United States v. Keeyon Dunbar ( 2018 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-3227
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Keeyon M. Dunbar
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
    ____________
    Submitted: June 1, 2018
    Filed: June 8, 2018
    ____________
    Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Keeyon Dunbar (“Dunbar”) directly appeals the within-Guidelines-range
    sentence the district court1 imposed after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession
    of a firearm. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under
    1
    The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Missouri.
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), arguing that the district court erred in
    calculating Dunbar’s base offense level by treating a prior felony bank robbery
    conviction as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (offense level
    of 20 applies to unlawful possession of a firearm if the defendant has a prior felony
    conviction for a crime of violence), and that the sentence is substantively
    unreasonable.
    First, we find no error in the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines range,
    see United States v. Turner, 
    781 F.3d 374
    , 393 (8th Cir. 2015) (this court reviews the
    district court’s application of Guidelines de novo, and its findings of fact for clear
    error), as bank robbery is a crime of violence, see United States v. Harper, 
    869 F.3d 624
    , 626-27 (8th Cir. 2017) (bank robbery is crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
    § 4B1.2(a)); United States v. Ossana, 
    638 F.3d 895
    , 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (the term
    “crime of violence” under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) has the same meaning as in § 4B1.2(a)).
    In addition, we conclude that the district court did not impose a substantively
    unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461-62 (8th Cir.
    2009) (en banc) (reviewing reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion
    standard); see also United States v. Callaway, 
    762 F.3d 754
    , 760 (8th Cir. 2014) (on
    appeal, within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumed reasonable).
    Finally, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 92 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly,
    we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and we affirm.
    ______________________________
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3227

Filed Date: 6/8/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021