State ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati (Slip Opinion) , 147 Ohio St. 3d 422 ( 2016 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati, Slip Opinion No. 
    2016-Ohio-7663
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2016-OHIO-7663
    THE STATE EX REL. DYNAMIC INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF
    CINCINNATI ET AL., APPELLEES.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati,
    Slip Opinion No. 
    2016-Ohio-7663
    .]
    Mandamus—Court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s claims in
    declaratory and injunctive relief and for money damages—Appellant’s
    takings and general mandamus claims are unripe and unavailing for failure
    to exhaust administrative remedies—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing
    petition affirmed.
    (No. 2016-0231—Submitted August 30, 2016—Decided November 10, 2016.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-150563.
    _____________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} We affirm the First District Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition
    for a writ of mandamus filed by appellant, Dynamic Industries, Inc. (“DI”), to
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    compel appellees, the city of Cincinnati, the manager of the city’s department of
    planning and buildings, and the head of that department’s historic-conservation
    office (collectively, the “city”) to issue a demolition permit.
    {¶ 2} Because the court of appeals correctly dismissed the action, we affirm
    the court’s judgment.
    Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 3} The building at issue is located in Cincinnati on real property owned
    by DI. DI claims that the building is dilapidated and unsalvageable and that
    renovation is not economically viable. On May 15, 2015, the Bootsy Collins
    Foundation and the Cincinnati USA Music Heritage Foundation filed an application
    to have the building designated a historic landmark on the grounds that it formerly
    housed King Records, which, according to the organizations, played a significant
    role in the 20th-century evolution of popular music. On June 25, 2015, DI filed an
    application seeking a permit to demolish the building.
    {¶ 4} The city did not process DI’s application or issue a permit, because
    the earlier-filed historic-designation application was still pending. The city’s
    refusal was based on its historic-preservation code, which states that no structure
    with historic significance may be demolished during the pendency of a historic-
    designation application. See Cincinnati Zoning Code 1435-07-2-A; see also 
    id.
    1435-01-H3 (defining “historic significance”).
    {¶ 5} Because it could not obtain the demolition permit, DI filed in the court
    of appeals an original action in mandamus, seeking a peremptory writ compelling
    appellees to immediately issue its requested permit and related relief. After the
    complaint was filed, the city passed an ordinance approving the historic-
    designation application. Because the former King Records building is now a
    historic landmark, DI may not receive a demolition permit unless it first obtains a
    certificate of appropriateness, a certificate that allows demolition or alteration of a
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    January Term, 2016
    historic landmark. See Cincinnati Zoning Code 1435-09. DI does not dispute that
    it has not applied for a certificate of appropriateness.
    {¶ 6} Appellees filed a motion to dismiss DI’s complaint. The court of
    appeals issued a four-sentence entry granting appellees’ motion, and DI appealed.
    Analysis
    {¶ 7} We review a judgment of the court of appeals in an original
    mandamus action filed in that court “as if the action had been filed originally in the
    Supreme Court.” State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 
    11 Ohio St.2d 141
    , 164,
    
    228 N.E.2d 631
     (1967).
    {¶ 8} DI’s complaint asserts six claims for relief. We address the first claim
    last, for ease of discussion.
    {¶ 9} DI’s second, third, and fourth claims seek, respectively, an injunction
    prohibiting appellees from interfering with DI’s asserted right to demolish the
    building at issue, money damages that DI has allegedly incurred due to appellees’
    failure to issue the requested permit, and a declaratory judgment invalidating the
    applicable zoning-code provisions on various constitutional grounds. The court of
    appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider these claims. See State ex rel. Williams v.
    Trim, 
    145 Ohio St.3d 204
    , 
    2015-Ohio-3372
    , 
    48 N.E.3d 501
    , ¶ 12 (“A court of
    appeals lacks original jurisdiction to grant prohibitory injunctions”), citing State ex
    rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 247
    , 248, 
    673 N.E.2d 1281
     (1997), and Pressley at paragraph four of the syllabus; State ex rel. Levin v.
    Schremp, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 733
    , 735, 
    654 N.E.2d 1258
     (1995) (“mandamus may not
    ordinarily be employed as a substitute for an action at law to recover money”),
    citing Maloney v. Sacks, 
    173 Ohio St. 237
    , 238, 
    181 N.E.2d 268
     (1962); State ex
    rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts, 
    133 Ohio St.3d 339
    , 
    2012-Ohio-4699
    , 
    978 N.E.2d 188
    , ¶ 22
    (“ ‘[C]ourts of appeals lack original jurisdiction over claims for declaratory
    judgment’ ”), quoting State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle, 
    92 Ohio St.3d 426
    , 430,
    
    751 N.E.2d 472
     (2001).
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 10} In the fifth claim asserted in its complaint, DI requests that the city
    be compelled to compensate it for an alleged unconstitutional taking of its property.
    However, a party must wait for a final administrative decision before asserting a
    takings claim. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
    533 U.S. 606
    , 620-621, 
    121 S.Ct. 2448
    ,
    
    150 L.Ed.2d 592
     (2001) (a landowner cannot establish a taking before regulatory
    authorities have had the opportunity “to exercise their full discretion in considering
    development plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any
    variances or waivers allowed by law”). As DI has not applied for a certificate of
    appropriateness, it has not exhausted its administrative remedies and the city has
    not had the opportunity to grant or deny the certificate. Until these events occur,
    DI’s takings claim is unripe and must be dismissed.
    {¶ 11} Finally, DI’s first claim requests a writ of mandamus compelling
    appellees to issue the requested demolition permit. To be entitled to extraordinary
    relief in mandamus, DI must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a
    clear legal duty on the part of appellees to provide it, and the lack of an adequate
    remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 55
    , 
    2012-Ohio-69
    , 
    960 N.E.2d 452
    , ¶ 6.
    {¶ 12} As explained above, DI has not exhausted its administrative
    remedies in that it has not applied for a certificate of appropriateness, which would
    allow the city to make a final decision on DI’s application for a demolition permit.
    Therefore, the city has no clear legal duty to grant the requested relief and DI has
    no clear legal right to that relief. State ex rel. Schindel v. Rowe, 
    25 Ohio St.2d 47
    ,
    48, 
    266 N.E.2d 569
     (1971).
    Conclusion
    {¶ 13} The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over Dynamic Industries’
    claims in declaratory and injunctive relief and for money damages. And because
    DI has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before asserting its takings and
    general mandamus claims, these claims are unripe and unavailing, respectively.
    4
    January Term, 2016
    Judgment affirmed.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,
    FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.
    _________________
    Sebaly, Shillito & Dyer, L.P.A., Toby K. Henderson, and Matthew G.
    Bruce, for appellant.
    Paula Boggs Muething, Cincinnati City Solicitor, Marion E. Haynes, III,
    Chief Counsel, Terrance A. Nestor, Deputy City Solicitor, and Emily E. Woerner,
    Assistant City Solicitor, for appellees.
    _________________
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