Com. v. Cobo, V. ( 2017 )

J-S23009-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VLADIMIR COBO,
Appellant No. 3066 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order of September 4, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0036604-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2017
Appellant, Vladimir Cobo, appeals from the order entered on
September 4, 2015, dismissing his petition for writ of certiorari before the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as
follows. On February 18, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to driving under the
influence of alcohol pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c) before the
Philadelphia Municipal Court. On April 14, 2015, the municipal court
sentenced Appellant to three to 56 days of incarceration followed by four
months of probation, a one-year license suspension, participation in an
alcohol program, and a fine. On April 24, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea with the municipal court. The municipal court
denied relief. Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the Court
J-S23009-17
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The trial court denied relief by
order entered on September 4, 2015. This timely appeal resulted.1
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Did the Common Pleas Court err in ruling that the Municipal
Court [j]udge who presided over [Appellant’s] guilty plea
had not abused her discretion by refusing to allow
[Appellant] to withdraw his guilty plea when he requested to
do so in a timely manner and stated as justification for the
request his lack of knowledge of the terms of the plea and
actual innocence of the crime?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant contends that his guilty plea “was not knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily entered as the plea agreement was never
conveyed to him in Albanian, his native language and the only one he
speaks fluently.” Id. at 9. Moreover, Appellant “did not expect to receive a
license suspension” or he would have petitioned to withdraw his guilty plea
earlier. Id.
This Court has held that
after the court has imposed a sentence, a defendant can
withdraw his guilty plea only where necessary to correct a
manifest injustice. Post-sentence motions for withdrawal are
____________________________________________
1
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on Monday, October 5, 2015. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903 (30 days to file a timely notice of appeal); see also 1
Pa.C.S.A. 1908 (“Whenever the last day of [a statutory] period shall fall on
[] Sunday[], such day shall be omitted from the computation.”). On March
24, 2016, the trial court entered an order directing Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant complied timely. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 12, 2016.
-2-
J-S23009-17
subject to higher scrutiny since courts strive to discourage
the entry of guilty pleas as sentencing-testing devices.
* * *
To be valid under the manifest injustice standard, a guilty
plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
entered. A manifest injustice occurs when a plea is not
tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and
understandingly. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open court and
require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to
ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the
consequences of his plea. Under [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 590, the
court should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant
understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) he is
giving up his right to trial by jury; (4) and the presumption
of innocence; (5) he is aware of the permissible ranges of
sentences and fines possible; and (6) the court is not bound
by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the
plea. The reviewing court will evaluate the adequacy of the
plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by
examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
entry of that plea. Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant
who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing,
and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal
citations, quotations, and original brackets omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated:
A consequence is civil in nature where, imposition has been
vested in an administrative agency over which the criminal
judge had no control and for which he had no responsibility.
The mandatory suspension of a driver's license upon
conviction for DUI is a collateral civil penalty
administratively imposed by PennDOT pursuant to the
mandates of the Vehicle Code not the Crimes Code. Thus,
the mandatory suspension is not a direct criminal penalty,
but rather, is a civil sanction[.]
-3-
J-S23009-17
As operating privilege suspensions are collateral civil
consequences, not criminal penalties, they do not violate a
motorist's equal protection or due process rights, nor does a
defendant in a criminal case need to be informed of the
collateral consequence for his criminal conduct, as it does
not constitute a portion of his or her punishment.
Bell v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bur. of Driver Licensing, 96
A.3d 1005, 1019 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis in original; internal citations,
quotations, and original brackets omitted).
“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he
makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds
for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his
plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citations omitted).
Upon review of the certified record, at the guilty plea hearing, the
municipal court provided Appellant with an Albanian interpreter named Eddie
Papha. N.T., 2/1/8/2015, at 4. Appellant claimed that he could understand
the plea colloquy questions with the aid of that interpreter. Id. at 6. Prior
to the municipal court’s acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea, Appellant did
not have any additional questions for the court. Id. at 10. Prior to entering
the guilty plea, the Commonwealth recited that the plea deal called for the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 8-9. At the
sentencing hearing, the interpreter was again present. N.T., 4/14/2015, at
3. The municipal court began the hearing by stating, “[t]his is a negotiated
guilty plea wherein the mandatory minimum was the recommended
sentence.” N.T., 4/14/2015, at 3. The municipal court then imposed the
-4-
J-S23009-17
sentence as set forth above, including the one-year driver’s license
suspension. Id. at 5-6. The municipal court asked Appellant if he had any
additional questions and Appellant did not. Id. at 6-7.
Here, Appellant was apprised of the criminal penalties to be imposed
before he accepted the plea deal that included a mandatory minimum
sentence. Appellant was provided with an interpreter at both the plea
hearing and at sentencing. Appellant claimed he understood the plea
proceedings, acknowledged that he would receive a mandatory minimum
sentence pursuant to plea negotiations,2 and had no additional questions for
the municipal court prior to its acceptance of the guilty plea. Moreover,
license suspension is a collateral consequence for DUI and, as such, it was
not necessary to inform Appellant that such consequence would apply upon
acceptance of the guilty plea. This did not render Appellant’s plea
unknowing or involuntary. Finally, after reviewing the sentence with
Appellant, including the license suspension, Appellant did not lodge a
complaint.
Based upon all of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty plea. We reject Appellant’s
suggestion that he could not understand the proceedings, or the terms of
the plea, because there was an Albanian interpreter present at all
____________________________________________
2
Appellant does not dispute the imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence.
-5-
J-S23009-17
proceedings and Appellant never asked for clarification. Appellant is bound
by the statements he made under oath at the plea hearing. Moreover,
Appellant cannot seek to withdraw his plea on the premise that he did not
understand that his driver’s license would be suspended, because such
consequence was wholly collateral to the imposition of criminal sanctions.
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied relief, as there was no manifest
injustice.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/21/2017
-6-