Chavez v. Barnhart , 126 F. App'x 434 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 3 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DENNIS A. CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-2298
(D.C. No. CIV-02-714-ACT)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McCONNELL , HOLLOWAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant Dennis A. Chavez appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for supplemental security income
benefits. He alleged disability due to neck, back, hip and leg pain, headaches,
and mental impairments, including major depression. At step five of the five-step
sequential evaluation process, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th
Cir. 1988) (discussing five steps), an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined
that Mr. Chavez could perform a limited range of light work that existed in
significant numbers in the regional and national economies. Accordingly, the
ALJ held that Mr. Chavez was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act and was, therefore, not entitled to benefits. Mr. Chavez appealed to
the district court, where a magistrate judge affirmed the denial of benefits. We
have jurisdiction over his appeal to this court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On appeal, Mr. Chavez asserts that reversal is required because (1) the ALJ
relied on incorrect information in concluding that Mr. Chavez could perform other
work that existed in the regional and national economies, (2) the Appeals Council
failed to consider relevant evidence submitted after the ALJ issued his decision
but before the Appeals Council denied review, (3) the ALJ’s credibility findings
were not supported by substantial evidence, and (4) the ALJ erred in evaluating
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Mr. Chavez’ residual functional capacity (RFC). We hold that the first three
arguments require a remand.
Standards of Review
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.
2003). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d
1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (further quotation omitted).
Other Jobs Available in the National and Regional Economies
The ALJ found that Mr. Chavez met his burden to prove his disability. At
that point, the burden of going forward shifted to the Commissioner to establish
that Mr. Chavez retained the capacity to perform alternative work activity and that
the specific type of job he could do existed in the national or regional economy.
Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992); 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). Relying on a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there were
three jobs Mr. Chavez could perform. The Commissioner concedes, however, that
two of those jobs as described by the vocational expert conflicted with the
definitions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Therefore, only the job of
parking lot attendant was properly identified as suitable for Mr. Chavez. See
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Haddock v. Apfel , 196 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding “ALJ must
investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict between the
Dictionary and expert testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert’s
testimony as substantial evidence to support a determination of nondisability”).
The VE testified that there were 49,957 of those jobs nationally, but only 199 in
the region.
We must remand on this issue because the ALJ did not have an opportunity
to evaluate whether the parking lot attendant job, standing alone, existed in
significant numbers under the statute. Allen v. Barnhart , 357 F.3d 1140, 1144
(10th Cir. 2004). “Thus, he did not give explicit consideration to the factors this
court has recognized should guide the ALJ’s commonsense judgment.” Id.In addition, “[t]his court has made it clear that judicial line-drawing in this
context is inappropriate.” Id. The question of whether the number of jobs
available is significant is fact-specific and requires evaluation on an individual
basis. Id. The resolution “should ultimately be left to the [ALJ’s] common sense
in weighing the statutory language as applied to a particular claimant’s factual
situation.” Trimiar , 966 F.2d at 1330 (quotation omitted). This rule is
particularly appropriate where, as here and in Allen , the number of jobs available
in the region is relatively small–199 here, 100 in Allen . See Allen , 357 F.3d at
1144. Accordingly, we decline the Commissioner’s invitation to find harmless
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error on the ground that the number of jobs is significant as a matter of law. See
Allen , 357 F.3d at 1144-45 (refusing to hold as a matter of law that 100 jobs in
region was numerically significant); compare id. , with Trimiar , 966 F.2d at 1330(affirming ALJ’s determination, based on appropriate factors, that 650 to 900 jobs
in region was significant number).
Mr. Chavez also asserts that the training required for this job conflicted
with the ALJ’s finding that he could do jobs involving only one- and two-step
processes. He argues that the parking lot attendant job’s specific vocational
preparation (SVP) level of two (“Anything beyond short demonstration up to and
including 1 month”), Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App. C, ¶ II ( 4th ed.
1991), impermissibly conflicts with the one- and two-step processes identified for
him. An SVP of two, however, is in the class of unskilled work, Social Security
Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3, which is “work which needs little or no
judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of
time,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a). There is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s conclusion that the parking lot attendant job’s mental
requirements were within Mr. Chavez’ capabilities.
In sum, our remand on the issue of alternative work that Mr. Chavez could
perform is limited to a determination of whether the number of jobs is sufficient
to qualify as significant under the statute, § 423(d)(2)(A).
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Evidence Submitted to Appeals Council
After the ALJ’s decision, but before the Appeals Council denied review,
Mr. Chavez submitted five reports from his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Leiby, to the
Appeals Council. “[N]ew evidence submitted to the Appeals Council becomes a
part of the administrative record to be considered when evaluating the
[Commissioner’s] decision for substantial evidence. . . . If the Appeals Council
fails to consider qualifying new evidence, the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.” Threet, 353 F.3d at 1191 (quotation omitted). The Appeals
Council is required to consider the evidence if it is new, material, and related to
the period on or before the ALJ’s decision. Id.
Here, as in Threet, the Appeals Council “simply stated, without any
reference to the newly submitted materials, that ‘there is no basis under the above
regulations for granting your request for review.’” Id. at 1192 (quoting Appeals
Council); R. Vol. II, at 7. Consequently, if the evidence Mr. Chavez submitted
was new, timely, and material, a remand is required. Threet, 353 F.3d at 1191.
Dr. Leiby’s reports qualify as new evidence because they were not
duplicative or cumulative; they provided information not available to the ALJ at
the time he made his decision. See Threet, 353 F.3d at 1191. The reports are
dated between October 25, 2001 and January 31, 2002. The reports available to
the ALJ were earlier than these new reports. Dr. Leiby opined that Mr. Chavez
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was totally disabled, citing physical pain and major depression. E.g., R. Vol. II,
at 430-31. The evidence also qualifies as timely because two of the reports
predate the ALJ’s decision, and the others appear to pertain to that period. See
Threet, 353 F.3d at 1191.
We turn to the materiality requirement. “Evidence is material to the
determination of disability if there is a reasonable possibility that it would have
changed the outcome.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Commissioner asserts that
the reports are not material because Dr. Leiby’s opinion of disability was based
on Mr. Chavez’ claims of physical pain, which is not Dr. Leiby’s specialty.
Whether Dr. Leiby’s reports raise a reasonable possibility that they would
have changed the outcome is a close question. The reports present the opinion of
a treating psychiatrist, which cannot simply be ignored. See Robinson v.
Barnhart , 366 F.3d 1078, 1082-84 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining how to analyze
treating psychiatrist’s opinion). On the other hand, the reports do not reveal that
Dr. Leiby’s opinions are based on “observed signs and symptoms or on
psychological tests,” either of which qualify as “specific medical findings” to
support a psychological opinion. Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th
Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). We need not resolve whether Dr. Leiby’s reports
are material because the case must be remanded on other grounds. Therefore, we
direct the ALJ to consider these reports on remand, and, if necessary, to obtain
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supplementation from Dr. Leiby. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(e)(1) (authorizing
Commissioner to obtain additional information from treating source).
Credibility
The ALJ found that Mr. Chavez retained the RFC to perform a limited
range of light work, after determining that his allegations of limitations caused by
his back pain and depression were not supported by the medical evidence or were
not credible to the extent alleged. Mr. Chavez argues that in finding him not fully
credible, the ALJ failed to consider all of the medical evidence, exaggerated the
extent of his daily activities, and relied on reasons not supported by the record.
“Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and
we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.”
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted).
Among the reasons the ALJ discounted Mr. Chavez’ claim that he could not
perform light work were that he refused to work at a desk job, he had a history of
non-compliance with recommended treatment, including quitting the “DVR
program” and refusing injections to his back, and he stopped psychiatric
counseling after a few visits because his counselor left the organization. In
addition, the ALJ found that Mr. Chavez continued to work off and on all the time
remodeling in Santa Fe, even after he injured his back.
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The record does not support the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Chavez continued to
do remodeling work after he injured his back. The ALJ cited to a form
Mr. Chavez filled out describing “any work performed within the past 15 years.”
R. Vol. II, at 222. Mr. Chavez stated that he did remodeling in Santa Rosa (not
Santa Fe) “off & on all the time.” Id. This reference cannot be interpreted to
mean that Mr. Chavez did remodeling work all the time after his injury because
the form clearly requested data about past work, and neither Mr. Chavez nor his
physicians indicated that he had worked after he injured his back. 1 Moreover, the
ALJ found that Mr. Chavez “ha[d] not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged onset date.” Id. at 19. The record also does not contain
evidence about the “DVR program,” or the circumstances under which
Mr. Chavez refused to perform a desk job, except for a very brief reference in an
examining psychiatrist’s September 2000 report. Id. at 371. Therefore, because
we cannot say that the ALJ would have made the same credibility determination if
he had properly considered this evidence, we remand for additional findings.
Evaluation of Residual Functional Capacity
Finally, Mr. Chavez contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly his
RFC because (1) he did not include in his hypothetical question to the VE
1
The Commissioner’s spurious claim on appeal that Mr. Chavez was hired to
work at a KOA campground is improper; the record makes clear that Mr. Chavez
was not hired because of his back pain. See R. Vol. II, at 44-45.
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Mr. Chavez’s limitation on standing and prolonged activity, so (2) placing
Mr. Chavez’ RFC in the category of “light” work was in error, and (3) the ALJ
did not conduct a function-by-function analysis of Mr. Chavez’ walking and
sitting limitations.
Dr. Reeve stated that Mr. Chavez would “have difficulty with standing
and/or performing activities for prolonged periods of time.” R. Vol. II, at 356.
The ALJ apparently incorporated these restrictions in a hypothetical question to
the VE, but the audiotape of the hearing was inaudible at that point, so the full
question is not contained in the record. Id. at 104. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the ALJ incorporated the restrictions noted by Dr. Reeve in his hypothetical
question, and that the restrictions did not change the jobs the VE had stated
Mr. Chavez could do. See id. Moreover, although “light” work can require “a
good deal of . . . standing,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b), the ALJ properly relied on
the VE’s testimony to determine that the jobs identified for Mr. Chavez did not
require prolonged standing or activity.
Mr. Chavez next complains that the ALJ did not evaluate his ability to walk
and sit in order to meet the requirements for light work. He points to evidence
that he exhibited discomfort while sitting and that he walked with an antalgic
(tending to alleviate pain) gait. “Disability requires more than mere inability to
work without pain.” Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir. 1988)
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(quotation omitted). Although the evidence on which Mr. Chavez relies
demonstrates that he suffered discomfort while walking and sitting, it does not
undermine the ALJ’s determination, based on substantial evidence in the record as
a whole, that he retained the RFC to perform a limited range of light work.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and this case is
REMANDED to the district court with instructions to remand, in turn, to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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