State v. Archuleta ( 2023 )

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 Opinion Number: _____________
3 Filing Date: July 19, 2023
4 No. A-1-CA-40466
5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
6 Plaintiff-Appellant,
7 v.
8 CAROLYN ARCHULETA,
9 Defendant-Appellee.
10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
11 Britt M. Baca Miller, District Court Judge
12 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
13 Emily C. Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General
14 Santa Fe, NM
15 for Appellant
16 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
17 Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
18 Santa Fe, NM
19 for Appellee
1 OPINION
2 MEDINA, Judge.
3 {1} The State appeals the district court’s order dismissing the charges against
4 Defendant Carolyn Archuleta without prejudice after finding Defendant was
5 incompetent to proceed to trial but not dangerous under the New Mexico Mental
6 Illness Code (NMMIC), NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.2(B) (1999) and Rule
7 5-602.2(D) NMRA. The State argues that the district court erred when determining
8 that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence applied to the dangerousness hearing and
9 excluded the State’s evidence of other criminal complaints to establish
10 dangerousness. Unpersuaded, we hold that the district court correctly held that the
11 New Mexico Rules of Evidence apply to dangerousness hearings under Section 31-
12 9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. We therefore affirm.
13 BACKGROUND
14 {2} A criminal information charged Defendant with battery upon a peace officer,
15 contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-24 (1971), and assault upon a peace officer,
16 contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-21(A)(1) (1971). Defendant was released
17 under the condition that she report to pretrial services. Defendant was subsequently
18 arrested and charged with another count of battery upon a peace officer. The State
19 moved to revoke Defendant’s conditions of release based on the new charge and
20 Defendant’s failure to comply with pretrial services in the present case. The district
1 court denied the motion, but did amend Defendant’s conditions of release. Pretrial
2 services later requested a noncompliance hearing. Defendant moved for a
3 competency evaluation to determine if she was competent to stand trial. The district
4 court granted the motion, ordered a competency evaluation and revoked Defendant’s
5 conditions of release. The district court later released Defendant to the custody of
6 her son pending the results of the competency evaluation.
7 {3} Upon completion and receipt of Defendant’s competency evaluation, and with
8 the State and Defendant’s stipulation, the district court accepted the results finding
9 Defendant incompetent to proceed.
10 {4} Under the NMMIC, after a finding of incompetency, the district court may
11 dismiss the case without prejudice if it “does not find that the defendant is
12 dangerous.” Section 31-9-1.2(A). “[D]angerous means that, if released, the
13 defendant presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on another or
14 violating [NMSA 1978,] Section 30-9-11 [(2009) (criminal sexual penetration)] or
15 [NMSA 1978, Section] 30-9-13 [(2003) (criminal sexual contact of a minor)].”
16 Section 31-9-1.2 (D). However, if a defendant is found to be both incompetent and
17 dangerous, the defendant may be involuntarily committed pending further
18 proceedings. See § 31-9-1.2(B). The procedure for a dangerousness hearing and
19 following proceedings are outlined in Rule 5-602.2—proceedings after a finding of
20 incompetency. See Rule 5-602.2(D), (F).
2
1 {5} The State filed a notice of intent to raise dangerousness and filed a witness list
2 for the dangerousness hearing. The first dangerousness hearing was vacated and
3 rescheduled in order to provide Defendant additional time to conduct pretrial
4 interviews. During this time, Defendant was charged in a third case with two counts
5 of indecent exposure, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-14.3(A)(1) (1996); and
6 two counts of assault, contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-3-1(A) (1963).
7 {6} At the dangerousness hearing, the State attempted to introduce into evidence
8 copies of Defendant’s three criminal complaints and a printout of Defendant’s
9 criminal history. The State also notified the district court that it would not be calling
10 witnesses to testify. Defendant objected to the use of the State’s exhibits, pointing
11 out that the criminal complaints consisted of hearsay statements from officers that
12 incorporated the hearsay statements of witnesses not present to testify in court.
13 According to Defendant, the complaints constituted hearsay with no foundation in
14 sworn testimony, and therefore introducing the criminal complaints into evidence
15 violated the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. See Rule 11-802 NMRA (stating that
16 hearsay is not admissible except as provided by a rule or statute). The State argued
17 that the Rules of Evidence did not apply to competency or dangerousness hearings
18 because a dangerousness hearing is a preliminary determination to involuntary
19 commitment. Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to some other preliminary
3
1 determinations, the State argued, the Rules of Evidence should not apply at a
2 dangerousness hearing.
3 {7} The district court agreed with Defendant, finding that the “New Mexico Rules
4 of Evidence apply to all criminal proceedings under Rule 11-1101(B) NMRA.” The
5 district court relied as well on the statement in NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.5(A)
6 (1999), which allows the admission of hearsay evidence solely on “secondary
7 matters to establish chain of custody, district court records, and business records,”
8 to conclude that “the rules of evidence apply in dangerousness hearings.” The district
9 court also found that, because a dangerousness finding could result in confinement
10 for “the maximum jurisdiction of the charges,” the finding of dangerousness requires
11 greater due process protections for the defendant than are permissible in other
12 proceedings. The district court therefore excluded the State’s proposed evidence.
13 Because the State did not produce any other evidence or call any witnesses, and none
14 of the crimes Defendant was charged with committing involved great bodily harm
15 or criminal sexual penetration or contact, the district court found the State failed to
16 show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was dangerous and dismissed
17 the matter without prejudice pursuant to Section 31-9-1.2(A). This appeal followed.
18 DISCUSSION
19 {8} The State’s appeal raises an issue of first impression, requiring that we
20 determine whether the Rules of Evidence apply to a dangerousness hearing under
4
1 Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. This appeal presents questions of statutory and
2 rule interpretation, which we review de novo. See State v. Stephen F., 2006-NMSC-
3 030, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 24, 139 P.3d 184; State v. Warford, 2022-NMCA-034, ¶ 21, 514
4 P.3d 31.
5 {9} “Our primary goal when interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the
6 intent of the Legislature.” Warford, 2022-NMCA-034, ¶ 22 (alteration, internal
7 quotation marks, and citation omitted). “The plain language of the statute is the
8 primary indicator of legislative intent, so we look first to the words the Legislature
9 used and their ordinary meaning.” State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 30, 142
10 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156. “Under the plain meaning rule, when a statute’s language is
11 clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the language and refrain from further
12 statutory interpretation.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 70, 206
13 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In applying the plain
14 meaning rule, we additionally consider the “context surrounding a particular statute,
15 such as its history, its apparent object, and other [related] statutes.” State v. Cleve,
16 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 8, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23. “Finally, in giving effect to the
17 plain meaning of the rule, we take care to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result.”
18 State v. Ayon, 2022-NMCA-003, ¶ 7, 503 P.3d 405, cert. granted (S-1-SC-38937,
19 Jan. 11, 2022). “In interpreting procedural rules, we apply the same canons of
20 construction as applied to statutes and, therefore, interpret the rules in accordance
5
1 with their plain meaning” to determine the intent of our Supreme Court. Id. (internal
2 quotation marks and citation omitted).
3 {10} We begin with the language of the Rules of Evidence. Rule 11-1101(A)-(B)
4 states that the Rules of Evidence apply in all “criminal cases and proceedings” before
5 the district court. However, Rule 11-1101(D) specifies it does not apply to the
6 following:
7 (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 11-104(A) NMRA, on a
8 preliminary question of fact governing admissibility;
9 (2) grand jury proceedings, and
10 (3) miscellaneous proceedings, such as
11 (a) extradition or rendition,
12 (b) issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search
13 warrant,
14 (c) sentencing by the court without a jury,
15 (d) granting or revoking probation or supervised release,
16 (e) considering whether to release on bail or otherwise,
17 (f) dispositional hearings in children’s court proceedings, and
18 (g) the following abuse and neglect proceedings:
19 (i) issuing an ex parte custody order;
20 (ii) custody hearings;
21 (iii) permanency hearings; and
6
1 (iv) judicial review proceedings.
2 {11} There is no dispute that a competency and dangerousness hearing is a criminal
3 proceeding under Section 31-9-1.2. See State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048,
4 ¶¶ 15-17, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 (describing the competency and
5 commitment process under the NMMIC as a criminal commitment in contrast to the
6 state’s ability to bring civil commitment proceedings if the state fails to prove its
7 case under the NMMIC); State v. Webb, 1990-NMCA-077, ¶ 6, 111 N.M. 78, 801
8 P.2d 660 (stating that a determination of competency and dangerousness that results
9 from a criminal complaint is a criminal matter). As such, under the plain language
10 of Rule 11-1101(B), the Rules of Evidence apply unless a dangerousness hearing
11 falls into one of the listed exceptions. See Rule 11-101 NMRA (“These rules govern
12 proceedings in the courts of the State of New Mexico, to the extent and with the
13 exceptions stated in Rule 11-1101.”).
14 {12} The plain language of the exceptions listed in Rule 11-1101(D) do not include
15 a dangerousness hearing under Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. The only
16 exception the State argues applies here is Rule 11-1101(D)(1). The State argues that
17 a finding of dangerousness is a preliminary determination of fact for commitment,
18 and therefore is a preliminary question under Rule 11-1101(D)(1) and Rule 11-
19 104(A). But this Court has held that the term “preliminary question[s]” contemplated
20 in Rule 11-1101(D)(1) and Rule 11-104 “refer[s] to evidentiary issues that are
7
1 decided by the judge.” State v. Delgado, 1991-NMCA-064, ¶ 12, 112 N.M. 335, 815
2 P.2d 631 (defining “preliminary matters” as used in Rule 11-104(D)); see also State
3 v. Farrington, 2020-NMSC-022, ¶ 35, 476 P.3d 1231 (“Rule 11-104(A) directs that
4 the [district] court must address preliminary questions about admissibility.”). The
5 State is correct that dangerousness is a determination that must be made before
6 criminal commitment. See Rule 5-602.2(F)(1); § 31-9-1.2(B). But simply because
7 dangerousness is a requirement to commitment does not mean that is a “preliminary
8 question of fact governing admissibility” of evidence. Rule 11-1101(D)(1). Indeed,
9 it plainly is not.
10 {13} The State also argues that a dangerousness hearing is similar to other pretrial
11 hearings that do not apply to the Rules of Evidence. The State cites to Rule 5-403
12 NMRA—revocation or modification of release orders—and Rule 5-212 NMRA—
13 motions to suppress—to support its argument that the Rules of Evidence do not
14 apply to dangerousness determinations. We do not find these comparisons
15 persuasive. Rule 5-403 specifically provides that the Rules of Evidence do not apply
16 to hearings on revocation or modification of release orders. See Rule 5-403(G)
17 (stating that the Rules of Evidence “shall not apply to the presentation and
18 consideration of information at any hearing under this rule”). In this context, “the
19 more specific statute”—Rule 5-403’s specific rejection of the Rules of Evidence—
20 “will prevail over the more general statute”—Rule 11-101’s general applicability—
8
1 “absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary.” State v. Santillanes,
2 2001-NMSC-018, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456. The State points to no specific
3 statement limiting the applicability of the Rules of Evidence, akin to Rule 5-403,
4 that applies to determinations of incompetency and dangerousness.
5 {14} The State’s other comparison, a motion to suppress, comes under the
6 exception in Rule 11-1101(D)(1) for “preliminary question[s] of fact governing
7 admissibility” of evidence because a motion to suppress addresses whether the
8 evidence at issue is admissible at trial. See State v. Doran, 1986-NMCA-126, ¶ 21,
9 105 N.M. 300, 731 P.2d 1344 (stating “the Rules of Evidence do not apply to pretrial
10 suppression hearings” and citing to a previous version of Rule 11-104(A) and 11-
11 1101(D)(1)); see also Rule 5-212 comm. cmt. (stating the rules of evidence do not
12 apply, and citing Rule 11-1101(D)(1) and Rule 11-104(A)). The determination of
13 dangerousness, in contrast, is a substantive determination of fact at the center of the
14 matter being heard by the district court, not a question about the admissibility of
15 evidence. Cf. In re Darcy S., 1997-NMCA-026, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 206, 936 P.2d 88816 (holding that the Rules of Evidence applied to a transfer hearing because in a transfer
17 hearing, the district court’s “determin[ation] whether the child is amenable to
18 treatment or rehabilitation as a child and whether there are reasonable grounds to
19 believe that the child committed the delinquent act, . . . are not questions of fact
9
1 preliminary to admissibility of evidence” (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and
2 citation omitted)).
3 {15} The State cites as well to Rule 5-409 NMRA—the rule governing pretrial
4 detention—to support its argument. But again this comparison is unpersuasive. Rule
5 5-409(F)(5) explicitly disclaims the use of the Rules of Evidence at a pretrial
6 detention hearing, stating that “[t]he New Mexico Rules of Evidence shall not apply
7 to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.” Relying on Rule
8 11-1101, our Supreme Court stated that Rule 5-409(F)(5) “is consistent with our
9 Rules of Evidence . . . that have long provided that the rules do not apply to
10 considering whether to release on bail or otherwise.” State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker,
11 2018-NMSC-005, ¶ 80, 410 P.3d 201 (omission, internal quotation marks, and
12 citation omitted).
13 {16} In contrast, Rule 5-602.2, the rule governing proceedings after a finding of
14 incompetency, does not exempt a dangerousness hearing from the Rules of
15 Evidence. Rule 5-602.2 limits the scope of what the district court can consider,
16 restricting the evidence the district court may rely on based on its relevance:
17 specifying that the district court “shall take into account only evidence relevant to
18 whether the defendant presents a serious threat of inflicting great bodily harm on
19 another or of violating Section[s] 30-9-11 or . . . 30-9-13.” Rule 5-602.2(D).
20 Significantly, this provision does not include a waiver of the Rules of Evidence. Rule
10
1 5-602.2(H) is the only provision in Rule 5-602.2 that explicitly waives the
2 application of the hearsay rules. That waiver, which applies if the State pursues
3 commitment after a finding of dangerousness, extends only to allow the district court
4 to “admit hearsay or affidavit evidence on secondary matters as permitted by law.”
5 Rule 5-602.2(H); see also § 31-9-1.5(A) (“The district court may admit hearsay or
6 affidavit evidence on secondary matters such as testimony to establish the chain of
7 possession of physical evidence, laboratory reports, authentication of transcripts
8 taken by official reporters, district court and business records and public
9 documents.”). We see no language in Rule 5-602.2 expressing an intention other
10 than to apply the Rules of Evidence to each of the proceedings unless explicitly
11 stated otherwise.
12 {17} The State acknowledges that Rule 5-602.2 and Section 31-9-1.2 do not contain
13 a specific provision disclaiming the Rules of Evidence, unlike Rule 5-409(F)(5).
14 Despite this, the State argues we should apply the same evidentiary standards to
15 dangerousness hearings as pretrial detention hearings because these hearings involve
16 the same purpose. The State argues that, like pretrial detention, a finding of
17 dangerousness allows a defendant to be held for a finite period of time pending
18 treatment to competency or until another hearing on criminal commitment. Section
19 31-9-1.2(E) (requiring a report filed within thirty days of a defendant’s admission to
20 a facility on the defendant’s amenability to treatment to competency and the
11
1 probability of the defendant attaining competency within a period of nine months
2 from the date of the original finding on incompetency). Any similarity of purpose
3 between the two is insufficient to assign Rule 5-409’s disclaimer of the Rules of
4 Evidence onto Rule 5-602.2 and Section 31-9-1.2. See State v. Lucero, 1992-
5 NMCA-103, ¶ 6, 114 N.M. 460, 840 P.2d 607 (“When there are provisions in
6 analogous statutes that a party contends should be present in the statute at issue in
7 the case, we utilize the process of negative inference to reason that the absence of
8 such provisions in the statute at issue is intentional.”). Further, the State’s argument
9 requires us to read language into Rule 5-602.2 and Section 31-9-1.2 disclaiming the
10 Rules of Evidence, which we will not do in the face of the plain language of Rule
11 5-602.2, Section 31-9-1.2, and Rule 11-1101(D) to the contrary. See State v.
12 Penman, 2022-NMCA-065, ¶ 21, 521 P.3d 96 (stating that this Court will not read
13 language into a statute that is not there).
14 {18} Our holding here is supported by this Court’s previous application of the Rules
15 of Evidence to a dangerousness hearing under Section 31-9-1.2. See State v.
16 Montoya, No. 32,682, mem. op. ¶¶ 11-12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2014)
17 (nonprecendential) (applying the Rules of Evidence to determine relevance in order
18 to comport with Section 31-9-1.2(D)).
19 {19} Finally, the State also argues that we should hold the Rules of Evidence do
20 not apply because the initial determination of competency and dangerousness are
12
1 nonfinal for purposes of appeal, but are instead preliminary determinations for a
2 finite amount of time under Section 31-9-1.2. See Webb, 1990-NMCA-077, ¶ 13
3 (concluding that “the orders finding [the] defendant dangerous and incompetent to
4 stand trial from which he appealed are not final orders subject to appellate review”).
5 The State contends that the preliminary nature of the dangerousness determination
6 is what makes Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-409 “counterparts.” We fail to see why
7 the preliminary nature of the two proceedings means that, as the State puts it, “The
8 same evidentiary standards should apply to each.” The State points to no authority
9 to support such a proposition.
10 {20} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Rules of Evidence apply to
11 dangerousness hearings under Section 31-9-1.2 and Rule 5-602.2. A dangerousness
12 hearing is a criminal proceeding that does not fall into a listed exception to the Rules
13 of Evidence under Rule 11-1101(D) and Rule 5-602.2 does not exempt itself from
14 the Rules of Evidence. As such, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without
15 prejudice of the charges against Defendant after excluding the State’s proposed
16 evidence as a violation of the Rules of Evidence.
17 CONCLUSION
18 {21} For the reasons explained above, we affirm.
13
1 {22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
2 ______________________________
3 JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge
4 WE CONCUR:
5 ______________________________
6 JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge
7 ______________________________
8 KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge
14