King v. Divoky , 2018 Ohio 2280 ( 2018 )

[Cite as King v. Divoky, et al., 2018-Ohio-2280.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
DERRICK MARTIN KING C.A. No. 28441
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
PATRICIA DIVOKY, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellees CASE No. CV-2017-08-3304
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 13, 2018
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Derrick King appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas
that dismissed his declaratory judgment action under Civil Rule 12(B)(6). For the following
reasons, this Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Mr. King was receiving benefits from the Disability Financial Assistance program
at the time the General Assembly ended the program. After the Summit County Department of
Job and Family Services notified Mr. King that his benefits would be ending, Mr. King filed a
declaratory judgment action against its director, Patricia Divoky, and the director of the Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services, Cynthia Dungey, seeking a declaration that the repeal of
the program violated his federal due process rights, his state and federal equal protection rights,
and his right to safety under the Ohio Constitution. He also sought to enjoin the directors from
terminating his benefits.
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{¶3} The directors moved to dismiss Mr. King’s complaint under Rule 12(B)(6),
arguing that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They also opposed
his request for injunctive relief. Mr. King opposed their motions, but the trial court dismissed his
complaint, concluding that its “scant factual allegations” failed to support his argument that the
repeal of the benefit program deprived him of due process of law, was not rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose, deprived him of safety, or violated his right to equal protection
of the laws. The court also concluded that Mr. King’s factual allegations did not support his
assertion that the directors had deprived him of his constitutional rights or establish that he was
entitled to injunctive relief. The court also denied Mr. King’s motion for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. Mr. King has appealed, assigning three errors.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT KING’S COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR
RELIEF, AS R.C. 812.40 AND OTHER CHANGES WHICH PERTAIN TO
THE ELIMINATION OF DISABILITY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AS ENACTED BY 2017 AM. SUB. H.B. 49, 2017 OHIO LAWS
FILE 10, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO
CONSTITUTIONS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
R.C. 812.40 AND OTHER CHANGES WHICH PERTAIN TO THE
ELIMINATION OF DISABILITY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AS
ENACTED BY 2017 AM. SUB. H.B. 49, 2017 OHIO LAWS FILE 10, ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE “SAFETY” CLAUSE OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
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{¶4} Mr. King argues that the trial court incorrectly dismissed his complaint.
Typically, for a defendant “[t]o prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, it must appear on
the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to
recover.” Raub v. Garwood, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22210, 2005-Ohio-1279, ¶ 4. The rule
operates differently, however, in a declaratory judgment action. Under Revised Code Section
2721.03, any person affected by a statute “may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the * * * statute * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other
legal relations under it.” Thus, “[a] complaint by which a declaratory judgment has been sought
is not properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon
a conclusion that the plaintiff’s position on the merits of his or her claim is incorrect.” Weyandt
v. Davis, 112 Ohio App.3d 717, 721 (9th Dist.1996). “Rather, such a complaint may only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if: (1) no real controversy
or justiciable issue exists between the parties; or (2) the declaratory judgment will not terminate
the uncertainty or controversy.” Id. We review the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action as
not justiciable for an abuse of discretion. Arnott v. Arnott, 132 Ohio St.3d 401, 2012-Ohio-3208,
¶ 13.
{¶5} The trial court did not examine the justiciability of the issues that Mr. King raised
in his declaratory judgment action. Instead, the court dismissed the complaint because it
contained only “scant factual allegations” that failed to support Mr. King’s arguments. Upon
review of the trial court’s decision, we conclude that the court did not review Mr. King’s
complaint under the correct standard. See Weyandt at 721 (concluding that trial court erred when
it did not dismiss declaratory judgment “claims based upon a determination that there was no
real controversy or justiciable issue between the parties or because a declaratory judgment would
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not terminate the uncertainty or controversy.”). The error may be harmless, however, if the trial
court, in its judgment, “actually granted the declaratory relief requested by the plaintiff.” Id.{¶6} Upon review of the trial court’s judgment entry, we cannot say that it granted the
declaratory relief requested by Mr. King. The court did not conclude that the termination of the
Disability Financial Assistance program did not violate Mr. King’s due process rights, violate his
right to safety, or violate his right to the equal protection of the law. It only determined that Mr.
King’s complaint did not provide enough factual support for his claims. We, therefore, cannot
say that the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. King’s complaint was harmless error. Mr. King’s first
assignment of error is sustained. His second and third assignments of error are overruled as
premature.
III.
{¶7} Mr. King’s first assignment of error is sustained. His second and third
assignments of error are premature, and are overruled on that basis. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellees.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, P. J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DERRICK MARTIN KING, pro se, Appellant.
MICHAEL DEWINE, Attorney General, and THERESA R. HANNA, Assistant Attorney
General, for Appellee.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JOSEPH R. MCALEESE, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney,