Leavitt v. . Putnam , 3 N.Y. 494 ( 1850 )

On the 29th day of August, 1844, Messrs. J.W. R. Leavitt made their note for $1570,52, payable to the order of T. Putnam Co. (the defendants) eight months after date. A few days after the maturity of the note, the defendants indorsed it as follows: "Pay the within to A. Thacher, value received, May 21, 1845. T. Putnam Co." Thacher indorsed without recourse, and delivered the note for a valuable consideration to the American Exchange Bank, in whose behalf this action is brought.

On the trial the defendants urged, among other grounds of objection to the plaintiff's recovery, that the defendants' indorsement was in effect a new draft payable to Thacher only, and not negotiable, so that no action could be maintained upon it in the name of the plaintiff. In this they were sustained by the court, and the plaintiff was nonsuited.

The other objections taken by the defendants on their motion for a nonsuit were not considered by the court below, and under the circumstances of the case can not be noticed on this appeal; so that the only thing for us to consider is, whether the indorsement of a note made after due, differs from one made before maturity in respect to its negotiability? It was conceded on the argument that no express authority could be found sustaining the distinction upon which the decision of the superior court was based, but it was urged that the defence could be sustained upon the principle that a dishonored note loses its mercantile character, and its indorsement becomes an original contract which must be made expressly negotiable in terms, or it could not be held to possess the character of negotiability. There is unquestionably a difference between the indorsement of a note after due and one while it is running to maturity, but this relates only to a single point arising from the necessity of the case, to wit, the time of payment, which, in the latter indorsement, is fixed at a future day by the express agreement of the parties, while in the former, it is declared by law to be within a reasonable time, upon demand. But in all other respects the contract is the same as an indorsement in the usual course of trade; and it is difficult to perceive how the single difference referred to can at all affect the negotiability of the indorsement. A bill or note does not lose its negotiable character by being dishonored. If originally negotiable it may still pass from hand to hand ad infinitum until paid by the drawer. Moreover the indorser after maturity writes in the same form and is bound only upon the same condition of demand upon the drawer and notice of non-payment as any other indorser. Thus the paper preserves its mercantile existence and retains the main attributes of a proper bill or note, and circulates as such in the commercial community. Exceptions to a general rule affecting so important and numerous a class of transactions as the one under consideration must be productive of great inconvenience, and will not be indulged except for urgent reasons; and nothing has been made to appear in the argument or seems to exist in the case, which warrants the court in treating the ordinary indorsement of a dishonored bill or note as without the law merchant and not negotiable. While it was questioned whether such a note was negotiable, and whether the indorser was chargeable except upon the usual condition of demand and notice, there was perhaps reason enough to sustain the decision of the court below. But since both the note and its indorsement, by a long course of decisions, have been treated as within the law merchant in respect to their main attributes, the indorsement ought to be regarded as negotiable to the same extent as an indorsement before maturity. The latter follows the nature of the orignal bill and is equally negotiable. (Edie v. The East India Co. 2Burr. 1216; Milford v. Walcott, 1 Ld. Raym. 574;Allwood v. Hazelton, 2 Baylies' S.C.R. 457; Bishop v.Dexter, 2 Conn. R. 419; Berry v. Robinson, 9 John. 121.)

The note in the present case was upon its face transferrible, and its character in respect to negotiability could only have been changed by an indorsement containing express words of restriction. The defendants' indorsement was a full one, containing the name of the person in whose favor it was made, but omitting the words "or order," the legal effect of which was, nevertheless, to make the note payable to him or his order, and his indorsement therefore was effectual to transfer the note to the plaintiff. (Chitty on Bills, 136; Story on Prom. Notes § 139.)

I am of opinion that the judgment of the superior court should be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Judgment reversed.