Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel , 133 Ohio St. 3d 345 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 
    133 Ohio St. 3d 345
    , 2012-Ohio-2297.]
    ACORDIA OF OHIO, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. FISHEL ET AL., APPELLEES.*
    [Cite as Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel,
    
    133 Ohio St. 3d 345
    , 2012-Ohio-2297.]
    Mergers—Transferability of contracts with employees not to compete—Judgment
    affirmed.
    (No. 2011-0163—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided May 24, 2012.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,
    No. C-1000071, 2010-Ohio-6235.
    __________________
    LANZINGER, J.
    {¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether the ability to
    enforce an employee’s noncompete agreement transfers by operation of law to the
    surviving company when the company that was the original party to the
    agreement merges with another company. We hold that in this case, the language
    of the agreement dictates that the surviving company cannot enforce the
    agreement after the merger as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original
    company.
    I. Facts
    A. Background
    {¶ 2} As a condition of their employment with the insurance-services
    company that eventually became known as Acordia of Ohio, Inc. (“Acordia,
    Inc.”),1 appellees Michael Fishel, Janice Freytag, Mark Taber, and Sheila
    Diefenbach (collectively, “the employees”) entered into noncompete agreements
    * Reporter’s Note: See opinion upon reconsideration that appears at 
    133 Ohio St. 3d 356
    , 2012-
    Ohio-4648, 
    978 N.E.2d 814
    .
    1. Initially known as Frederick Rauh & Company, Acordia, Inc. underwent a number of mergers,
    acquisitions, and reorganizations between 1993 and 2001. Appellant will be referred to as “the
    L.L.C.”
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    by which they agreed to forgo competition with Acordia, Inc. for two years after
    termination of their employment there. Fishel’s noncompetition agreement, for
    example, provides:
    In consideration of my employment and its continuation by
    Frederick Rauh & Company (hereinafter, Company) I hereby
    covenant as follows:
    A. For a period of two years following termination of
    employment with the company for any reason, I will not directly,
    indirectly, or through association with others solicit, write, accept
    or in any other manner perform any services relating to insurance
    business, insurance policies, or related insurance services for any
    of the following;
    (1) Any individual or entity for whom the company has
    written, accepted, or in any other manner performed any services
    relating to insurance business, insurance policies, or related
    insurance services at any time while I was employed by the
    Company;
    (2) Any individual or entity whose name was provided me
    as a prospective client at any time while I was employed by the
    Company.
    B. For a period of two years following termination of
    employment with the company, I will not encourage nay [sic] other
    employees of the company, directly, indirectly, or through
    association with others to leave the Company’s employment.
    (Emphasis added.) It is significant that this agreement of noncompetition does
    not contain language that extends to other employers, such as the company’s
    2
    January Term, 2012
    “successors or assigns.”      The other employees signed nearly identical
    noncompetition agreements, the only differences consisting of formatting
    changes, the substitution of company names, and the dates. All agreements at
    issue were signed between 1993 and 2000.
    {¶ 3} Frederick Rauh & Company became known as Acordia of
    Cincinnati, Inc. after its acquisition by Acordia, Inc. in 1994. Fishel began his
    employment with Frederick Rauh in 1993. Freytag and Taber began employment
    with Acordia of Cincinnati, Inc. before it merged with other Ohio companies to
    become Acordia of Ohio, Inc. in 1997.       Diefenbach signed her noncompete
    agreement with the successor company, Acordia, Inc., in July 2000.
    {¶ 4} Wells Fargo acquired Acordia, Inc. in May 2001. As part of this
    acquisition, the employees were required to complete several standard forms,
    including an acquisition-employment application, a United States Department of
    Justice employment-eligibility-verification form, a background-investigation
    authorization form, and a new-hire team-member acknowledgment form.
    {¶ 5} Seven months later, Acordia, Inc. underwent a merger with
    appellant, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. (“the L.L.C.”). Following the merger, only
    appellant remained. The employees continued to work for the L.L.C. until August
    2005, when they began employment with appellee Neace Lukens Insurance
    Agency, L.L.C. (“Neace Lukens”). They soon used their contacts to recruit
    multiple customer accounts from the L.L.C. to Neace Lukens. Within six months,
    19 customers had transferred $1 million in revenue to Neace Lukens from the
    L.L.C.
    B. The Lawsuit
    {¶ 6} The L.L.C. filed suit for injunctive relief and money damages in
    September 2005 against the employees, Neace Lukens, Neace and Associates
    Insurance Agency of Ohio, Inc., and Joseph Lukens, all appellees. The complaint
    claimed that the employees had violated their two-year noncompete agreement
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    and would misappropriate the L.L.C.’s trade secrets.        After reviewing the
    evidence presented at preliminary-injunction hearings, the trial court denied the
    L.L.C.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The First District Court of Appeals
    affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding in part that a preliminary injunction
    was unwarranted because Acordia, Inc. and the employees did not intend to make
    the noncompete agreements assignable to successors such as the L.L.C. Acordia
    of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 1st Dist. No. C-060292 (May 9, 2007). The trial court
    granted the employees’ motion for summary judgment, and the L.L.C. appealed,
    arguing in part that the noncompete agreements signed by the employees had
    transferred to the L.L.C.
    {¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant
    summary judgment in favor of the employees. Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel,
    1st Dist. No. C-100071, 2010-Ohio-6235.         The court explained that while
    noncompete agreements transfer from the predecessor company to the successor
    company by operation of law after a merger, the employees’ noncompete
    agreements pertained only to the specific companies with which they had
    originally been employed. 
    Id. at ¶
    13-20. Because the previous iterations of
    Acordia, Inc. had been merged out of existence more than two years before the
    employees left the L.L.C., the court of appeals concluded that the agreements had
    expired when the employees left and that the L.L.C. had no right to enforce them.
    
    Id. at ¶
    17-18.
    {¶ 8} The L.L.C. appealed, and we accepted its proposition of law that
    states, “Pursuant to Ohio’s merger statutes, agreements between employees and
    employers that contain restrictive covenants are assets of the constituent company
    that transfer automatically by operation of law in a statutory merger from the
    constituent company to the surviving company and are enforceable by the
    surviving company according to the agreements’ original terms as if the surviving
    company were a party to the original agreements.” Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v.
    4
    January Term, 2012
    Fishel, 
    128 Ohio St. 3d 1458
    , 2011-Ohio-1829, 
    945 N.E.2d 522
    . We reject that
    proposition and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
    II. Legal Analysis
    {¶ 9} The pivotal question is whether the noncompete agreements apply
    only to the original contracting employer or whether after the merger, the L.L.C.
    may enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of
    those original contracting employers.
    A. The Contract Assets
    {¶ 10} R.C. 1701.82 provides that a company’s assets transfer to the new
    company after a merger:
    (A) When a merger or consolidation becomes effective, all
    of the following apply:
    ***
    (3) The surviving or new entity possesses all assets and
    property of every description, and every interest in the assets and
    property, wherever located, and the rights, privileges, immunities,
    powers, franchises, and authority, of a public as well as of a private
    nature, of each constituent entity * * *.
    Because the statute specifies that the new company takes over all the previous
    company’s assets and property after the merger, it is clear that employee contracts
    transfer to the resulting company. In this case, the employees’ contracts came
    under the control of the L.L.C. after it merged with Acordia, Inc.
    {¶ 11} Nevertheless, although the L.L.C. assumed control of the
    employees’ contracts after the merger, we agree with the First District Court of
    Appeals that the L.L.C. may not enforce the noncompete agreements as if the
    L.L.C. had stepped into the shoes of the company that originally contracted with
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    the employees. Appellant’s proposed outcome would require a rewriting of the
    agreements. By their terms, the noncompete agreements are between only the
    employees and the companies that hired them.
    {¶ 12} We have previously explained that when a merger between two
    companies occurs, one of those companies ceases to exist: “[A] merger involves
    the absorption of one company by another, the latter retaining its own name and
    identity, and acquiring the assets, liabilities, franchises and powers of the former.
    Of necessity, the absorbed company ceases to exist as a separate business entity.”
    Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co., 
    27 Ohio St. 2d 26
    , 31, 
    272 N.E.2d 105
    (1971).
    After the L.L.C. absorbed Acordia, Inc., the companies with which the employees
    agreed to avoid competition had ceased to exist.         Because the noncompete
    agreements do not state that they can be assigned or will carry over to successors,
    the named parties intended the agreements to operate only between themselves—
    the employees and the specific employer. While the employment agreements
    transferred to the L.L.C. by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 1701.82, the
    wording within those agreements prevents the L.L.C. from enforcing a
    noncompetition period as if it were the original company with which the
    employees agreed not to compete. The L.L.C. acquired only the ability to prevent
    the employees from competing two years after their employment terminated with
    the specific company named in the agreements.
    {¶ 13} We hold that noncompete agreements that are transferred as a
    matter of law by a merger between companies are enforceable according to their
    terms.
    B. Ohio merger law remains undisturbed
    {¶ 14} The L.L.C. argues that a decision in favor of the appellees-
    employees would disturb the principle of corporate continuity established in
    merger law that constituent companies continue after the merger as a unified
    company vested with the identical contracts of the merged companies.             Our
    6
    January Term, 2012
    decision, however, rests firmly within this framework. We emphasize that in
    accordance with R.C. 1701.82(A)(3), the surviving company possesses all assets
    and property and every interest in the assets and property of each constituent
    entity, including employment contracts and agreements.
    {¶ 15} When contracts pass to the surviving company following merger,
    the surviving company obtains the same bargain agreed to by the preceding
    company, nothing more. Our decision today honors the noncompete agreement
    obtained by the employees’ original employers. The L.L.C. argues that as the
    surviving company, it needs these agreements because they protect the goodwill
    and proprietary information obtained in the merger; however, extending these
    agreements would run counter to their plain language, which specifies that they
    apply only to “the Company” with which the employees agreed to avoid
    competing, not the company’s successors. The L.L.C. could have protected its
    goodwill and proprietary information by requiring that the employees sign a new
    noncompete agreement as a condition of their continued at-will employment,
    similar to the way in which Wells Fargo required them to complete a number of
    employment forms as a condition of continued employment when it acquired
    Acordia, Inc.
    {¶ 16} The L.L.C. also argues that we should follow the decisions of other
    jurisdictions.   Our decision in this case, however, is premised upon our
    application of Ohio law to the particular agreement in this case. Our analysis of
    Ohio law and the noncompete agreements leads to the conclusion that although
    the employees’ noncompete agreements transferred automatically by operation of
    law to the L.L.C. following the merger, the merger did not alter the language of
    the agreements, and the noncompete agreements provided only that the employees
    would avoid competition during the two years following their termination from
    “the company” as defined by their respective noncompete agreements.
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    C. The employees did not violate the noncompete agreements
    {¶ 17} Because the noncompete agreements transferred to the L.L.C. upon
    completion of the merger, the L.L.C. obtained the right to enforce the agreements
    as written. In other words, the employees were unable to compete with the L.L.C.
    for the two years following their termination from the “company” with which they
    each had signed their respective noncompete agreements.
    {¶ 18} In this case, the termination, or complete severance of the
    employer-employee relationship, occurred when the company with which the
    employee agreed not to compete ceased to exist, an event triggered by merger.
    The triggering event for Fishel, Freytag, and Taber occurred when Acordia of
    Cincinnati, Inc. merged with other Ohio companies to become Acordia of Ohio,
    Inc. in December 1997.     Consequently, their noncompete periods expired in
    December 1999. The triggering event for Diefenbach occurred when Acordia of
    Ohio, Inc. merged with the L.L.C. in December 2001. Her noncompete period
    accordingly expired in December 2003. Because the employees’ noncompete
    periods had all expired before their resignations from the L.L.C. and subsequent
    employment with Neace Lukens, the L.L.C. had no legal right to enforce the
    noncompete agreements against the employees.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 19} The noncompete agreements between the employees and their
    original employers specified that they applied only to the specific companies that
    had originally hired each employee. Because the agreements made no provision
    for the continuation of the agreement upon any acquisition of the original
    company by another company, the agreements are not enforceable by the L.L.C.
    according to the agreements’ original terms past the two-year noncompete period
    agreed to by the employees and their original employers. We accordingly hold
    that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employees.
    Judgment affirmed.
    8
    January Term, 2012
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, J., concur.
    PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only.
    LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent.
    __________________
    O’DONNELL, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent.
    {¶ 21} A noncompete agreement existing between an employee and a
    constituent entity is an asset of that entity and, in a statutory merger, transfers by
    operation of law to the surviving entity and is enforceable by the surviving entity
    as if it were a signatory to the original agreement. As a result of a series of
    successive corporate mergers, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete
    agreements at issue in this case by operation of law, along with the ability to
    enforce them without regard to assignment.
    {¶ 22} Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
    The Lead Opinion
    {¶ 23} In my view, the lead decision does not conform with state statutes
    governing corporate mergers, and it departs from century-old precedent holding
    that a successor entity steps into the shoes of an acquired entity and any
    predecessor entities, and thereby acquires the right to enforce agreements in its
    capacity as a successor entity.
    {¶ 24} In this case, the lead opinion concludes that Acordia of Ohio,
    L.L.C., cannot enforce the noncompete agreements it acquired by merger as if it
    had stepped into the shoes of the original corporate entities. The lead opinion
    interprets the silence in these agreements regarding assignability or successorship
    as evidence that the parties intended the agreements to operate only between the
    employee and the corporate employer that was a party to the agreement, and not
    any successor entities. While acknowledging that these agreements transferred by
    operation of law pursuant to R.C. 1701.82, the lead opinion concludes that “the
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    wording within those agreements” precludes Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., from
    enforcing the agreements as if it were one of the original contracting parties. The
    lead opinion explains that the merger did not change the language of the
    agreements by expanding its scope to include surviving entities; thus, it
    concludes, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., can enforce the agreements only according to
    their terms, which enjoined each employee from competing for two years after his
    or her employment terminated with the specific corporate employer that was a
    party to the agreement. This analysis, I submit, is faulty.
    A Noncompete Agreement Is an Asset that
    Passes by Operation of Law
    {¶ 25} R.C. 1701.82(A)(3) states, “The surviving or new entity possesses
    all assets and property of every description, and every interest in the assets and
    property, wherever located, and the rights, privileges, immunities, powers,
    franchises, and authority * * * of each constituent entity, and * * * all obligations
    belonging to or due to each constituent entity” without reversion or impairment.
    R.C. 1705.39, which pertains to mergers between corporations or partnerships and
    limited-liability companies, confers the same vestments on the surviving entity.
    {¶ 26} It is true that R.C. 1701.82(A)(1) states that a constituent entity
    ceases to exist as a separate business in a merger, but that statute also provides
    several exceptions to this general rule, including when “a conveyance,
    assignment, transfer, deed, or other instrument or act is necessary to vest property
    or rights” in a surviving entity.       In those instances, “the existence of the
    constituent entities and the authority of their respective officers, directors, general
    partners, or other authorized representatives is continued notwithstanding the
    merger or consolidation.” Id.; compare R.C. 1705.39(A)(1) (contains similar
    exceptions).
    {¶ 27} R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, by their operation, vest all the assets
    and obligations of a constituent entity in the surviving entity without reversion or
    10
    January Term, 2012
    impairment. When we examined the effect of R.C. 1701.82 in the context of a
    stock purchase agreement entered into by a constituent entity, we held that a
    properly executed contract is binding on the surviving entity “in a merger unless
    the agreement explicitly sets forth that in the event of a merger, the obligations of
    the constituent corporation cease to exist.” ASA Architects, Inc. v. Schlegel, 
    75 Ohio St. 3d 666
    , 
    665 N.E.2d 1083
    (1996), syllabus. In that case, the agreement
    made no provision for what would happen in the event of a merger, the surviving
    entity in the merger assumed full responsibility for all obligations of the
    constituent entity, and the parties did not enter into a new agreement following the
    merger. 
    Id. at 673.
    Based on those factors, we determined that the contractual
    obligations of the constituent entity flowed, by operation of law, to the surviving
    entity. 
    Id. These same
    considerations are present here and compel a similar
    conclusion.
    {¶ 28} The lead opinion correctly concludes that contract principles
    dictate that agreements must be enforced according to their terms; however, it
    ignores the fact that the entity entitled to enforce those agreements is determined
    by statute. See R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39.
    {¶ 29} More than 180 years ago, we recognized that contracts are
    subordinate to statutes, and the latter “may regulate them, prescribe their form,
    their effect, and the mode of their discharge, and every contract is supposed to be
    made with reference to those laws.” Smith v. Parsons, 
    1 Ohio 236
    , 238-239
    (1823). And almost 100 years ago, we construed railroad-consolidation statutes
    that contained language similar to that in R.C. 1701.82 and determined that in a
    merger, “the consolidated company merely steps into the shoes of the constituent
    companies.” Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 
    111 Ohio St. 139
    , 161-
    164, 
    144 N.E. 689
    (1924). The determination of the lead opinion that the terms of
    the agreements preclude Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., from their enforcement runs
    counter to our century-old precedent.
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 30} We applied this analysis more recently, rejecting the argument that
    a change in corporate structure invalidated noncompete agreements originally
    entered into by the constituent entity. Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio
    St.3d 5, 7, 
    565 N.E.2d 540
    (1991). There, the employees signed noncompete
    agreements while working for a sole proprietorship, which subsequently changed
    its business structure to that of a corporation, during their tenure of employment.
    
    Id. In determining
    that the noncompete agreements were valid and could be
    enforced by the newly incorporated business, which had acquired all the assets
    and liabilities of the sole proprietorship, we were guided in our analysis by the
    fact that “[o]nly the legal structure of the business changed, not the business
    itself,” 
    id., and that
    the change in corporate structure did not place additional
    burdens on the “duties or the daily operations” of the employees. 
    Id. This is
    the
    same circumstance that we confront in this case.
    {¶ 31} Here, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete
    agreements from Wells Fargo, which in turn had acquired them through a series
    of corporate mergers.    Those mergers, which began with Frederick Rauh &
    Company, did not affect the nature of the business—the sale of insurance
    securities; thus, the mergers changed only the corporate structure of the business
    operation. Similarly, there is no evidence or claim in this record that additional
    employment duties or obligations resulted from these mergers. Thus, Rogers
    supports the conclusion that Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., is entitled to enforce the
    agreements it acquired in the merger that passed to it by operation of law.
    {¶ 32} In addition to this court, other courts construing similar statutes
    have rejected the conclusion reached by the lead opinion.         For example, in
    Corporate Express Office Prods., Inc. v. Phillips, the Supreme Court of Florida
    held that a surviving entity in a “merger assumes the right to enforce a
    noncompete agreement entered into with an employee of the merged corporation
    by operation of law, and no assignment is necessary * * * because in a merger, the
    12
    January Term, 2012
    two corporations in essence unite into a single corporate existence.” 
    847 So. 2d 406
    , 414 (Fla.2003). And in Aon Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Fin. Benefits, Inc.,
    the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached the same result when it construed a
    Maryland statute, concluding that a surviving entity could enforce a noncompete
    agreement acquired in a merger because it was an asset that passed by operation
    of law, and no assignment was necessary. 
    275 Neb. 642
    , 650-652, 
    748 N.W.2d 626
    (2008). See also Natl. Instrument, L.L.C. v. Braithwaite, Md.Cir.Ct. No. 24-
    C-06-004840, 
    2006 WL 2405831
    , *3 (June 5, 2006), (identifying cases in which
    courts construed merger statutes that vested in surviving entities the assets of a
    constituent entity without further act or deed, and which held that surviving
    entities could enforce noncompete agreements because they were business assets
    that passed by operation of law and not by assignment).
    Conclusion
    {¶ 33} Pursuant to R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, the primary statutes
    governing mergers in Ohio, assets pass to a surviving entity by operation of law.
    It has been understood for more than a century that contracts are subordinate to
    statutes and that the latter also determine the effect of merger contracts and their
    mode of discharge. The agreements here automatically vested in Acordia of
    Ohio, L.L.C., without reversion or impairment, because they are assets that passed
    by operation of law, and Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., can enforce the noncompete
    agreements as if it were a signatory to them.
    {¶ 34} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of
    appeals and hold that the surviving entity in a merger acquires the right to enforce
    a noncompete agreement entered into by a constituent entity by operation of law,
    and that neither assignment nor consent is necessary to effectuate that result.
    LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting
    opinion.
    __________________
    13
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    CUPP, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 35} I join Justice O’Donnell’s dissent, which cogently explains why
    the noncompete agreements in this case transferred by operation of law to
    appellant, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., through the series of mergers. Therefore, I
    agree that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
    {¶ 36} The determination that the agreements transferred by operation of
    law pursuant to the statute through the several mergers, however, does not
    definitively resolve the separate and distinct question whether the agreements are
    ultimately enforceable. The transfer by operation of law does not, in my view,
    foreclose appropriate relief to the parties to the noncompete agreement under
    traditional principles of law that regulate and govern noncompete agreements.
    {¶ 37} During the progress of this case in the lower courts, it appears that
    there was insufficient appreciation of the legal distinction between the issue of
    transfer and the issue of the agreements’ enforceability after transfer. As a result,
    there has been no specific and discrete inquiry thus far into the agreements’
    enforceability. Thus, if the transfer of the noncompete agreements by operation
    of law were appropriately recognized by our decision today, then this matter
    would properly be remanded for additional proceedings that could explore the
    enforceability of the agreements under the principles that govern such
    agreements.
    {¶ 38} As the lead opinion explains, at ¶ 2, the noncompete agreements at
    issue in this case were signed between 1993 and 2000. The pertinent series of
    mergers and acquisitions started in 1994, when Frederick Rauh and Company, a
    single-office insurance agency in Cincinnati, was acquired by Acordia of Ohio,
    Inc. (“Acordia, Inc.”) and concluded when Acordia, Inc., merged with Acordia of
    Ohio, L.L.C., effective late in 2001.      When these employees resigned from
    Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., in 2005, their employer had grown to have multiple
    offices, with 5,000 to 6,000 customers in the Cincinnati office alone.          The
    14
    January Term, 2012
    changes that occurred over the years and other factors in this record would seem
    to be relevant to the issue of the enforceability of these agreements.
    {¶ 39} The proceedings on remand would likely encompass those matters
    normally focused on when noncompete agreements are challenged, such as
    whether the agreements are reasonable and whether the employees incurred
    additional obligations or duties as the mergers occurred so that the agreements
    should not be enforced on their original terms. See, e.g., Lake Land Emp. Group
    of Akron, L.L.C. v. Columber, 
    101 Ohio St. 3d 242
    , 2004-Ohio-786, 
    804 N.E.2d 27
    , ¶ 9 (noncompete agreements are enforceable if they contain reasonable
    geographical and temporal restrictions); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 
    42 Ohio St. 2d 21
    , 
    325 N.E.2d 544
    (1975), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (a
    noncompete agreement that “imposes unreasonable restrictions upon an employee
    will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate
    interests”; a noncompete agreement “is reasonable if the restraint is no greater
    than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue
    hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public”).
    {¶ 40} Consequently, the issue of the enforceability of the noncompete
    agreements after the merger, an inquiry independent from the determination of
    their transfer by operation of law, remains to be explored.
    {¶ 41} The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, and this
    cause should be remanded for further proceedings.
    LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
    __________________
    Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild, James F. McCarthy III, and Laura
    Hinegardner, for appellant.
    Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, L.P.A., Mark E. Lutz, and Michael P.
    Majba, for appellees.
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornette, John B.
    Nalbandian, and Ryan M. Bednarczuk, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio
    Chamber of Commerce and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council.
    Beckman Weil Shepardson, L.L.C., and Peter L. Cassady, urging reversal
    for USI Holdings Corp. and USI Midwest, Inc.
    Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., and Jennifer Turk,
    urging reversal for Willis of Ohio, Inc.
    Hylant Group, Inc., and Michelle Lafferty, urging reversal for Hylant
    Group, Inc.
    Jones Day, Robert P. Ducatman, and Meredith M. Wilkes, urging reversal
    for amicus curiae PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
    Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil Klingshirn; and Gregory Gordillo, urging
    affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers’ Association.
    ______________________
    16