State v. Brown , 2021 Ohio 3078 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Brown, 
    2021-Ohio-3078
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LAKE COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                       CASE NO. 2021-L-017
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Criminal Appeal from the
    -v-                                          Court of Common Pleas
    GREGORY BROWN,
    Trial Court No. 2020 CR 000062
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OPINION
    Decided: September 7, 2021
    Judgment: Affirmed
    Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor,
    Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
    44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    Brian A. Smith, Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC, 755 White Pond Drive, Suite 403, Akron,
    OH 44320 (For Defendant-Appellant).
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
    {¶1}    Appellant, Gregory Brown, appeals the final judgment of conviction and
    sentencing entered by the Lake County Court of Common Pleas on January 21, 2021.
    For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment is affirmed.
    {¶2}    One evening in January 2020, Patrolman Cook happened to be behind a
    silver Nissan, later determined to be driven by appellant, travelling southbound on East
    286th Street in Wycliffe, Ohio toward Euclid Avenue. The Patrolman testified that he
    observed the vehicle turn right onto Euclid Avenue into the leftmost westbound lane,
    instead of into the curb lane as required by law. He also testified that the vehicle came
    to a stop “past the stop bar and came to a stop in the cross walk prior to turning,” though
    he did not mention this violation to appellant at the time.
    {¶3}   Patrolman Cook initiated a traffic stop and testified that immediately upon
    approach he detected a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The vehicle
    was thereafter determined to be a rental car rented by one of the occupant’s girlfriend,
    but none of the vehicle’s passengers were authorized to operate the vehicle. Therefore,
    the vehicle had to be towed and it was necessary to conduct an inventory of the vehicle’s
    contents. Additionally, based on the odor of marijuana, Patrolman Cook had probable
    cause to conduct a search of the vehicle. The search yielded a baggie of suspected crack
    cocaine hidden under the drivers’ seat, a scale with a white powder residue between the
    front seats, and a bag of marijuana. Appellant was arrested for possession of drug
    paraphernalia; however, he was not cited for any traffic violation.
    {¶4}   Appellant was indicted on three counts: Counts 1 and 2, Possession of
    Cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11; and Count 3, Illegal Use
    or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, in violation of
    R.C. 2925.14(C)(1). All three counts included forfeiture specifications as set forth in R.C.
    2941.1417 and R.C. 2981.04. Initially, appellant pleaded not guilty and filed a Motion to
    Suppress, alleging that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop
    of his vehicle nor probable cause to arrest him. Following a hearing, the trial court denied
    the motion. Appellant then entered a plea of “No Contest.”
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    Case No. 2021-L-017
    {¶5}   The trial court sentenced appellant to two years of community control on
    each count to be served concurrently to each other, subject to several sanctions and
    conditions not directly relevant here.
    {¶6}   On appeal, appellant assigns one error for our review, which states:
    {¶7}   The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, in
    violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution and the
    Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution.
    {¶8}   “An appellate court’s review of a decision on a motion to suppress involves
    issues of both law and fact.” State v. Eggleston, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0068,
    
    2015-Ohio-958
    , ¶18. “‘When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes
    the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
    evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Freshwater, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-
    117, 
    2019-Ohio-2968
    , ¶4, quoting State v. Burnside, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 2003-Ohio-
    5372, ¶8. As such, the appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they
    are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.
    2001-A-0041, 
    2002-Ohio-6569
    , ¶16, citing State v. Guysinger, 
    86 Ohio App.3d 592
    , 594
    (4th Dist.1993).   “Accepting these findings of facts as true, a reviewing court must
    independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
    conclusion, whether they meet the appropriate legal standard.” Jones, supra, citing State
    v. Curry, 
    95 Ohio App.3d 93
    , 96 (8th Dist.1994).
    {¶9}   Under this assignment of error, appellant argues that neither of the traffic
    violations provided Patrolman Cook with sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the
    vehicle. It is well established that “[a]n officer’s observation of a traffic violation provides
    probable cause to stop a vehicle.” Freshwater, 
    supra, at ¶7
    , citing Eggleston, supra, at
    3
    Case No. 2021-L-017
    ¶20. At the suppression hearing, the Patrolman testified to two traffic violations: stopping
    beyond the stop bar and improper turn. Appellant challenges both.
    {¶10} First, he challenges the stop bar violation on the grounds that the Wickliffe
    City Ordinance 331.18(a) conflicts with R.C. 4511.43(A), and argues that applying W.C.O.
    331.18(a), he did not commit any traffic violation.
    {¶11} R.C. 5411.43(A), which discusses violations pertaining to a stop sign, states
    in pertinent part:
    {¶12} Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every
    driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley approaching a stop sign shall
    stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the
    crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the
    point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view
    of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it.
    * * * Id.
    {¶13} However, W.C.O. 331.18, entitled Operation of Vehicle at Yield Signs,
    pertains not to stop signs, but yield signs; thus R.C. 5411.43(A) and W.C.O. 331.18 are
    incomparable. Further, as appellant was stopped for a stop bar violation, W.C.O. 331.18
    is entirely inapplicable here. The Wickliffe ordinance pertaining to stop signs is W.C.O.
    331.19 and is near verbatim to R.C. 4511.43(A), with the only difference pertaining to the
    application to trackless trollies. Thus, appellant’s argument of a material discrepancy
    between the Wickliffe City Ordinance and the Ohio Revised Code regarding stop signs is
    mistaken.
    {¶14} Appellant also challenges the Patrolman’s ability to see the stop sign
    violation due to his location behind appellant and the late time of day. Though it was after
    sunset, the Patrolman was about a car and half length behind appellant. The Patrolman
    testified that he was able to see the violation and was familiar with the area. Given that
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    Case No. 2021-L-017
    the trial court was in the best position to determine the veracity of the Patrolman’s
    statements and that nothing in the record contradicted his testimony, we determine the
    trial court’s finding is supported by competent, credible evidence. Thus, we find no
    reversible error on these grounds.
    {¶15} Second, appellant challenges the improper turn violation. He does not
    dispute that he turned from the southbound curb lane into the leftmost westbound lane,
    but instead asserts the Patrolman committed a mistake of law as to the turn violation.
    R.C. 4511.36(A) states in pertinent part:
    {¶16} The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall be
    governed by the following rules:
    {¶17} (1) Approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close
    as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.
    {¶18} Appellant argues that the law does not absolutely require a turn into the
    curb lane and that the state failed to show that it was practicable for appellant to turn into
    the curb lane.    The statute, however, states the turn “shall be” made as close as
    practicable to the curb. Thus, unless there is an obstruction, a driver must turn into the
    curb lane. After being shown pictures of the intersection in question, Patrolman Cook
    testified that the condition of the roadway in the pictures were the same as they were on
    the night in question. The pictures clearly depict no obstruction or reason why it would
    not have been practicable for appellant to turn into the curb lane.           Thus, we find
    appellant’s contentions to be without merit.
    {¶19} As either violation alone would have allowed the Patrolman to legally stop
    the vehicle, we find the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Appellant’s
    sole assignment of error is without merit.
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    Case No. 2021-L-017
    {¶20} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
    MATT LYNCH, J.,
    concur.
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    Case No. 2021-L-017
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2021-L-017

Citation Numbers: 2021 Ohio 3078

Judges: Rice

Filed Date: 9/7/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2021