State v. Randleman ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Randleman, 2019-Ohio-3221.]
    STATE OF OHIO                    )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF LORAIN                 )
    STATE OF OHIO                                        C.A. No.     17CA011179
    Appellee
    v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    DEVONTAE RANDLEMAN                                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
    Appellant                                    CASE No.   17CR095509
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: August 12, 2019
    CALLAHAN, Judge.
    {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Devonte Randleman, appeals from his convictions in the
    Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
    I.
    {¶2}    Someone shot S.D. four times after he came home in the middle of the night. The
    police discovered his body lying in his driveway along with a pair of sunglasses and an iPhone.
    Because his apartment had been ransacked, the police surmised that a burglary had been in
    progress when S.D. unexpectedly returned home.           An anonymous tip led them to Mr.
    Randleman, and evidence found at the scene also pointed toward his involvement. Forensic
    testing of the sunglasses and iPhone detected Mr. Randleman’s DNA on those items.
    Additionally, his DNA was detected on a loaded firearm the police found lying on a dresser
    inside S.D.’s apartment. The iPhone was registered to Mr. Randleman’s girlfriend and used by
    Mr. Randleman. The police discovered that someone remotely wiped the phone and restored it
    2
    to its factory settings a little over two hours after the murder. They also discovered that, later
    that same day, Mr. Randleman purchased a new cell phone.
    {¶3}    A grand jury indicted Mr. Randleman on one count of aggravated murder; one
    count of murder; one count of felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, charged under
    alternative subsections; two counts of aggravated burglary, charged under alternative
    subsections; two counts of felonious assault, charged under alternative subsections; one count of
    tampering with evidence; one count of having a weapon under disability; and numerous firearm
    specifications. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury found Mr. Randleman guilty on all
    counts. The trial court then sentenced him to a total of 33 years to life in prison.
    {¶4}    Mr. Randleman now appeals from his convictions and raises three assignments of
    error for review. For ease of analysis, this Court rearranges his assignments of error.
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
    THE STATE OF OHIO VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
    FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND BATSON V. KENTUCKY, WHEN THE
    PROSECUTOR EXCUSED THE ONLY AFRICAN AMERICAN JUROR FOR
    BEING “DISHONEST” WHEN HE ONLY DISCLOSED A CRIMINAL
    CONVICTION THROUGH A JURY QUESTIONNAIRE AND NOT
    AFFIRMATIVELY DURING VOIR DIRE.
    {¶5}    In his second assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that his due process
    rights were violated when the trial court allowed the State to strike Juror Number 5, the only
    member of the jury pool who was an African American. Upon review, this Court rejects his
    argument.
    {¶6}     “The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
    deliberate discrimination based on race by a prosecutor in his exercise of peremptory
    challenges.” State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24668, 2010-Ohio-2573, ¶ 33, citing
    3
    Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    , 89 (1986). “‘A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three
    steps.’” State v. Were, 
    118 Ohio St. 3d 448
    , 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Murphy, 
    91 Ohio St. 3d 516
    , 528 (2001).
    In the first step, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the [S]tate has
    exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Once the prima facie
    showing has been made, the State must offer a basis for striking the prospective
    juror that is race-neutral. Finally, the trial court must consider the parties’
    positions to determine whether the defendant has demonstrated purposeful
    discrimination.
    (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27739, 2017-Ohio-278, ¶ 6.
    The final step directs the court to examine the State’s race-neutral explanation “‘in context to
    ensure [its] reason is not merely pretextual.’” State v. Pickens, 
    141 Ohio St. 3d 462
    , 2014-Ohio-
    5445, ¶ 63, quoting State v. Frazier, 
    115 Ohio St. 3d 139
    , 2007-Ohio-5048, ¶ 65. The court
    “must ‘assess the plausibility’ of the prosecutor’s reason for striking the juror ‘in light of all
    evidence with a bearing on it.’” Pickens at ¶ 63, quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 
    545 U.S. 231
    , 252
    (2005). “The conclusion of the trial court that the [S]tate did not possess discriminatory intent in
    the exercise of its peremptory challenges will not be reversed on appeal absent a determination
    that it was clearly erroneous.” State v. Hernandez, 
    63 Ohio St. 3d 577
    , 583 (1992).
    {¶7}    During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether any of them,
    their family members, or their friends had ever been “accused or convicted of a crime.” Two
    prospective jurors responded, and the prosecutor asked those jurors about their experiences and
    whether those experiences would affect their impartiality. The prosecutor then asked the jury
    pool: “Anyone else?     Someone?      Anyone else?     Here?    Anyone?”     Because no one else
    responded, the prosecutor changed topics. Later during voir dire, however, a third prospective
    juror asked to return to the prosecutor’s question and discuss the matter in private. After she did
    so, a fourth prospective juror likewise indicated that she wanted to discuss the matter in private.
    4
    Both prospective jurors were given the opportunity to answer the prosecutor’s question in
    chambers.
    {¶8}   At the conclusion of voir dire, the prosecutor sought to excuse Juror Number 5.
    Mr. Randleman objected on the basis that Juror Number 5 was the only prospective juror who
    was African American. Because Juror Number 5 had not answered any questions in a manner
    that might lead someone to question his impartiality, Mr. Randleman argued that the State’s
    peremptory challenge was race-based. The prosecutor noted, however, that Juror Number 5 had
    failed to disclose his criminal convictions during voir dire. The prosecutor knew that Juror
    Number 5 had been convicted of “making false alarms and falsification” because he had included
    that information on his jury questionnaire. Yet, Juror Number 5 had not responded when the
    prosecutor asked whether anyone had ever been convicted of a crime. Nor had he come forward
    when two other prospective jurors later indicated that they wished to discuss the prosecutor’s
    question in chambers. The prosecutor stated that she was striking Juror Number 5 because she
    felt he was not giving truthful answers. She noted that she was striking another juror for the
    same reason, as that juror also had failed to disclose her prior conviction during voir dire. After
    hearing from the prosecutor, the trial court overruled Mr. Randleman’s objection.
    {¶9}   Mr. Randleman concedes that the State provided a race-neutral reason for its
    decision to strike Juror Number 5. See Jackson, 2017-Ohio-278, at ¶ 6. His argument is that the
    State’s reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. He claims that the State misled the
    court when it portrayed Juror Number 5 as dishonest. He notes that Juror Number 5 answered
    his jury questionnaire honestly, and the prosecutor never directly inquired of him during voir
    dire.   Because the record supports the conclusion that the State engaged in purposeful
    discrimination, Mr. Randleman argues, the court’s finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
    5
    {¶10} This Court cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it found that the
    prosecutor lacked a discriminatory intent. See 
    Hernandez, 63 Ohio St. 3d at 583
    . A prospective
    juror’s past criminal history, standing alone, “‘“is a valid, race-neutral reason for raising a
    peremptory challenge.”’” State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28064, 2017-Ohio-2747, ¶ 11,
    quoting State v. Lacey, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10MA122, 2012-Ohio-1685, ¶ 127, quoting State
    v. Santiago, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1094, 2003-Ohio-2877, ¶ 10. Here, apart from the
    mere fact of Juror Number 5’s prior conviction, the prosecutor explained that she struck him
    because she felt he had failed to answer her questions truthfully. See State v. Moss, 9th Dist.
    Summit No. 24511, 2009-Ohio-3866, ¶ 12 (“[A] peremptory challenge may be exercised for any
    racially-neutral reason.”). Even if Juror Number 5 disclosed his prior conviction on his jury
    questionnaire, he failed to respond when asked about prior convictions during voir dire. He did
    not respond when the prosecutor first asked her question.       He did not respond when two
    prospective jurors disclosed their family members’ prior convictions. He did not respond when
    the prosecutor followed up on her inquiry (i.e., “Anyone else? Someone? Anyone else? Here?
    Anyone?”). Finally, he did not respond when two other prospective jurors later asked for an
    opportunity to answer the prosecutor’s question in chambers. The prosecutor specifically cited
    Juror Number 5’s failure to take advantage of any of the foregoing opportunities as a basis for
    her conclusion that he was not being truthful. Moreover, she indicated that she had struck
    another prospective juror for the same reason. Contrary to Mr. Randleman’s argument, “[t]here
    is no indication in the record that the State possessed a discriminatory intent when it sought to
    remove Juror Number [5] from the venire.” Lewis at ¶ 11. Accordingly, this Court cannot
    conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it overruled Mr. Randleman’s Batson challenge.
    See Hernandez at 583.
    6
    {¶11} Mr. Randleman’s brief also contains a singular assertion that the trial court erred
    by rejecting his Batson challenge without first conducting “a proper Batson hearing under Hicks
    v. Westinghouse [Materials Co.], [
    78 Ohio St. 3d 95
    (1997)].” The record reflects, however, that
    Mr. Randleman failed to raise this argument in the lower court. See State v. Rice, 9th Dist.
    Medina No. 08CA0054-M, 2009-Ohio-5419, ¶ 9 (“When reviewing arguments on appeal, this
    Court cannot consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). The trial court
    listened to the parties’ arguments and made its Batson ruling at sidebar. Mr. Randleman never
    requested a more extensive hearing. Nor has he claimed that the trial court misapplied the
    standard articulated in Batson. Compare Hicks at 98-99. Because Mr. Randleman has not
    shown that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson challenge, this Court rejects his
    arguments to the contrary. Mr. Randleman’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
    THE EVIDENCE IN THIS MATTER WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
    [MR.] RANDLEMAN OF AGGRAVATED MURDER OR MURDER BY
    CAUSING THE “PURPOSEFUL” DEATH OF THE VICTIM WHILE
    COMMITTING A BURGLARY OR ROBBERY.         THE EVIDENCE
    PRESENTED WAS ONLY SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A
    MURDER OCCURRED.      THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW A
    PURPOSEFUL KILLING, BUT ONLY A DEATH CAUSED AS THE
    PROXIMATE RESULT OF COMMITTING A BURGLARY.
    {¶12} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that his aggravated murder
    and murder convictions are based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues that there was
    no evidence he purposely caused S.D.’s death. This Court disagrees.
    {¶13} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law
    that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-
    6955, ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is
    whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to
    7
    sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, we do
    not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v.
    Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St. 3d 259
    , 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to
    reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt. 
    Id. {¶14} A
    person commits murder if he “purposely cause[s] the death of another * * *.”
    R.C. 2903.02(A). The crime constitutes aggravated murder if he purposely causes the other’s
    death “while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing
    or attempting to commit, * * * aggravated robbery * * * [or] aggravated burglary * * *.” R.C.
    2903.01(B). “A person acts purposely when it is [his] specific intention to cause a certain result,
    or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of
    what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is [his] specific intention to engage in
    conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).
    {¶15} “A person need not be the principal offender to be convicted of a crime.” State v.
    Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26660, 2013-Ohio-5226, ¶ 11. R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) prohibits any
    person, “acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, [from] * *
    * [a]id[ing] or abet[ting] another in committing the offense.” “To support a conviction for
    complicity by aiding and abetting * * *, the evidence must show that the defendant supported,
    assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the
    crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. Johnson, 
    93 Ohio St. 3d 240
    (2001), syllabus. “‘[A] jury can infer an aider and abettor’s purpose to kill where
    the facts show that the participants in a felony entered into a common design and either the aider
    or abettor knew that an inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be employed to accomplish
    8
    the felony or the felony and the manner of its accomplishment would be reasonably likely to
    produce death.’” State v. Lollis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26607, 2014-Ohio-684, ¶ 21, quoting
    State v. Scott, 
    61 Ohio St. 2d 155
    , 165 (1980). “A person who violates R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) is
    guilty of complicity and ‘shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender.’”
    Davis at ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 2923.03(F).
    {¶16} The State set forth evidence that S.D. was shot and killed in his driveway around
    4:00 a.m. on August 5, 2016. He was shot four times with a .40 caliber firearm, but that firearm
    was never recovered. The police officers who responded to the scene found S.D.’s garage door
    open and his apartment ransacked. Items had been strewn about, cabinet doors and dresser
    drawers had been left open, and the toilet tank cover had been removed. Inside the apartment,
    the police observed several items of interest, including (1) drug paraphernalia; (2) packaging
    consistent with the type used to transport powdered drugs; and (3) a loaded firearm lying on top
    of a dresser in the spare bedroom. Outside the apartment, they also found several items of
    interest, including (1) a small blowtorch and hammer, both of which had been used to disable the
    front door; (2) a pair of sunglasses; (3) an iPhone; and (4) a drawstring bag containing money,
    several champagne canisters, and two firearms that were later traced to S.D. Both the sunglasses
    and the iPhone were discovered lying on the driveway just outside S.D.’s garage.
    {¶17} The police were able to trace three of the items they found at S.D.’s apartment to
    Mr. Randleman. First, his DNA was detected on the loaded firearm they found lying on top of
    the dresser in S.D.’s spare bedroom. Second, his DNA was detected on the sunglasses they found
    lying on the driveway just outside the garage. Third, his DNA was detected on the iPhone they
    found lying in the same area.
    9
    {¶18} Several witnesses testified about the iPhone. A records custodian from Sprint
    linked the iPhone to a prepaid account registered to D.C., Mr. Randleman’s girlfriend. The
    prepaid account reflected that D.C. had activated two devices over the course of her subscription.
    Service for the first device was activated in June 2016 and remained active until August 5, 2016.
    On that date, service was transferred to the second device. The State produced evidence that
    D.C. and Mr. Randleman went to Best Buy on the afternoon of August 5th to purchase the
    second device. Though neither phone was registered in Mr. Randleman’s name, the State
    produced evidence that he was the user of both phones.
    {¶19} The police were only able to obtain limited information from the iPhone. A
    cybercrimes agent from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation inspected the phone and
    determined that it had been restored to its factory settings as a result of being remotely wiped
    through Apple. The only information he was able to retrieve from the phone was a file creation
    date and a file termination date. The file creation date showed that the files on the phone had
    been created in June 2016. The file termination date showed that the files had been terminated at
    6:10 a.m. on August 5, 2016; a little over two hours after the murder. D.C. testified that she had
    used Mr. Randleman’s Apple ID to remotely wipe the phone after she spoke with him at 5:50
    a.m. on August 5th. She claimed that she did so because Mr. Randleman said he had lost the
    phone and it contained potentially embarrassing pictures and videos of her.
    {¶20} Both Mr. Randleman and D.C. told the police that Mr. Randleman was in
    Sandusky at the time of the murder. D.C. initially claimed to have driven Mr. Randleman there
    herself, but later recanted. The call history records that Sprint maintained for the iPhone
    demonstrated that the phone was still in the Lorain area at 12:36 a.m. on August 5th. Thereafter,
    no calls were made or received on the phone until 4:32 a.m. At that time, the phone began
    10
    receiving calls. It is undisputed that the police arrived at S.D.’s apartment shortly after 4:30
    a.m., by which point in time the phone was already lying in his driveway.
    {¶21} Special Agent Jonathan Lieber acted as the lead investigator in this matter. Given
    that S.D. had been earning a significant amount of money as a drug dealer, Special Agent Lieber
    believed that more than one person had broken into his apartment to steal his money and his
    product. The special agent theorized that one of the intruders had brought sunglasses with him to
    protect his eyes as he used a blowtorch to destroy the door lock on the apartment. He further
    theorized that the burglary was still in progress when S.D. unexpectedly arrived home and
    “spooked” the intruders, at which point an altercation took place in the driveway. Special Agent
    Lieber speculated that one of the intruders dropped several of his items in the driveway and
    either he or his accomplice also dropped a drawstring bag while running from the scene. He
    noted that the drawstring bag was awkward and heavy because, apart from being loaded with two
    firearms and several other items, it contained more than 17 pounds of loose change. Special
    Agent Lieber theorized that the intruders panicked and ran quickly once they shot S.D. because
    the gunshots would have been noteworthy at that time of night in a relatively quiet community.
    {¶22} Mr. Randleman argues that his aggravated murder and murder convictions are
    based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to prove that he burglarized S.D.’s home
    with the intention of killing him. He argues that, at best, the evidence showed it was his
    accomplice who shot S.D. Further, he argues that the evidence showed the killing was a
    spontaneous event, not a planned occurrence. Because there was no evidence that he specifically
    intended to kill S.D., Mr. Randleman argues, the State failed to prove mens rea on his aggravated
    murder and murder charges.
    11
    {¶23} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
    could have concluded that the State proved mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d at 273
    . The State set forth evidence that Mr. Randleman was present both before and
    during S.D.’s murder, as his sunglasses, iPhone, and gun were found at the scene. See State v.
    Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25650, 2012-Ohio-794, ¶ 7, quoting In re T.K., 
    109 Ohio St. 3d 512
    ,
    2006-Ohio-3056, ¶ 13 (“The criminal intent of [an] aider and abettor ‘can be inferred from the
    presence, companionship, and conduct of the defendant before and after the offense is
    committed.’”). Even if it was his accomplice who ultimately shot S.D. with a .40 caliber gun,
    the record supports the conclusion that Mr. Randleman brought his own gun to the scene. S.D.
    was a known drug dealer, so the jury reasonably could have inferred that Mr. Randleman
    recognized the potential dangers involved in the burglary and armed himself accordingly.
    Because he and his accomplice broke into S.D.’s apartment in the middle of the night, fully
    armed, to commit a theft offense, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he “‘entered into a
    common design’” knowing either that (1) “‘an inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be
    employed to accomplish the felony’”; or (2) “‘the felony and the manner of its accomplishment
    would be reasonably likely to produce death.’” Lollis, 2014-Ohio-684, at ¶ 21, quoting 
    Scott, 61 Ohio St. 2d at 165
    . Upon review, Mr. Randleman has not shown that his aggravated murder and
    murder convictions are based on insufficient evidence. Accordingly, his third assignment of
    error is overruled.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
    THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT UTILIZED THE
    DEFINITION OF “CAUSE” AS AN ACT WHICH, IN A NATURAL AND
    CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE, DIRECTLY PRODUCES THE DEATH OF A
    PERSON. THIS IS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF LAW UNDER OHIO
    JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE OHIO STATE SUPREME COURT.
    12
    {¶24} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that the trial court
    committed plain error when it instructed the jury on aggravated murder. Specifically, he argues
    that he was prejudiced by the court’s instruction on the element of causation. Because Mr.
    Randleman has not shown that the trial court committed plain error, this Court rejects his
    argument.
    {¶25} A defendant’s “[f]ailure to object to a jury instruction limits review of the alleged
    error to the plain error standard.” State v. Fry, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0057-M, 2017-Ohio-
    9077, ¶ 20. Plain error exists only where there is a deviation from a legal rule, that is obvious,
    and that affected the appellant’s substantial rights to the extent that it affected the outcome of the
    trial. State v. Barnes, 
    94 Ohio St. 3d 21
    , 27 (2002). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B)
    is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 
    53 Ohio St. 2d 91
    (1978), paragraph three of the
    syllabus.   Further, “[w]hen reviewing jury instructions, the appellate court reviews the
    instructions as a whole.” State v. Schell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28255, 2017-Ohio-2641, ¶ 38.
    “‘[M]isstatements and ambiguity in a portion of the instructions will not constitute reversible
    error unless the instructions are so misleading that they prejudicially affect a substantial right of
    the complaining party.’” State v. Horne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24672, 2010-Ohio-350, ¶ 19,
    quoting Wozniak v. Wozniak, 
    90 Ohio App. 3d 400
    , 410 (9th Dist.1993).
    {¶26} When instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated murder, the trial court
    defined “cause” as follows:
    “Cause” is an act which, in a natural and continuous sequence, directly produces
    the death of a person and without which the death could not have occurred.
    The court used the same definition when instructing the jury on the elements of murder and
    felony murder. Mr. Randleman argues that the court’s causation instruction was misleading as to
    13
    his aggravated murder charge because it included a foreseeability component. He avers that the
    instruction’s “natural and continuous sequence” language allowed the jury to convict him of
    aggravated murder in the absence of a finding of specific intent. Because the instruction relieved
    the State of its burden to prove mens rea, Mr. Randleman argues, he was denied a fair trial.
    {¶27} For purposes of criminal trials, the Ohio Jury Instructions offer a standard
    causation instruction:
    1. CAUSE. * * * Cause is an act or failure to act which in a natural and
    continuous sequence directly produces the [death of another], and without which
    it would not have occurred.
    2. NATURAL CONSEQUENCES. The defendant’s responsibility is not limited
    to the immediate or most obvious result of the defendant’s act or failure to act.
    The defendant is also responsible for the natural and foreseeable [consequences]
    that follow, in the ordinary course of events, from the act or failure to act.
    Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.23 (2019). For an aggravated murder charge, however,
    the Ohio Jury Instructions offer a specific causation instruction:
    4. CAUSATION. * * * Cause is an act which directly produces the [death of
    another], and without which it would not have occurred.
    Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 503.01 (2019).           Unlike the standard instruction, the
    aggravated murder instruction omits any reference to the “natural and foreseeable consequences”
    of one’s act. Compare Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.23 with Ohio Jury Instructions,
    CR Section 503.01.
    {¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly “expressed concern that the standard
    foreseeability instruction may be confusing in aggravated murder cases.” State v. Williams, 
    99 Ohio St. 3d 493
    , 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶ 105. Accord State v. Getsy, 
    84 Ohio St. 3d 180
    , 196 (1998);
    Causation Comment to Ohio Jury Instructions, CR 503.01. Yet, it also has recognized that
    “[t]he use of that instruction * * * does not require reversal where the instructions as a whole
    make clear that the jury must find purpose to kill in order to convict.” State v. Phillips, 
    74 Ohio 14
    St.3d 72, 100 (1995). The question is whether the instructions adequately conveyed that “the
    jury was required to find specific intent to kill and prior calculation and design before it could
    convict [the defendant] of aggravated murder.” State v. Jalowiec, 
    91 Ohio St. 3d 220
    , 231
    (2001). Accord State v. Gross, 
    97 Ohio St. 3d 121
    , 2002-Ohio-5524, ¶ 99.
    {¶29} Upon review, Mr. Randleman has not shown that the trial court committed plain
    error when it instructed the jury on his aggravated murder charge. The trial court instructed the
    jury that it could find Mr. Randleman guilty of aggravated murder only if it found that he
    purposely caused S.D.’s death during the commission or attempted commission of an aggravated
    robbery or aggravated burglary.      The court then “extensively instructed the jury on the
    requirement of purpose and intent prior to the causation language.” State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio
    St.3d 331, 346 (1999). It instructed the jury (1) that it must have been Mr. Randleman’s
    “specific intention to purposely cause the death of another”; (2) that he must have “act[ed] with a
    conscious objective of producing a specific result”; and (3) that his actions must not have been
    accidental. It also instructed the jury that “[p]urpose and intent mean the same thing” and that
    purpose may be inferred from the fact that a victim’s wound is inflicted “with a deadly weapon
    in a manner calculated to destroy life * * *.” Moreover, the court specifically instructed the jury
    that “no person may be convicted of aggravated murder unless he or she specifically intended to
    cause the death of another.” “[W]hen viewed in the requisite full context, the trial court’s
    instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that it could not convict [Mr. Randleman] of
    aggravated murder unless it found specific intent to kill.” Gross at ¶ 99. See Williams at ¶ 105;
    Jalowiec at 231.
    {¶30} In rejecting Mr. Randleman’s argument, this Court neither adopts, nor approves of
    the trial court’s decision to use one causation instruction for all three of Mr. Randleman’s murder
    15
    charges. This Court would caution the trial court against including “natural and continuance
    sequence” language in its causation instruction for aggravated murder. See Getsy at 196. In this
    instance, however, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court’s inclusion of that language
    resulted in plain error. That is because the instructions, as a whole, made it clear that the jury
    could only convict Mr. Randleman of aggravated murder upon a finding of specific intent to kill.
    See Williams at ¶ 105; Gross at ¶ 99; Jalowiec at 231. For that reason, Mr. Randleman’s first
    assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶31} Mr. Randleman’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
    County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
    this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    16
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
    FOR THE COURT
    TEODOSIO, P. J.
    HENSAL, J.
    CONCUR.
    APPEARANCES:
    JOHN D. TOTH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17CA011179

Judges: Callahan

Filed Date: 8/12/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/12/2019