in the Interest of C.P.C. and D.L.C., Children ( 2022 )

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed January 25, 2022
In the
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-21-00764-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF C.P.C. AND D.L.C., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. FA-20-0978
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to
her twin children, C.P.C. and D.L.C. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
In July 2020, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the
Department) filed a petition seeking conservatorship and termination of Mother’s
parental rights with respect to C.P.C. and D.L.C. The Department filed a supporting
affidavit stating it had received a report that the twins, who were born premature on
May 3, 2020, were in the NICU and that Mother admitted using methamphetamine
while pregnant with them in February of that year. The report also alleged that
Mother had been diagnosed with mental illness, that she had attempted suicide while
pregnant in January, and that she had a history of domestic violence with her
boyfriend. According to the affidavit, the children’s meconium tested negative for
drugs, and medical records showed that Mother passed multiple drug tests in March
and April of that year. Nevertheless, Mother tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamine ten days after the children’s birth.
The trial court granted the Department temporary conservatorship and ordered
Mother to comply with a Family Service Plan. That plan, which Mother received in
August 2020, required her to: (1) obtain and maintain stable housing and
employment; (2) attend, participate in, and successfully complete parenting classes;
(3) submit to a drug-and-alcohol dependency evaluation; (4) submit to and
successfully complete substance abuse treatment, including attending support
services at least three times a week; (5) submit to drug testing at the Department’s
direction; (6) submit to a psychosocial evaluation and follow all recommendations;
(7) attend and cooperate fully in counseling sessions; and (8) attend, participate in,
and successfully complete a domestic violence course.
In advance of the July 16, 2021 final hearing, Mother filed a motion seeking
to continue the case and extend the temporary conservatorship beyond the statutory
dismissal date of August 2, 2021, arguing that she “has completed the majority of
services and is working on getting stable housing but needs more time to locate
stable housing.” The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which
Mother’s chemical dependency counselor, Erika Stroud, testified that, although
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Mother had participated in some of her court-ordered counseling services, she did
not complete them. In fact, Ms. Shroud testified that Mother’s “attendance was very
sporadic,” that “she hasn’t met any of her treatment plan goals,” and that she hasn’t
seen Mother “in quite some time.” According to Ms. Shroud, in the year since
Mother began the program, she had attended less than a third of the program’s
sessions. Ms. Shroud noted that completing the program should have taken Mother
only three months, and she added that, because it had been so long since Mother last
attended sessions, she would need to reassess Mother before counseling could
resume.
Department caseworker Kristina Bowen testified that, in addition to testing
positive for drugs while the case was pending in April and June of 2021, Mother did
not submit to drug tests requested by the Department on at least sixteen occasions:
October 15, 2020; November 10, 2020; November 30, 2020; December 4, 2020;
December 8, 2020; December 10, 2020; December 11, 2020; January 22, 2021;
January 25, 2021; February 1, 2021; April 19, 2021; May 7, 2021; May 11, 2021;
May 18, 2021; June 6, 2021; and July 13, 2021. With respect to the July 13 request,
Ms. Bowen testified that Mother texted her, saying she could not leave for testing
because she was in her back yard, helping her landlord mow the lawn to avoid
eviction. Ms. Bowen, who was approximately 15 minutes away from Mother’s
residence at the time, said she drove over to the residence and confirmed both that
Mother was not in the yard and that the lawn had not been recently mowed. To Ms.
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Bowen’s knowledge, Mother never initiated the domestic violence class required
under her service plan.
Mother testified that she was, in fact, in her back yard when she missed the
test on July 13, and she accused Ms. Bowen of lying. Mother said she did not know
how many times she failed to take a drug test upon request, although she admitted
she did not comply with other aspects of the service plan. When asked if she
completed court-ordered parenting classes, Mother responded: “I have not
completed it. I just wanted more services.” Similarly, when asked whether she
completed her court-ordered counseling, Mother responded: “I have not. I wanted
more services.” She further testified that, although she was “[t]otally engaged” in
her classes and counseling, she couldn’t “always be at class” or “always attend
individual counseling” because she had to work.
Mother also attributed her failure to complete services, in part, to domestic
violence injuries she suffered to her eyes and hands in July 2020. She admitted that
her injuries had improved by the time of the trial, and she did not know exactly when
she had recovered from them, but the injuries “caused [her] some delay in getting all
of [her] services started.” Mother said her ability to find stable employment, as
required by the service plan, was also hindered by the fact that she did not have a
valid driver’s license. Nevertheless, she worked various jobs close to home, doing
“haul offs and make readies.”
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied Mother’s motion, stating:
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This case has been going on for approximately 50 weeks, and
I’m not hearing any evidence that any services at all have been
completed. To the contrary, we have a significant number of missed
drug tests. If I do my math correctly, probably -- maybe a third of the
sessions that could have been attended for just one of the [services]
have been completed. And it doesn’t seem like any of the other ones
have even been initiated. So I don’t think that there has been substantial
compliance with the service plan or any evidence of any remedy of the
situation that brought the kids into care that would constitute
extraordinary circumstances.
I haven’t heard in any way any extraordinary circumstances
concerning the children that would cause the Motion to Extend to be in
their best interest, so I am going to deny that motion . . .
The court proceeded with the trial, after which it terminated Mother’s parental rights.
Mother contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to extend. We
review that issue for abuse of discretion. See In re C.J.B., No. 05-19-00165-CV,
2019 WL 3940987, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without any guiding rules or principles; it
does not abuse its discretion by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. Gen.
Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Tex. 1998).
Under the family code, unless trial has commenced, a Department’s suit
seeking to terminate parental rights is automatically dismissed on the first Monday
after the first anniversary of the date the court entered its order appointing the
Department as a temporary managing conservator. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a).
The trial court may extend the automatic dismissal deadline for up to 180 days if it
finds “that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the
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temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the
appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best
interest of the child.” Id. § 263.401(b). In considering “whether to find that
extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary
managing conservatorship of the department for a case in which the court orders a
parent to complete a substance abuse treatment program, the court shall consider
whether the parent made a good faith effort to successfully complete the program.”
Id. § 263 (b-2).
According to Mother, the evidence shows she made a good faith effort to
complete her substance abuse treatment program. From that premise, she argues the
trial court was required to conclude that extraordinary circumstances necessitated an
extension, and it abused its discretion by concluding otherwise. We disagree.
As an initial matter, the statute does not provide that extraordinary
circumstances exist whenever a parent has made a good faith effort to complete a
treatment program. Rather, it states that the trial court must consider any such effort
as part of its determination on whether extraordinary circumstances exist. See id.
Nothing in the record suggests the trial court did not appropriately consider mother’s
participation in her substance abuse treatment program. On the contrary, the trial
court specifically referenced Mother’s attendance in her treatment counseling
sessions and weighed it alongside evidence showing that Mother made little or no
effort to complete other aspects of her service plan.
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Moreover, there was evidence from which the trial court could conclude
Mother did not make a good faith effort to complete her substance abuse treatment
program. Mother’s treatment counselor testified that her “attendance was very
sporadic,” that “she hasn’t met any of her treatment plan goals,” and that she hasn’t
seen Mother “in quite some time.” Ms. Bowen also testified that Mother failed to
take sixteen drug tests requested by the Department. And the evidence shows Mother
tested positive for amphetamines two weeks before she filed her motion to extend.
On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining there
were no extraordinary circumstances justifying an extension of the statutory
dismissal deadline. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Cory L. Carlyle/
CORY L. CARLYLE
210764f.p05 JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
IN THE INTEREST OF C.P.C. AND On Appeal from the 397th Judicial
D.L.C., CHILDREN District Court, Grayson County,
Texas
No. 05-21-00764-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. FA-20-0978.
Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
Justices Myers and Partida-Kipness
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 25th day of January, 2022.
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