Eddie Wilson v. State ( 2010 )

i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-09-00226-CR
Eddie WILSON,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2007-CR-3496
Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 12, 2010
AFFIRMED
A jury convicted Eddie Wilson of possession of a controlled substance, and assessed
punishment at sixty-seven years confinement. On appeal, Wilson raises one issue, contending the
trial court erred in refusing his request for a jury instruction pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-09-00226-CR
BACKGROUND
Marsha Hadaway regularly opens her house to those in need. Although she was the sole
renter of her house, she allowed her cousin, Clifford McKnight, to stay with her while he was trying
to get back on his feet. Some of her cousin’s friends, including Wilson, came over one evening
while she was at home, to play dominoes. At one point during the evening, Wilson, who had been
playing dominoes with the other men, asked Hadaway if he could lie down in one of the bedrooms
to go to sleep. Hadaway said “yes,” and Wilson “went into the bedroom and laid down.”
That same evening, officers from the Gang Unit of the San Antonio Police Department were
working in the area of Hadaway’s home. Detective Kevin Nogle testified there had been complaints
about drugs, prostitution, and gangs in the area. Detective Nogle saw a known prostitute and drug
addict, Nancy Martinez, leaving Hadaway’s house. Detective Nogle testified officers had been to
the house before for “narcotics complaints.” He stated that during previous contacts Hadaway had
told officers they could come over “anytime we wanted” because “she was tired of the problems
being brought to her house.” Detective Nogle said he spoke with Martinez and based on that
conversation, he knocked on Hadaway’s door. McKnight answered the door, and Detective Nogle
asked to speak to Hadaway. Hadaway obviously heard Detective Nogle because she yelled, “Yeah,
I’m here, I’m on the couch.”
According to both Detective Nogle and Hadaway, Detective Nogle asked Hadaway if the
officers could come into the house, and Hadaway agreed. Hadaway denied she was threatened in
any way by the officers. She said she did not feel coerced into giving the officers permission to enter
the house. After Detective Nogle and another officer entered the house, Detective Nogle explained
they believed there might be drug dealing taking place in the house. Detective Nogle asked Hadaway
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if there was anyone else in the house, and she told him there were “some in the back, and
somebody’s in the bedroom asleep.” Hadaway testified she had no problem with the officers going
through the house or into the bedroom. Detective Nogle and Hadaway both testified officers went
to the back room of the house. One of the officers with Detective Nogle took everyone from the
back room outside, to the front of the house. Detective Nogle testified that as he was walking back
to the front of the house he noticed a closed door. He opened the door and shined his flashlight into
the room. Detective Nogle saw someone lying on bed. Detective Nogle said, “Hey, it’s the police,”
and he saw the individual moving around on the bed. He also saw what he believed to be a “bag of
crack next to the guy’s head.” When Detective Nogle started to enter the room, the individual on
the bed put the bag in his mouth. Detective Nogle and the individual struggled, but eventually, with
the help of another officer, the individual was subdued, and the bag was retrieved. It was determined
the bag contained drugs, and the individual, later identified as Wilson, was arrested.
Wilson was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, and possession of a controlled substance. Wilson argued the evidence seized by the officers
should be suppressed because under the Fourth Amendment he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy while in Hadaway’s bedroom, which the police violated. The trial court denied the motion
to suppress, and denied Wilson an instruction pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. ANN . art. 38.23 (Vernon 2005). The jury
convicted Wilson of the lesser offense of possession.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Wilson contends the trial court erroneously denied his request for an article 38.23
instruction, contending the “vague and incomplete evidence of the scope of the homeowner’s consent
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to the search created a fact issue regarding the legality of the search,” which thereby entitled him to
the requested instruction. Article 38.23 provides that in any case where the evidence raises an issue
as to whether evidence was seized in violation of state or federal law, the jury shall be instructed that
if it believes beyond reasonable doubt that evidence was illegally seized it shall disregard such
evidence. Id. Wilson acknowledges the outcome of this appeal turns on whether Hadaway gave
consent to the search of her home and, more specifically, the bedroom where Wilson was sleeping.
However, Wilson must first establish standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, and a
subsequent article 38.23 instruction based thereon. See Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 603 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008); see also U.S. CONST . amend. IV; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “‘against unreasonable searches and seizures.’”
Luna, 268 S.W.3d at 603 (quoting Johnson v. State, 226 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
An individual’s standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, and entitlement to an article 38.23
jury instruction, is contingent on whether he has a legitimate expectation to privacy that society
would deem reasonable. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12; Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008) (holding, in context of challenge to admission of another person’s confession, that
if defendant lacks standing to raise constitutional challenge, he is not entitled to article 38.23
instruction). The accused has the burden of proving the legitimacy of his expectation to privacy.
Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). To carry this burden, the accused
must generally prove that by his conduct, he exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy,
and that circumstances existed under which society was prepared to recognize his subjective
expectation as objectively reasonable. Id. In determining whether the accused has met his burden,
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the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, and may evaluate: (1) whether the
individual had an actual, subjective expectation to privacy, (2) whether he was on the premises
legitimately, (3) the degree of his control over the premises and whether he had the right to exclude
other individuals, (4) whether he took normal precautions to ensure his privacy, (5) whether he put
the premises to private use, and (6) whether his expectation was consistent with historical notions
of privacy. Id. “Although we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and view them in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, we review the legal issue of standing de novo.” Kothe v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Parker v. State, 182 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006).
An “overnight guest” has a legitimate expectation to privacy in the place where he spends
the night. Luna, 268 S.W.3d at 603 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990)). However,
“an overnight guest’s expectation of privacy is controlled to a significant degree by the wishes of his
host[,]” and a host may diminish the expectation of privacy by guests when the host permits police
to search the premises. Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 222–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Moreover, the legitimate privacy expectation of an overnight guest does not extend to a casual visitor
or guest who is merely present with the consent of the homeowner. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 90 (1998); see Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (holding guest
with no possessory or proprietary interest in premises, who has no clothes in house or other
belongings, has no legitimate privacy interest in premises); Black v. State, 776 S.W.2d 700, 701
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d) (holding individual has no valid expectation of privacy in home
where he is simply guest and does not control entrances or exits); Villarreal v. State, 893 S.W.2d
559, 561 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994) (refusing to impute expectation of privacy for
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standing purposes to invited guest who was not overnight guest), aff’d, 935 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996). Mere presence at night does not establish “overnight guest” status. See Taylor v. State,
995 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999) (concluding appellant was not overnight guest,
“[a]lthough he was indisputedly there at night.”), pet. dism’d as improvidently granted, 55 S.W.3d
584 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
APPLICATION OF LAW
Although the record undisputedly establishes Wilson was legitimately on the premises as an
invited guest at night, Wilson did not establish he was an overnight guest as opposed to a casual
guest or visitor who elected to nap while his friends continued to drink and play dominoes in the next
room. The evidence shows Wilson only asked permission to lie down in a bedroom, which he did.
Wilson most likely did have an actual, subjective expectation to privacy given that he went into the
bedroom, closed the door, and apparently went to sleep, but the inquiry does not end there because
a subjective expectation must be reasonable and consistent with societal norms. Villarreal, 935
S.W.2d at 137.
In Villarreal, the Court of Criminal Appeals refused to categorize the appellant as an
overnight guest despite his actual, subjective expectation to privacy in his friend’s house. Villarreal,
935 S.W.2d at 137. The court reasoned the appellant was not entitled to challenge the search of the
premises because he had no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises, lacked control over
entrances and exits, had no clothing or personal items stored there, and did not demonstrate intent
to stay the night, despite an invitation to do so. Id. Similarly in this case, Wilson did not
demonstrate any proprietary interest in the property, kept no personal items there, and provided no
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evidence of any control over entrances or exits. And, it appears from the record Wilson was lying
in bed with his clothes on.
Accordingly, we hold Wilson failed to meet the burden of proving he has standing to
complain of the trial court’s refusal of his article 38.23 instruction. However, even if we assume
Wilson established his status as an overnight guest, the court of criminal appeals has held, as noted
above, a host may limit a guest’s expectation of privacy by giving law enforcement consent to search
the premises. Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 224–25. This is in line with Villarreal’s requirement that the
expectation be one society is ready to recognize as reasonable. 935 S.W.2d at 137. Because the
overnight guest doctrine is rooted in societal custom, other customs must also be observed, such as
the assumption of risk that the host might revoke a guest’s status or invite the police in to search the
house. See Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 224.
The evidence established that when police arrived they asked Hadaway if they could come
inside. It is clear from her testimony that Hadaway gave officers permission to search the house,
which included going into the back room and securing anyone found, as well as entering the
bedroom where Wilson was found. Hadaway even testified she pointed out to police where everyone
was located, stating, “I said some [are] in the back, and somebody’s in the bedroom asleep.” The
following exchange also occurred between the State and Hadaway, conclusively establishing
Hadaway’s consent to search the bedroom where Detective Nogle found Wilson with the drugs:
Q. [The State]: Okay. And during this entire time, did you have any problem with
what the police were doing; meaning, coming into the house, going to the back
and securing people, going into the bedroom?
A. [Hadaway]: No, ma’am.
Q. [The State]: Any of those things?
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A. [Hadaway]: No, ma’am.
Q. [The State]: Okay. Those things were done with your permission?
A. [Hadaway]: Yes, ma’am.
(emphasis added)
Hadaway’s testimony conclusively refutes Wilson’s contention that evidence of Hadaway’s
consent was “vague and incomplete,” which thereby entitled him to an article 38.23 instruction. To
the contrary, Hadaway’s testimony was clear and complete–she granted the officers permission to
search the bedroom.
CONCLUSION
We hold Wilson failed to carry his burden to establish standing to raise a Fourth Amendment
challenge, which might have entitled him to an instruction under article 38.23. Even if he had met
his burden, the evidence conclusively establishes Hadaway consented to a search of the house,
including the bedroom where police found Wilson in possession of a controlled substance.
Accordingly, we overrule Wilson’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Do Not Publish
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