In re Disqualification of Gaul , 2015 Ohio 3929 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as In re Disqualification of Gaul, 2015-Ohio-3929.]
    IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF GAUL.
    STATE v. EVANS.
    [Cite as In re Disqualification of Gaul, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-Ohio-3929.]
    Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant lacks standing—
    Disqualification denied.
    (No. 15-AP-046—Decided June 9, 2015.)
    ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas Case
    No. CR-15-593828-A.
    ____________
    O’CONNOR, C.J.
    {¶ 1} Attorney Michael Wolpert has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this
    court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Daniel Gaul from presiding
    over any further proceedings in case No. CR-15-593828-A in the Cuyahoga
    County Court of Common Pleas.
    {¶ 2} Wolpert filed the affidavit after Judge Gaul issued entries removing
    Wolpert as defendant’s attorney in the underlying case, appointing the public
    defender’s office to represent defendant, and barring Wolpert from appearing in
    his courtroom until Wolpert “clearly demonstrates to the Court that he is receiving
    effective Mental Health Services.”
    {¶ 3} Judge Gaul has responded in writing to the affidavit, explaining that
    due to a series of recent events, he has concluded that Wolpert is currently unfit to
    practice law and unable to provide effective assistance to his clients. Therefore,
    the judge barred Wolpert from appearing in his courtroom.
    {¶ 4} The Code of Judicial Conduct, however, sets forth the appropriate
    channels through which a judge may initiate corrective action regarding an
    attorney who the judge believes has a mental impairment or is unfit to practice
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    law.   Specifically, Jud.Cond.R. 2.14(A) provides that if a judge reasonably
    believes that the performance of a lawyer is impaired “by a mental, emotional, or
    physical condition,” the judge “shall take appropriate action, which may include a
    confidential referral to a lawyer or judicial assistance program.”        Similarly,
    Jud.Cond.R. 2.15(B) provides that if a judge knows that a lawyer has committed a
    violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a question
    regarding the lawyer’s “honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
    respects,” the judge “shall inform” the appropriate disciplinary authority. Barring
    an attorney from practicing in a judge’s courtroom is not an appropriate substitute
    for either referring the attorney to an assistance program or initiating the bar-
    complaint process.
    {¶ 5} Moreover, a trial court’s blanket ban on an attorney’s practicing
    before the court generally violates this court’s exclusive jurisdiction over
    attorney-disciplinary matters.     See Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section
    2(B)(1)(g); Melling v. Stralka, 
    12 Ohio St. 3d 105
    , 
    465 N.E.2d 857
    (1984). “To
    permit each of the trial and appellate courts to establish rules that generally limit
    the ability of attorneys to practice their profession, or that impose specific
    disciplinary standards upon the attorneys of this state, certainly would frustrate
    the purpose behind the Supreme Court’s constitutionally authorized governance
    of the bar.” 
    Id. at 107;
    see also State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 
    102 Ohio St. 3d 250
    ,
    2004-Ohio-2590, 
    809 N.E.2d 20
    , ¶ 11 (a probate court judge lacks authority to bar
    an attorney from practicing law in all future cases before the probate court);
    Catholic Social Servs. of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Howard, 
    106 Ohio App. 3d 615
    , 620,
    
    666 N.E.2d 658
    (8th Dist.1995) (a trial court’s order barring an attorney from
    practicing law before the court “conflicts with the exclusive power of the
    Supreme Court of Ohio to govern the practice of law”); State ex rel. Jones v.
    Stokes, 
    49 Ohio App. 3d 136
    , 
    551 N.E.2d 220
    (8th Dist.1989) (a court’s order
    imposing a continuing restriction on an attorney’s ability to practice in that court
    2
    January Term, 2015
    is the “type of usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court which necessitates
    relief in prohibition”).
    {¶ 6} Notwithstanding    Judge   Gaul’s    troubling   conduct,   however,
    Wolpert’s affidavit must be dismissed. Under R.C. 2701.03(A), an affidavit to
    disqualify a judge may be filed by “any party to the proceeding or the party’s
    counsel.” As explained in previous disqualification matters, “the chief justice has
    strictly enforced this statutory requirement and consistently found that individuals
    who do not qualify as a ‘party’ or ‘party’s counsel’ do not have standing to file an
    affidavit of disqualification.” In re Disqualification of Grendell, 
    137 Ohio St. 3d 1220
    , 2013-Ohio-5243, 
    999 N.E.2d 681
    , ¶ 2; In re Disqualification of Cleary, 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 1225
    , 
    657 N.E.2d 1337
    (1990). Here, Judge Gaul removed Wolpert as
    counsel in the underlying case and assigned the public defender’s office to
    represent defendant. Because Wolpert is no longer counsel in the case, he is not
    one of the persons who may file an affidavit of disqualification.
    {¶ 7} Accordingly, although Wolpert may have other remedies for his
    legal claims, he lacks standing to file an affidavit of disqualification under R.C.
    2701.03. The affidavit is therefore dismissed.
    ________________________
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-AP-046

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 3929

Judges: O'Connor, C.J.

Filed Date: 9/30/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2015