
    or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 18, 
    142 N.M. 176
    , 
    164 P.3d 57
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In appropriate
    circumstances, a police officer may “approach a person for purposes of investigating
    possible criminal behavior” even if there is insufficient probable cause to make an arrest.
    State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 5, 
    134 N.M. 503
    , 
    79 P.3d 1111
    (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the officer must
    have a reasonable suspicion that the person is or is about to be “engaged in criminal
    8
    activity.” 
    Id. “Reasonable suspicion
    must be based on specific articulable facts and the
    rational inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059,
    ¶ 7, 
    122 N.M. 84
    , 
    920 P.2d 1038
    . An anonymous tip “must be suitably corroborated or
    exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the police reasonable suspicion to make an
    investigatory stop.” Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 5. We review de novo whether
    Lieutenant Jacquez’s conduct was objectively reasonable. See Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 19.
    {21} In Contreras, this Court reversed the district court’s order suppressing evidence
    obtained following a traffic stop of the defendant. 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 1. The defendant was
    stopped and subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated driving while under the
    influence following an anonymous call to police. 
    Id. ¶ 2.
    The caller informed dispatch of a
    possible drunk driver and described the vehicle as a gray van, towing a red Geo, and driving
    erratically. 
    Id. Dispatch informed
    police who subsequently stopped the defendant’s vehicle
    that matched the description. 
    Id. This Court
    reasoned that, under the totality of the
    circumstances, the tip from the caller “contained sufficient information and was sufficiently
    reliable to provide the deputies with reasonable suspicion that a crime was being or was
    about to be committed” and that “the possible danger to public safety was sufficient for the
    deputies to conduct the . . . stop.” 
    Id. ¶ 7.
    This Court further stated that the facts supported
    the inference that “the anonymous caller was a reliable concerned motorist; the information
    given was detailed enough for the deputies to find the vehicle in question and confirm the
    description; and the caller was an apparent eyewitness[.]” 
    Id. ¶ 21.
    {22} We conclude there were sufficient facts to provide Lieutenant Jacquez with
    reasonable suspicion that a crime was being or about to be committed. On March 17, 2012,
    a concerned citizen called the central dispatch of the Deming Police Department to report
    that a big gray or silver vehicle, with a male driver, was unable to control his lanes, was
    driving recklessly, and the caller believed the driver was possibly under the influence. At the
    hearing on the motion to suppress, Lieutenant Jacquez testified that dispatch sent out the
    details of the call, advising all units of a possible drunk driver in a residential area, heading
    northbound on Copper Street. Lieutenant Jacquez was two blocks away from the area, and
    when he entered Florida Street, he saw Defendant’s vehicle, which matched the description
    sent out by dispatch. Lieutenant Jacquez activated his emergency equipment, and Defendant
    pulled his vehicle over after proceeding another block or two. Lieutenant Jacquez
    approached the vehicle, informed Defendant of the reason for the stop, and proceeded with
    his investigation.
    {23} As in Contreras, the anonymous tip given to the police in this case provided
    sufficient information describing the color and model of the vehicle, its location and
    direction on a specific street so that Lieutenant Jacquez could reliably identify Defendant’s
    vehicle moments later. Under the circumstances, the caller’s tip met the criteria discussed
    in Contreras for determining that the anonymous citizen tip was sufficiently reliable. See 
    id. ¶ 10
    (“In New Mexico, a citizen-informant is regarded as more reliable than a police
    informant or a crime-stoppers informant[.]”). Although Lieutenant Jacquez did not testify
    that he observed Defendant driving erratically, it is sufficient that the caller was an
    9
    eyewitness to Defendant’s reckless driving. See 
    id. (stating that
    a tip is more reliable if it is
    apparent the informant witnessed or observed the details personally). Finally, the possible
    danger to the public of a drunk driver presents an exigent circumstance that can tip the
    balance in favor of a stop. See 
    id. ¶ 13
    (“The reasonableness of seizures that are less
    intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on a balance between the public interest and the
    individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law [enforcement]
    officers.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Under the totality of the
    circumstances, the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was reasonable as there are articulable facts
    that Defendant was engaged in criminal behavior by driving while under the influence. See
    
    id. ¶ 5
    (stating that the facts surrounding a tip are viewed in light of the totality of the
    circumstances). As a result, the district court did not error in denying Defendant’ motion to
    suppress.
    III.    There is Sufficient Evidence to Support Defendant’s Conviction for Possession
    of Methamphetamine
    {24} Defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for
    possession of methamphetamine and “that no rational trier of fact could have found him
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether
    substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.”
    State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 
    140 N.M. 94
    , 
    140 P.3d 515
    (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
    appellate courts “indulg[e] in all reasonable inferences and resolv[e] all conflicts in the
    evidence in favor of the verdict.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). The
    appellate courts do “not substitute [their] judgment for that of the fact[-]finder, nor [do they]
    reweigh the evidence.” State v. Smith, 2001-NMSC-004, ¶ 7, 
    130 N.M. 117
    , 
    19 P.3d 254
    .
    {25} To find Defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine, the jury was instructed
    that: “the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt [that]: 1.
    [D]efendant had methamphetamine in his possession. . . . 2. [D]efendant knew it was
    methamphetamine or believed it to be methamphetamine or believed it to be some drug or
    other substance the possession of which is regulated or prohibited by law[.] . . . 3. This
    happened in New Mexico on or about the 17th day of March, 2012.”
    {26} After placing Defendant under arrest, Lieutenant Jacquez found ninety-seven empty
    small baggies with red lips printed on them and the straw with a burnt end in Defendant’s
    left pocket. Lieutenant Jacquez testified that the small baggies and the straw with a burnt end
    are commonly used to package methamphetamine. In Defendant’s right pocket, Lieutenant
    Jacquez found another small plastic bag with a white powdery substance, later identified as
    methamphetamine. After the owner of the vehicle arrived and consented to a search of the
    vehicle, officers found three additional baggies imprinted with the same red lips in a
    cigarette pack under the armrest. Each baggie contained what was identified in a field test
    as methamphetamine, later confirmed by the forensic crime expert as a “weighable amount”
    10
    of methamphetamine. Defendant testified and argues on appeal that the cigarette pack did
    not belong to him. However, “[c]ontrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a
    basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject [the d]efendant’s version of the facts.”
    Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore,
    Defendant does not contest that the methamphetamine found on his person was also in his
    possession or that he did not know that the substance on his person was methamphetamine.
    As a result, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Defendant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt of possession of methamphetamine.
    IV.     Defendant’s Right to a Speedy Trial Was Not Violated
    {27} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14
    of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial. See State v. Garza,
    2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 10, 
    146 N.M. 499
    , 
    212 P.3d 387
    . To determine whether the right has
    been violated, we examine four factors: “(1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay,
    (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the actual prejudice to the defendant[.]” 
    Id. ¶ 13
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he factors have no talismanic
    qualities, and none of them are a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
    violation of the right of speedy trial.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 18, 
    283 P.3d 272
    (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). This Court examines the
    complexity of the case to determine whether a delay triggers a presumption of prejudice. See
    Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 23. “[A] ‘presumptively prejudicial’ length of delay is simply
    a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the [other Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972)] factors.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21. When specifically analyzing the
    four factors, we review the weight attributed to each factor de novo but defer to the district
    court’s findings of fact. 
    Id. ¶¶ 19,
    24.
    {28} Here, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. First, assuming the
    Defendant’s case was simple, the ten-month delay between Defendant’s arrest in March
    2012 and trial in January 2013 does not meet the minimum length of delay to be considered
    presumptively prejudicial. See 
    id. ¶ 41
    (stating that the minimum length of delay in a simple
    case to be considered “presumptively prejudicial” is one year); see also State v. Maddox,
    2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 10, 
    145 N.M. 242
    , 
    195 P.3d 1254
    (indicating that the right to a speedy
    trial attaches “when the defendant becomes an accused, that is, by a filing of a formal
    indictment or information or arrest and holding to answer” (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 46-48.
    Although the “presumptively prejudicial” guidelines set by the appellate courts are not
    bright-line rules, Defendant does not present an argument that would otherwise require us
    to independently analyze the four speedy trial factors. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 49
    (“The situation may arise where a defendant alerts the district court to the possibility of
    prejudice to his defense and the need for increased speed in bringing the case to trial, i.e.,
    the impending death of a key witness. Where that possibility is realized and the defendant
    suffers actual prejudice as a result of delay, these guidelines will not preclude the defendant
    from bringing a motion for a speedy trial violation though the delay may be less than one
    11
    year.”); see also State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 59, 
    367 P.3d 420
    (noting that “[the
    d]efendant must still show particularized prejudice cognizable under his constitutional right
    to a speedy trial and demonstrate that, on the whole, the Barker factors weigh in his favor”).
    {29} Defendant only asserts that he was prejudiced by being in custody while awaiting
    trial, but makes no argument as to how his case was prejudiced in any way due to his
    incarceration. See State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 69, 
    128 N.M. 192
    , 
    991 P.2d 477
    (recognizing that even when the delay slightly exceeds the presumptively prejudicial
    threshold, the typical hardship and anxiety resulting from criminal charges and pretrial
    incarceration only warrants enough prejudice to weigh lightly in the defendant’s favor). As
    a result, we hold that Defendant has failed to present a viable argument that his right to a
    speedy trial was violated.
    CONCLUSION
    {30} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and vacate Defendant’s convictions for
    possession of drug paraphernalia that was based upon the small baggies in his possession and
    affirm the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia based upon the red straw with a
    burnt end. We also uphold all of Defendant’s remaining convictions. We remand this case
    to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
    {31}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________________________
    TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
    ____________________________________
    MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
    12