Quiero, Jr., A. v. Rivera, N. ( 2017 )


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  • I S91004/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION             - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P.        65.37
    AVON C. QUIERO JR.,                             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.                              No. 1174 MDA 2016
    NICOLAS RIVERA
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2016,
    inthe Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Civil Division at No. 2014-00808
    BEFORE:    FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                    FILED APRIL 06, 2017
    Avon C. Quiero, Jr. appeals the June 24, 2016 order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lebanon County that denied appellant's petition for order
    of compliance of law.
    The factual and procedural history of this matter, as recounted by the
    trial court ,is as follows:
    In this case, [appellant] has initiated a lawsuit
    seeking to obtain the return of an $800.00 security
    deposit he allegedly paid when he rented an
    apartment.     Unfortunately, [appellant] is now an
    inmate in a state correctional facility. Despite efforts
    made by the Lebanon County Court Administrator,
    the State Bureau of Corrections refuses to allocate
    time in its video and telephone conference centers
    for use by inmates involved in civil litigation.
    Because of this, we entered an order on June 7,
    2016 staying the above -referenced litigation until
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    I S91004/16
    such time as [appellant] is released from prison.
    [Appellant] has appealed.  .   .   .
    The procedural history of this case is
    complicated.       The   file  contains   numerous
    handwritten letters and motions, most of which were
    filed by [appellant]. We have sifted through all of
    the documents in the file and have attempted to
    create a list of pertinent events. That list is as
    follows:
    2/22/13 -- [Appellant] filed     Complaint
    a
    before the Lebanon County Court of
    Common Pleas seeking return of an
    $800.00 security deposit that he alleged
    was unlawfully withheld by Nicolas Rivera
    (hereafter [appellee]). No Notice to Plead
    was included with the Complaint.
    5/24/13 -- [Appellant's] Complaint was
    reinstated. Once again, no Notice to Plead
    was included.
    9/17/13 -- [Appellant] filed        a    Motion for
    Default Judgment and       a   Rule to Show Cause
    was entered.
    9/30/13 -- [Appellee] filed an Answer.
    2/19/14 -- The Court issued an Order
    remanding [appellant's] cause of action to a
    Magisterial District Judge.       The Court
    reasoned that [appellant's] requested relief
    was within the jurisdictional limit applicable
    to Magisterial District Judges. In addition,
    the Court noted that [appellant's] claim
    involved a landlord -tenant dispute, which is
    also the type of claim that is traditionally
    heard by Magisterial District Judges.
    Between 2/19/14 and 5/12/14 -- At some
    point within this time period, the Magisterial
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    I S91004/16
    District Judge conducted a hearing and
    entered a decision in favor of [appellant] in
    the amount of $1,600.00. Also at some
    point during this time frame, [appellee] filed
    an    Appeal of the M.D.J.'s decision.
    Although we do not have copies of the
    actual papers issued by the M.D.J., both
    parties reference the above and we accept
    that the preceding events occurred.
    5/12/14 -- [Appellant] filed      Complaint
    a
    before this Court asking this Court to affirm
    the decision of the M.D.J.
    6/5/14 -- [Appellant] simultaneously files     a
    Motion for Summary Judgment and                a
    request for a Writ of Execution.
    6/24/14 -- [Appellant] files      a    Motion for
    Default Judgment.
    7/2/14 -- [Appellant] files   a   second Motion
    for Summary Judgment.
    7/7/14 -- [Appellant]     notified by the
    is
    Lebanon County Prothonotary's Office that
    he must submit an affirmative request that
    his motions be submitted to the Court for
    disposition.
    7/24/14 -- [Appellant] was notified by the
    Prothonotary's Office that his request for a
    Writ of Execution was being denied as
    premature because no judgment had yet
    been issued.
    7/31/14 -- This Court enters an Order. The
    Order noted that [appellant] did not append
    a  Notice to Plead to his Complaint or
    provide proof that the Complaint had been
    served upon [appellee].      Because due
    process was not afforded to [appellee], the
    Court denied [appellant's] Motion for
    I S91004/16
    Summary Judgment and Motion for Default
    Judgment.
    8/8/14 -- [Appellant] files a Notice to Plead
    that is unaccompanied by any pleading.
    10/17/14      -- [Appellant's] request for
    in forma     pa uperis status is denied
    because he failed to provide pertinent
    financial information.
    10/28/14 -- [Appellant's] request for I.F.P.
    status is granted based upon the financial
    information that he did present following
    our 10/17/14 Court Order.
    11/17/14   --    [Appellant] refiles his
    Complaint with an accompanying Notice to
    Plead.
    12/11/14 -- [Appellant's] Complaint was
    served upon [appellee].
    12/15/14 -- [Appellee] files an Answer with
    New Matter and Counterclaim.
    12/26/14 -- [Appellant] filed a Reply to
    [appellee's] New Matter and Counterclaim.
    1/2/15 -- The Court schedules         a   status
    conference.
    2/26/15 -- The Court presides over      a status
    conference. Both parties participated in the
    status conference via telephone. As a result
    of the status conference, we certified the
    above -referenced matter as ready for a trial
    "no earlier than 6/10/15."            We also
    established a process by which [appellant]
    could participate at trial via teleconference.
    Early 2016 -- The Lebanon County Court
    Administrator     attempts     to     make
    arrangements with the State Correctional
    Institution at Dallas for a trial to occur.
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    I S91004/16
    After numerous efforts, the Superintendent
    of S.C.I. Dallas decided that his institution
    would not permit its video conference
    center and telephone conference center to
    be used for more than 15 minutes for a civil
    proceeding.
    6/7/16 -- This Court entered an Order
    staying the above -referenced case until
    after [appellant] is released from prison.
    We entered the Order based upon our
    inability to arrange a video or telephonic
    conference with S.C.I. Dallas. We stated:
    "The Court directs that the above -
    referenced matter be stayed until the
    [appellant] is released from incarceration.
    Once the [appellant] is released from
    incarceration, leave is granted for him to file
    a motion to establish a bench trial."
    6/24/16 -- [Appellant] files    a "Petition for
    Order of Compliance of Law Concerning
    Escrow Funds."        Because we could not
    conduct a      factual     hearing   due      to
    [appellant's]   incarceration, we        denied
    [appellant's] Petition.
    7/11/16 - [Appellant] files an Appeal from
    our Order dated June 24, 2016.
    In his Statement of Errors Complained of on
    Appeal, [appellant] alleges that our decision to stay
    the above -referenced case was error.        He also
    challenges a decision we made to refuse his request
    to require [appellee] to pay into escrow the sum of
    $1,600.00.
    Trial court opinion, 8/16/16 at 2-5.
    On appeal to this court, appellant raises the following issues   for this
    court's review:
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    I S91004/16
    Does     the    stay    order    violate   [appellant's]
    constitutionally protected right to access to courts?
    Is the lower Court's refusal to enforce [68] P.S.
    [§] 250-511(b)(c) an abuse of discretion and
    violation of plaintiff's due process rights?
    Appellant's brief at 2-3.
    Before addressing the merits of appellant's argument, this court must
    determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
    Despite the fact that neither side questions the
    jurisdiction of this Court to dispose of the present
    controversy, we are not precluded from reaching the
    appealability of the lower court's order sua sponte,
    Turner v. May Corp., 
    427 A.2d 203
     (Pa.Super.
    1981), for it is axiomatic that neither silence nor
    agreement of the parties can confer jurisdiction
    where it otherwise would not be. T.C.R. Realty,
    Inc. v. Cox, 
    372 A.2d 721
     (Pa. 1977).
    The appellate court's jurisdiction is defined by
    statute, i.e., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742, which grants this
    Court "exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals
    from final orders of the courts of common pleas
    If
    In deciding if the order appealed is final or not, we
    are guided by the decision of Phi/co Corp. v.
    Sunstein, 
    429 Pa. 606
    , 
    241 A.2d 108
     (1968),
    wherein the court held:
    "Whether or not    a stay order should be
    considered final for appeal purposes
    depends to a large extent upon the
    practical effect and impact the stay order
    might have on the relief requested by
    the litigants. If the effect of the stay
    order is tantamount to a dismissal of the
    cause of action or amounts to a
    permanent denial of relief requested, the
    party aggrieved should undoubtedly be
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    I S91004/16
    afforded the opportunity to appeal on the
    basis that such stay order is a final
    disposition of some, if not all, of the
    rights involved.
    Therefore,    a   consideration of the
    practical effects of the stay order on
    appellant's cause of action is an essential
    prerequisite in determining whether the
    order appealed from is interlocutory."
    (Footnote omitted). Id. at 608-610, 241
    A.2d at 109-110.
    Opperman         v.   Opperman,   
    443 A.2d 313
    , 315 (Pa.Super. 1982).
    Here,    the trial court stayed the proceedings because the state
    correctional institution where appellant was housed did not permit him to
    appear in court, even by electronic means.                 While the stay postpones
    resolution of the action between appellant and appellee for an indeterminate
    time as it       is   not known whether appellant will be paroled before the
    expiration of his sentence, the stay does not amount to                  a   dismissal of
    appellant's cause of action or, essentially,        a   permanent denial of the relief
    requested.       The stay order here is interlocutory and not       a   final appealable
    order.
    Accordingly, the appeal    is   quashed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn,
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/6/2017
    -7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Quiero, Jr., A. v. Rivera, N. No. 1174 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 4/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/6/2017