State v. Mays , 2022 Ohio 3659 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Mays, 
    2022-Ohio-3659
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO                                   :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   Appellate Case No. 29051
    :
    v.                                              :   Trial Court Case No. 2020-CRB-2063
    :
    ROYCE L. MAYS                                   :   (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                     :
    :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 14th day of October, 2022.
    ...........
    STEPHANIE L. COOK, Atty. Reg. No. 0067101 and AMY B. MUSTO, Atty. Reg. No.
    0071514, City of Dayton Prosecutor’s Office, 335 West Third Street, Room 372, Dayton,
    Ohio 45402
    Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
    DAWN S. GARRETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0055565, 70 Birch Alley, Suite 240-24005,
    Beavercreek, Ohio 45440
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    .............
    WELBAUM, J.
    -2-
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Royce L. Mays, appeals from his misdemeanor assault
    conviction following a bench trial in the Dayton Municipal Court. In support of his appeal,
    Mays asserts that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mays asserts that the evidence
    presented at trial established that he was acting in self-defense during the assault in
    question and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden under
    R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-
    defense. Mays also asserts that the weight of the evidence supported his self-defense
    claim and that the trial court erred by failing to grant his Crim.R. 29 motion for an acquittal
    of the assault charge. Because the State presented video evidence at trial showing that
    Mays was not acting in self-defense at the time he assaulted the victim, the judgment of
    conviction will be affirmed.
    Facts and Course of Proceedings
    {¶ 2} On July 1, 2020, Mays was charged with assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. The charge arose from allegations that
    Mays assaulted a patron at the House of Bread in Dayton, Ohio, while Mays was there
    providing security services.      Mays pled not guilty to the charge, and the matter
    proceeded to a bench trial.
    {¶ 3} During trial, the State presented testimony from two witnesses: the executive
    director of the House of Bread and a bystander who witnessed the alleged assault. The
    -3-
    State also presented video evidence taken from the House of Bread’s security camera.
    The defense presented testimony from one of Mays’s co-workers who was working at the
    House of Bread during the incident in question. Mays himself also testified at trial.
    {¶ 4} The testimony and evidence presented at trial established that Mays worked
    for a company that had contracted to provide security services for the House of Bread.
    The House of Bread is a non-profit community organization that provides meals to anyone
    in need. There is no dispute that on June 20, 2020, Mays was providing security services
    at the House of Bread when a regular patron named Kenya Turner attempted to enter the
    building while pushing a baby stroller that contained her personal items. There is also
    no dispute that Mays would not let Turner enter the building with the stroller.
    {¶ 5} Mays testified that when he encountered Turner, it was his first day back
    working at the House of Bread since the COVID-19 pandemic began. Because of this,
    Mays testified that he was unsure whether Turner was permitted to bring her stroller into
    the building, as new restrictions were in place. Mays testified that he stopped Turner
    from entering the House of Bread and told her to “hold on” so that he could ask his co-
    worker if Turner could bring her stroller inside. Trial Tr. (Nov. 4, 2020), p. 88.
    {¶ 6} Mays testified that as he was asking his co-worker about Tuner’s stroller,
    Turner tried to force her way into the building by pushing her stroller into his leg. Mays
    also testified that Turner was yelling obscenities at him and was being violent and
    disorderly. Mays claimed that as a result of Turner’s conduct, he decided not to allow
    Turner inside the House of Bread, and Turner hit him when he tried to eject her from the
    building. Mays testified that he thereafter hit Turner in self-defense because Turner
    -4-
    continued to be aggressive and because he had “to get her off [him].” Trial Tr. at 92.
    Mays’s co-worker, Joelikia Dumas, similarly testified that Turner was holding onto Mays
    after they stumbled down the steps and that Mays hit Turner in an effort to get Turner off
    of him.
    {¶ 7} A security camera from the House of Bread captured the incident on video,
    and the video footage was admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 1. Due to the
    position of the security camera, the video footage only depicts what happened just outside
    the House of Bread’s entrance. Therefore, on the video, Turner can be seen attempting
    to get her stroller inside the House of Bread and pushing the stroller toward the entrance
    with force. Mays is not shown on the video until he steps outside to eject Turner from
    the building.
    {¶ 8} While ejecting Turner, Mays, who was much larger than Turner, could be
    seen on the video taking a hold of Turner’s stroller. After Mays took hold of the stroller,
    the video showed Turner slapping Mays on the top of his head with her hand. Thereafter,
    Mays moved his body forward toward Turner, which caused both Mays and Turner to lose
    their balance and stumble down a short set of steps located in front of the building. The
    video showed that Mays held Turner’s arm as they were stumbling down the steps. As
    Mays and Turner regained their footing, Turner could be seen moving her body away
    from Mays, but Mays kept a hold of Turner’s arm, grabbed Turner’s head with both of his
    hands, and then forcefully hit Turner across the face with his right hand.
    {¶ 9} After Mays hit Turner in the face, the video showed Mays picking up a jelly
    jar that had fallen out of Turner’s overturned stroller and throwing the jelly jar on the
    -5-
    ground near Turner. It was unclear from the video whether Mays was attempting to hit
    Turner with the jar. Mays testified that he threw the jar out of anger because Turner had
    spit at him. Both Mays and Dumas testified that Mays threw the jar at the ground and
    that Mays had not been aiming it at Turner. The bystander who testified for the State,
    Shaun Sullivan, testified that it appeared as though Mays was trying to hit Turner with the
    jar.
    {¶ 10} The video of the incident was played several times during trial. After the
    State rested its case, Mays moved for a Crim.R. 29 acquittal on the assault charge. In
    support of the motion, Mays argued that the video evidence established that Turner had
    been violent with Mays and that Mays had hit Turner in self-defense during their physical
    altercation. Mays also argued that an acquittal was proper because the State had failed
    to meet its burden to present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that he
    had not acted in self-defense during the altercation. The trial court, however, disagreed
    with Mays and found that the State had satisfied its burden of proof. Accordingly, the
    trial court overruled Mays’s Crim.R. 29 motion.
    {¶ 11} At the end of trial, the trial court rejected Mays’s claim of self-defense and
    found him guilty of assault. The trial court sentenced Mays to 180 days in jail, all of which
    were suspended, and to one year of basic probation. The trial court also ordered Mays
    to pay a $200 fine and court costs.
    {¶ 12} Mays appeals from his conviction, raising two assignments of error for
    review. Because Mays’s assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them
    together.
    -6-
    First and Second Assignments of Error
    {¶ 13} Under his first assignment of error, Mays raises sufficiency and manifest
    weight arguments that pertain to his claim of self-defense. Specifically, Mays contends
    that the evidence presented at trial established that he was acting in self-defense when
    he assaulted Turner and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy its
    burden under R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to show that he was not acting in self-defense. Mays
    also contends that the trial court’s rejection of his self-defense claim was against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 14} Under his second assignment of error, Mays contends that the trial court
    erred by overruling his Crim.R. 29 motion for an acquittal. Because a Crim.R. 29 motion
    tests the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, rulings on Crim.R. 29 motions are
    reviewed under the same standards that apply to a review for sufficiency of the evidence.
    State v. Baker, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2009-CA-62, 
    2010-Ohio-2633
    , ¶ 16; State v.
    Crabtree, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2019-CA-1, 
    2019-Ohio-3686
    , ¶16, citing State v.
    Williams, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 569
    , 576, 
    660 N.E.2d 724
     (1996). Therefore, Mays’s second
    assignment of error also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his self-
    defense claim.
    {¶ 15} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has
    presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
    the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
    No. 22581, 
    2009-Ohio-525
    , ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 678
    -7-
    N.E.2d 541 (1997). “When reviewing a claim as to sufficiency of evidence, the relevant
    inquiry is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
    the state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis, 
    79 Ohio St.3d 421
    , 430, 
    683 N.E.2d 1096
     (1997). “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds
    that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.”
    (Citations omitted.) 
    Id.
    {¶ 16} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
    of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence
    is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12. When evaluating
    whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court
    must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
    witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
    of fact “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
    conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State
    v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st Dist.1983).
    {¶ 17} As previously discussed, Mays was convicted of first-degree-misdemeanor
    assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A).        That statute prohibits any person from
    “knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to another or to another’s
    unborn.”    R.C. 2903.13(A).      “Physical harm” means any injury, illness, or other
    physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration. R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
    {¶ 18} During his testimony, Mays admitted to physically assaulting Turner on the
    -8-
    day in question by grabbing her head and hitting her, but he claimed that he engaged in
    such conduct while acting in self-defense. “It is well established that ‘[t]he defense of
    self-defense may exonerate an accused’s admitted use of force.’ ” State v. Shropshire,
    2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29108, 
    2021-Ohio-3848
    , ¶ 16, quoting State v. Parrish, 1st Dist.
    Hamilton No. C-190379, 
    2020-Ohio-4807
    , ¶ 4. R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) specifically provides
    that “[a] person is allowed to act in self-defense” and that if there is evidence presented
    at trial “that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, * * *
    the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not
    use force in self-defense[.]” R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).
    {¶ 19} “To establish self-defense, a defendant must introduce evidence showing
    that: (1) he was not at fault in creating the violent situation; (2) he had a bona fide belief
    that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm; and (3) he did not violate any duty to
    retreat or avoid the danger.” State v. Brown, 
    2017-Ohio-7424
    , 
    96 N.E.3d 1128
    , ¶ 24 (2d
    Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 323
    , 326, 
    673 N.E.2d 1339
     (1997). “It is
    well established that a person cannot provoke a fight or voluntarily enter combat and then
    claim self-defense.”   (Citations omitted.)    State v. James, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
    28892, 
    2021-Ohio-1112
    , ¶ 21. “Moreover, a defendant must have a bona fide belief that
    the use of force was the only means of escape.” State v. Lovett, 2d Dist. Montgomery
    No. 29240, 
    2022-Ohio-1693
    , ¶ 42, citing James at ¶ 21. “Part of this entails a showing
    that the defendant used ‘only that force that [was] reasonably necessary to repel the
    attack.’ ” State v. Wallace-Lee, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-19, 
    2020-Ohio-3681
    , ¶ 42,
    quoting State v. Bundy, 
    2012-Ohio-3934
    , 
    974 N.E.2d 139
    , ¶ 55 (4th Dist.). “If the force
    -9-
    used was so disproportionate that it shows a purpose to injure, self-defense is
    unavailable.” (Citation omitted.) Lovett at ¶ 42.
    {¶ 20} In this case, Mays argues that he was acting in self-defense when he hit
    Turner because Turner had hit him first and because he was trying to get Turner off of
    him during their physical altercation. The video evidence, however, clearly showed that
    Mays went on the offensive after he stumbled down the stairs with Turner. The video
    showed that as Mays and Turner were stumbling down the stairs, Mays had a hold of
    Turner’s arm and continued to hold on to Turner as they regained their footing at the
    bottom of the steps. The video also showed that Turner, who was much smaller than
    Mays, briefly attempted to move her body away from Mays, but that Mays kept a hold of
    Turner’s arm, grabbed Turner’s head with both of his hands, and forcefully hit Turner
    across the face.
    {¶ 21} At the time Mays hit Turner, Turner was not posing a threat of harm to Mays
    that warranted Mays’s hitting Turner in the manner he did. Indeed, Mays was the one
    who kept a hold of Turner’s arm, and nothing prevented him from letting Turner go after
    they stumbled down the steps. Therefore, the video did not support a finding that hitting
    Turner in the face was reasonably necessary for Mays to protect himself or to escape
    from the violent situation. Instead, the video established that Mays went on the offensive
    and prolonged the violent situation by assaulting Turner.
    {¶ 22} Because the video evidence clearly established that Mays went on the
    offensive when he hit Turner, the video was more than sufficient to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Mays was not acting in self-defense when he assaulted Turner.
    -10-
    Given that the video evidence was sufficient in that regard, the trial court did not err by
    overruling Mays’s Crim.R. 29 motion. In light of this, we also find that the video evidence
    was sufficient to convict Mays of assault and that said conviction was not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence, as the video evidence undoubtedly belied Mays’s claim
    of self-defense.
    {¶ 23} For all the foregoing reasons, Mays’s first and second assignments of error
    are overruled.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 24} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    .............
    DONOVAN, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.
    Copies sent to:
    Stephanie L. Cook
    Amy B. Musto
    Dawn S. Garrett
    Hon. Mia Wortham Spells
    Hon. Edward Utacht, Visiting Judge