Banks v. Natural Essentials, Inc. , 2011 Ohio 3063 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Banks v. Natural Essentials, Inc., 
    2011-Ohio-3063
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 95780
    SAMUEL W. BANKS, III
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    NATURAL ESSENTIALS, INC., ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-725397
    BEFORE: Rocco, J., Blackmon, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                                June 23, 2011
    FOR APPELLANT
    2
    Samuel W. Banks, III, Pro Se
    19024 Winslow Road
    Shaker Heights, Ohio 44122
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    For Natural Essentials, Inc.
    I. Bernard Trombetta
    6590 Creekside Trail
    Solon, Ohio 44139
    For Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
    Michael DeWine
    Attorney General of Ohio
    BY:   Patrick MacQueeney
    Assistant Attorney General
    615 West Superior Avenue, 11th Floor
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1899
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
    {¶ 1} Appellant Samuel W. Banks, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
    trial court’s order that affirmed the Unemployment Compensation Review
    Commission’s (“the commission’s”) decision, which upheld the denial by the
    3
    Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“the agency”) of Banks’s
    application for unemployment benefits.
    {¶ 2} Banks presents a single assignment of error.   Banks argues that
    the trial court’s order should be reversed.   He contends the record of the
    administrative hearing fails to support the commission’s decision that
    Natural Essentials, Inc. (“Natural”), his former employer, terminated him for
    “just cause” and that he was afforded his right to due process in being
    terminated from his employment.
    {¶ 3} Upon a review of the record, however, this court disagrees.
    Consequently, Banks’s assignment of error is overruled.     The trial court’s
    order is affirmed.
    {¶ 4} According to the record, Natural hired Banks as a warehouse
    worker in September 2007. Banks signed an acknowledgment at the time of
    his hiring that he received a copy of Natural’s “Employee Policy Manual.”
    {¶ 5} Natural required its employees to follow strict rules of conduct.
    The manual indicated that “abusive or obscene language to fellow employees
    or supervisors will not be tolerated.” Furthermore, the manual warned that
    such language, along with “threatening [or] intimidating” behavior toward
    other employees “will be cause for immediate disciplinary action and possible
    dismissal.”
    4
    {¶ 6} The   manual     provided    that    Natural   used   a   progressive
    disciplinary procedure for infractions of the employee rules of conduct.
    Certain offenses were listed as ones that could incur more severe penalties;
    included in these were “unsatisfactory performance” of the job and “abusive or
    obscene language to fellow employees or supervisors.”
    {¶ 7} With respect to such offenses, the manual outlined the procedure
    as follows. For the first offense, Natural issued to the employee a written
    warning and a two-day suspension without pay.          For the second offense,
    depending on its severity, Natural issued to the employee either a suspension
    or a discharge.
    {¶ 8} Moreover, the manual separately contained a note that informed
    employees: 1) Natural placed written warnings in the employee’s personnel
    file to serve as the basis for the progressive disciplinary procedure; 2) each
    warning issued remained in the employee’s file for a period of twelve months;
    and, 3) three warnings for infractions of “any combination of rules will be
    cause for immediate discharge.”
    {¶ 9} The record reflects Natural issued a written reprimand to Banks
    on April 22, 2009. Therein, Natural cited Banks’s substandard work, i.e.,
    failing to properly pack product into cartons.
    5
    {¶ 10} On July 1, 2009, a female coworker complained that Banks used
    obscene and abusive language toward her. After his supervisors conducted a
    short investigation, one that included obtaining Banks’s written explanation
    of the incident, Banks received another written reprimand.
    {¶ 11} On July 10, 2009, Natural issued a third written warning to
    Banks for the use of abusive language toward another coworker; Banks was
    suspended from work. Effective July 17, 2009, Natural notified Banks his
    employment was terminated. Natural informed Banks in writing that his
    termination was based upon his violations of the employee rules of conduct
    and his disciplinary record.
    {¶ 12} On July 21, 2009, Banks filed a claim with the agency seeking
    unemployment benefits. On August 13, 2009, the agency issued a denial on
    the basis that Banks had been terminated for just cause pursuant to R.C.
    4141.29(D)(2)(a).
    {¶ 13} Banks appealed the decision.   On September 3, 2009, the agency
    reaffirmed its decision to deny Banks’s claim.
    {¶ 14} Banks again appealed, causing the matter to be transferred to the
    commission.    On January 21, 2010, Banks’s case proceeded to a hearing
    before a hearing officer (“HO”). Over a period of several days, the HO took
    6
    testimony and evidence from Banks’s supervisors, a coworker, and Banks
    himself.
    {¶ 15} On March 16, 2010, the HO issued a decision that affirmed the
    agency’s denial of Banks’s claim.     The HO determined Banks had been
    terminated for just cause. Although Banks requested further review of that
    decision, the commission disallowed his request.
    {¶ 16} Banks pursued the matter by filing an appeal in the trial court
    pursuant to R.C. 4141.282.       The trial court heard the matter on the
    administrative record and on the briefs of the parties.
    {¶ 17} In his brief, Banks argued that the commission’s decision should
    be reversed for two reasons.     Banks asserted: 1) Natural failed to prove
    either that it had just cause to discharge him or that it had followed its
    disciplinary procedures in doing so; and, 2) the HO improperly evaluated the
    evidence presented at the hearing.
    {¶ 18} Eventually, the trial court issued its order affirming the
    commission’s decision. The trial court found that the commission’s decision
    “was not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.”
    {¶ 19} Banks filed a timely notice of appeal in this court from the trial
    court’s order. He presents one assignment of error.
    7
    {¶ 20} “I.   Procedures and decisions made by the [commission]
    Hearing Officer are unlawful, unreasonable, and against the manifest
    weight of the evidence, and in violation of Article IV, Section 3 of The
    Ohio Constitution.       These errors were not recognized by the
    reviewing Court of Common Pleas in its Affirmation Decision, and
    appeal is made herein.”
    {¶ 21} As he did in the trial court, Banks argues that Natural failed to
    prove at the administrative hearing that it either terminated him from
    employment for just cause, or followed its own disciplinary procedures prior
    to doing so; therefore, the HO improperly evaluated the evidence, and the
    commission’s decision should be reversed. This court disagrees.
    {¶ 22} A reviewing court may reverse the commission’s decision only if it
    is “unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
    R.C. 4141.282(H); see, also, Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp.
    Servs., 
    73 Ohio St.3d 694
    , 696, 
    1995-Ohio-206
    , 
    653 N.E.2d 1207
    . That is, all
    reviewing courts, from common pleas courts to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
    are charged with making the foregoing determination. Alexander v. Lowe’s
    Home Ctrs., Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 95027, 
    2011-Ohio-113
    , ¶22, citing
    Williamson v. Complete Healthcare for Women, Inc., Licking App. No.
    10CA0044, 
    2010-Ohio-3693
    .
    8
    {¶ 23} Thus, appellate courts have the duty to determine whether the
    agency’s decision is supported by the evidence in the record.            Irvine v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. (1985), 
    19 Ohio St.3d 15
    , 
    482 N.E.2d 587
    .
    Nevertheless, the appellate court cannot either make factual findings or
    determine the credibility of witnesses. Every reasonable presumption should
    be made in favor of the commission’s decision and findings of fact. Karches v.
    Cincinnati (1988), 
    38 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 19, 
    526 N.E.2d 1350
    .
    {¶ 24} R.C.   4141.29   establishes    the   eligibility   requirements   for
    unemployment benefits. A claimant is ineligible if he is discharged for “just
    cause in connection with the individual’s work.” R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).
    {¶ 25} “Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to
    an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a
    particular act.” Irvine at 17. An employer may require specific standards of
    conduct and discharge employees who violate the standards. Piazza v. Ohio
    Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1991), 
    72 Ohio App.3d 353
    , 357, 
    594 N.E.2d 695
    , citing
    Williams v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (Nov. 27, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No.
    49759.
    {¶ 26} The critical issue is whether the employee by his actions
    demonstrated an unreasonable disregard for his employer’s best interest.
    Piazza, citing Kiikka v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1985), 
    21 Ohio App.3d 168
    ,
    9
    169, 
    486 N.E.2d 1233
    . Whether just cause exists is unique to the facts of
    each case, bearing in mind the principle that the claimant has the burden of
    proving his or her entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits.
    Irvine.
    {¶ 27} The record in this case supports the commission’s decision.
    Natural submitted a copy of Banks’s employment record, which included all
    the times he committed an infraction.       Banks’s record of infractions was
    lengthy, and it demonstrates that for each infraction he received verbal
    warnings before written ones were issued.
    {¶ 28} Gary Pelligrino, Natural’s owner, described the process taken
    with respect to the most serious allegations made against Banks. Pelligrino
    showed the circumstances had been documented, statements were obtained
    from the victims and from witnesses to the incidents, and Banks was
    permitted to provide his versions of what occurred in each.
    {¶ 29} Banks’s female coworker provided a written description of the
    July 1, 2009 incident in which she indicated she felt intimidated and
    frightened by Banks’s “yelling” and use of swear words when she approached
    him with a request to repack some material. Similarly, with respect to the
    July 10, 2009 incident, Banks’s male coworker submitted a written statement
    indicating he felt insulted by ethnically-specific words Banks used in response
    10
    to a request for assistance.       Conduct that is intimidating to either the
    employer or a coworker has been deemed just cause for termination. Saini v.
    Cleveland Pneumatic Co. (May 14, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 51913. So, too,
    has conduct that tends to create a hostile or offensive work environment.
    Vitatoe v. Lawrence Industries Inc., 
    153 Ohio App.3d 609
    , 
    2003-Ohio-4187
    ,
    
    795 N.E.2d 125
    .
    {¶ 30} In conjunction with the documents, the testimony of Natural’s
    witnesses proved the company’s prescribed procedures were followed, and
    Banks was allowed every opportunity to rebut allegations of inappropriate
    behavior.    Banks’s written explanations of what he did in each of the
    incidents, on the other hand, did not ring true.
    {¶ 31} His testimony at the hearing suffered from the same problem.
    Banks’s responses to the HO’s questions tended to be fragmentary, evasive,
    and occasionally argumentative.         From the evidence presented, the HO
    properly    could   conclude    Banks    did   not   prove   his   entitlement   to
    unemployment benefits.         Barksdale v. State Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm.,
    Cuyahoga App. No. 93711, 
    2010-Ohio-267
    .
    {¶ 32} Since this court, like the trial court, lacks authority to substitute
    its judgment for that of the commission, and the commission’s decision is
    supported in the record, Banks’s assignment of error is overruled.
    11
    Massengale-Hasan v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Fam. Serv., Cuyahoga App.
    No. 92981, 
    2010-Ohio-251
    ; Harrison v. Penn Traffic Co., Franklin App. No.
    04AP-728, 
    2005-Ohio-638
    .
    Affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this
    judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ________________________________
    KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95780

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 3063

Judges: Rocco

Filed Date: 6/23/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014