Inner City Living, Inc. v. Dept. of Dev. Disabilities , 2017 Ohio 8317 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as Inner City Living, Inc. v. Dept. of Dev. Disabilities, 
    2017-Ohio-8317
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 105255
    INNER CITY LIVING, INC.
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
    vs.
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
    DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Administrative Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-15-853695
    BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and Jones, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 26, 2017
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Jeffrey J. Jurca
    Sean P. Casey
    Jurca & Lashuk
    240 North Fifth Street, Suite 330
    Columbus, Ohio 43215
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael DeWine
    Ohio Attorney General
    Roger F. Carroll
    Katherine J. Bockbrader
    Assistant Attorneys General
    30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor
    Columbus, Ohio 43215
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
    {¶1} Inner City Living, Inc. appeals the trial court’s decision affirming the Ohio
    Department of Developmental Disabilities’ (“DODD”) revocation of Inner City Living’s
    certification to provide services to developmentally disabled individuals. We affirm.
    {¶2} In May 2014, DODD conducted a compliance review, as required for Inner
    City Living to maintain its state-mandated certification. During that review, DODD
    issued three “immediate citations” for conditions that represented an immediate risk to an
    individual’s health, safety, and welfare. Two of Inner City Living’s employees did not
    have the required first-aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) training; a company
    vehicle that was used for transporting clients was unacceptably damaged (the driver-side
    mirror was held in place with a paper towel); and Inner City Living had failed to conduct
    required background checks for three staff members before hiring them, one of whom had
    worked at the company for almost a year. In addition, and as provided in the compliance
    review summary that followed the onsite visit, Inner City Living was cited for 34
    violations, which included (1) the failure to provide and implement individual service
    plans for two clients, (2) the failure to document nonmedical transportation, (3) the failure
    to comply with several requirements regarding “unusual incidents,” (4) the failure to
    conduct a myriad of background checks before hiring staff, (5) the lack of documentation
    regarding necessary staff training, (6) the failure to complete a driver’s abstract for staff
    members transporting clients, and (7) the failure to meet inspection and service
    requirements for vehicles used for nonmedical transportation. None of the citations were
    appealed despite the opportunity. Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-2-04(D)(2).
    {¶3} In light of the citations, Inner City Living’s certification was suspended.
    Inner City Living could no longer take any new clients but could continue providing
    services to existing ones. That suspension was also not appealed.
    {¶4} Inner City Living had two weeks to prepare and submit a plan of correction
    (“POC”) to address the 34 citations.     Under Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-2-04(D)(2), a
    provider has 14 days from receipt of a compliance review summary that includes citations
    to submit a written appeal or a written POC for each citation. A POC demonstrates the
    steps the provider will take to correct the citation and create a system to prevent
    reoccurrence. Inner City Living was unable to submit an acceptable POC within 14
    days; however, DODD provided it with a two-month extension and technical assistance to
    complete the requirement. By the end of July 2014, Inner City Living’s several attempts
    to produce an acceptable POC were rejected and DODD began the process to revoke
    Inner City Living’s certification by issuing formal notice according to the “Compliance
    Review Protocol,” an internal guide for DODD employees regarding the compliance
    review procedures. Inner City Living appealed the proposed revocation and requested an
    administrative hearing, which was scheduled for the beginning of August 2014.
    {¶5} Despite the notice of revocation and hearing, DODD provided Inner City
    Living with another opportunity to comply with the health and safety requirements. See
    Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-2-04(D)(2)(b).        In October, DODD followed up with an
    unannounced visit to Inner City Living’s offices. During that visit, two more violations
    were discovered. Inner City Living had not maintained sufficient documentation for
    nonmedical transportation, and two staff members had not undergone the mandatory drug
    tests required of all employees who transport clients. Because of the two new citations
    and the failure to appeal those citations, Inner City Living was required to prepare a
    second POC. 
    Id.
    {¶6} At the end of October 2014, and despite the pending revocation notice,
    DODD approved both a newly submitted POC for the 34 citations issued in May and a
    POC for the two new violations discovered earlier in October. As part of the approval
    process, DODD was set to conduct a compliance verification visit to confirm the
    provider’s implementation of the remedial plan.
    {¶7} In early December, during the compliance verification, DODD cleared the
    two violations from October, but 13 of the 34 citations from May were found to be
    ongoing. Inner City Living was providing services to clients that did not match the
    client’s individual service plan, failed to maintain the appropriate incident logs, failed to
    conduct background checks before hiring new employees — including verifications
    through the “Abuser” and “Nurse Aid” registries, and failed to produce documentation
    demonstrating that some staff members had received mandatory first-aid training. In
    addition, DODD found new violations, two of which were of immediate concern. Inner
    City Living hired a new employee who had six or more points on his driver’s license but
    was nonetheless permitted to transport clients, and Inner City Living was performing the
    wrong background checks with the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Inner City Living
    used the incorrect coding so that the background check was not pulling all the required
    information that must be reviewed before new employees can be legally hired.
    {¶8} In light of Inner City Living’s failure to ensure corrections were made and the
    additional violations that were found during each follow-up visit, DODD proceeded with
    the revocation of Inner City Living’s certification, although an amended notice of
    revocation was issued in March 2015 to include the newer violations. The hearing
    proceeded, and DODD found that Inner City Living’s certification should be revoked
    based on the violations. Inner City Living filed an unsuccessful appeal under R.C.
    119.12 to the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County challenging DODD’s decision.
    {¶9} In this appeal, Inner City Living contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion in affirming the administrative action. We find no merit to Inner City Living’s
    arguments.
    {¶10} “Under R.C. 119.12, when a decision of a state board is appealed, a court of
    common pleas must decide whether the board’s order was ‘supported by reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.’” Spitznagel v. State
    Bd. of Edn., 
    126 Ohio St.3d 174
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2715
    , 
    931 N.E.2d 1061
    , ¶ 14, quoting R.C.
    119.12. “The court of appeals is even more limited in its review and can overturn
    findings of fact ‘only if the trial court has abused its discretion.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting Rossford
    Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn., 
    63 Ohio St.3d 705
    , 707,
    
    590 N.E.2d 1240
     (1992), and Lorain Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 
    40 Ohio St.3d 257
    , 260-261, 
    533 N.E.2d 264
     (1988). A court of appeals, however, reviews
    questions of law under the de novo standard of review. Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 
    120 Ohio St.3d 205
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4826
    , 
    897 N.E.2d 1096
    , ¶ 43.
    {¶11} In the first assignment of error, Inner City Living claims the “trial court
    erred in failing to find that Appellee did not give Appellant notice of the law or rule
    directly involved as required by R.C. 119.07.”
    {¶12} R.C. 119.07, in part, provides that an agency must provide notice that
    includes the charges or other reasons for the proposed action and the law directly
    involved.    Generally, providing the relevant statutory sections upon which the
    administrative action is being considered is sufficient. Richmond v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing,
    10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-328, 
    2013-Ohio-110
    , ¶ 11. Issues can arise, however, if
    the notice is overly specific. In Simic v. Accountancy Bd. of Ohio, 
    2014-Ohio-3237
    , 
    15 N.E.3d 1247
    , ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), for example, it was concluded that under R.C. 119.07, the
    board’s notice of intent to take a proposed action under one specific subdivision of a
    statute, with accompanying factual allegations, did not provide notice of an intent to
    pursue the proposed action on a separate, undelineated subdivision that required a
    different factual predicate. Id. at ¶ 17. The Accountancy Board of Ohio had provided
    notice that it intended to take disciplinary action against an accounting firm for violation
    of R.C. 4701.16(A)(11), which penalizes the firm for the failure to timely renew the
    firm’s registration. Id. At the hearing, however, the board penalized the accountant
    individually under R.C. 4701.16(A)(3) for engaging in unlicensed practice after the firm’s
    registration renewal had been denied without a hearing, which was in contravention of the
    statutory requirement. Id. It was therefore concluded that notice for the proposed action
    was lacking; the accountant had not been provided notice that a sanction would be
    imposed against him for operating without a license. Id.
    {¶13} In this case, DODD’s notice of revocation complied with R.C. 119.07. The
    revocation notice included a statement that DODD intended to revoke Inner City Living’s
    certificate under R.C. 5123.166(B) because of the numerous violations found between
    May and December 2014. According to Inner City Living, listing all potential reasons
    supporting a revocation was not sufficient under R.C. 119.07 because DODD was
    required to determine which subdivisions of R.C. 5123.166(B) were actually violated by
    Inner City Living’s conduct in the notice.
    {¶14} We decline to create such a nonsensical requirement — the agency is not
    required to predetermine which section of the statute applies based on the alleged facts.
    DODD provided Inner City Living with the specific violations that it intended to pursue
    along with a lengthy factual recitation upon which the allegations were based.
    According to an unambiguously drafted notice, DODD intended to demonstrate that the
    revocation of Inner City Living’s certification was warranted under any of the enumerated
    provisions of R.C. 5123.166(B)(1)-(9), which provides in part that the provider’s
    certificate may be revoked for good cause.          Subdivisions (B)(1)-(9) provide a
    nonexhaustive list of what is considered to be “good cause,” including any other conduct
    the director determines is or would be injurious to individuals who receive supported
    living from the provider. That the decision was based on less than all of the R.C.
    5123.166(B) categories is irrelevant; Inner City Living still had notice that DODD
    intended to take action for that which was proven. The first assignment of error is
    overruled.
    {¶15} In the second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Inner City Living
    contends (1) that DODD did not follow its protocol delineated in the “Compliance
    Review Protocol” document, which provided that DODD would conduct up to three
    compliance checks after accepting a POC; (2) that the revocation was improper because
    none of the violations actually caused any harm to any developmentally disabled
    individual (Inner City Living maintains that the violations “amounted to nothing more
    than clerical errors”); and (3) that DODD deprived Inner City Living of due process by
    not producing an internal “basic work flow” document that described the revocation
    process once DODD decided to pursue revocation. None of these three assignments of
    error complied with App.R. 16(A)(7). At a minimum, an appellant’s brief must include
    an argument supported by legal authority. App.R. 16(A)(7).
    {¶16} Inner City Living has not provided citation to authority demonstrating that
    strict compliance with internal protocols generally describing the procedure, as opposed
    to rules promulgated under the Revised Code or Administrative Code, precludes DODD
    from taking administrative action.   App.R. 16(A)(7).    It is not an appellate court’s
    responsibility to find and articulate legal authority to support an appellant’s assigned
    error. Id. Further, even if we reviewed the factual underpinnings of the unsupported
    argument, Inner City Living ignores the fact that the revocation notice was originally
    issued in July 2014, under the process set forth in the “Compliance Review Protocol”
    document and based on Inner City Living’s inability to timely submit an acceptable POC
    for the May citations. The protocols that Inner City Living is relying on did not address
    the particular circumstances of its case, in which DODD provided Inner City Living with
    a second chance to submit the belated POC after the revocation proceedings had been
    initiated; the document simply described a general procedure.
    {¶17} Inner City Living also believes that DODD’s decision — that the unresolved
    violations created a substantial risk to the health and safety of consumers — was not
    based on substantial, reliable, or probative evidence because the violations were “clerical
    errors.” This characterization is, at best, disingenuous. Inner City Living was cited for,
    among other things, failing to timely conduct proper background checks of prospective
    employees, failing to properly maintain vehicles used for transporting clients, failing to
    ensure that employees had the required first-aid training, and failing to conduct drug
    screening of employees who transported clients. These violations went beyond “mere
    clerical” errors, and in addition, every visit yielded new violations, demonstrating that
    Inner City Living was failing to maintain even a rudimentary level of compliance with its
    certification requirements.
    {¶18} Inner City Living is asking us to disregard the trial court’s conclusion that
    the administrative decision was based on reliable, substantive, and probative evidence.
    There has been no demonstration or even an argument that the trial court abused its
    discretion in making that determination.            Spitznagel, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 174
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-2715
    , 
    931 N.E.2d 1061
    , at ¶ 14. It must be recognized that Inner City Living
    is not contesting the underlying violations that were the basis of the revocation under R.C.
    5123.166. See Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 
    63 Ohio St.3d 570
    , 573,
    
    589 N.E.2d 1303
     (1992). DODD may revoke a provider’s certification regardless of
    whether some or all of the deficiencies enumerated in the citations are corrected at the
    time of the revocation hearing. Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-2-04(F)(5). In light of the facts
    that the violations were not challenged, that Inner City Living failed to appeal the
    citations under Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-2-04(D)(2), and that numerous violations
    remained outstanding several months after being discovered, DODD’s decision to revoke
    Inner City Living’s certification under R.C. 5123.166(B) was supported by reliable,
    probative, and substantial evidence. 
    Id.
    {¶19} With respect to the “basic work flow” document, Inner City Living contends
    that the failure to timely produce the document deprived Inner City Living of due process
    under the Ohio and United States Constitutions.         According to Inner City Living,
    “nothing could be more important to the preservation of a fair hearing than to allow
    Appellant access to the document for the purposes of cross-examining [the witness]
    regarding the validity” of her testimony that DODD proceeded with the July revocation
    based on the “basic work flow” document. In its reply brief, however, Inner City Living
    agrees that the revocation provisions “set forth in the [basic work flow] documents were
    not even at issue” at the time DODD issued the notice of revocation. Essentially, Inner
    City Living’s argument is that the “basic work flow” document was irrelevant to DODD’s
    decision to revoke the certification in July 2014 because DODD’s decision to accept the
    POCs in October meant that DODD should have adhered to its published, internal
    protocol of conducting three compliance visits.
    {¶20} This is precisely what the hearing officer concluded:
    The [“basic work flow”] document sought is an internal policy, not
    published, and [it] is immaterial at this point as to whether or not DODD
    followed its own rules. The testimony by [DODD’s employee] established
    that DODD did not follow the published “COMPLIANCE REVIEW
    PROTOCOL” [indicating DODD would conduct three verification visits
    after accepting a POC] and she explained why not. Hence for purposes of
    this case the fact that DODD did not follow the “COMPLIANCE REVIEW
    PROTOCOL” and the reason for doing so have been clearly established.
    The question now becomes did DODD have to follow the published
    protocol and since it did not what are the consequences?
    It was immaterial whether the “basic work flow” document authorized DODD’s action
    because there was an admission that the internal, published protocols were not followed
    following the acceptance of the POC in October. Since the document was deemed
    irrelevant and Inner City Living has not demonstrated otherwise, we have not been
    provided a basis upon which we could conclude that the refusal to produce it for the
    hearing was error. In light of the foregoing, we overrule the second, third, and fourth
    assignments of error.
    {¶21} And finally, in the fifth assignment of error, Inner City Living contends that
    the trial court erred by not issuing findings of facts and conclusions of law under Civ.R.
    52. Even if we assume Civ.R. 52 applied in this case, which we do only for the sake of
    discussion, the rule requires the party to file a request for the findings of facts or
    conclusions of law within seven days of the trial court’s order. GMC v. Joe O’Brien
    Chevrolet, 
    118 Ohio App.3d 470
    , 479, 
    693 N.E.2d 317
     (10th Dist.1997) (“unless the
    court is making factual determinations on the basis of additional evidence not before the
    administrative agency, Civ.R. 52 has no application to such review proceedings”);
    Newman v. Indus. Glove Cleaning Co., 
    34 Ohio App.3d 41
    , 42, 
    516 N.E.2d 1278
     (8th
    Dist.1986). There was no timely request in this case, and therefore, there can be no error
    for failing to issue findings of facts or conclusions of law under Civ.R. 52. 
    Id.
     The fifth
    assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶22} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR