Hinojos v. Poulos ( 2022 )


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  • This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
    the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
    citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
    generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
    Appeals.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    No. A-1-CA-39473
    JACOB HINOJOS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    VICTOR F. POULOS, as Personal
    Representative of the ESTATE OF
    ROBERT H. KERN,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
    James T. Martin, District Judge
    Jacob Hinojos
    El Paso, TX
    Pro Se Appellant
    Poulos & Coates LLP
    Greig Coates
    Las Cruces, NM
    for Appellee
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    IVES, Judge.
    {1}   Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. In this Court’s notice of proposed
    disposition, we proposed to summarily affirm. [CN 1] Plaintiff filed a memorandum in
    opposition and motion to amend the docketing statement, which we have duly
    considered. Remaining unpersuaded, we deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend the docketing
    statement because the issues raised are not viable, and affirm. See State v. Munoz,
    
    1990-NMCA-109
    , ¶ 19, 
    111 N.M. 118
    , 
    802 P.2d 23
     (indicating that we deny motions to
    amend the docketing statement if the issues that the appellant is seeking to raise are
    not viable).
    {2}     In his memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff maintains that dismissal was not
    proper because he is attempting to sue Defendant in his individual capacity—despite
    the clear statement in the complaint that Defendant is being sued as the personal
    representative on behalf of the Estate of Robert H. Kern—and thus principles of res
    judicata do not bar the filing of his complaint. [MIO 2-3] Plaintiff, however, has not
    asserted any new facts, law, or argument that persuade this Court that our notice of
    proposed disposition was erroneous. See Hennessy v. Duryea, 
    1998-NMCA-036
    , ¶ 24,
    
    124 N.M. 754
    , 
    955 P.2d 683
     (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary
    calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly
    point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 
    1988-NMCA-027
    , ¶ 10, 
    107 N.M. 421
    , 
    759 P.2d 1003
     (stating that a party responding to a summary calendar notice must
    come forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of
    earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other
    grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 
    2013-NMCA-031
    , ¶ 3, 
    297 P.3d 374
    . We,
    therefore, refer Plaintiff to our analysis therein.
    {3}    To the extent that Plaintiff now argues that his claim for emotional distress was
    not brought in the prior suit and thus is not subject to dismissal under principles of res
    judicata, we disagree. See Sandel v. Sandel, 
    2020-NMCA-025
    , ¶ 15, 
    463 P.3d 510
    (“Claims present the same ‘cause of action’ for purposes of res judicata if they arise out
    of the same transaction, or series of connected transactions.” (alteration, internal
    quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Additionally, Plaintiff appears to argue that he
    was inappropriately denied discovery on his claims. [MIO 3] It is well settled, however,
    that a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and a complaint that
    is properly dismissed on its face does not warrant a period of discovery. See Lohman v.
    Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 
    2007-NMCA-100
    , ¶ 4, 
    142 N.M. 437
    , 
    166 P.3d 1091
     (“A motion
    to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”).
    {4}     To the extent Plaintiff seeks to add an issue regarding inadequate notice of the
    costs and attorney fees ordered against him as sanctions, this issue is undeveloped and
    lacks supporting authority, and we decline to address it further. See Curry v. Great Nw.
    Ins. Co., 
    2014-NMCA-031
    , ¶ 28, 
    320 P.3d 482
     (“Where a party cites no authority to
    support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”); see also Corona v.
    Corona, 
    2014-NMCA-071
    , ¶ 28, 
    329 P.3d 701
     (“This Court has no duty to review an
    argument that is not adequately developed.”). Additionally, Plaintiff attempts to add an
    “issue” to the docketing statement, claiming he is entitled to appeal costs upon
    prevailing in the appeal. [MIO 4] Nonetheless, any such issue is not viable because
    Plaintiff is not the prevailing party in this appeal. See Rule 12-403(A) NMRA (“[T]he
    appellate court may, in its discretion, award costs to the prevailing party on request.”);
    Fort Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. W. Techs., Inc., 
    2006-NMCA-096
    , ¶ 34, 
    140 N.M. 233
    ,
    
    142 P.3d 1
     (“Under New Mexico law, at the end of the entire action, the prevailing party
    is the party who wins on the merits or on the main issue of the case.” (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted)); Munoz, 
    1990-NMCA-109
    , ¶ 19.
    {5}    Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and
    herein, we affirm.
    {6}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge
    JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge