Fitzpatrick v. Monday , 549 F. App'x 734 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT December 3, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KEMAN FITZPATRICK,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-6166
(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-00284-M)
WILLIAM MONDAY; SCOTT PRUITT, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondents – Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Keman Fitzpatrick, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to
appeal the denial of a habeas application). Mr. Fitzpatrick also requests leave to proceed
*This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Fitzpatrick is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “[T]his rule of liberal construction
stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.” United States v.
Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009).
in forma pauperis (“ifp”). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny both
requests and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Proceedings
On October 18, 2007, Mr. Fitzpatrick was convicted by a jury of (1) possession of
a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; (2) possession of a controlled
dangerous substance; and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia. On November 30, 2007,
he was sentenced to eighteen years, five years, and one year in prison for the respective
crimes, to be served concurrently. The judgment and sentence were entered on
December 17, 2007. Mr. Fitzpatrick appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (“OCCA”), which affirmed his conviction on March 25, 2009.
On June 3, 2010, Mr. Fitzpatrick filed an application for post-conviction relief in
the Oklahoma County District Court (“OCDC”). The State moved to strike the
application because the brief supporting it exceeded the page limit set forth in Rule 37 of
the Rules of the Seventh and Twenty-Sixth Judicial Administrative Districts. See ROA at
43. On June 9, 2010, the OCDC granted the State’s motion and struck Mr. Fitzpatrick’s
application. Id.
On December 27, 2010, the OCDC entered an order granting Mr. Fitzpatrick until
February 15, 2011, to file a brief in support of his application for post-conviction relief
that complied with Rule 37. Id. In response, Mr. Fitzpatrick filed several motions and
briefs on February 16, 2011, which the OCDC construed as an attempt to circumvent
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Rule 37’s page limitations. Id. In its order denying Mr. Fitzpatrick’s motions, the OCDC
noted that Mr. Fitzpatrick’s June 3, 2010 application had been stricken from the record
and found that “a proceeding for post-conviction relief has not been properly commenced
in this case.” See Fitzpatrick v. Monday, No. CIV-13-284-M, 2013 WL 3759941, at *1
(W.D. Okla. July 10, 2013) (hereinafter “Dist. Ct. Order”) (quoting Order Denying
Application/Motions for Post-Conviction Relief, May 5, 2011, ECF No. 1-1, at 4).
The OCDC construed Mr. Fitzpatrick’s February 16, 2011 motions as a second
application for post-conviction relief, which the OCDC denied. The OCDC’s order
informed Mr. Fitzpatrick that he had thirty days from May 5, 2011, to appeal the denial
of relief to the OCCA. Mr. Fitzpatrick failed to timely file an appeal of the denial of his
second application for post-conviction relief.
On October 17, 2011, Mr. Fitzpatrick filed a third application for post-conviction
relief with the OCDC, which the OCDC denied. The OCCA affirmed the OCDC’s denial
on April 6, 2012.
B. Federal Habeas Proceedings
1. Magistrate Judge Report and Recommendation
On March 22, 2013, Mr. Fitzpatrick filed the § 2254 habeas petition underlying
this proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
A magistrate judge reviewed Mr. Fitzpatrick’s petition and recommended that the petition
be denied as untimely filed. See Dist. Ct. Order at *1.
The magistrate judge noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state prisoner
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must file a federal habeas action within one year of the date that his state court conviction
“became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review.” See id. at 2; see also Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that under § 2244(d)(1)(A), “a petitioner’s conviction is not final and the one-
year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition does not begin to run until—
following a decision by the state court of last result—after the United States Supreme
Court has denied review, or, if no petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for filing a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has passed” (quotations omitted)). The
magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Fitzpatrick’s conviction became final on June 23,
2009, upon expiration of the ninety-day period during which Mr. Fitzpatrick could have
filed a petition for certiorari. His deadline for filing a habeas petition was, therefore, June
23, 2010—nearly three years before Mr. Fitzpatrick actually filed for relief. See Dist. Ct.
Order at *2; United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1259-61 (10th Cir. 2003) (one-year
period calculated by the anniversary method).
The magistrate judge considered whether statutory or equitable tolling applied to
permit Mr. Fitzpatrick’s application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year
limitations period is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim.” Id. (emphasis added). An application for state review is properly filed when it is
in compliance with all applicable rules as determined by state procedural law. See
Garcia v. Shanks, 351 F.3d 468, 471 (10th Cir. 2003).
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The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Fitzpatrick had failed to comply with
state court filing requirements when, on June 3, 2010, he attempted to file an application
for post-conviction relief that exceeded the page limit set forth in Rule 37. The
magistrate judge noted that the OCDC had specifically found that Mr. Fitzpatrick’s
application had been stricken as improperly filed. Furthermore, Mr. Fitzpatrick’s second
application for post-conviction relief (as construed by the OCDC), submitted February
16, 2011, was filed after the expiration of the one-year limitations period and could not
be applied to toll the statute of limitations. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43
(10th Cir. 2001).
The magistrate judge also concluded that equitable tolling did not apply to permit
Mr. Fitzpatrick’s habeas petition. The Supreme Court has held that the one-year
limitations period for filing a federal habeas action is subject to equitable tolling “in
appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). Generally
speaking, a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show “(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quotations
omitted). Tenth Circuit precedent on equitable tolling holds that a “sufficiently supported
claim of actual innocence creates an exception to procedural barriers for bringing
constitutional claims,” so that a petitioner providing evidence of actual innocence is not
required to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing his claims. Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d
1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010). This exception, however, “is rare and will ‘only be
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applied in the extraordinary case.’” Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321
(1995)). The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Fitzpatrick’s case is not an
“extraordinary case,” because it does not include a “colorable showing of factual
innocence.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (quotations omitted).
Although Mr. Fitzpatrick asserted his innocence in his habeas petition—“I am Innocent
of ALL these charges”—the magistrate judge noted that “his protestation of innocence,
alone, is not sufficient to support application of equitable tolling in this case.” Dist. Ct.
Order at *4.
Because he concluded that Mr. Fitzpatrick is entitled to neither statutory nor
equitable tolling, the magistrate judge recommended that his petition be dismissed as
untimely.
2. District Court Orders
The district court initially adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation on May
31, 2013, without objection from Mr. Fitzpatrick. Mr. Fitzpatrick filed a motion a few
days later to extend the time to file objections. The district court granted his motion and
vacated its May 31, 2013 judgment. Mr. Fitzpatrick filed his objections on July 4, 2013.
On July 10, 2013, the district court again adopted the magistrate judge’s initial
recommendation and denied the petition as untimely. See Dist Ct. Order at *1; see also
Fitzpatrick v. Monday, No. CIV-13-284-M, 2013 WL 2404048 (W.D. Okla. May 31,
2013), vacated June 6, 2013.
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II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Fitzpatrick may not appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition
without a COA. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Clark v.
Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2006). To obtain a COA, Mr. Fitzpatrick must
make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). Because the district court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Fitzpatrick’s petition as
untimely filed rested on procedural grounds, Mr. Fitzpatrick must “demonstrate both that
[(1)] ‘jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right and that [(2)] jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Clark, 468 F.3d at 713
(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
Mr. Fitzpatrick has failed to meet this burden here. Mr. Fitzpatrick’s habeas
petition was filed nearly three years after the one-year period of limitations expired, and
he has failed to make a case for either statutory or equitable tolling.
In his brief on appeal, Mr. Fitzpatrick argues that his June 3, 2010 application for
post-conviction relief in the OCDC was properly filed and, along with the time for
subsequent filings and proceedings, gave rise to statutory tolling. Aplt. Br. at 6-7. He
notes that the OCDC issued an order on December 27, 2010, granting him until February
15, 2011, to file a new brief in support of his application for post-conviction relief. Mr.
Fitzpatrick emphasizes that this order did not instruct him to file a new application, and
he contends that this omission indicates the OCDC viewed his June 3, 2010 application
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as properly filed pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 1080. This argument fails, however,
because the OCDC specifically struck his June 3, 2010 application and noted that no
post-conviction proceeding had been properly commenced.
Regarding equitable tolling, Mr. Fitzpatrick merely repeats his bald assertion of
innocence from his original habeas petition, stating, “I am an innocence [sic] man who
has been wrongfully convicted.” Aplt. Affidavit at 1. He does not explain why the
district court was incorrect in concluding that his unsubstantiated profession of innocence
did not suffice to justify equitable tolling.
In short, Mr. Fitzpatrick has failed to demonstrate that “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Clark,
468 F.3d at 713 (quotations omitted).2 We agree with the district court that statutory
tolling is not appropriate because the OCDC specifically struck Mr. Fitzpatrick’s June 3,
2010 application as improperly filed. Mr. Fitzpatrick has likewise failed to show that
equitable tolling is appropriate.
2
Mr. Fitzpatrick also appears to argue that the district court failed to give him fair
notice and an opportunity to present his position before acting sua sponte and dismissing
his habeas petition as untimely. Aplt. Br. at 7. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,
209-10 (2006) (holding that a district court may consider the timeliness of a state
prisoner’s habeas petition sua sponte, but noting that it “must accord the parties fair
notice and an opportunity to present their positions”). We disagree. The district court
vacated its May 31, 2013 judgment and gave Mr. Fitzpatrick an additional opportunity to
file objections, which he did before the district court issued its final judgment.
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For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Fitzpatrick’s
habeas petition as untimely filed. We also deny Mr. Fitzpatrick’s motion to proceed ifp.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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