West Carrollton City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision , 2018 Ohio 2322 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as West Carrollton City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-2322.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    WEST CARROLLTON CITY                                 :
    SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION,                          :
    Appellee                                             :     Appellate Case No. 27679
    :
    :     BTA Case No. 2015-2357
    v.                                                   :
    :     (Administrative Appeal from Board of
    MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD                              :     Tax Appeals)
    OF REVISION, Appellee;                               :
    MCDONALD’S USA, LLC, Appellant                       :
    ...........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the 15th day of June, 2018.
    ...........
    KAROL C. FOX, Atty. Reg. No. 0041916 and MARK H. GILLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0066908,
    6400 Riverside Drive, Suite D, Dublin, Ohio 43017
    Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, West Carrollton City Schools BOE
    CHARLES L. BLUESTONE, Atty. Reg. No. 0060897 and PATRICK J. HEERY, Atty. Reg.
    No. 0092060, 141 E. Town Street, Suite 100, Columbus, Ohio 43215
    Attorneys for Defendant, Appellant, McDonald’s USA, LLC
    .............
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    HALL, J.
    {¶ 1} McDonald’s USA, LLC, appeals from the decision of the Board of Tax
    Appeals (BTA) that found the taxable value of McDonald’s property to be $1,860,000 for
    tax year 2014. We find no error in the BTA’s decision, so it is affirmed.
    I. Background
    {¶ 2} The property at issue is a 1.383-acre parcel located at 741 East Dixie Drive
    in West Carrollton, Ohio. The property is improved with a 4,470-square foot building,
    constructed in 2005, that houses a McDonald’s restaurant. For tax year 2014 the
    Montgomery County Auditor valued the property at $1,308,710. McDonald’s filed a
    complaint with the Board of Revision (BOR) seeking to reduce the value to $675,000. The
    West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education (BOE) filed a countercomplaint, asking
    the BOR to retain the auditor’s original valuation.
    {¶ 3} The BOR held a hearing. Stephen J. Weis, a certified appraiser retained by
    McDonald’s, testified at the hearing and submitted a written appraisal report. He
    appraised the property at $715,000 as of January 1, 2014. McDonald’s amended its
    complaint to conform with Weis’s appraisal. The BOE cross-examined Weis but did not
    present any evidence of its own. The BOR reduced the property’s value to $715,000. The
    BOE appealed to the BTA.
    {¶ 4} At the BTA hearing, the BOE presented the testimony and written appraisal
    report of Thomas D. Sprout, a certified appraiser. Sprout valued the property at
    $1,860,000. 1 Apparently, the recording device used at the BOR hearing stopped
    1As the BTA noted in its decision, it “held a consolidated merit hearing on this matter, as
    well as another matter involving a McDonald’s restaurant (BTA No. 2015-2319), which
    -3-
    recording during Weis’s cross-examination. McDonald’s asked the BTA to supplement
    the record by having Weis recreate the cross-examination portion of his testimony. The
    BTA agreed and held another hearing at which Weis was cross-examined on his
    appraisal.
    {¶ 5} The BTA issued a written decision finding Sprout’s analysis superior to
    Weis’s, and the BTA adopted the $1,860,000 valuation proposed by the BOE.
    {¶ 6} McDonald’s appealed.
    II. Analysis
    {¶ 7} McDonald’s presents seven assignments of error. Each assignment of error
    challenges the BTA’s assessment of the competing appraisal reports, the specific
    calculations contained in them, or the relative qualifications of the appraisers.
    First Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, when it failed to find that Appellant’s appraisal evidence
    constituted competent and probative evidence of the market value of the
    subject property.
    Second Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, when it failed to find that Appellant met its burden of proof,
    when the record contained reliable and probative evidence to support
    involved the same counsel, same appraisers and substantially the same appraisal
    reports. (The cases were not formally consolidated because they involved unaffiliated
    property owners.)” The other case is the subject of a separate appeal (Appellate Case
    No. 27686).
    -4-
    Appellant’s market value of the subject property.
    Third Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, by finding the appraisal analysis submitted by Appellee West
    Carrollton City Schools Board of Education to be more competent and
    probative evidence of the subject property’s market value than the appraisal
    analysis proffered by Appellant.2
    Fourth Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, by finding the highest and best use analysis advanced by
    Appellee West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education more appropriate
    than the analysis proffered by Appellant.
    Fifth Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, in considering the present use of the subject property in
    determining its market value.
    Sixth Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, in finding the capitalization rate advanced by Appellee West
    2  The third assignment of error is found only in McDonald’s notice of appeal. The only
    mention of the third assignment of error in McDonald’s merit brief is a parenthetical
    statement at the end of the argument supporting the first two assignments of error saying
    that we need not rule on the third assignment of error if we agree with the first two
    assignments of error. Although we may disregard it because McDonald’s failed to argue
    it separately, see App.R.12(A)(2), our review covers the issue that the assignment of error
    appears to raise.
    -5-
    Carrollton City Schools Board of Education, rather than the rate adopted by
    Appellant, more appropriate to use in calculating the subject property’s
    market value under the income capitalization approach to value.
    Seventh Assignment of Error
    The Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully, and abused
    its discretion, in continuing to recognize Appellee West Carrollton City
    School Board of Education’s appraiser as an expert witness in view of the
    testimony and evidence proffered at the BTA hearing.
    {¶ 8} McDonald’s primary argument on appeal is that the BTA should have
    adopted Weis’s valuation. We begin by reviewing the standards that apply to BTA
    decisions.
    A. Standards of review
    {¶ 9} When a case is appealed to the BTA from a board of revision, the appellant
    has the burden of proving its right to a decrease or increase in value from the value found
    by the board of revision. Shinkle v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    135 Ohio St. 3d 227
    ,
    2013-Ohio-397, 
    985 N.E.2d 1243
    , ¶ 24. This means that the “appellant must come
    forward and demonstrate that the value it advocates is a correct value. Once competent
    and probative evidence of value is presented by the appellant, the appellee who opposes
    that valuation has the opportunity to challenge it through cross-examination or by
    evidence of another value.” (Citation omitted.) EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty.
    Bd. of Revision, 
    106 Ohio St. 3d 1
    , 2005-Ohio-3096, 
    829 N.E.2d 686
    , ¶ 6.
    {¶ 10} The BTA, itself, as a taxing authority, has an independent duty to weigh
    evidence and make findings, and the BTA reviews the administrative decisions of boards
    -6-
    of revision de novo as to both fact and law. MacDonald v. Shaker Hts. Bd. of Income Tax
    Rev., 
    144 Ohio St. 3d 105
    , 2015-Ohio-3290, 
    41 N.E.3d 376
    , ¶ 21; Coventry Towers, Inc.
    v. City of Strongsville, 
    18 Ohio St. 3d 120
    , 122, 
    480 N.E.2d 412
    (1985). Under R.C.
    5717.01, the BTA has “three options when hearing an appeal: the board may confine itself
    to the record and the evidence certified to it by the board of revision, hear additional
    evidence from the parties, or may make such other investigation of the property as is
    deemed proper.” Coventry Towers at 122.
    {¶ 11} Under what is called the Bedford rule, “ ‘when the board of revision has
    reduced the value of the property based on the owner’s evidence, that value has been
    held to eclipse the auditor’s original valuation,’ and the board of education as the appellant
    before the BTA may not rely on the latter as a default valuation.” Dublin City Schools Bd.
    of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    147 Ohio St. 3d 38
    , 2016-Ohio-3025, 
    59 N.E.3d 1270
    , ¶ 6, referencing Bedford Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio
    St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 
    875 N.E.2d 913
    . (Other citation omitted.) Thus, when the
    board of revision adopts a new value based on an owner’s evidence, the burden of going
    forward shifts to the board of education on appeal to the BTA. 
    Id. The board
    of education
    then has the burden to establish a new value, whether that be the valuation of the auditor
    or another value. 
    Id. at ¶
    7.
    {¶ 12} With respect to our review of BTA decisions, we note that McDonald’s notice
    of appeal was filed before the effective date of recent amendments to R.C. 5717.04, which
    became effective on September 29, 2017. See Am. Sub. H.B. 49, 2017 Ohio Laws File
    14. Before the amendments, parties had the option of appealing decisions of the BTA to
    the Supreme Court of Ohio, as well as to the court of appeals for the county in which the
    -7-
    taxed property was situated. But the statute was amended to eliminate initial appeals to
    the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the court of appeals in which a notice of appeal has been
    filed now has exclusive jurisdiction.3 See Am. Sub. H.B. 49, 2017 Ohio Laws File 14, Part
    15.
    {¶ 13} R.C. 5717.04, as amended, states:
    If upon hearing and consideration of such record and evidence the
    applicable court decides that the decision of the board appealed from is
    reasonable and lawful it shall affirm the same, but if the court decides that
    such decision of the board is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall
    reverse and vacate the decision or modify it and enter final judgment in
    accordance with such modification.4
    {¶ 14} The general standards for reviewing BTA decisions are well settled. If the
    BTA’s decision is both “reasonable and lawful,” the reviewing court must affirm. NWD 300
    Spring, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    151 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2017-Ohio-7579, 
    87 N.E.3d 199
    , ¶ 13, citing R.C. 5717.04. Nonetheless, a reviewing court does not hesitate
    3 An exception was made for appeals in which a party files a petition requesting a transfer
    of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The petition must be filed within 30 days
    after the notice of appeal has been filed with the appropriate court of appeals, and the
    petition must be filed with the Supreme Court of Ohio. If the appeal “involves a substantial
    constitutional question or a question of great general or public interest,” the Supreme
    Court of Ohio may approve the petition and order the appeal to be taken directly to the
    Supreme Court. However, if jurisdiction is not transferred, the appeal proceeds in the
    court of appeals. See R.C. 5717.04, as amended in 2017. The remainder of the
    amendments to R.C. 5717.04 are non-substantive, except for a line that was added which
    stated that “[a]s used in this section, ‘taxpayer’ includes any person required to return any
    property for taxation.”
    4The amendment to this paragraph is non-substantive, as the only change under the
    2017 revision was the insertion of the word “applicable.” Am. Sub. H.B. 49, 2017 Ohio
    Laws File 14, Part 15. Thus, the standard of review is unchanged.
    -8-
    to reverse BTA decisions that are based on incorrect legal conclusions. See, e.g., Satullo
    v. Wilkins, 
    111 Ohio St. 3d 399
    , 2006-Ohio-5856, 
    856 N.E.2d 954
    , ¶ 14, citing Gahanna-
    Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 
    93 Ohio St. 3d 231
    , 232, 
    754 N.E.2d 789
    (2001). Consequently, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Dublin City Schools
    Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    139 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2013-Ohio-4543, 
    11 N.E.3d 206
    , ¶ 13; Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    150 Ohio St. 3d 527
    ,
    2017-Ohio-4415, 
    83 N.E.3d 916
    , ¶ 7.
    {¶ 15} Review of BTA decisions “is guided by the premise that ‘ “[t]he fair market
    value of property for tax purposes is a question of fact, the determination of which is
    primarily within the province of the taxing authorities.” ’ ” NWD 300 Spring at ¶ 13, quoting
    EOP-BP Tower, 
    106 Ohio St. 3d 1
    , 2005-Ohio-3096, 
    829 N.E.2d 686
    , at ¶ 17. (Other
    citation omitted.) The BTA’s factual decisions are upheld “if the record contains reliable
    and probative evidence supporting the BTA’s determination.” Dublin City Schools Bd. of
    Edn., 
    139 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2013-Ohio-4543, 
    11 N.E.3d 206
    , at ¶ 13, citing Satullo at ¶ 14.
    Deference is also given to BTA findings about the weight of the evidence, as long as the
    findings are supported by the record. Terraza 8 at ¶ 7, citing Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v.
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    122 Ohio St. 3d 134
    , 2009-Ohio-2461, 
    909 N.E.2d 597
    , ¶
    27.
    {¶ 16} Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution requires property to be “taxed
    by uniform rule according to value.” “This provision generally requires a real-property
    valuation to ascertain ‘the exchange value’ of the property.” (Citation omitted; emphasis
    sic.) Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    149 Ohio St. 3d 155
    , 2017-Ohio-870, 
    73 N.E.3d 503
    , ¶ 13. As a general rule, “the value or true value in
    -9-
    money of any property is the amount for which that property would sell on the open market
    by a willing seller to a willing buyer. In essence, the value of property is the amount of
    money for which it may be exchanged, i.e., the sales price.” State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v.
    Bd. of Tax Appeals, 
    175 Ohio St. 410
    , 412, 
    195 N.E.2d 908
    (1964). Actual sales are the
    best way to determine value, when they are available. (Citations omitted.) Terraza 8, 
    150 Ohio St. 3d 527
    , 2017-Ohio-4415, 
    83 N.E.3d 916
    , at ¶ 9.
    {¶ 17} But where no recent sales of the property have occurred, the BTA has wide
    latitude in the matters that it can consider and broad discretion in the weight that it
    attaches to expert testimony. (Citations omitted.) Wynwood Apts., Inc. v. Bd. of Revision
    of Cuyahoga Cty., 
    59 Ohio St. 2d 34
    , 35, 
    391 N.E.2d 346
    (1979). When the BTA reviews
    appraisals, it “ ‘is vested with wide discretion in determining the weight to be given to the
    evidence and the credibility of the witnesses that come before it.’ ” NWD 300 Spring, 
    151 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2017-Ohio-7579, 
    87 N.E.3d 199
    , at ¶ 13, quoting EOP-BP Tower, 
    106 Ohio St. 3d 1
    , 2005-Ohio-3096, 
    829 N.E.2d 686
    , at ¶ 9. (Other citation omitted). Reviewing
    courts also apply an abuse of discretion standard to BTA decisions on witness credibility
    and the weight their testimony is given. 
    Id. at ¶
    14. An abuse of discretion refers to “an
    unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.” Renacci v. Testa, 
    148 Ohio St. 3d 470
    , 2016-Ohio-3394, 
    71 N.E.3d 962
    , ¶ 32, citing J.M. Smucker, L.L.C. v. Levin, 113 Ohio
    St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-2073, 
    865 N.E.2d 866
    , ¶ 16. BTA factual determinations are not
    disturbed “ ‘ “if the record contains reliable and probative support.” ’ ” Meijer Stores Ltd.
    Partnership v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    122 Ohio St. 3d 447
    , 2009-Ohio-3479, 
    912 N.E.2d 560
    , ¶ 17, quoting Satullo, 
    111 Ohio St. 3d 399
    , 2006-Ohio-5856, 
    856 N.E.2d 954
    ,
    at ¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy, 
    72 Ohio St. 3d 150
    , 152, 
    648 N.E.2d 483
                                                                                            -10-
    (1995).
    {¶ 18} Here, the BTA weighed the probative value of two appraisals and found one
    to be more probative than the other. “This decision rests within the core of the BTA’s
    competence as fact-finder and deserves the highest degree of deference from this court.”
    Meijer at ¶ 18. Most of the assignments of error allege deficiencies in Sprout’s appraisal
    and testimony. “But determining the probative value of an appraiser’s testimony lies within
    the competence of the BTA,” 
    id. at ¶
    20, and we will defer to the BTA’s determinations as
    to these matters.
    B. The competing appraisals and the BTA’s findings
    {¶ 19} Each expert—Stephen Weis for McDonald’s and Thomas Sprout for the
    BOE—performed a comprehensive valuation of the subject property, a McDonald’s
    restaurant. They both valued the property at its “highest and best use,” a concept that is
    a “crucial element in determining the value of property in the overall market.” Rite Aid of
    Ohio, Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    146 Ohio St. 3d 173
    , 2016-Ohio-371, 
    54 N.E.3d 1177
    , ¶ 34. “Highest and best use” “ ‘is that use which will generate the highest
    net return to the property over a reasonable period of time.’ ” 
    Id., quoting IAAO,
    Property
    Assessment Valuation 31 (2d Ed.1996) (International Association of Assessing Officers).
    {¶ 20} Both experts also analyzed the property’s value using the same two
    approaches—the sales-comparison approach and the income-capitalization approach.
    These different and independent approaches are “two accepted methods of analysis.”
    Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
    149 Ohio St. 3d 155
    , 2017-Ohio-870, 
    73 N.E.3d 503
    , ¶
    15. The sales-comparison approach values the subject property by comparing it with
    similar, or comparable, properties that have recently sold and that reflect the subject
    -11-
    property’s market value. The sale price of each comparable property is adjusted for
    factors like market conditions at the time of sale, building size, location, and quality and
    condition. Based on the adjusted sales prices, a market price for the subject property is
    determined. In the income-capitalization approach, the value of the subject property is the
    present worth of anticipated future income derived from the property. This is calculated
    by estimating the property’s net annual operating income and then applying a rate of
    capitalization that reflects the relative certainty of continuing to earn that income and the
    risks of ownership. The net operating income is based on the lease rates of comparable
    properties. And the appropriate capitalization rate is determined by looking at the
    capitalization rates of similar properties. Because the purpose of the valuation here is to
    determine the value for tax purposes, both experts also conducted a tax additur analysis.
    This analysis removes real estate taxes from the net-operating-income calculation and
    adds a tax additur to the capitalization rate “to reflect the percentage amount of the
    subject’s value that is paid in tax each year.” (Sprout Appraisal Report, p. 46; see also
    Weis Appraisal Report, p. 45-46).5 After the experts analyzed the property’s value under
    each approach, they reconciled the two values into a final opinion of value.
    i. Weis’s appraisal
    5 A “tax additur” is a component of the capitalization rate that accounts for the negative
    effect that property taxes have on the value of the property. When the amount of real
    estate taxes is unknown, such as when the taxes are in dispute, the appraiser develops
    an adjustment—a “tax additur”—that reflects the “effective tax rate” for the subject
    property; this percentage then is added to and becomes a component of the capitalization
    rate. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    144 Ohio St. 3d 324
    , 2015-Ohio-3633, 
    43 N.E.3d 387
    , ¶ 26-28, citing Worthington City Schools Bd. of
    Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    140 Ohio St. 3d 248
    , 2014-Ohio- 3620, 
    17 N.E.3d 537
    , ¶ 8, fn. 2.
    -12-
    {¶ 21} Weis concluded that the best-and-highest use of the subject property here,
    as improved, was as a “Restaurant.”6
    {¶ 22} In his sales-comparison analysis, Weis selected six properties in
    Montgomery County that had sold between 2012 and 2015. Five of the properties were
    restaurants and one was a retail building. Three of the restaurants were fast-food
    restaurants and two were sit-down. Three of the restaurants were vacant at the time of
    sale, and the retail building was also vacant at the time of its sale. After making
    adjustments to the sales prices, Weis derived adjusted values of the comparable
    properties that ranged from $77.37 to $165.71 per square foot. He then concluded that
    the market value of the subject property was $160 per square foot. Multiplying this square-
    footage value by the size of the subject property (4,470 sq. ft.) showed a rounded market
    value of $715,000.
    {¶ 23} For his income-capitalization analysis, Weis selected nine restaurant
    properties in Montgomery County that were leased between 2012 and 2015. Based on
    the adjusted lease rates of these properties, Weis determined that the subject property’s
    net annual operating income was $59,612. Weis then determined that the appropriate
    rate of capitalization was 8.25%. He based this figure on the subject property’s size,
    location, and condition and on the capitalization rates for 32 retail properties in several
    Ohio counties as well as national capitalization rates. Next, Weis determined that a tax
    additur of 0.16% would be appropriate. He applied the adjusted capitalization rate to the
    6 Weis concluded that, although the building had some elements of the McDonald’s
    design, if those items were removed, the building would come back as a regular, typical-
    use, free-standing building. So he did not think that the property should be classified as
    “special purpose” property.
    -13-
    net annual operating income to get a rounded value of $710,000.
    {¶ 24} In his reconciliation of values, Weis gave the most weight to the sales-
    comparison value, “due to abundance of free standing retail building sales.” (Weis
    Appraisal Report, p. 48). Weis concluded that the value of the subject property as of
    January 1, 2014, was $715,000.
    ii. Sprout’s appraisal
    {¶ 25} Sprout concluded that the highest-and-best use of the property, as
    improved, was as a “national fast food restaurant,” a little narrower than Weis’s highest-
    and-best use conclusion. (Sprout Appraisal Report, p. 19.)
    {¶ 26} For his sales-comparison analysis, Sprout selected eight properties from
    across Ohio that had sold between 2012 and 2015—three in the Dayton area, one in
    Lebanon, one in Springfield, two in the Columbus area, and one in Mansfield. Six of the
    properties were restaurants, occupied at the time of sale. One of the properties was a
    vacant former restaurant in a poor location, which Sprout included to illustrate the sale of
    what the subject property was not. After making adjustments to the sale prices of the
    properties, Sprout determined that the market value of the subject property ranged from
    $400 to $425 per square foot. He then multiplied these values by the subject property’s
    square footage (4,470 sq. ft.) to arrive at a rounded value of between $1,790,000 and
    $1,900,000.
    {¶ 27} For his income-capitalization analysis, Sprout used eight comparison
    properties from across Ohio—four in the Dayton area, one in Lebanon, one in Springfield,
    one in Columbus, and one in Mansfield. Based on the adjusted lease prices of the
    comparable properties, Sprout determined that the net annual operating income of the
    -14-
    subject property was $165,904—more than 2½ times Weis’s income determination.
    Sprout then concluded that the appropriate capitalization rate was 7.00%. He based this
    rate on a band-of-investment analysis, the capitalization rates of the comparison
    properties, and national rates. Sprout then found that a tax additur of 3.11% should be
    added to the capitalization rate, giving an adjusted capitalization rate of 10.11%. He
    applied the adjusted rate to the net operating income to get a rounded value of
    $1,860,000.
    {¶ 28} In his value reconciliation, in contrast to Weis, Sprout gave the most weight
    to the income-capitalization value. He testified that he gave this value “[s]lightly more”
    weight “just because these types of properties, the national fast food restaurants, there’s
    a lot of data out there available for rents, and I think that would provide a more probative
    * * * indication for value.” (July 12, 2016, BTA No. 2015-2357, Tr. 16). Sprout concluded
    that the value of the subject property on January 1, 2014, was $1,860,000.
    iii. The BTA’s decision
    {¶ 29} The BTA found Sprout’s valuation analysis “to be the most competent and
    probative evidence of value.” It found that his highest-and-best-use conclusion as a
    national fast-food restaurant is “most appropriate.” And it found that Sprout’s “selection of
    comparable properties, under both the sales comparison and income approaches to
    value, best represented the market in which the subject property would operate.” “Sprout,”
    said the BTA, “mostly relied upon comparables that were operating fast-food restaurants
    and that continued to operate as fast-food restaurants after their transfer.” “Weis, on the
    other hand, relied upon comparables that were dissimilar from the subject property, i.e.,
    ‘sit-down’ restaurants, at least one property that had been converted to a different use,
    -15-
    and vacant properties.” The BTA said that this was a “crucial” difference that led Weis to
    undervalue the property. As for the capitalization rate, the BTA found that Sprout’s rate
    was “reflective of the subject property’s most likely use,” because it was based on other
    fast-food restaurants. The BTA criticized Weis’s capitalization rate because “it was
    derived from properties that were dissimilar from the subject properly, i.e., general retail,
    instead of restaurant or fast-food restaurant properties.”
    {¶ 30} After reviewing the evidence, the BTA concluded that the BOE had satisfied
    its evidentiary burden on appeal. The BTA determined that the subject property’s value
    as of January 1, 2014, was $1,860,000.
    C. McDonald’s challenges to the BTA’s decision
    {¶ 31} McDonald’s takes issue with the BTA’s decision, challenging it in five
    primary ways. Fundamentally, McDonald’s argues that the BTA should not have given
    the most weight to Sprout’s appraisal. McDonald’s also argues that the BTA’s highest-
    and-best-use finding is too narrow and that it improperly considered the property’s present
    use. McDonald’s further argues that Weis’s capitalization rate is better supported than the
    rate used by the BTA. Finally, McDonald’s argues that the BTA should not have
    recognized Sprout as an expert.
    {¶ 32} Again, our standard of review: “We must affirm the BTA’s decision if it is
    reasonable and lawful. R.C. 5717.04. In making this determination, we must consider
    legal issues de novo and defer to findings concerning the weight of evidence so long as
    they are supported by the record.” (Citations omitted.) Pavilonis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1480, ¶ 8.
    {¶ 33} The BTA here considered two competing opinions of value. Although
    -16-
    facially they are widely divergent, the analysis leading to each value is well explained in
    each appraiser’s written appraisal report. Many of McDonald’s arguments urge us to re-
    weigh the appraisal evidence presented to the BTA and reach a different conclusion. But
    that is not our role.
    i. The weight given Sprout’s valuation
    {¶ 34} McDonald’s challenges the BTA’s determination that Sprout’s analysis is
    entitled to more weight than Weis’s analysis. Specifically, McDonald’s disputes the BTA’s
    findings that Sprout used a more appropriate methodology to value the property, that
    Sprout’s selection of comparable properties “best represents the market in which the
    subject property would operate,” and that Sprout’s qualitative adjustments are more
    probative than Weis’s qualitative and quantitative adjustments. McDonald’s also argues
    that the BTA should not have accepted the sales-breakpoint analysis in Sprout’s appraisal
    report. And McDonald’s claims that Sprout’s appraisal methodology and analysis produce
    inconsistent results.
    Selection of comparable properties
    {¶ 35} The appraisal reports and the appraisers’ testimony describe the manner in
    which comparable properties were selected. Determining which appraiser selected the
    best comparable properties was the crux of the BTA’s decision. On the one hand, Weis
    generally placed a high priority on using properties within Montgomery County, but this
    limited the number of properties that were similar to the subject property in other ways,
    such as the specific nature of the restaurant business (fast-food vs. sit-down restaurants),
    and resulted in the inclusion of one property that was torn down after its sale and used
    for a completely different purpose. On the other hand, Sprout chose properties from a
    -17-
    wider geographical area, which led to more variations in locations, neighborhood,
    population, and the like, but allowed him to more narrowly focus his comparisons on
    operating fast-food restaurants.
    {¶ 36} Further, although McDonald’s argument in its brief places great emphasis
    on “location, location, location,” the BTA concluded that comparison of the properties
    based on other factors was entitled to greater weight than geographical location. On the
    whole, the BTA determined that Sprout’s comparable properties were more similar to the
    subject property in characteristics and markets than Weis’s comparables, even if they
    were located in a broader geographical area.
    {¶ 37} The BTA gave its reasons for concluding that Sprout’s appraisal was
    entitled to greater weight. The BTA agreed with Sprout’s conclusion that the highest-and-
    best use of the property was as a fast-food restaurant, rather than as a more broadly
    defined restaurant or as a property that could be put to use for another retail purpose.
    The BTA found this difference to be “crucial” and concluded that Weis’s approach had
    undervalued the property. Because Sprout had defined the highest-and-best use more
    narrowly, the BTA, as the finder of fact, was permitted to reasonably conclude that his
    comparables were more carefully tailored to this particular use.
    {¶ 38} The BTA’s statement that Sprout’s selection of comparable properties “best
    represented the market in which the subject property would operate” is reasonable if the
    “market” is defined in this broader sense, rather than as limited to Montgomery County.
    And we reject McDonald’s assertion that this statement by the BTA “makes no sense
    whatsoever” and is “literally impossible.”7
    7   We also reject McDonald’s assertions that the Sprout report “strangely chose” an
    -18-
    Adjustments
    {¶ 39} McDonald’s also asserts that Sprout’s analysis is inferior to Weis’s because
    Sprout’s qualitative adjustments to the sales prices of his comparable properties were
    less reliable than Weis’s qualitative and quantitative sales-price adjustments, 8 and
    because Sprout did not provide market support for his conclusions.
    {¶ 40} The BTA has held that “qualitative, rather than quantitative adjustments, are
    recognized standard appraisal practice.” Insite Wooster, LLC, v. Wayne Cty. Board of
    Revision, BTA No. 2014-4149, 
    2015 WL 11005090
    , *4 (Sept. 11, 2015), citing Bd. of Edn.
    of the Columbus City Schools v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2014-2022, 
    2015 WL 1048721
    (Feb. 27, 2015). Here, the BTA specifically referenced the Columbus City
    Schools decision for this proposition and rejected McDonald’s criticism of the fact that
    Sprout used qualitative adjustments as opposed to the quantitative adjustments Weis
    applied in his report.
    {¶ 41} McDonald’s does not explain exactly what it thinks is wrong with Sprout’s
    qualitative adjustments, other than that they were subjective. We disagree that they were
    subjective. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we do not find Sprout’s adjustments
    purely subjective. Both experts testified about their process of making adjustments and
    they applied similar factors, like location, size, and so forth, to adjust the sales prices of
    appraisal method, that the BTA's decision is “not merely unreasonable, but shocking,”
    that the Sprout testimony “laughably referr[ed]” to certain building features, that the BTA
    engaged in “[s]loppy reasoning,” that Sprout made “outlandish claims,” that the BTA’s
    reasoning was “lazy and factually inaccurate,” that the BTA failed “to employ common
    sense and good judgment in evaluating [Sprout’s] appraisal report,” or that Sprout
    “magically conclude[d]” a higher value than the BOR.
    8   The BTA described Weis’s adjustments only as “quantitative.”
    -19-
    the properties. We fail to see how Sprout’s adjustments were more unsubstantiated than
    Weis’s.
    Sprout’s sales-breakpoint analysis
    {¶ 42} McDonald’s contends that the BTA ignored the problems that McDonald’s
    raised concerning Sprout’s sales-breakpoint analysis. McDonald’s claims that Sprout’s
    income-capitalization approach is “built around some conjectured ‘sales breakpoint
    analysis,’ ” which McDonald’s calls “a flawed methodology unsupported by verifiable
    market research or appraisal industry guidelines that he used to substantiate his income
    capitalization approach.”
    {¶ 43} A “sales breakpoint” typically refers to “[t]he amount of gross sales at which
    percentage rent becomes payable.” Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Ohio Real Estate Law,
    Percentage rent, Section 46:12 (December 2017 Update).9 One Ohio appellate court has
    said this about a sales-breakpoint provision in a lease: “A percentage rent was an
    additional amount payable by a retail tenant at the Centre when its annual sales exceeded
    a level defined in its lease and referred to as a ‘breakpoint.’ The additional rent due was
    computed as a percentage of the amount by which the tenant’s sales exceeded the
    breakpoint.” Kenwood Plaza Ltd. Partnership v. State Teachers’ Retirement Sys. Bd., 1st
    Dist. Hamilton No. C-000730, 
    2001 WL 1077939
    , *9 (Sept. 14, 2001). These explanations
    9 “Percentage rent” has been explained this way: “Percentage rent is a reflection of the
    fact that the commercial location in question is so valuable a location that the traffic
    generated warrants a premium to be computed in accordance with the commercial
    revenues obtained from business at the site. Percentage rent also gives the landlord
    certain protections from the effects of inflation, while protecting the tenant from downturns
    in sales.” Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Ohio Real Estate Law, Percentage rent, Section 46:12
    (December 2017 Update). “Percentage rent is frequently based on gross sales in excess
    of the amount of gross sales which would yield the base rent when multiplied by the
    applicable percentage.” 
    Id. -20- agree
    with the definition that Sprout gave at the BTA hearing that “[a] breakpoint is * * * a
    percentage of sales.” (July 12, 2016, BTA No. 2015-2319, Tr. 31). Using Wendy’s
    restaurants as an example, Sprout said that “[t]hose leases also a lot of times have a
    percentage rent based on a breakpoint. So if they achieve a sale level that’s above that
    breakpoint, then the lessee is paying percentage rents to the property owner * * *.” 
    Id. at 17.
    A sales-breakpoint provision is put in a lease agreement, said Sprout, “because that
    way if the tenant’s doing well with their sales, the landlord is benefitting as well.” 
    Id. at 32.
    How sales breakpoints are determined and the significance of their analysis is complex.
    Indeed, after going through a lengthy explanation for the BTA hearing examiner, Sprout
    admitted that “it took me a long time to figure that out myself.” 
    Id. at 33.
    {¶ 44} McDonald’s did not spend much time challenging Sprout’s sales-breakpoint
    testimony. It asked him whether “a sales breakpoint rent clause [is] much more common
    in tenant situations where it’s a mall or a strip center than a fast food restaurant.” (July
    16, 2016, BTA No. 2015-2357, Tr. 24). Sprout disagreed and testified that in his
    experience national fast-food companies use sales-breakpoint provisions in typical
    restaurant leases, giving Wendy’s as an example.
    {¶ 45} McDonald’s gives no reason why Sprout’s sales-breakpoint analysis is such
    a problem. It may well be that a sales breakpoint increase in rent disadvantages a more
    successful business because the net operating income is increased, and hence the
    income-capitalization value of a specific property will be higher. But the BTA heard
    Sprout’s testimony about his sales-breakpoint analysis and heard McDonald’s attempts
    to undermine it. We leave it to the BTA’s discretion to accord the analysis the weight that
    it deserves.
    -21-
    Sprout’s inconsistent results
    {¶ 46} McDonald’s claims that Sprout’s appraisal methodology produced
    inconsistent results. It cites another case involving a McDonald’s valuation in which both
    Weis and Sprout participated as appraisers, Bd. of Edn. of the Brookville Local Schools
    v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2016-325, 
    2017 WL 3034549
    (July 6, 2017).
    In that case, the appraisers valued a McDonald’s that was “at the end of its economic life”
    and was slated to be demolished and replaced, and the BTA noted that the restaurant’s
    age “greatly impact[ed]” its value. The BTA relied on Weis’s selection of comparable
    properties, rather than on Sprout’s, in determining the value of the property.
    {¶ 47} McDonald’s says that the result in the Brookville case should lead us to
    reject Sprout’s appraisal in this case. There are flaws in this reasoning, including that
    each case is factually different, that we do not have the record and evidence from the
    Brookville case, and that the BTA’s rejection of the valuation provided by an appraiser in
    one case does not automatically impugn that appraiser’s qualifications or his opinion in
    another case. Appraisers make judgments based on the facts of each case, and those
    facts differ. Accordingly, we find no merit to McDonald’s claim that Sprout’s methodology
    is inconsistent.
    ii. The highest-and-best-use finding
    {¶ 48} McDonald’s next major argument is that the BTA’s conclusion as to the
    property’s highest-and-best use is too narrow. McDonald’s says that the BTA effectively
    valued the property as “special purpose” property.
    Special-purpose property?
    {¶ 49} McDonald’s focuses much of its argument on the fact that the two
    -22-
    appraisers expressed different opinions about whether the East Dixie Drive McDonald’s
    restaurant was a special-purpose property. But even though Sprout believed that it could
    have been treated as such, he did not value the property as special-purpose property. So
    Sprout’s observation that the property could have been classified as a special-purpose
    property was inconsequential to the BTA’s decision. Indeed, the BTA noted in its decision
    that “although the property owner faults Sprout’s conclusion that the subject property fit
    the definition of ‘special-purpose property,’ we find no error there given that he testified
    that he did not appraise the property as if it were a ‘special-purpose property.’ ”
    Rite Aid
    {¶ 50} McDonald’s contends that the BTA ignored Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc., v.
    Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    146 Ohio St. 3d 173
    , 2016-Ohio-371, 
    54 N.E.3d 1177
    .
    In Rite Aid, the BTA adopted the property owner’s lower valuation, finding that the
    county’s comparables, “while potentially appropriate,” were drawn from an unnecessarily
    narrow pool of properties. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed. The Court concluded that
    the county’s appraiser had essentially and unjustifiably treated the subject property as a
    special-use property and that therefore the BTA “was justified in rejecting” the county’s
    appraisal and adopting the property owner’s. The Court also criticized the county’s
    argument that properties encumbered by a lease at the time of sale could be compared
    with unencumbered properties, without adjustment for this difference, “[p]recisely
    because the lease affects the sale price and value.” 
    Id. at ¶
    20.
    {¶ 51} But Sprout’s appraisal does not treat the subject property here as special-
    purpose property, and the appraisal incorporates very specific information about existing
    leases on comparable properties in determining whether adjustments in value are
    -23-
    appropriate. So we see no conflict between Rite Aid and the BTA’s decision here.
    The BTA’s precedent
    {¶ 52} McDonald’s also claims that the BTA ignored its own precedent. In NWD
    300 Spring, L.L.C v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    151 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2017-Ohio-7579,
    
    87 N.E.3d 199
    , the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s valuation of a luxury, high-
    rise residential condominium building. Sprout and another appraiser had provided
    competing appraisals giving different values. In Sprout’s analysis, he selected as
    comparable properties a variety of vacant land parcels designated for mixed-use in the
    nearby market rather than vacant land parcels designated for residential use (which is
    what the other appraiser did). The BTA found that Sprout’s comparables were more
    appropriate and reflective of the subject property’s market. The BTA commended Sprout
    for “ ‘consider[ing] a wider variety of commercial development’ ” and faulted the other
    appraiser for “ ‘utiliz[ing] only sales of properties ultimately developed into apartments.’ ”
    NWD 300 Spring at ¶ 9, quoting BTA Nos. 2015-106 et al., 
    2015 WL 11018757
    , *4 (Dec.
    23, 2015). McDonald’s says that the BTA’s decision in the present case directly
    contradicts its decision in NWD 300 Spring.
    {¶ 53} As we have already pointed out, every valuation case is factually different.
    We do not have the record and evidence from the NWD 300 Spring case. The BTA’s
    acceptance of an analysis provided by an appraiser in one case does not mean that the
    BTA must accept the same analysis in another case. The facts on which an appraiser
    makes judgments differ in every case. Therefore we find no merit in McDonald’s claim
    that the BTA ignored its own precedent.
    iii. Consideration of present use
    -24-
    {¶ 54} McDonald’s next major argument is that the BTA erred by applying the
    holding in Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling, 
    149 Ohio St. 3d 155
    , 2017-Ohio-870, 
    73 N.E.3d 503
    . McDonald’s says that that case involved the valuation of an enormous bottling plant,
    which is unlike the subject property here.
    {¶ 55} In Johnston, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that the “present use”
    method of evaluation cannot be the basis of valuing real property for tax purposes,
    because it “ ‘excludes, among other factors, location and speculative value which
    comprise market value * * *.’ ” 
    Id. at ¶
    13, quoting State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Tax
    Appeals, 
    32 Ohio St. 2d 28
    , 33, 
    289 N.E.2d 579
    (1972); Rite Aid at ¶ 27. Which is not to
    say that present use must be ignored. Rather, as the Court stressed in Johnston,
    “[a]lthough present use generally cannot be the only measure of value, in a proper case
    it may be considered in determining true value for tax purposes.” Johnston at ¶ 14. The
    key point is that the present-use value may not be considered “to the exclusion of other
    factors relevant to exchange value.” 
    Id. at ¶
    15. The Johnston court found that the BTA
    referred to the property’s present use as a bottling company but that “it did so in the
    context of deciding which comparables identified by the appraisers were ‘more analogous’
    under the sales-comparison approach.” 
    Id. at ¶
    16. This consideration of present use was
    not improper.
    {¶ 56} Here, the BTA observed that Sprout did not value the subject property
    based solely on its present use as a McDonald’s restaurant: “[W]e find that Sprout
    properly considered the subject property’s current use as a McDonald’s restaurant and
    developed the sales comparison and income approaches to value to determine the
    subject property’s exchange value.” Johnston supports this finding, said the BTA. On this
    -25-
    record we cannot disagree.
    iv. The capitalization rate
    {¶ 57} McDonald’s argues that the BTA should have chosen Weis’s capitalization
    rate of 8.25% over Sprout’s 7.0% rate.
    {¶ 58} The BTA faulted Weis’s capitalization rate because he derived it from
    properties that were unlike the subject property:
    * * * Weis’s capitalization rate raises concerns given that it was derived from
    properties that were dissimilar from the subject properly, i.e., general retail,
    instead of restaurant or fast-food restaurant properties. As such, we cannot
    confirm that his capitalization rate appropriately captures the market in
    which the subject property would operate. However, Sprout’s capitalization
    rate was based upon fast-food restaurants and, therefore, reflective of the
    subject property’s most likely use.
    {¶ 59} Both appraisers consulted local and national capitalization rates to derive
    their respective rates. Sprout looked at seven fast-food restaurants in Ohio, three of which
    were in the Dayton area. The capitalization rates of these properties ranged from 5.45%
    to 6.77%. Sprout also consulted the PwC Real Estate Survey, “a national publication
    indicating typical capitalization rates within the net lease market traded in the U.S.,” which
    he included with his report. (Sprout Appraisal Report, p. 45). This survey shows a range
    of 6.0% and 8.5%. Finally, Sprout conducted a band-of-investment analysis, which
    showed a range of 6.77% to 7.27%. As for Weis, he looked at 32 properties across Ohio,
    only ten of which were restaurants and of those ten only nine were fast-food. And like
    Sprout, Weis consulted a source for national capitalization rates. This source used
    -26-
    various techniques to determine the capitalization rate in the retail, restaurants (all types),
    and restaurants (fast food) sectors.
    {¶ 60} Which capitalization rate is more accurate? Who knows. But the evidence
    supporting Sprout’s rate of 7.0% is reliable and probative. And the BTA’s decision to adopt
    this rate as the appropriate capitalization rate for the subject property was reasonable.
    See Dublin City Schools Bd. of Edn., 
    139 Ohio St. 3d 193
    , 2013-Ohio-4543, 
    11 N.E.3d 206
    , at ¶ 13; Terraza 8, 
    150 Ohio St. 3d 527
    , 2017-Ohio-4415, 
    83 N.E.3d 916
    , at ¶ 7.
    v. Sprout’s qualifications as an expert
    {¶ 61} Finally, McDonald’s argues that the BTA should not have “continu[ed] to
    recognize” Sprout as an expert. McDonald’s suggests that it discredited or impeached
    Sprout such that the BTA should have doubted whether Sprout “ha[d] experience in
    appraising fast-food restaurants” or was “familiar with the neighborhood in which the
    Subject Property is located.”
    {¶ 62} In its decision, the BTA rejected McDonald’s argument that Sprout was not
    an expert:
    We note that, at this board’s hearing, the property owner stipulated to
    Sprout’s qualifications as set forth in his appraisal report; however, in its
    post-hearing     briefs,   the   property    owner     attempts    to   impugn
    Sprout’s qualifications and claims that he misled this board about his
    qualifications. We find no merit to this argument and recognize Sprout (and
    Weis) as an expert qualified to render an opinion on the subject property’s
    value.
    The BTA provided a detailed discussion of how it weighed the experts’ opinions and
    -27-
    methodology, including specific criticisms of Weis’s analysis. McDonald’s obviously
    disagrees with Sprout’s conclusions, but nothing in the record suggests that Sprout was
    unqualified, that his choice of comparable properties or his calculations were
    unreasonable, or that his valuation should have been disregarded because he lacked
    appropriate qualifications.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 63} The BTA said in its decision that “inherent in the appraisal process is the
    fact that an appraiser must make a wide variety of subjective judgments” in selecting data
    on which to rely, making adjustments to the data to make it “usable,” and interpreting and
    evaluating all the information to form an opinion. Similarly, the BTA must use its judgment
    in determining which evidence presents the most credible valuation. Here, the BTA relied
    on credible evidence from an appraiser who presented support for his positions. Based
    on the record before us, we conclude that the BTA’s determination was reasonable and
    lawful.
    {¶ 64} All of the assignments of error are overruled. The BTA’s decision is affirmed.
    .............
    WELBAUM, P.J. and FROELICH, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Karol C. Fox
    Mark H. Gillis
    Charles L. Bluestone
    Patrick J. Heery
    Laura Mariani
    Joseph W. Testa, Ohio Tax Commissioner
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27679

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 2322

Judges: Hall

Filed Date: 6/15/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/15/2018