State v. Marlett , 2015 Ohio 3795 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Marlett, 2015-Ohio-3795.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                       :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellant                         :   Appellate Case No. 26557
    :
    v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 2012-CRB-0933
    :
    KYLE D. MARLETT                                     :   (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
    :
    Defendant-Appellee                          :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 18th day of September, 2015.
    ...........
    KENT J. DEPOORTER, Atty. Reg. No. 0058487, Assistant Prosecutor, Kettering
    Municipal Court, 7501 Paragon Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
    CHARLES W. SLICER, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0059927, 111 West First Street, Suite 518,
    Dayton, Ohio 45402
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
    .............
    WELBAUM, J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the
    Kettering Municipal Court sealing defendant-appellee Kyle D. Marlett’s record of
    conviction for criminal trespass immediately after sentencing. Specifically, the State
    contends that, pursuant to R.C. 2953.32, Marlett was required to wait one year from his
    misdemeanor conviction before applying to have the record sealed. For the reasons
    outlined below, the judgment of the trial court sealing the record of Marlett’s conviction will
    be vacated.
    {¶ 2} Sometime prior to December 30, 2014, Marlett was found guilty of criminal
    trespass, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, following a bench trial. According to the
    State’s brief, Marlett had stolen some building materials from a construction site. Neither
    the charging instrument, the judgment of conviction, nor the transcript of the bench trial is
    part of the record before this court.
    {¶ 3} On December 30, 2014, the trial court sentenced Marlett to pay a fine of
    $100, which the trial court thereafter suspended. Counsel for the State was not present
    during sentencing. Immediately after the sentence was announced, and before any final
    judgment entry was filed, the following discussion took place between the trial court and
    Marlett’s trial counsel:
    COURT:         Check to see if your motion’s [sic] come in. Go out with Rob,
    and he’s gonna process, or have them process whatever they
    need through the Clerk’s [sic] and you bring him right back in
    and we’ll do the[—]
    DEFENSE: It should be here by now.
    -3-
    COURT:        Okay.
    DEFENSE: Okay, great, thanks.
    COURT:        I’ll be back in Chambers, so just let Rob know, or somebody
    come back and let me know, and I’ll come back and we’ll take
    care of it.
    Sentencing Trans. (Dec. 30, 2014), p. 3.
    {¶ 4} While trial court did not specify the nature of the motion it was referring to
    and was thereafter cut off before it could explain what it was going to do once the motion
    was processed, we can glean from the record that the court was referring to an
    application to seal Marlett’s record of conviction, because shortly after the court made the
    foregoing comments, it came back on the record and stated the following to Marlett:
    Mr. Marlett, same thing. I’m granting the request to seal [the] record of
    conviction. You’ll get a certified copy. Keep it for future reference. Once
    you walk out of the Courthouse, the record’s sealed technically.
    Realistically, it’s gonna take that amount of time that I explained to the other
    gentleman.
    Hearing Trans. (Dec. 30, 2014), p.3.
    {¶ 5} A judgment entry reflecting the court’s decision to seal the record was filed
    the same day, December 30, 2014. The judgment entry incorrectly stated that Marlett
    had been acquitted. In addition, the entry stated that “all official records pertaining to this
    case shall be sealed and all indexed references thereto shall be deleted[.]”
    {¶ 6} On January 7, 2015, the trial court filed an amended judgment entry that
    referenced the sealing of the record and stated the following:
    -4-
    Further, the Court finds that the [case] qualifies for expungement pursuant
    to §2953.31(A) of the Revised Code; that there is no pending criminal
    proceeding against Defendant; that Defendant’s rehabilitation has been
    attained to the satisfaction of the Court, and that the sealing of the record of
    Defendant’s conviction is consistent with the public interest.
    The amended entry also differed from the original entry in that it did not refer to an
    acquittal, and the list of agencies upon which the order was to be served was more
    extensive and specific than the original order.
    {¶ 7} On January 13, 2015, the State appealed from both the trial court’s original
    and amended judgment entries sealing Marlett’s record of conviction, raising the following
    single assignment of error for review:
    THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SIGNING AND
    APPROVING THE ENTRY & ORDER SEALING THE RECORD OF
    CONVICTION THAT DID NOT SATISFY THE PROPER REQUIREMENTS
    UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE §2953.32.
    {¶ 8} Under its sole assignment of error, the State contends that Marlett’s
    application to seal the record of his conviction had been improperly granted because R.C.
    2953.32 provides that an offender convicted of a misdemeanor is not eligible for sealing
    his record until one year after his “final discharge.” The State also asserts that neither
    Marlett nor the trial court notified the State of the application to seal before it was
    addressed by the court, which deprived the State of its opportunity to object to the court’s
    action.
    {¶ 9} “The trial court’s preliminary determination as to whether the statutory
    -5-
    eligibility requirements for sealing a conviction apply is a question of law that this court
    reviews de novo.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Widener, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013 CA
    29, 2014-Ohio-333, ¶ 8. If the conviction was eligible to be sealed, we then review the
    trial court’s decision to grant or deny an application to seal a record of conviction for an
    abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted.) 
    Id. Accord State
    v. D.L., 2d Dist. Montgomery
    No. 26394, 2015-Ohio-1664, ¶ 7.
    {¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), “an eligible offender may apply to the
    sentencing court * * * for the sealing of the record of the case that pertains to the
    conviction.” An “eligible offender” is “anyone who has been convicted of an offense in
    this state or any other jurisdiction and who has not more than one felony conviction, not
    more than two misdemeanor convictions, or not more than one felony conviction and one
    misdemeanor conviction in this state or any other jurisdiction.” R.C. 2953.31(A).
    {¶ 11} R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) further provides that an offender convicted of a
    misdemeanor may apply to have his or her record sealed “at the expiration of one year
    after the offender’s final discharge[.]” A court may seal an offender’s record of conviction
    “ ‘only when all requirements for eligibility are met.’ ” State v. Radcliff, 
    142 Ohio St. 3d 78
    ,
    2015-Ohio-235, 
    28 N.E.3d 69
    , ¶ 15, quoting State v. Boykin, 
    138 Ohio St. 3d 97
    ,
    2013-Ohio-4582, 
    4 N.E.3d 980
    , ¶ 11. (Other citation omitted.)
    {¶ 12} The language of R.C. 2953.32 makes clear that the trial court was not
    authorized to consider Marlett’s motion to seal his record simultaneously with or
    immediately after his conviction, as Marlett was not eligible for such relief until one year
    after his “final discharge.” Moreover, regardless of whether Marlett served his motion on
    the State, the trial court was still required under R.C. 2953.32(B) to “set a date for a
    -6-
    hearing and * * * [to] notify the prosecutor for the case of the hearing on the application[,]”
    whereupon the State was permitted to file objections prior to the hearing. The trial court
    failed to comply with this requirement as well. For the forgoing reasons, the trial court
    erred in granting Marlett’s application to seal the record of his conviction for criminal
    trespass.
    {¶ 13} The State’s sole assignment is sustained. Accordingly, the judgment of
    the trial court sealing the record of Marlett’s conviction shall be vacated.
    .............
    FROELICH, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Kent J. DePoorter
    Charles. W. Slicer, III
    Hon. Thomas M. Hanna (retired)
    Hon. James F. Long
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 26557

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 3795

Judges: Welbaum

Filed Date: 9/18/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/18/2015