State v. Viveros ( 2022 )


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  • This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
    the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    No. A-1-CA-39829
    STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ROMAN VIVEROS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
    Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
    Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellee
    Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
    Santa Fe, NM
    Patrick J. Martinez, Assistant Appellate Defender
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellant
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BOGARDUS, Judge.
    {1}   Defendant appeals his convictions for possession with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine and heroin. [MIO 2] In our notice of proposed disposition, we
    proposed to affirm Defendant’s convictions. [CN 1, 6] Defendant filed a memorandum in
    opposition that we have duly considered. Remaining unpersuaded, we affirm.
    {2}     In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant maintains that the evidence was
    insufficient to sustain his convictions. [MIO 2-3] To the extent that Defendant now
    argues that our decision in State v. Becerra, 
    1991-NMCA-090
    , ¶ 1, 
    112 N.M. 604
    , 
    817 P.2d 1246
    , requires reversal, we disagree. Defendant contends that the evidence he
    possessed the methamphetamine and heroin found in his trunk was insufficient as
    Becerra requires additional evidence of knowledge and control when a defendant does
    not have exclusive possession of the premises where the drugs were found. [MIO 7]
    Supporting this contention, Defendant points to testimony at trial indicating he had just
    purchased the vehicle where the drugs were found earlier that day, demonstrating that
    he did not have exclusive possession or control over the vehicle on the day of the
    incident. [MIO 7] See id. ¶ 14 (“[K]nowledge of the presence of drugs may be inferred
    where exclusive possession of the premises is shown[.]”); see also State v. Howl, 2016-
    NMCA-084, ¶ 31, 
    381 P.3d 684
     (explaining that “[w]hen exclusive control is at issue,
    additional circumstances, including the conduct of the accused, are required” to
    establish constructive possession). Even if we were to conclude, however, that
    Defendant did not have exclusive control over the vehicle, other evidence at trial
    indicating that he owned the vehicle, was its sole occupant at the time of the stop, and
    had marijuana on his person and in his cup-holder is sufficient to allow a jury to
    conclude that Defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine and heroin in
    his trunk. See Howl, 
    2016-NMCA-084
    , ¶ 31 (concluding that evidence establishing (1)
    the defendant was the owner of the vehicle, and (2) had drugs on his person was
    sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the defendant possessed drug
    paraphernalia found elsewhere in the vehicle).
    {3}     Defendant also relies on Becerra to contend that the quantity of the drugs
    recovered was insufficient to support an inference that he intended to distribute
    methamphetamine or heroin. [MIO 8] See Becerra, 
    1991-NMCA-090
    , ¶ 22 (concluding
    that the evidence that the defendant possessed approximately fifty-six grams of cocaine
    by itself was insufficient to establish that the defendant had the intent to distribute that
    cocaine). In this case, however, there was ample evidence apart from the amounts of
    methamphetamine and heroin to support an inference of Defendant’s intent to distribute,
    including the drugs’ proximity to baggies, syringes, a scale, a scoop and a firearm,
    which were all found together in Defendant’s trunk. [DS 3] Thus, Defendant’s reliance
    on Becerra on this point is unpersuasive.
    {4}      Defendant has not asserted any new facts, law, or argument that persuade this
    Court that our notice of proposed disposition was erroneous. See Hennessy v. Duryea,
    
    1998-NMCA-036
    , ¶ 24, 
    124 N.M. 754
    , 
    955 P.2d 683
     (“Our courts have repeatedly held
    that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed
    disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”); State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-
    027, ¶ 10, 
    107 N.M. 421
    , 
    759 P.2d 1003
     (stating that “[a] party responding to a
    summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and
    fact[,]” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement),
    superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris, 
    2013-NMCA-031
    , ¶
    3, 
    297 P.3d 374
    . We therefore refer Defendant to our analysis therein.
    {5}   For the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm
    Defendant’s convictions.
    {6}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
    JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge