Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc. , 869 F.3d 1372 ( 2017 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    TRIM-LOK, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1096
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Indiana in No. 3:13-cv-00819-RLM-
    MGG, Senior Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr.
    ______________________
    Decided: September 7, 2017
    ______________________
    MICHAEL DAVID MARSTON, Botkin & Hall, LLP,
    South Bend, IN, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also
    represented by GARRICK THEODORE LANKFORD.
    DANIEL M. CISLO, Cislo & Thomas LLP, Los Angeles,
    CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
    CHONG WOOK PAK, MARK D. NIELSEN.
    ______________________
    Before LOURIE, MOORE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    2                 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    Lifetime Industries, Inc. (“Lifetime”) appeals from the
    district court’s final judgment granting Trim-Lok, Inc.’s
    (“Trim-Lok”) motion to dismiss Lifetime’s patent in-
    fringement complaint for failing to adequately allege that
    Trim-Lok either directly or indirectly infringed claims 1–6
    of U.S. Patent 6,966,590 (“the ’590 patent”). See Lifetime
    Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-819, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *3–5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016) (“Opinion”).
    For the following reasons, we reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    Lifetime owns the ’590 patent, which generally de-
    scribes a two-part seal for use in a mobile living quarters
    (also referred to as a “recreational vehicle” or “RV”) with a
    slide-out room. See ’590 patent, col. 2 ll. 37–39. As the
    name implies, a slide-out room is formed by extending a
    portion of the side wall of the RV outward to create extra
    interior space. See, e.g., 
    id. col. 2
    ll. 37–51. Figure 1 of
    the ’590 patent shows an RV with the slide-out room
    extended:
    
    Id. fig. 1.
    A seal is “commonly placed along the interface
    between the slide-out room and the opening in the side-
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.             3
    wall of the mobile living quarters to prevent water, debris,
    and excessive air drafts from entering the interior of the
    mobile living quarters from the outside.” 
    Id. col. 1
    ll. 18–
    23.
    According to the patent, prior art seals had to be
    separately mounted to both the slide-out room and the
    wall of the RV, could not be easily adapted to different RV
    models, or were difficult to replace. 
    Id. col. 1
    ll. 36–38,
    51–58. The inventor explained that the claimed two-part
    seal could be “easily adapted for installation on different
    slide-out room configurations” and could be “easily as-
    sembled and installed.” 
    Id. col. 2
    ll. 12–18. Claim 1 is
    exemplary:
    1. A resilient seal used in combination with a
    mobile living quarters having a slide-out room
    defining an interior space, said mobile living
    quarters comprising a first sidewall having an
    exterior side, said first sidewall defining an
    opening through which said slide-out room is
    shifted between open and closed positions rela-
    tive the first sidewall, said slide-out room in-
    cluding a second sidewall spaced from said
    first sidewall and an end wall defining said in-
    terior space, said end wall including a periph-
    eral flange overlapping said first sidewall
    when said slide-out room is in its said closed
    position, said seal comprising a mounting por-
    tion attached to said first sidewall along said
    opening and a separate bulb portion, said bulb
    portion slidably connected to said mounting
    portion for comp[r]essible contact with said
    flange of said exterior wall when said slide-out
    room is in its said closed position.
    
    Id. col. 4
    ll. 7–22. Dependent claims 2–5 further limit “the
    seal and mobile living quarters of claim 1,” and independ-
    ent claim 6 is directed to a “method of attaching a seal to
    4                 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    a mobile living quarters having a slide-out room.” 
    Id. col. 4
    ll. 23–64.
    On August 12, 2013, Lifetime sued Trim-Lok, alleging
    that Trim-Lok both directly and indirectly infringed the
    ’590 patent. See Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1–4. Trim-Lok
    moved to dismiss the original complaint on the basis that
    Lifetime did not adequately identify the product or prod-
    ucts that allegedly infringed. J.A. 22–33. Lifetime thus
    filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) in an attempt to
    identify the accused products. J.A. 37–43. Trim-Lok
    moved to dismiss the FAC on that same basis. J.A. 65–
    84. The district court granted the motion, and also grant-
    ed Lifetime leave to file a second amended complaint
    (“SAC”). J.A. 180–87. Accordingly, Lifetime filed an SAC.
    See J.A. 188–199.
    In the SAC, Lifetime alleged that in the months be-
    fore it filed the original complaint, two of its engineers
    with knowledge of the ’590 patent and the Lifetime prod-
    ucts that it covered left Lifetime and began working for
    Trim-Lok. Lifetime alleged that Andrew Busch (“Busch”),
    who participated in the design of Lifetime’s seals, left
    Lifetime on or around March 1, 2013. J.A. 190–91 ¶ 17.
    Lifetime also alleged that Daryl Torrey (“Torrey”), who
    participated in the design of manufacturing equipment
    and tooling for Lifetime’s products, left Lifetime on or
    around May 3, 2013. J.A. 191 ¶ 18. Lifetime alleged that
    within one month of Busch and Torrey leaving Lifetime,
    they began working at Trim-Lok. J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18.
    Lifetime further alleged that it learned that Trim-Lok,
    for the first time, was offering for sale a two-part seal for
    an RV with a slide-out room in June 2013, soon after
    Busch and Torrey began working for Trim-Lok. J.A. 190
    ¶ 16. Specifically, Lifetime alleged that Ed Ksiezopolski
    (“Ksiezopolski”), a Lifetime representative, discovered a
    two-part Trim-Lok seal installed on an RV with a slide-
    out room at a plant run by Forest River, an RV manufac-
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.             5
    turer, in Elkhart County, Indiana (“the Forest River
    plant”). J.A. 190 ¶ 16.
    Thus, Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok either directly or
    indirectly infringed the ’590 patent by causing the two-
    part seal to be installed on the RV at the Forest River
    plant. Supporting its claim of direct infringement, Life-
    time alleged that “[a]t least one representative, agent, or
    employee of” Trim-Lok visited the Forest River plant
    while “acting on behalf of” Trim-Lok, and “directly in-
    stalled” Trim-Lok’s two-part seal onto “an RV having a
    slide-out room.” J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Lifetime alleged that the
    Trim-Lok agent installed the seal “for the purpose of test
    fitting [the seal] on a Forest River RV . . . and to solicit
    sales” of the seal to Forest River. 
    Id. As for
    induced infringement, Lifetime alleged that
    Forest River’s “making, using, offering for sale and selling
    of an RV having the Accused Product [i.e., the two-part
    seal] constitutes infringement,” J.A. 195 ¶ 40, that Trim-
    Lok “influenced Forest River” to include the two-part seal
    in their RVs, “knowing that such combination would fulfill
    all elements of at least one claim of the ’590 patent,” J.A.
    195–96 ¶ 42, and that “employees or representatives or
    agents of [Trim-Lok] assisted in the installation, [or]
    directed the installation” of the seals, J.A. ¶ 43. Thus,
    Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok induced Forest River to
    infringe. 
    Id. Concerning contributory
    infringement, Lifetime al-
    leged that the two-part seal sold by Trim-Lok had only
    one purpose—for use on RVs with slide-out rooms, J.A.
    197 ¶ 55, that Trim-Lok assisted in or directed the instal-
    lation of the seal on an RV, J.A. 197 ¶ 51, and that the
    seals were not staple articles of commerce suitable for
    noninfringing use, J.A. 197–98 ¶ 57.
    Trim-Lok again moved to dismiss the complaint, argu-
    ing that Lifetime had not adequately identified the ac-
    cused product and that Lifetime had not adequately
    6                 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    pleaded direct or indirect infringement. Although the
    district court determined that Lifetime had adequately
    identified the accused product, it concluded that Lifetime
    had not adequately pleaded its case. See Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *3–5. The court concluded that Lifetime
    had not adequately pleaded direct infringement because
    the claims require both a two-part seal and an RV, and
    Trim-Lok only manufactures seals. 
    Id. at *4.
    The court
    rejected Lifetime’s argument that Trim-Lok had “assisted
    with the installation, directed the installation, or directly
    installed” the Trim-Lok seal as confusing liability for
    direct infringement with liability for contributory in-
    fringement, which the court characterized as imposing
    liability “based on an offer to sell a component, material,
    or apparatus.” 
    Id. Thus, the
    court dismissed Lifetime’s
    direct infringement allegations.
    Regarding indirect infringement, the district court
    concluded that Lifetime had not alleged “any facts from
    which intent [to infringe] could be inferred in this case.”
    
    Id. at *5.
    Instead, the court determined, Lifetime had
    only made conclusory allegations that Trim-Lok had acted
    knowingly and intentionally. 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    court
    dismissed Lifetime’s allegations of indirect infringement
    as well.
    The district court entered judgment against Lifetime,
    and Lifetime timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    “We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to
    state a claim under the law of the regional circuit.”
    BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
    LLC, 
    827 F.3d 1341
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing In re
    Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent
    Litig., 
    681 F.3d 1323
    , 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). In the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a
    district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.             7
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) is re-
    viewed de novo. Manistee Apartments, LLC v. City of
    Chi., 
    844 F.3d 630
    , 633 (7th Cir. 2016). In so doing, the
    Seventh Circuit “assume[s] all well-pleaded allegations
    are true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff.” 
    Id. In arguing
    that the district court erred, Lifetime con-
    tests direct and indirect infringement separately. We
    take each argument in turn, beginning with direct in-
    fringement.
    I.   DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
    Before reaching the merits of Lifetime’s allegations of
    direct infringement, we must first address a dispute
    relating to the pleading standard. To survive a motion to
    dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint must “contain
    sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). A plaintiff meets
    this requirement if it “pleads factual content that allows
    the court to draw the reasonable inference that the de-
    fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
    Id. Meeting this
    requirement requires a plaintiff to do more than
    plead facts that are “‘merely consistent with’ a defend-
    ant’s liability.” 
    Id. (quoting Twombly,
    550 U.S. at 557).
    In the past, Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms to the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Form 18”) was titled
    “Complaint for Patent Infringement” and provided a
    sample allegation of direct infringement. See Lyda v.
    CBS Corp., 
    838 F.3d 1331
    , 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We had
    also held that compliance with Form 18 “effectively im-
    munize[d] a claimant from attack regarding the sufficien-
    cy of the pleading.” K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time
    Warner Cable, Inc., 
    714 F.3d 1277
    , 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
    (internal citation omitted).
    8                 LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    However, Form 18 was abrogated by the Supreme
    Court effective December 1, 2015. See Supreme Court of
    the United States, Order Regarding Amendments to the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29, 2015),
    https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(u
    pdate)_1823.pdf. That order also states that it will govern
    “insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings” pending
    on that date. 
    Id. Thus, until
    December 1, 2015, com-
    plaints that complied with Form 18 were “effectively
    immunized,” 
    K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1283
    , from challenges to
    the adequacy of their pleading.
    Lifetime filed its SAC on October 13, 2014, J.A. 188–
    99, but the district court did not issue its order dismissing
    the SAC until September 30, 2016, Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *5. Thus, the SAC was filed while Form 18
    was still in effect, but the court did not issue the order
    dismissing it until after Form 18 was abrogated. In its
    order, the court did not reference Form 18, but did re-
    peatedly reference the Iqbal / Twombly standard. See
    Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *1–4.
    Lifetime argues that the district court erred in dis-
    missing its direct infringement count because the court
    should have applied the requirements of Form 18, rather
    than Iqbal / Twombly. As the SAC meets the require-
    ments of Form 18, Lifetime contends, the court erred even
    if the SAC does not meet the Iqbal / Twombly standard.
    Although Lifetime recognizes Form 18’s abrogation, it
    argues that it would not be “just and practicable” to apply
    what it views as the more rigorous Iqbal / Twombly
    standard to its SAC, given the time period between when
    the SAC was filed and Form 18’s abrogation. In the
    alternative, Lifetime argues that the SAC meets the Iqbal
    / Twombly standard.
    Trim-Lok responds that the Supreme Court order spe-
    cifically indicates that it should be applied to pending
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.             9
    cases, and that the SAC does not meet either the re-
    quirements of Form 18 or the Iqbal / Twombly standard.
    The parties assume that there is a difference between
    the requirements of Form 18 and Iqbal / Twombly; how-
    ever, we have never recognized such a distinction. See K-
    
    Tech, 714 F.3d at 1284
    (“That Form 18 would control in
    the event of a conflict between the form and Twombly and
    Iqbal does not suggest, however, that we should seek to
    create a conflict where none exists.”). In any event, we
    need not resolve the question whether there is a differ-
    ence between the two standards here because, as we
    explain, the SAC met the Iqbal / Twombly standard for
    pleading direct infringement.
    We now turn to the merits of the district court’s deci-
    sion. Lifetime argues that the district court erred in
    dismissing its direct infringement count because the court
    stated that Lifetime had to establish that “Trim-Lok knew
    about the ’590 patent in June 2013, and knew that it was
    infringing . . . that patent” to plead direct infringement,
    Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *3, but that patent in-
    fringement is a strict-liability offense. Trim-Lok responds
    that the court’s dismissal of the direct infringement count
    was not predicated on Lifetime’s failure to plead
    knowledge of the patent, and thus the section of the
    court’s opinion quoted by Lifetime was taken out of con-
    text.
    Although we agree with Lifetime that direct infringe-
    ment is a strict-liability offense that does not require
    knowledge of the patent or intent to infringe, see Commil
    USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 1920
    , 1926 (2015),
    we also agree with Trim-Lok that the district court’s
    statement did not affect its analysis or lead to its dismis-
    sal of Lifetime’s allegations of direct infringement, see
    Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *3–4. “We sit to review
    judgments, not opinions.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
    Corp., 
    713 F.2d 1530
    , 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Doe v.
    10                LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    Howe Military Sch., 
    227 F.3d 981
    , 992 (7th Cir. 2000)
    (refusing to reverse discovery rulings where they “did not
    make a difference in the disposition of the plaintiffs’
    claims.”). The court’s judgment was not predicated on the
    alleged error of law, and therefore that error does not
    require reversal.
    The court’s decision relating to direct infringement
    turned on the fact that the claims of the ’590 patent
    require both a seal and an RV, but Trim-Lok only manu-
    factures seals. See Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *4.
    Lifetime argues that it properly pleaded direct infringe-
    ment because it alleged that a Trim-Lok employee or
    representative “directly installed” Trim-Lok’s two-part
    seal on “an RV having a slide-out room.” J.A. 194 ¶ 33.
    Trim-Lok responds that the district court correctly
    dismissed the SAC because Trim-Lok only makes seals,
    not the seal and RV combination required to infringe the
    claims. Trim-Lok contends that Lifetime’s allegation that
    a Trim-Lok agent installed the seal on a Forest River RV
    is speculative and implausible because it does not identify
    a person controlled by Trim-Lok who took an action that
    would directly infringe.
    We agree with Lifetime that the SAC adequately
    alleged that Trim-Lok directly infringed. “One who
    ‘makes’ a patented invention without authorization in-
    fringes the patent.” Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v.
    Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 
    637 F.3d 1269
    ,
    1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Commercial manufacture is not
    the only way that a combination can infringe. Limited
    internal manufacture and use can also infringe. See 
    id. (remanding for
    determination of reasonable royalty
    damages where infringing product was made, but not
    sold). For example, we affirmed a finding of infringement
    of claims to a combination of a primary fireplace burner
    and a secondary burner because “each time [a secondary
    burner] was attached to a primary burner by either [the
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.           11
    alleged infringer] or an end-user, the combination was
    infringing.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson
    Co., 
    438 F.3d 1354
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We have also
    reversed a grant of summary judgment of noninfringe-
    ment relating to orthopedic surgical implants where there
    was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether sur-
    geons infringe by making the claimed apparatus” by
    having the implant contact a patient’s bone, as required
    by the patent, during surgery. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v.
    Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 
    424 F.3d 1293
    , 1312 (Fed.
    Cir. 2005).
    The district court dismissed Lifetime’s direct in-
    fringement count on the basis that Trim-Lok only made
    one of the two components that comprised the patented
    invention. Opinion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *4. Although
    Lifetime did not allege that Trim-Lok made the RV onto
    which it installed the seal, Lifetime did allege that Trim-
    Lok installed the seal onto the RV; that is, Lifetime
    alleged that Trim-Lok made an infringing seal-RV combi-
    nation. J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Because Lifetime alleged that an
    agent of Trim-Lok installed the seal onto the RV, and that
    the resulting seal-RV combination infringed the ’590
    patent, it alleged that Trim-Lok directly infringed in a
    manner consistent with our precedents holding that
    assembling the components of an invention is an infring-
    ing act of making the invention.
    Trim-Lok’s complaints concerning lack of detail ask
    for too much. There is no requirement for Lifetime to
    “prove its case at the pleading stage.” Bill of 
    Lading, 681 F.3d at 1339
    (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 
    562 U.S. 521
    , 529
    (2011)). Our precedent requires that a complaint place
    the alleged infringer “on notice of what activity . . . is
    being accused of infringement.” K-
    Tech, 714 F.3d at 1284
    .
    The SAC meets that requirement. Lifetime identified
    where the alleged infringement occurred (the Forest River
    plant); when it occurred (in or around June 2013); who
    performed the allegedly infringing act (an agent or em-
    12                LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    ployee of Trim-Lok); and why (to test fit the seal onto the
    RV and to solicit sales). J.A. 194 ¶ 33. Lifetime pleaded
    other facts supporting its allegations as well: that Ksiezo-
    polski discovered the seal installed “adjacent to the open-
    ing for the slide-out room on the Forest River RV” and
    learned that Trim-Lok was offering its seal for sale, J.A.
    190 ¶ 16; that Trim-Lok admitted that it had offered its
    seals for sale, J.A. 191 ¶ 20; and that former Lifetime
    employees with knowledge of the seal design and manu-
    facturing process had joined Trim-Lok shortly before June
    2013, J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18. Drawing reasonable infer-
    ences in Lifetime’s favor, these facts make it plausible
    that a Trim-Lok agent installed the seal onto the Forest
    River RV. “[W]e do not say that these inferences are, in
    fact, correct or that they are the only fair inferences to be
    drawn from the facts alleged.” Bill of 
    Lading, 681 F.3d at 1340
    n.12. Taken together, however, they render Life-
    time’s pleadings sufficiently plausible to survive a motion
    to dismiss.
    It is important to note that the limited scope of the
    district court’s decision similarly limits our own review.
    Its decision to dismiss Lifetime’s direct infringement
    count was based solely on the conclusion that Trim-Lok
    only made one component of the patented invention. As
    explained above, Lifetime adequately alleged that Trim-
    Lok created an infringing combination by installing its
    seal onto an RV at the Forest River plant. We need not,
    and do not, express any other opinion relating to the level
    of detail contained in Lifetime’s SAC.
    Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dis-
    trict court’s dismissal of Lifetime’s direct infringement
    allegations for failing to state a claim.
    II. INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
    As Form 18 does not apply to allegations of indirect
    infringement, the Iqbal / Twombly standard unquestiona-
    bly applies to Lifetime’s allegations of induced and con-
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.            13
    tributory infringement. See Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor
    Glob. Enters., Ltd., 
    700 F.3d 1287
    , 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    For an allegation of induced infringement to survive a
    motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead facts plausibly
    showing that the accused infringer “specifically intended
    [another party] to infringe [the patent] and knew that the
    [other party]’s acts constituted infringement.” Bill of
    
    Lading, 681 F.3d at 1339
    .
    The district court dismissed Lifetime’s indirect in-
    fringement counts on the basis that they failed to plead
    “any facts from which intent could be inferred,” and
    instead had only supplied conclusory allegations. Opin-
    ion, 
    2016 WL 5724451
    , at *5. The court also noted that
    Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the
    patent and the alleged infringement in July 2013, when
    Trim-Lok received a cease-and-desist letter, but that the
    allegedly infringing acts occurred “well before.” 
    Id. Lifetime argues
    that it pleaded sufficient facts to sup-
    port a plausible claim of induced infringement because it
    alleged that Busch and Torrey had knowledge of the ’590
    patent and its scope. Specifically, Lifetime contends that
    because it alleged that the employees hired by Trim-Lok
    had knowledge of seal design and manufacturing relating
    to products covered by the ’590 patent, that knowledge
    could be imputed to the Trim-Lok employees that assisted
    or directed the allegedly infringing installation. Taken
    together, Lifetime contends, these facts plausibly estab-
    lish that Trim-Lok knew that its acts constituted in-
    fringement.
    Trim-Lok responds that Lifetime’s allegations, at best,
    only alleged that it knew of the ’590 patent, not that it
    had the intent to infringe. For example, Trim-Lok con-
    tends that Lifetime’s former employees could have used
    their knowledge of Lifetime’s seal to design around the
    ’590 patent’s claims. Thus, Trim-Lok continues, Lifetime
    has only pleaded that Trim-Lok intended the consequenc-
    14                LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    es of its actions, but has not adequately pleaded that
    Trim-Lok intended to infringe.
    We agree with Lifetime that it has plausibly alleged
    that Trim-Lok induced infringement of the ’590 patent.
    “[T]he plausibility requirement is not akin to a ‘probabil-
    ity requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
    enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
    discovery will reveal’ that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.” Bill of 
    Lading, 681 F.3d at 1341
    (quoting 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556
    ).
    At the outset, we agree with Lifetime that it ade-
    quately pleaded that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the
    patent before the allegedly infringing act. Lifetime specif-
    ically alleged that Busch and Torrey had knowledge of the
    patent and its scope when they joined Trim-Lok in the
    months before June 2013. J.A. 190–91 ¶¶ 17–18. Draw-
    ing reasonable inferences in Lifetime’s favor, these facts
    make it plausible that Trim-Lok had knowledge of the
    ’590 patent before June 2013.
    We also agree that Lifetime plausibly pleaded that
    Trim-Lok had the intent to infringe. Trim-Lok’s respons-
    es again ask too much. Lifetime pleaded that Trim-Lok
    had knowledge of the ’590 patent, its scope, and the
    products covered thereby. After Trim-Lok gained that
    knowledge, Lifetime alleged that it then assisted in or
    directed the installation of exactly the same type of seal
    as the one described in the patent onto an RV at the
    Forest River plant. Lifetime alleged, moreover, that
    Trim-Lok never made or sold these particular seals prior
    to gaining that knowledge, and that the seals have no
    noninfringing use. Our precedent does not require Life-
    time to do more.
    Bill of Lading is 
    instructive. 681 F.3d at 1339
    . In
    that case it was unclear whether the claimed method had
    been performed at all, but we determined that the patent
    owner had adequately pleaded intent where it alleged
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.             15
    knowledge of the patent and had plausibly pleaded that
    the defendants’ customers performed the claimed method.
    
    Id. at 1341–42.
    Lifetime pleaded facts that are at least as
    strong, because Lifetime could rely on direct evidence (i.e.,
    the two-part seal found installed on an RV at the Forest
    River plant) that tended to show infringement. This
    evidence, taken together with Trim-Lok’s prior knowledge
    of the patent and viewed in Lifetime’s favor, “gives rise to
    a reasonable inference that [Trim-Lok] intend[ed] to
    induce” Forest River to infringe. 
    Id. at 1341.
    Thus, we
    reverse the district court’s dismissal of the induced in-
    fringement count.
    Finally, Lifetime argues that the district court erred
    in dismissing its contributory infringement count because
    contributory infringement only requires knowledge of the
    patent and of infringement, not the intent to infringe, and
    that it adequately pleaded the elements of contributory
    infringement.     Trim-Lok responds that contributory
    infringement does require the intent to infringe, and that
    Lifetime inaccurately equates knowledge of the patent
    with knowledge of infringement.
    We agree with Lifetime that it plausibly pleaded con-
    tributory infringement. Contributory infringement oc-
    curs, inter alia, when a party sells “a component of a
    patented . . . combination . . . constituting a material part
    of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made
    or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
    patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
    suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” 35 U.S.C. §
    271(c). We have held that contributory infringement
    requires “only proof of a defendant’s knowledge, not
    intent, that his activity cause infringement.” Hewlett-
    Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 
    909 F.2d 1464
    , 1469
    (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also 
    Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1927
    (“[C]ontributory infringement requires knowledge of the
    patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement.”
    (citation omitted)). Thus, the district court erred to the
    16                LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.
    extent that it dismissed the contributory infringement
    count for failing to plausibly allege that Trim-Lok intend-
    ed to infringe.
    Lifetime also plausibly pleaded that Trim-Lok knew of
    the patent and knew of infringement. As explained
    previously, Lifetime adequately pleaded that Trim-Lok
    gained knowledge of the patent before June 2013 from
    Busch and Torrey. Lifetime also pleaded that a two-part
    seal was found installed on a Forest River RV, and that
    Trim-Lok employees assisted with or directed that instal-
    lation. It is reasonable to infer, based on those facts and
    at this stage of litigation, that Trim-Lok also knew of
    infringement.
    Trim-Lok also generally contends that Lifetime has
    not plausibly pleaded that the seal was installed by others
    with the assistance or under the direction of Trim-Lok
    employees because Lifetime’s direct infringement count
    alleges that Trim-Lok employees installed the seal them-
    selves. But “[t]he Federal Rules permit a party to plead
    in the alternative.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
    Assurance Co. of Can., 
    687 F.3d 1266
    , 1280 (Fed. Cir.
    2012). Moreover, the seal discovered by Ksiezopolski was
    installed on the Forest River RV by someone, and the two
    plausible installers are either Trim-Lok employees or
    Forest River employees. If it was Trim-Lok employees,
    then Trim-Lok may be liable for direct infringement; if it
    was Forest River employees, then Trim-Lok may be liable
    for indirect infringement. Thus, a more developed record
    will clarify what role, if any, Trim-Lok employees had in
    the installation of the seal at the Forest River plant. At
    present, Lifetime has adequately pleaded both direct and
    indirect infringement. Accordingly, we reverse the dis-
    trict court’s dismissal of the indirect infringement counts.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the remaining arguments, but
    find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the
    LIFETIME INDUSTRIES, INC.   v. TRIM-LOK, INC.           17
    decision of the district court is reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED