State ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. v. O'Donnell , 2023 Ohio 428 ( 2023 )

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. O’Donnell, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-428.]
NOTICE
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-428THE STATE EX REL. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION v.
O’DONNELL, JUDGE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. O’Donnell, Slip
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-428.]
Mandamus—Prohibition—R.C. 2743.03(A)—Court of Claims Act—Claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief filed by public employer against Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation is a legal claim over which common-pleas-court
judge lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—Writs of mandamus and
prohibition granted against common-pleas-court judge.
(No. 2022-0108—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided February 16, 2023.)
IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation, requests (1) a writ of prohibition ordering respondent, Judge John
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P. O’Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, to stop exercising
jurisdiction over Parma v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-
21-943131 (“the underlying case”), and (2) a writ of mandamus ordering Judge
O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case. We grant both of the requested writs.
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In 2013, the city of Cleveland and intervening respondent, the city of
Parma, sued the bureau in separate actions in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court, alleging that the bureau’s former premium-calculation method had resulted
in excessive premium charges for non-group-rated employers. Cleveland brought
its action individually; however, Parma filed a class action. In February 2020, this
court held that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland’s
action because Cleveland’s claim for relief—reimbursement of excessive
premiums by way of restitution—sounded in law, not equity. Cleveland v. Ohio
Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172,
¶ 1, 7-8, 11. In March 2020, Judge O’Donnell dismissed Parma’s action without
prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing this court’s decision in
Cleveland.
{¶ 3} In January 2021, Parma filed the underlying case in the common pleas
court, which Parma characterized as a “refiling” of its 2013 case against the bureau.
Parma sought a declaratory judgment determining the amount of the refund that it
claimed it was owed by the bureau and an injunction prohibiting the bureau from
refusing to pay the refund. Judge O’Donnell denied the bureau’s motion to dismiss
Parma’s complaint, reasoning that this court’s decision in Cleveland did not control.
{¶ 4} On the same day Parma filed the underlying case, it also filed an
action against the bureau in the Court of Claims. See Parma v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-00024JD (July 12, 2021). In the Court of
Claims, Parma asked for an award of damages as compensation for the alleged
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overcharged premiums. The Court of Claims dismissed Parma’s complaint, in part
because the statute of limitations had passed.
{¶ 5} In January 2022, the bureau brought this action against Judge
O’Donnell, asserting that in the wake of this court’s decision in Cleveland, 159
Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, the common pleas court patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the underlying case. We denied Judge
O’Donnell’s motion to dismiss, denied Parma’s first motion to intervene, and
granted an alternative writ. 166 Ohio St.3d 1528, 2022-Ohio-1837, 188 N.E.3d
197. We later granted Parma’s second motion to intervene. 167 Ohio St.3d 1456,
2022-Ohio-2429, 190 N.E.3d 632.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 6} The central question here is whether the Court of Claims Act, R.C.
2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divests the common pleas court of
jurisdiction in the underlying case. To answer that question, we must determine
whether Parma brought a legal or equitable claim in the underlying case. The
bureau argues that Parma brought a legal claim that belongs in the Court of Claims
and that Parma has employed artful labels to disguise its claim as equitable. Judge
O’Donnell and Parma disagree, stressing that the complaint in the underlying case
advances a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The absence of a legal claim
requesting damages, they contend, means that Judge O’Donnell has jurisdiction
over the underlying case. We agree with the bureau.
A. Prohibition
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, the bureau must establish that
(1) Judge O’Donnell has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Elder v.
Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. If the
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common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, then the bureau
need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Id.{¶ 8} This court will typically “deny relief in prohibition when a respondent
judge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will deem any error by the judge
to be an error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein,
153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 24. Thus, “[i]n the
absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5. When
this court has determined that a “court of common pleas patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly
removed that jurisdiction.” Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio
St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9.
{¶ 9} Here, we must determine whether the Court of Claims’ “exclusive,
original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of
immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code,” R.C. 2743.03(A)(1),
patently and unambiguously divests the common pleas court of jurisdiction in the
underlying case. To do so, we must decide whether Parma’s claim seeks legal or
equitable relief. Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172,
at ¶ 10. “Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”
(Emphasis sic.) Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124
L.Ed.2d 161 (1993). But this court’s decision in Cleveland illustrates that a claim
may sound in law even when the plaintiff does not seek money damages.
{¶ 10} In Cleveland, the city sued the bureau in common pleas court on a
claim of unjust enrichment, arguing that the discounts the bureau had provided to
group-rated employers resulted in excessive premiums for non-group-rated
employers like itself. Id. at ¶ 7. The court of appeals affirmed the common pleas
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court’s order directing the bureau to pay restitution to Cleveland, id. at ¶ 8, but this
court reversed on the ground that the trial court had usurped the Court of Claims’
jurisdiction, id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 11} In determining whether Cleveland had brought a claim for legal or
equitable relief, this court observed that a claim sounds in law if it “s[eeks] to
recover from a defendant’s general assets rather than ‘specifically identified funds
that remain in the defendant’s possession.’ ” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Montanile v. Natl.
Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145, 136
S.Ct. 651, 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016). Equitable remedies, on the other hand, “ ‘ “are,
as a general rule, directed against some specific thing; they give or enforce a right
to or over some particular thing * * * rather than a right to recover a sum of money
generally out of the defendant’s assets.” ’ ” (Ellipsis added in Montanile.) Id.,quoting Montanile at 145, quoting 4 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence,
Section 1234, 694 (5th Ed.1941). Thus, when a plaintiff cannot point to a
“specifically identifiable fund * * * to seize” or to “traceable items on which the
money from the fund was spent,” the claim sounds in law. Id. Applying these
principles, we concluded that Cleveland had brought a legal claim that belonged in
the Court of Claims because Cleveland’s premiums went into the state’s general
insurance fund and became commingled with the premiums of other employers.
And even assuming that the state’s general insurance fund could have been
construed as a specific fund, the money in that fund had been paid out long ago,
meaning that it could no longer be traced.
{¶ 12} Parma and Judge O’Donnell argue that Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d
459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, does not control here, because it did not
involve, as this case does, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. This
argument points to the Court of Claims Act’s preservation of “the original
jurisdiction of another court of this state to hear and determine a civil action in
which the sole relief that the claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory
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judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief.” R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see also
Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 103, 579
N.E.2d 695 (1991) (“a suit that seeks only injunctive or declaratory relief may be
brought against the state in the court of common pleas”).
{¶ 13} Although Parma claims that it is seeking only a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, we are not bound by Parma’s labels. “Regardless of how an
action is labeled, the substance of the party’s arguments and the type of relief
requested determine the nature of the action.” Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427,
2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 38; see also State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach,
58 Ohio St.3d 130, 132, 568 N.E.2d 1206 (1991) (this court will look beyond the
pleadings to ensure that a mandamus complaint is not a disguised request for a
prohibitory injunction); Ruehmer v. Queen City Lodge, 2021-Ohio-2904, 176
N.E.3d 350, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“Artful pleading does not alter the essence of the claim
* * *”). We accordingly look beyond Parma’s labels and independently analyze
the nature of the claims asserted.
{¶ 14} We start by analyzing Parma’s claim for injunctive relief. At first
blush, it may seem that Parma seeks a prohibitory injunction because it seeks an
order that “forbids or restrains an act.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (10th
Ed.2014) (defining “prohibitory injunction”). But although Parma seeks to
“enjoin[] the Bureau * * * from continuing to refuse to furnish the refunds” that
Parma claims it is due, this is just an artful way of saying that it wants a refund.
{¶ 15} On this point, the bureau repeatedly points to the opinion concurring
in judgment only in Cirino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., which observed: “ ‘It
does not take much lawyerly inventiveness to convert a claim for payment of a past
due sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing to pay the sum,
or for a declaration that the sum must be paid, or for an order reversing the agency’s
decision not to pay.’ ” 153 Ohio St.3d 333, 2018-Ohio-2665, 106 N.E.3d 41, ¶ 36
(DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only), quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
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January Term, 2023
U.S. 879, 915-916, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Parma concedes as much, saying that “the objective of [its] request for declaratory
and injunctive relief is to require [the bureau] to issue refunds.”
{¶ 16} As this court relayed in Cleveland, “ ‘ “[a]lmost invariably * * * suits
seeking * * * to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are
suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they
seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of
legal duty.” ’ ” (First ellipsis added in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.; second
ellipsis added in Cleveland.) 159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172,
at ¶ 12, quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210,
122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002), quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 918-919(Scalia, J., dissenting).
{¶ 17} Here, Parma’s premiums went into a general fund and became
commingled with premiums paid by other public employers. See Cleveland at
¶ 17, citing R.C. 4123.30. Moreover, even if Parma’s premiums had been deposited
into a specific fund, Parma seeks refunds for premiums it paid from 2001 to 2011.1
As in Cleveland, in which the last funds Cleveland paid were in 2009, it is
inconceivable in this case how money belonging to Parma “could ‘clearly be traced
to particular funds or property’ in the [bureau’s] possession,” id., quoting Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. at 213. It follows here, as it did in Cleveland, that
Parma’s claim for relief “sounds in law and must proceed through the Court of
Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over legal claims against the [bureau],” id.{¶ 18} This conclusion holds true notwithstanding Parma’s additional claim
for declaratory relief, which is a claim that is “sui generis in the sense that it is
1. Parma’s complaint in the underlying case alleges that the overcharges began in “approximately
2001 and continued past 2010 * * * through 2011 and potentially beyond.” Without objection from
Parma, the bureau and Judge O’Donnell have described Parma as challenging the period from 2001
to 2011.
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neither one strictly in equity nor one strictly at law; it may possess attributes of
both.” Sessions v. Skelton, 163 Ohio St. 409, 415, 127 N.E.2d 378 (1955). Under
Ohio law, when a plaintiff brings a claim permitted by R.C. 2743.02’s waiver of
immunity that is joined with a claim for declaratory judgment “that arises out of the
same circumstances,” the Court of Claims has “exclusive, original jurisdiction to
determine” both claims. R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio
St.3d 97 at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695 (Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over legal
claims is not defeated by the presence of a claim for ancillary relief such as a
declaratory judgment that arises from the same circumstances).
{¶ 19} Judge O’Donnell rejoins that prohibition cannot lie, because the
bureau has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal from
the trial court’s disposition of the underlying case. He further emphasizes that the
common pleas court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. But these
arguments lose their force when, as here, a court patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction. See Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485,
at ¶ 5.
{¶ 20} For its part, Parma points to instances in which courts have
determined that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were properly brought
against the state in common pleas court rather than in the Court of Claims, see, e.g.,
Bee v. Univ. of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21081, 2002-Ohio-5776, or,
conversely, that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were improperly
brought against the state in the Court of Claims, see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Ohio Dept.
of Human Servs., 77 Ohio App.3d 827, 603 N.E.2d 1089 (1991).2 But it is
2. Parma also cites Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304, Serv. Emps. Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC
v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 28 Ohio St.3d 317, 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), in which this court held
that the common pleas court, rather than the Court of Claims, had jurisdiction over an action for
injunctive relief brought against the state racing commission, including a claim for relief demanding
that a third party be ordered to refund tax abatements. This court in Racing Guild reached that
conclusion without analyzing whether the character of the refund would have sounded in law or
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unnecessary for this court to scrutinize those cases to decide this one because “[t]he
law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be treated alike.” Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1623, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018).
Aside from the words used to describe the relief sought, Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d
459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, and this case are substantively alike,
meaning that Cleveland supplies the rule of decision here.3
{¶ 21} Parma next argues that it should be permitted to seek declaratory
relief against the bureau because questions concerning the bureau’s statutory
authority are bound to arise and declaratory judgments are well-suited to resolve
these questions. But, as explained above, Parma’s complaint contains more than a
claim for declaratory relief; it contains a disguised legal claim cast as a request for
injunctive relief. When a plaintiff brings a suit against the state that combines a
claim for declaratory relief with a claim sounding in law, as Parma’s complaint
does, both claims must be brought in the Court of Claims. R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see
also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio St.3d at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695.
{¶ 22} Lastly, Parma highlights the fact that it instituted the underlying case
as a class action. Parma argues that because a party in a class action may assert
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the underlying case should be permitted
to proceed before Judge O’Donnell in common pleas court. But we have no license
to ignore the terms of the Court of Claims Act based on class-action considerations.
See Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440,
13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 20 (“we must apply statutory language as enacted by the General
Assembly and * * * we are prohibited from acting in a legislative capacity”).
equity. Moreover, unlike in the underlying case here, the refund at issue in Racing Guild would
have required a third party to return money to the state.
3. We note that the result in Cleveland would have been the same even if Cleveland had, as Parma
has done here, joined its legal claim with a claim for a declaratory judgment. R.C. 2743.03(A)(2);
see also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio St.3d at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695.
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{¶ 23} In summary, the bureau is entitled to a writ of prohibition because
Judge O’Donnell patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the
underlying case.
B. Mandamus
{¶ 24} We next turn to the bureau’s mandamus claim. To be entitled to a
writ of mandamus, the bureau must show (1) a clear legal right to the requested
relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of Judge O’Donnell to provide it, and (3)
the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel.
Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. When
“ ‘a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a
cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future unauthorized
exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally
unauthorized actions.’ ” State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118
Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Mayer
v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.
{¶ 25} In Sapp, we concluded that because the court of appeals patently and
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over an appeal, the relator was entitled to both
a peremptory writ of prohibition preventing the court from proceeding over the
appeal and a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the court to dismiss the
appeal. Id. at ¶ 32. Applying that logic here, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering
Judge O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case. Judge O’Donnell’s contrary
argument, that mandamus cannot lie because the bureau has an adequate remedy
by way of appeal, is foreclosed by Sapp.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we grant a writ of prohibition ordering
Judge O’Donnell to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case, and we
grant a writ of mandamus ordering Judge O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case
for lack of jurisdiction.
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Writs granted.
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
_________________
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Sandra Nimrick, Assistant Attorney
General; and Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., James D. Abrams, David J. Butler,
David C. Roper, and Michael J. Zbiegien Jr., for relator.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jake A.
Elliott and Matthew T. Fitzsimmons IV, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for
respondent.
Flowers & Grube, Paul W. Flowers, Louis E. Grube, and Melissa A. Ghrist;
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., W. Craig Bashein, and John P. Hurst; Plevin &
Gallucci and Frank Gallucci; and Weisman, Kennedy & Berris Co., L.P.A., and
Daniel P. Goetz, for intervening respondent.
_________________
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