State v. Taylor , 2016 Ohio 5541 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-5541.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 26896
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2006-CR-3172/2
:
SHAWN D. TAYLOR : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 26th day of August, 2016.
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHELE D. PHIPPS, Atty. Reg. No. 0069829, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
SHAWN D. TAYLOR, Inmate No. 566-960, London Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 69,
London, Ohio 43140
Defendant-Appellant-Pro Se
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} In this case, Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Taylor, appeals pro se from a
decision of the trial court overruling his post-conviction motion for relief. In support of his
appeal, Taylor contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the jury made the
required finding regarding the jury verdict, i.e., that the death of the victim of the murder
with which Taylor was charged was proximately caused by Taylor’s commission of a
felony of violence. According to Taylor, the jury verdict form improperly failed to contain
a space for the jury to make such a finding. Taylor further contends that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to accept an incomplete jury form.
{¶ 2} We conclude that Taylor’s arguments are without merit and are also barred
by res judicata. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 3} In December 2007, Taylor was found guilty by a jury on the following charges:
two counts of kidnapping; one count of robbery; one count of murder; and one count of
involuntary manslaughter. We affirmed Taylor’s conviction on appeal on all grounds,
other than our conclusion that the convictions for robbery and kidnapping to facilitate the
robbery should have been merged for sentencing. See State v. Taylor, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 22564, 2009-Ohio-806, ¶ 2.
{¶ 4} Our opinion noted the following factual background for the alleged crimes
and the convictions:
On July 9, 2006, Myreon Mazur, a.k.a. “Chico,” was badly beaten,
stripped of his clothes, and robbed by a group of men outside a home at
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454 Quitman in Dayton. By all accounts, the attack was motivated by a
territorial dispute among drug dealers. Mazur stumbled away after the
beating, but he was found a short time later by a Dayton police officer
outside a nearby church. Although Mazur had no visible wounds, he was
lying in the grass, moaning, and he stated that he was dying. He died a
short time later at Miami Valley Hospital.
Several men, including Taylor, were charged in connection with
Mazur's attack. Taylor was indicted on two counts of kidnapping, one
count of robbery, three counts of felony murder (robbery, kidnapping, and
felonious assault), and tampering with evidence. He was tried by a jury on
November 26-30, 2007. The jury found Taylor guilty of robbery, two counts
of kidnapping, and felony murder (kidnapping). The jury found Taylor not
guilty of felony murder (felonious assault), but guilty on the lesser included
offense of involuntary manslaughter (assault). The jury found Taylor not
guilty of felony murder (robbery) and tampering with evidence.
Taylor at ¶ 3-4.
{¶ 5} On appeal, Taylor raised five assignments of error, including a supplemental
assignment of error. These assignments of error included: a constitutional challenge
based on the state’s failure to include a mens rea element into the robbery charge;
arguments that the felony murder (kidnapping) conviction and robbery convictions were
based on insufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and
an argument that the trial court committed plain error by failing to merge Taylor’s
convictions for robbery and kidnapping to facilitate a robbery. Taylor, 2d Dist.
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Montgomery No. 22564, 2009-Ohio-806, at ¶ 8, 23-24, 35, and 40. As was noted, we
rejected all the assignments of error, other than the assignment of error related to merger.
As a result, we merged Taylor’s conviction for kidnapping to facilitate a robbery with the
robbery conviction, vacated one concurrent kidnapping sentence, and affirmed the trial
court’s judgment in all other respects. Id. at ¶ 44.
{¶ 6} Taylor appealed from our judgment to the Supreme Court of Ohio, but on
June 17, 2009, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected his appeal for review. See State v.
Taylor, 122 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2009-Ohio-2751, 907 N.E.2d 1195. There is no indication
that Taylor filed a further appeal to the United States Supreme Court. As a result, his
conviction was final at that time. Taylor did file a petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the federal court, but his petition was dismissed with prejudice in 2010. See Taylor v.
Brunsman, S.D.Ohio No. C-3:10-CV-044, 2010 WL 2465372, *1 (June 10, 2010).
{¶ 7} The record does not indicate that Taylor filed any post-conviction motions in
the trial court, other than a motion for an interstate corrections compact transfer that was
filed in April 2010 and denied in January 2011, and the current motion for relief, which
was filed on September 9, 2015, and denied on October 7, 2015.
{¶ 8} Taylor’s September 2015 motion asserted that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to accept the jury’s guilty verdict on Count 5 (Murder), because the verdict
form did not contain an essential element of the charge of murder, i.e., that the defendant
acted “purposely.” The trial court rejected this argument, concluding that under R.C.
2903.02(B), the jury was not required to find that Taylor acted purposely; instead, the jury
had to decide that the victim’s death was the proximate result of Taylor’s commission of
an offense of violence, i.e., kidnapping. The court further concluded that the jury did, in
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fact, find Taylor guilty of this offense, and clearly signed the verdict. Taylor now appeals
from the judgment of the trial court.
II. Issues Relating to the Jury Verdict
{¶ 9} Taylor raises two assignment of error, and has combined his discussion of
both assignments of error. We will combine our discussion as well. Taylor’s First
Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Overruling the Defendant-
Appellant’s Motion Under the False Pretense That the Jury, in Addition to
Finding Appellant Guilty of Murder, Also Made the Required Finding that the
Murder Was the “Proximate Cause of the Kidnapping,” Even Though the
Record Show[s] the Verdict Form Did Not Contain a Space for the Jury to
Make such a Finding.
{¶ 10} Taylor’s Second Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred to the Substantial Prejudice of the Defendant-
Appellant in Not Granting His Motion Where [the] Motion Sufficiently
Demonstrated That the Trial Court Had No Authority, i.e., Jurisdiction to
Have Accepted the Guilty Verdict on the Count 5 Murder That Was
Returned by the Jury on an Uncompleted Verdict Form.
{¶ 11} Under these assignments of error, Taylor contends that the trial court relied
on a false premise because the verdict form failed to include a place for the jury to indicate
whether the murder was or was not the proximate cause of the kidnapping. In addition,
Taylor argues that the jury was required to find that he purposely caused the death of
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another human being.
{¶ 12} In the trial court, Taylor contended that the jury verdict was incomplete
because it failed to include a “mens rea” element, i.e., a finding that he had acted
purposely. As was noted, the trial court rejected this argument, because R.C.
2903.02(B) does not include a requirement that a defendant has acted purposely.
{¶ 13} The jury verdict was labeled “Verdict – Count 5 Murder (Proximate Result
of Kidnapping),” and stated that “We, the jury, upon the issues joined in this case, do find
the Defendant, Shawn D. Taylor, Guilty of Murder as charged in the Indictment.” The
Verdict was signed by 12 jurors.
{¶ 14} R.C. 2903.02(B) provides that:
No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of
the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence
that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of
section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.
{¶ 15} In view of the plain language of the statute, the trial court correctly rejected
Taylor’s motion, because R.C. 2903.02(B) does not require that a defendant has acted
purposely; it only requires that a defendant cause another’s death as a proximate result
of the defendant having committed or having attempted to commit a violent offense that
is a felony of the first or second degree. Kidnapping is a predicate offense of violence
for purposes of R.C. 2903.02(B). See, e.g., State v. Kaseda, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-
L-002, 2004-Ohio-1074, ¶ 34.
{¶ 16} Consistent with the point that a showing of purpose is not required, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has stressed in connection with R.C. 2903.02(B), that “[t]he
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felony-murder statute imposes what is in essence strict liability. Though intent to commit
the predicate felony is required, intent to kill is not.” State v. Nolan, 141 Ohio St.3d 454,
2014-Ohio-4800, 25 N.E.3d 1016, ¶ 9. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied
on its own prior cases, which had held that R.C. 2903.02(B) does not contain a mens rea
requirement. Id., citing State v. Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384, 2002-Ohio-4931, 775 N.E.2d
498, ¶ 31-33, and State v. Fry, 125 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-Ohio-1017, 926 N.E.2d 1239,
¶ 43.
{¶ 17} In addition, the court relied on a case from New York’s highest court, which
had stated that “ ‘[t]he basic tenet of felony murder liability is that the mens rea of the
underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing. By operation of
that legal fiction, the transferred intent allows the law to characterize a homicide, though
unintended and not in the common design of the felons, as an intentional killing.’ ” Nolan
at ¶ 9, quoting People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309, 317, 604 N.Y.S.2d 524, 624 N.E.2d
661 (1993). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the jury did not need to
find that the murder was purposeful.
{¶ 18} On appeal, Taylor also contends that the verdict form was defective
because it did not contain a specific finding that the murder was or was not the proximate
result of kidnapping. In responding, the State argues that Taylor never objected to the
jury form at trial, and that the alleged error was not plain error. The State further argues
that Taylor failed to cite any case law (and the State also found no case law) requiring
juries to make a separate finding of guilt as to the predicate felony in a felony murder
verdict.
{¶ 19} We agree with the State. As the State notes, the Supreme Court of Ohio
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has held that “[s]pecial verdicts by juries are required only where specifically mandated
by statute.” State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 525, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992), citing State v.
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984). Accord State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio
St.3d 308, 318, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995). For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
held that where the degree of an offense becomes more serious based on the presence
of additional elements, R.C. 2945.75 requires that verdict forms signed by juries “ ‘must
include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is convicted or a statement
that an aggravating element has been found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater
degree of a criminal offense.’ ” State v. McDonald, 137 Ohio St.3d 517, 2013-Ohio-5042,
1 N.E.3d 374, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256, 860
N.E.2d 735, ¶ 14.
{¶ 20} Unlike the charges in McDonald and Pelfrey, Taylor’s murder charge did not
contain any additional elements that caused it to become more serious. See State v.
Bell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24783, 2012-Ohio-3491, ¶ 9 (noting that murder is not an
elevated form of voluntary manslaughter, and that R.C. 2903.02(B) “does not set forth
any additional elements that could make the offense ‘one of more serious degree.’ In
other words, Pelfrey is inapplicable.”)
{¶ 21} In the trial court, Taylor also contended that res judicata would not apply,
because the defect in the verdict form rendered the judgment void. We disagree. In
State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, the Supreme Court
of Ohio stated that, in certain situations, a sentence may be void and res judicata would
not apply to preclude relief. Id. at ¶ 30. However, the court limited this holding to “a
discrete vein of cases: those in which a court does not properly impose a statutorily
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mandated period of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶ 22} In Fisher, the court further held that “[a]lthough the doctrine of res judicata
does not preclude review of a void sentence, res judicata still applies to other aspects of
the merits of a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of
the ensuing sentence.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. See also State v.
Perkins, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25808, 2014-Ohio-1863, ¶ 57 (noting that Fisher
“limited the application of the voidness doctrine.”)
{¶ 23} In Bell, we held that a defendant’s argument about a defective verdict form
for his murder conviction was barred by res judicata because the matter could have been
raised on direct appeal. Bell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24783, 2012-Ohio-3491, at ¶ 7-
8. Likewise, in the case before us, Taylor’s arguments about the verdict form are based
on matters contained in the trial court record at the time of his direct appeal, and could
have been raised at that time.
{¶ 24} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any
proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due
process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which
resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v.
Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.
Consequently, “the doctrine serves to preclude a defendant who has had his day in court
from seeking a second on that same issue. In so doing, res judicata promotes the
principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on
which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v.
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Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18.
{¶ 25} Based on the preceding discussion, we conclude that both assignments of
error are without merit and are also barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the First and
Second Assignments of Error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 26} Both of Taylor’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, P.J. and FAIN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Michele D. Phipps
Shawn D. Taylor
Hon. Dennis J. Adkins