Nathan Lamont Reed v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and
Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
NATHAN LAMONT REED
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1231-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
JUNE 23, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
David F. Berry, Judge Designate
David H. White for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Nathan Lamont Reed (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial
of second degree murder and of use of a firearm in the commission
of that murder. He contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support the second degree murder conviction, and, therefore,
was also insufficient to support the firearm conviction. We
disagree and affirm.
I.
On the day of the murder, Roscoe Ellison "had words" with
Tobias Reed, appellant's cousin. Thereafter, Ellison asked Gary
Goodridge to obtain a gun. Goodridge found a gun and gave it to
Ellison. Goodridge and Ellison walked into an alley and
confronted appellant and Tobias Reed. Ellison and Tobias Reed
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
exchanged words. Appellant ran up the alley and shot Ellison
five times. Appellant continued firing although Ellison's back
was towards appellant and Ellison was running away. Ellison shot
his gun once or twice before he died. Appellant ran back down
the alley and left in a car with Tobias Reed. Tobias Reed asked
appellant, "How many times do you think you . . . hit [him]?"
Appellant replied, "I don't know. I just let it go. . . . He
shouldn't had did what he did."
At trial, Tobias Reed testified that Ellison had robbed him
the week before at gunpoint. On the day of the murder, Tobias
Reed said he wanted to "leave it alone," but Ellison came down
the alley and pulled out a gun. When appellant refused Ellison's
command to "get out of the way," Tobias Reed claimed that Ellison
shot at appellant twice. Thereafter, appellant began shooting at
Ellison. Ellison ran until he fell in the alley.
Appellant testified that on the day of the murder, Ellison
approached him and Tobias Reed and said, "I heard you was coming
looking for me, and you was suppose to kill me. . . . Somebody
gonna die tonight." Appellant said he was scared and thought
Ellison was going to kill him. Appellant testified that he had
his hands in his pockets when Ellison began to shoot. Appellant
pulled out a gun from his pocket and pulled the trigger.
Appellant held the trigger and the gun kept firing. Appellant
let go of the trigger after Ellison fell.
II.
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When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 353, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The
credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded to testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the proven facts are matters
to be determined by the fact finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8
Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
So viewed, the evidence showed that appellant and Ellison
were armed when they confronted each other in the alley.
Appellant was there with his cousin who had earlier argued with
Ellison. As appellant's cousin and Ellison continued to argue,
Ellison and appellant began shooting. Appellant fired his weapon
five times at Ellison. Some of the bullets hit Ellison while
Ellison was fleeing. According to appellant's own testimony, he
fired several shots at Ellison while Ellison had his back turned
and was running away. The fact finder believed the
Commonwealth's evidence, and rejected portions of the testimony
of appellant and Tobias Reed.
The fact finder rejected appellant's claim that he acted in
self-defense. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient for the
trier of fact to infer beyond a reasonable doubt the element of
malice from the circumstances in which the gun was used. See
Henry v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 281, 289, 77 S.E.2d 863, 868
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(1953). Thus, the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with malice
and committed second degree murder and that he used a firearm in
the commission of that murder.
Affirmed.
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