Rouse v. State , 301 Neb. 1037 ( 2019 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    02/15/2019 08:06 AM CST
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    301 Nebraska R eports
    ROUSE v. STATE
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 1037
    Roy J. Rouse, appellant, v.
    State of Nebraska et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 4, 2019.    No. S-18-129.
    1.	 Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s
    grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo,
    accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all rea-
    sonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
    2.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    3.	 Constitutional Law: Immunity: Waiver. Under the 11th Amendment,
    a nonconsenting state is generally immune from suit unless the state has
    waived its immunity.
    4.	 Tort Claims Act: Legislature: Immunity: Waiver. The Legislature has
    provided limited waivers of the State’s sovereign immunity through the
    State Tort Claims Act, subject to statutory exceptions.
    5.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts give statutory language
    its plain and ordinary meaning and will not resort to interpretation to
    ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
    unambiguous.
    6.	 Statutes: Immunity: Waiver. Statutes that purport to waive the State’s
    protection of sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor of the
    sovereign and against the waiver.
    7.	 Immunity: Waiver. To strictly construe against a waiver of sovereign
    immunity, courts broadly read exceptions to a waiver of sovereign
    immunity.
    8.	 Statutes: Immunity: Waiver. A waiver of sovereign immunity is found
    only where stated by the most express language of a statute or by such
    overwhelming implication from the text as will allow no other reason-
    able construction.
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    301 Nebraska R eports
    ROUSE v. STATE
    Cite as 
    301 Neb. 1037
    9.	 Constitutional Law: Tort Claims Act: Immunity: Appeal and Error.
    An appellate court must determine whether the constitution and statutes
    provide sovereign immunity by reference to the nature of the underly-
    ing dispute. Where the facts are undisputed, whether an exception to
    immunity under the State Tort Claims Act precludes suit is a question
    of law.
    10.	 Tort Claims Act: Federal Acts. Nebraska’s State Tort Claims Act is
    patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act.
    11.	 Tort Claims Act: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The structure and text
    of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,219(2) (Reissue 2014) demonstrate that the
    broad phrase “any law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement
    officers, including correctional officers.
    Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: K evin
    R. McM anaman, Judge. Affirmed.
    Roy J. Rouse, pro se.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and David A. Lopez
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Roy J. Rouse is an inmate in the custody of the Nebraska
    Department of Correctional Services (DCS) who filed suit
    against various defendants in the district court for Lancaster
    County under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA), alleging that
    his personal property was seized and improperly disposed of
    by DCS personnel. In an order filed January 12, 2018, the
    district court granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss. In its
    order, the district court determined that Rouse’s claims against
    the individual defendants were barred by qualified immunity.
    The district court also determined that the claim against the
    State arose with respect to the detention of goods by DCS
    personnel who are law enforcement officers and was barred
    under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,219(2) (Reissue 2014), because
    the claim was an exception to the STCA’s waiver of sovereign
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    ROUSE v. STATE
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    301 Neb. 1037
    immunity. Section 81-8,219(2) provides that the State does not
    waive sovereign immunity for claims “arising with respect to
    the assessment or collection of any tax or fee, or the detention
    of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer.”
    Rouse appeals from the portion of the order which dismissed
    his action against the State. We affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Rouse was an inmate housed at the Lincoln Correctional
    Center at the time of the events that gave rise to this action.
    Rouse brought this action under the STCA, Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 81-8,209 et seq. (Reissue 2014). He sued the State and vari-
    ous individuals by name. He alleged that when he was assigned
    to segregation on July 24, 2015, DCS personnel searched his
    cell and seized and negligently disposed of some of his per-
    sonal property, including reference books, irreplaceable photo-
    graphs, personal items, clothing, a sewing kit, and a compact
    disc player. Rouse attached exhibits to his complaint related
    to his claimed missing property, including letters denying his
    claims made through the grievance procedure, photographs of
    the missing items from the evidence file, and an itemized valu-
    ation of his property totaling $1,059.87.
    All defendants moved to dismiss Rouse’s claim. In a consol-
    idated order, the district court granted all defendants’ motions
    to dismiss. The district court determined that the claims against
    the individual defendants were barred by qualified immunity.
    Rouse does not assign error to this portion of the district
    court’s order. The district court next considered whether the
    STCA’s detention of goods exception, which provides that the
    waiver of immunity under the STCA shall not apply to “‘[a]ny
    claim arising with respect to the assessment or collection of
    any tax or fee, or the detention of any goods or merchandise
    by any law enforcement officer,’” bars Rouse’s claim. See
    § 81-8,219(2).
    The district court found that under § 81-8,219(2), corrections
    officers are “‘any law enforcement officers’” and that the loss
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    of Rouse’s personal property was a “‘detention of any goods or
    merchandise’” by such officers under that statute. The district
    court ultimately concluded that Rouse’s claim was within the
    exception to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity under
    § 81-8,219(2) and that thus, his action was barred by sovereign
    immunity. The district court dismissed Rouse’s action.
    Rouse appealed.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Rouse claims, summarized and restated, that the district
    court erred when it dismissed his claims against the State.
    He specifically contends that the State should not have been
    protected by sovereign immunity under the STCA detention of
    goods exception, § 81-8,219(2), because DCS personnel who
    detained his property are not “law enforcement officer[s].”
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the
    pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in
    the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
    favor of the nonmoving party. Amend v. Nebraska Pub. Serv.
    Comm., 
    298 Neb. 617
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 551
    (2018).
    [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an indepen-
    dent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court
    below. 
    Id. ANALYSIS This
    appeal presents the issue of whether exceptions to
    the STCA’s limited waiver of immunity in § 81-8,219 relat-
    ing to “the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law
    enforcement officer” protects the State from Rouse’s claim that
    DCS personnel mishandled his inmate property. Rouse con-
    tends that the portion of the STCA at issue should not shield
    the State from his claims, because DCS personnel are not “law
    enforcement officer[s].”
    The applicable exception to the waiver of sovereign immu-
    nity is § 81-8,219, which provides: “The State Tort Claims Act
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    shall not apply to: . . . (2) Any claim arising with respect to
    the assessment or collection of any tax or fee, or the detention
    of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement offi-
    cer.” For purposes of this opinion, we assume without decid-
    ing that DCS personnel “detained” Rouse’s property and thus
    satisfy § 81-8,219(2)’s “arising with respect to . . . the deten-
    tion” requirement.
    Statutory Waivers of Immunity and Exceptions
    to Waiver Are Construed in Favor
    of the Sovereign.
    [3-5] Under the 11th Amendment, a nonconsenting state
    is generally immune from suit unless the state has waived its
    immunity. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Amend v. Nebraska Pub.
    Serv. 
    Comm., supra
    . Nebraska Const. art. V, § 22, provides:
    “The state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall pro-
    vide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be
    brought.” The Legislature has provided limited waivers of the
    State’s sovereign immunity through the STCA, subject to statu-
    tory exceptions. See § 81-8,219. Appellate courts give statutory
    language its plain and ordinary meaning and will not resort
    to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words
    which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Amend v. Nebraska
    Pub. Serv. 
    Comm., supra
    .
    [6-8] Statutes that purport to waive the State’s protection of
    sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor of the sov-
    ereign and against the waiver. 
    Id. To strictly
    construe against a
    waiver of sovereign immunity, we broadly read exceptions to
    a waiver of sovereign immunity. See 
    id. A waiver
    of sovereign
    immunity is found only where stated by the most express lan-
    guage of a statute or by such overwhelming implication from
    the text as will allow no other reasonable construction. 
    Id. [9] An
    appellate court must determine whether the constitu-
    tion and statutes provide sovereign immunity by reference to
    the nature of the underlying dispute. See 
    id. Where the
    facts
    are undisputed, whether an exception to immunity under the
    STCA precludes suit is a question of law. 
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    ROUSE v. STATE
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    “[A]ny law enforcement officer” in § 81-8,219(2)
    Includes DCS Correctional Officers.
    As noted, § 81-8,219(2) provides that the State does not
    waive sovereign immunity for claims “arising with respect
    to . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any law
    enforcement officer.” If this exception to the STCA’s limited
    waiver of immunity applies to Rouse’s claims, his case was
    barred and properly dismissed. Rouse contends that the dis-
    trict court erred, because the exception to the State’s waiver
    of immunity for acts related to “the detention of any goods or
    merchandise by any law enforcement officer” does not apply
    to correctional officers. He also refers to other statutes in sup-
    port of his contention. In contrast, the State asserts that Rouse’s
    action is barred by the language of § 81-8,219(2) and that such
    reading is supported by other Nebraska statutes. We agree with
    the State that § 81-8,219(2) bars Rouse’s action.
    [10] The leading case relied upon by the district court and
    the State interpreted a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act
    which is similar to § 81-8,219(2). See Ali v. Federal Bureau
    of Prisons, 
    552 U.S. 214
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 831
    , 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 680
    (2008). The Federal Tort Claims Act, at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)
    (2012), provides that sovereign immunity for torts committed
    by federal officers shall not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in
    respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
    duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other
    property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law
    enforcement officer . . . .” We have recognized that Nebraska’s
    STCA is patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act. Johnson
    v. State, 
    270 Neb. 316
    , 
    700 N.W.2d 620
    (2005). Because
    Nebraska law is limited, we can look to federeal law for addi-
    tional guidance. 
    Id. In Ali,
    a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
    federal statutory exception to the waiver of immunity con-
    tained in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) for acts related to “the detention
    of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer
    of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer”
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    was clear and unambiguous and encompassed acts by Federal
    Bureau of Prisons officers. The Court reasoned that the phrase
    “‘any other law enforcement officer’ . . . suggests a broad
    meaning.” Ali v. Federal Bureau of 
    Prisons, 552 U.S. at 218-19
    (emphasis in original).
    Rouse distinguishes Ali by noting differences between
    Nebraska’s statutory STCA detention of goods provision and
    that of its federal counterpart. But he also finds similarities
    between the Nebraska and federal statutes. Finally, Rouse pro-
    poses that we adopt the reasoning of the dissenting justices in
    Ali and urges us to hold that § 81-8,219(2) applies only to law
    enforcement officers who detain goods or merchandise as part
    of the assessment or collection of taxes or fees. We decline to
    adopt the reasoning suggested by Rouse.
    As noted above, we give statutory language its plain and
    ordinary meaning and we must broadly read exceptions to
    a waiver of sovereign immunity. Amend v. Nebraska Pub.
    Serv. Comm., 
    298 Neb. 617
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 551
    (2018). Like the
    Federal Tort Claims Act, Nebraska’s STCA contains “[n]othing
    in the statutory context [which] requires a narrowing con-
    struction . . . .” Ali v. Federal Bureau of 
    Prisons, 552 U.S. at 227
    . To the contrary, we read Nebraska’s exception for “any
    law enforcement officer” more broadly than the Federal Tort
    Claims Act, which is limited to “any other” law enforcement
    officer. Thus, we interpret § 81-8,219(2) as encompassing acts
    by DCS personnel.
    [11] We believe the text of § 81-8,219(2) indicates that
    the Legislature intended to preserve immunity from claims
    arising from the detention of property, and there is no indi-
    cation of any intent that immunity from those claims turns
    on the type of official enforcing the law. The structure and
    text of § 81-8,219(2) demonstrate that the broad phrase “any
    law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers,
    including correctional officers. Referring to the word “any”
    in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
    552 U.S. 214
    , 219, 
    128 S. Ct. 831
    , 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 680
    (2008), the Court reasoned that
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    read naturally, the word “any” has an expansive meaning that
    is “‘“one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,”’” quot-
    ing United States v. Gonzales, 
    520 U.S. 1
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 1032
    ,
    
    137 L. Ed. 2d 132
    (1997). We agree with the reasoning in Ali,
    and applying it to Nebraska’s statute, we conclude that DCS
    personnel are “any law enforcement officer[s]” covered by
    the exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity outlined in
    § 81-8,219(2), and therefore, the State remains immune from
    claims such as that filed by Rouse. We observe that other
    states’ appellate courts have adopted the reasoning in Ali and
    have concluded that correctional officers are “any law enforce-
    ment officer[s]” under similar state tort claims statutes. See,
    e.g., Mason v. Department of Correction, 75 Mass. App. 1111
    (2009) (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Summary
    Dispositions” at 
    916 N.E.2d 423
    ).
    For completeness, we note that both Rouse and the State
    refer to numerous Nebraska statutes not repeated here as well
    as other sources in an effort to convince us of the meaning of
    § 81-8,219(2) in general and “any law enforcement officer” in
    particular. None of these authorities are definitive or particu-
    larly convincing. Instead, we believe our interpretation of the
    language of § 81-8,219(2) itself provides the most coherent
    reading of the statute in question.
    CONCLUSION
    Rouse, an inmate, claimed money damages for property
    detained by DCS personnel while he was housed in segre-
    gation. Because the DCS personnel are “law enforcement
    officer[s]” covered by the exception to the waiver of sover-
    eign immunity contained in § 81-8,219(2), the State has not
    waived sovereign immunity from Rouse’s claims. The dis-
    trict court did not err when it concluded that Rouse’s claims
    were barred by the State’s sovereign immunity and dismissed
    Rouse’s action.
    A ffirmed.