State v. Bolton , 2017 SD 94 ( 2017 )


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  • #28127-a-SLZ
    
    2017 S.D. 94
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,                      Plaintiff and Appellee,
    v.
    CLINT BOLTON,                               Defendant and Appellant.
    ****
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
    THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
    PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
    ****
    THE HONORABLE MATTHEW M. BROWN
    Judge
    ****
    MARTY J. JACKLEY
    Attorney General
    GRANT FLYNN
    Assistant Attorney General
    Pierre, South Dakota                        Attorneys for plaintiff
    and appellee.
    TIMOTHY J. RENSCH of
    Rensch Law Office
    Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant
    and appellant.
    ****
    CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
    ON AUGUST 28, 2017
    OPINION FILED 12/27/17
    #28127
    ZINTER, Justice
    [¶1.]         This appeal raises the question whether sentencing courts have the
    power to suspend execution of sentence on the condition of good behavior for periods
    longer than the authorized maximum term of imprisonment. We conclude that
    sentencing courts have such power because it has been delegated to them by the
    Constitution and the Legislature has not restricted it.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [¶2.]         Clint Bolton was charged with alternative counts of simple assault, a
    class 1 misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended
    complaint charging disorderly conduct, a class 2 misdemeanor. Class 2
    misdemeanors carry a maximum sentence of thirty days in jail or a $500 fine or
    both. SDCL 22-6-2. The State also agreed to recommend a thirty-day jail sentence
    with all thirty days suspended. Bolton agreed to the plea agreement, and counsel
    entered a no contest plea to disorderly conduct on Bolton’s behalf. 1
    [¶3.]         The magistrate court accepted the plea and imposed a thirty-day jail
    sentence. The court then suspended execution of that sentence on the condition
    that Bolton obey all laws and remain on good behavior for six months. Bolton’s
    attorney immediately objected to the sentence. He argued the court could not
    condition a suspended execution of sentence for a period longer than thirty days, the
    statutory maximum term of imprisonment for class 2 misdemeanors. The court
    invited counsel to brief the issue.
    1.      Bolton was not present. His counsel entered an Alford “benefit of the bargain
    plea.” See State v. Rondell, 
    2010 S.D. 87
    , ¶ 1 n.1, 
    791 N.W.2d 641
    , 642 n.1.
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    [¶4.]        In lieu of briefing, Bolton filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
    The magistrate court denied the motion. Relying on State v. Macy, the court
    concluded it was permitted to conditionally suspend execution of sentence for
    periods that exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying offense.
    See State v. Macy, 
    403 N.W.2d 743
    , 745 (S.D. 1987) (stating sentencing courts have
    complete discretion in setting the length of probation when the court suspends
    imposition of sentence). Following the circuit court’s affirmance, we granted
    Bolton’s petition for intermediate appeal.
    Decision
    [¶5.]        As a preliminary matter, the State argues Bolton’s appeal is moot
    because his sentence was complete on January 17, 2017. However, this Court may
    “determine a moot question of public importance if we feel that the value of its
    determination as a precedent is sufficient to overcome the rule against considering
    moot questions.” Larson v. Krebs, 
    2017 S.D. 39
    , ¶ 16, 
    898 N.W.2d 10
    , 16-17. The
    public interest exception requires “general public importance, probable future
    recurrence, and probable future mootness.” 
    Id.
    [¶6.]        The issue raised in Bolton’s appeal meets these requirements. The
    magistrate court indicated that it conditionally suspended sentences in class 2
    misdemeanors for six months “just about every day.” The issue will also continue to
    evade review because the relatively short sentences imposed in this kind of case
    expire before an appeal can be completed. It is finally an issue of general public
    importance. If such sentences are illegal, they are being improperly imposed on not
    only the thousands of people sentenced for very low-level offenses, but potentially on
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    those felons that require long and extensive court supervision on suspended
    sentences. We exercise our discretion to address the issue.
    [¶7.]        The specific issue is whether a sentencing court may conditionally
    suspend execution of sentence for a period that exceeds the statutory maximum
    term of imprisonment for the offense. Bolton argues such sentences are illegal. He
    contends there is no case or statute that authorizes such suspensions. Although he
    relies on a number of our precedents that have touched on the legality of various
    suspended sentences, none of them address the ultimate question here: whether
    sentencing courts have been delegated the power to suspend execution of sentence
    for periods longer than the maximum term of imprisonment.
    [¶8.]        This Court considered a closely related issue in Macy, a case involving
    a suspended imposition of sentence under SDCL 23A-27-13. We held that courts
    have discretion to set the period of probation beyond the maximum authorized term
    of imprisonment. Macy, 403 N.W.2d at 745. We did so in part because under SDCL
    23A-27-13, a sentencing court is given express, discretionary authority over the
    “period” of probation. Additionally, the sentencing court must obtain the
    defendant’s consent to the sentence. SDCL 23A-27-13.
    [¶9.]        Here, the magistrate court and circuit court relied on Macy to uphold
    Bolton’s suspended sentence. Bolton contends that Macy has no application because
    SDCL 23A-27-18—which governs Bolton’s suspended execution of sentence—
    contains no express grant of authority concerning the “period” of suspension, nor
    does it require the defendant’s consent. Bolton’s contentions require an
    examination of the source of a sentencing court’s power to suspend sentences.
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    [¶10.]       Prior to 1972, Article V, section 39 of the South Dakota Constitution
    delegated suspended sentence authority to the Legislature and authorized that body
    to delegate the power to courts. It provided: “The Legislature may empower all
    courts having jurisdiction to try offenses under the laws of this state, and the judges
    thereof, to suspend sentences of persons convicted . . . .” State ex rel. Grant v.
    Jameson, 
    70 S.D. 369
    , 370, 
    17 N.W.2d 714
    , 714 (1945) (emphasis added) (quoting
    S.D. Const. art. V, § 39 (superseded 1972)). Thus, “[t]he circuit courts of this state
    [did] not have the inherent authority to suspend . . . execution of a sentence.” State
    v. Oban, 
    372 N.W.2d 125
    , 128 (S.D. 1985). Suspensions required a specific
    legislative grant of authority.
    [¶11.]       However, in 1972, the foregoing provision was repealed. It was
    replaced by an amendment to Article V, section 5, which now delegates the power to
    suspend sentences directly to the courts with only one limitation: “Imposition or
    execution of a sentence may be suspended by the court empowered to impose the
    sentence unless otherwise provided by law.” S.D. Const. art. V, § 5. Thus,
    sentencing courts now possess complete authority over all aspects of suspended
    sentencing unless the Legislature otherwise provides by statute. Accordingly, the
    question here is not whether the Legislature has passed a statute specifically
    authorizing Bolton’s suspended execution of sentence exceeding the maximum
    authorized term of imprisonment. The question is whether the Legislature has
    passed a statute limiting the court’s authority to conditionally suspend sentences in
    such a manner.
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    [¶12.]       Although SDCL 23A-27-18 requires that sentences may only be
    suspended during good behavior, it sets no limit on the period of the suspension.
    The statute provides: “Upon conviction, the sentencing court may suspend the
    execution of any sentence imposed during good behavior, subject to such conditions
    or restitutions as the court may impose.” SDCL 23A-27-18 (emphasis added).
    Plainly, this provision contemplates broad discretion. It contains no language
    limiting the period of the suspension or its conditions. It certainly does not limit a
    conditional suspension to the maximum term of imprisonment. Additionally,
    although Bolton did not consent to his suspended execution of sentence, the
    Legislature did not impose the consent limitation that it required to suspend
    imposition of sentence. Compare SDCL 23A-27-13 (requiring defendant’s consent in
    suspended imposition cases), with SDCL 23A-27-18 (no consent required in
    suspended execution cases).
    [¶13.]       We conclude that because the Legislature has not limited a sentencing
    court’s discretion regarding the period of suspension, courts may in their discretion
    conditionally suspend execution of sentence for periods exceeding the maximum
    term of imprisonment. This conclusion does not mean a sentencing court may
    impose conditions that are unlimited or are not justified by and are clearly against
    reason and evidence. Unreasonable sentences are always subject to challenge for
    an abuse of discretion. See State v. Rice, 
    2016 S.D. 18
    , ¶ 23, 
    877 N.W.2d 75
    , 83. We
    also point out that the Constitution contemplates a legislative role in this
    determination. If the Legislature believes such suspended sentences should be
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    limited in length, Article V, section 5 empowers it to limit the period of suspension,
    an opportunity some other states have taken. 2
    [¶14.]         Because SDCL 23A-27-18 does not limit a sentencing court’s authority
    to determine the duration of suspended sentences, Bolton’s sentence was not illegal.
    The circuit court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s denial of Bolton’s
    motion to correct an illegal sentence.
    [¶15.]         Affirmed.
    [¶16.]         GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, SEVERSON and KERN, Justices, and
    WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur.
    [¶17.]         JENSEN, Justice, not having been a member of the Court at the time
    this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.
    2.       Many states expressly limit the maximum period of suspension to a fixed
    number of years. See, e.g., 
    Ala. Code § 15-22-54
     (West 2017) (two years for
    misdemeanors and five years for felonies); 
    Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.2
    (1)
    (West 2017) (same). Several states vary the maximum period depending on
    the level of the offense. See, e.g., 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902
     (West 2017)
    (one to three years for misdemeanors and three to ten years for felonies).
    Many other states expressly set the period to the maximum term of
    confinement either by statute or case law. See, e.g., 
    Idaho Code Ann. § 19
    -
    2601(7) (West 2017) (two years for misdemeanors and maximum period of
    confinement for felonies); Mont. Code Ann, § 46-18-201(2) (West 2017) (six
    months to maximum period of confinement, whichever is greater); Hicklin v.
    State, 
    535 P.2d 743
    , 753 (Wyo. 1975). Finally, a few states give courts
    discretion to suspend sentence beyond the maximum period of confinement.
    See, e.g., 
    Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303.1
     (West 2017) (providing that the court
    “may fix the period of suspension for a reasonable time . . . without regard to
    the maximum period for which the defendant might have been sentenced.”);
    State v. Wallace, 
    150 P.3d 540
    , 543 (Utah 2006) (“[W]e find no other provision
    that limits the term of probation and therefore conclude that our law
    currently provides no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial
    court may impose.”).
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Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2017 SD 94

Filed Date: 12/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/28/2017