State v. Barrett , 2012 Ohio 3948 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Barrett, 2012-Ohio-3948.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97614
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
STEVEN BARRETT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-551162
BEFORE: Stewart, P.J., Cooney, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 30, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Eric C. Nemecek
Friedman & Frey, L.L.C.
1304 West 6th Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Jesse W. Canonico
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 9th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J.:
{¶1} A grand jury returned a 20-count indictment against defendant-appellant
Steven Barrett charging him with illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or
performance, voyeurism, and possessing criminal tools. In lieu of trial, Barrett pleaded
guilty to nine counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance,
two counts of voyeurism, and one count of possession of criminal tools. The court
sentenced him to seven years on each of the child pornography counts, six months in jail
on the voyeurism counts, and 11 months on the possession of criminal tools counts. All
of the counts were ordered to be served concurrently for a total term of seven years. In
this appeal, Barrett complains that the court erred by failing to consider whether the child
pornography counts were allied offenses of similar import that the court should have
merged for sentencing, that the court abused its discretion by ordering a seven-year term
for each of the child pornography counts, and that the court erred by failing to consider the
statutory factors guiding the court’s discretion in sentencing by placing emphasis on
Barrett’s punishment over his rehabilitation.
I
{¶2} In his first assignment of error, Barrett does not argue that the nine child
pornography counts were allied offenses of similar import. Instead, he argues that even
though he did not raise the issue of allied offenses at sentencing, the court should have
nevertheless considered the matter on its own initiative. He asserts that, because “the
counts at issue involve the same statute and subsection, it is possible that the same conduct
could establish a violation of each offense.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s Brief at 11.
While acknowledging that he pleaded guilty to an indictment that contained different dates
for the offenses, Barrett argues that the dates used in the indictment “do not provide an
accurate indication as to when Appellant actually received, viewed or possessed the
[material].” He asks that we vacate his sentence and remand the matter for a
determination of whether the child pornography counts were allied offenses of similar
import that should have merged for sentencing.
{¶3} When a defendant’s conduct results in the commission of two or more “allied”
offenses of similar import, that conduct can be charged separately, but the defendant can
be convicted and sentenced for only one offense. R.C. 2941.25(A). Offenses are
“allied” and must be merged for sentencing if the defendant’s conduct is such that a single
act could lead to the commission of separately defined offenses, but those separate
offenses were committed with a state of mind to commit only one act. See State v.
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 48-50.
{¶4} Despite filing an extensive sentencing memorandum, Barrett did not raise the
issue of allied offenses at sentencing. He has forfeited all but plain error as defined by
Crim.R. 52(B), which states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” A reviewing
court will take notice of plain error only with the utmost caution, and only then to prevent
a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804(1978), syllabus. To qualify as “plain,” the error must be “obvious” from the record on
appeal. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 16.
{¶5} Barrett’s convictions resulted from a guilty plea that constituted “a complete
admission of [his] guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1). That guilt was based on the facts alleged in
the indictment. State v. Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 388 N.E.2d 745 (1979), paragraph one
of the syllabus. Because Barrett’s guilty plea terminated the proceedings against him, the
facts alleged in the indictment and admitted by Barrett are the only facts in the record.
{¶6} The state alleged in nine different counts of the indictment that Barrett “did
recklessly create, direct, produce or transfer material or performance that shows a minor in
a state of nudity in violation of Section 2907.232 of the Revised Code.” Three separate
dates were stated for the nine counts: July 26, 2009 for one count; September 15, 2009
for five counts; and April 12, 2011 for three counts. The images forming the basis of
each count are not in the record.
{¶7} In his sentencing memorandum, Barrett stated that he had “images” depicting
minors in a state of nudity. The plural form of the word “images” and the multiple counts
of possessing child pornography indicate that more than one picture was involved. But
beyond that, the record on appeal is empty. To the extent that the multiple images
depicted different victims, we have held that they do not merge. State v. Collier, 8th Dist.
No. 95572, 2011-Ohio-2791, ¶ 12. However, as the dissent notes, the images are not in
the record on appeal, so we have no way of knowing what these images depict. It is
possible that the images depict different victims, or may depict the same victim in different
poses, or may even be duplicates of a single image. In short, the record on appeal gives
us no basis for saying whether the child pornography counts were allied.
{¶8} Given the lack of facts in the record on appeal, we cannot find that the court
committed error, much less the kind of error that is so “obvious” on the record that it
qualifies as plain error, by failing to inquire prior to sentencing whether separate counts of
an indictment are allied offenses of similar import. State v. Snuffer, 8th Dist. Nos. 96480,
96481, 96482, 96483, 2011-Ohio-6430, ¶ 9; State v. Lindsey, 8th Dist. No. 96601,
2010-Ohio-804, ¶ 13; State v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Nos. 97093 and 97094, 2012-Ohio-2496.
{¶9} Some panels of this court have reached a different conclusion on similar facts:
notably State v. Corrao, 8th Dist. No. 95167, 2011-Ohio-2517, and State v. Baker, 8th
Dist. No. 97139, 2012-Ohio-1833. In both cases, the panels considered issues of plain
error in the failure to merge allied offenses following a guilty plea. And in both cases, the
panels acknowledged the absence of facts supporting an allied offenses claim: in Baker,
the panel stated “[t]he record is nearly devoid of any facts[;]” id. at ¶ 2; in Corrao, the
panel stated, “[i]t is impossible to determine whether any of the * * * offenses were
committed in ‘a single act with a single state of mind.’” Id. at ¶ 10. Nevertheless, both
panels found that the trial court’s failure to conduct an allied offenses analysis was plain
error. The cases were reversed and remanded with instructions for the respective trial
courts to resolve the allied offenses issues raised on appeal.
{¶10} Our disagreement with Baker and Corrao is with the decision to reverse a
sentence on the basis of plain error when the records in both cases admittedly did not
contain any evidence from which an allied offenses error might be determined. This is a
departure from the well-established principle of appellate review that requires the
appellant to exemplify the error by reference to the record on appeal. See App.R.
12(A)(2); State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 455, 1999-Ohio-464, 705 N.E.2d 329.
What is more, to the extent that appellate review requires the application of the plain error
doctrine, it is an oxymoron to find plain error because there are insufficient facts in the
record necessary to determine whether error occurred at all. If we cannot determine
whether error exists because of the absence of facts in the record on appeal, it follows that
there is no plain error that is “obvious.”
{¶11} Baker found that the trial court’s failure in the first instance to inquire into
allied offenses prior to imposing sentence was itself plain error. This conclusion followed
from several premises. First, allied offenses issues invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution, Johnson at ¶ 25, and constitutional
errors cannot be waived unless the waiver is knowing or intelligent. State v. Underwood,
124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, at ¶ 32. Second, Underwood held that
“imposition of multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import is plain error.” Id.
at ¶ 31, citing State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 2004-Ohio-6087, 817 N.E.2d 845, ¶
96-102. Third, Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, stated,
“[u]nder R.C. 2941.25, the court must determine prior to sentencing whether the offenses
were committed by the same conduct.” Id. at ¶ 47. From these principles, Baker and
Corrao appear to conclude that the court not only has a duty to merge allied offenses of
similar import, but that it also has the obligation to raise the issue of allied offenses at
sentencing, even if the defendant fails to do so.
{¶12} Baker and Corrao misapprehend the extent to which Underwood and
Johnson apply to guilty pleas in which there are no facts or concessions demonstrating the
existence of allied offenses. Beginning with Johnson, the facts of that case show that
Johnson was found guilty by a jury verdict following a trial. The facts produced at trial
would have enabled the court to determine whether Johnson’s offenses were committed by
the same conduct. The holding in Johnson is consistent with the R.C. 2941.25(A)
prohibition against sentencing a defendant twice for the same conduct because the court
could “construe” the evidence. But unlike a trial, a guilty plea is made to an indictment.
Johnson cannot apply to guilty pleas because there are no facts that the court could
construe as showing whether offenses are allied.
{¶13} Underwood concerned a no contest plea. On direct appeal, the state
conceded that Underwood’s offenses were allied offenses of similar import. Id. at ¶ 8.
Given that concession, we have distinguished Underwood from cases in which we have
held that, by voluntarily entering guilty pleas to two separate offenses, a “defendant
waive[s] any argument that the same constituted allied offenses of similar import.” State
v. Antenori, 8th Dist. No. 90580, 2008-Ohio-5987, ¶ 6. In State v. Wulff, 8th Dist. No.
94087, 2011-Ohio-700, we explained the distinction between Underwood and Antenori
as follows:
Underwood pled no contest to all four counts for which he was indicted. On
appeal, the State in Underwood, conceded that the convictions were in fact
allied offenses of similar import. Whereas, in Antenori and the instant case, a
plea bargain was entered involving pleas to just some charges and no such
concession by the State exists. Moreover, Underwood applies to an
appellate review of a jointly recommended sentence, as opposed to sentences
like those in Antenori and the instant case, which were imposed by the trial
court after the defendant pled guilty to just some of the charges he faced.
(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶14} The dissent claims that we have “play[ed] the Antenori card,” claiming that
Antenori is invalid precedent because it is an “anomaly” that is in conflict with
Underwood. This is a curious statement because Antenori was also followed by State v.
Clementson, 8th Dist. No. 94230, 2011-Ohio-1798, a decision written by the dissenting
judge in an application for reopening. Clementson stated:
Likewise, Clementson entered separate guilty pleas to four of eight charges,
the parties did not jointly recommend a sentence to the trial court, and the
state did not concede that the charges were allied offenses. This court
decided Antenori in 2008, and Clementson’s case was briefed, argued, and
decided in 2009-2010. In light of Antenori, therefore, Clementson has not
met his burden to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of a colorable
claim of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel [for not assigning as
error the trial court’s failure to determine whether offenses were allied].
(Emphasis in original.)
Clementson at ¶ 13.
{¶15} Far from being an anomaly, Antenori is, and continues to be, viable precedent
in this district. If by “play[ing] the Antenori card” the dissent means that we are not
disregarding the precedential significance of the case, then guilty as charged.
{¶16} We can also distinguish Underwood because it was decided under the former
allied offenses law stated in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 1999-Ohio-291, 710
N.E.2d 699. Rance required a “comparison of the statutory elements in the abstract” to
determine whether the statutory elements of crimes correspond to such a degree that the
commission of one crime will result in the commission of the other. Unlike the new allied
offenses standard in Johnson that requires a court to consider a defendant’s conduct, under
Rance, the court could not consider the facts giving rise to each offense. A court
reviewing an allied offenses claim under Rance did not need any facts on appeal to
determine whether offenses were allied. The Supreme Court’s decision in Underwood
could thus be made on a bare record. For that reason, Underwood has no applicability to
a guilty plea made in the Johnson era of allied offenses law.
{¶17} Applying cases like Underwood and Johnson, where facts or a concession
exists to find plain error in the failure to merge allied offenses of similar import, to cases
involving only bare guilty pleas is pointless. If there are insufficient facts on the record to
determine whether plain error occurred, a reviewing court simply cannot find any error at
all. Baker and Corrao incorrectly assume that an allied offenses error exists because the
record fails to show that one does not. This conclusion is a departure from
well-established rules of appellate review.
{¶18} The holdings in Baker and Corrao take the extraordinary step of declaring
that the court’s failure to sua sponte raise the issue of allied offenses at sentencing from a
guilty plea amounts to plain error. In fact, those cases arguably institute a form of per se
error because they believe a bare record makes it impossible for an appellate court to
determine whether offenses are allied and thus protect a defendant’s right not to be
sentenced twice for the same offense. They do this on the basis of the following language
from Underwood:
When the plea agreement is silent on the issue of allied offenses of similar
import, however, the trial court is obligated under R.C. 2941.25 to determine
whether the offenses are allied, and if they are, to convict the defendant of
only one offense.
Underwood at ¶ 29.
{¶19} This passage lends no support to the proposition that the court must sua
sponte review whether offenses are allied. The supreme court made it clear that a trial
judge is required to merge allied offenses of similar import “when the issue of allied
offenses is before the court[.]” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 27. For example, in
Johnson, there were demonstrable facts in the record to show that the allied offenses issue
was before the court — the sentencing judge presided over trial and heard the evidence, so
the judge had facts at hand to determine whether individual counts were allied offenses of
similar import even without an express request to do so.
{¶20} Johnson stands for the proposition that a judge who presides over trial and
hears evidence showing that multiple offenses are allied must merge those offenses even if
the defendant does not request merger. And in Underwood, the supreme court was able to
determine that Underwood’s sentence was imposed in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A)
because the state conceded on appeal that the underlying offenses were allied offenses of
similar import. As in Johnson where the trial court had a factual record to indicate that
offenses were allied, the concession in Underwood that the offenses should have merged
was enough to allow the court to conclude that the defendant had been sentenced in
violation of R.C. 2941.25(A).
{¶21} Barrett’s case is different because the allied offenses issue was never before
the court. He pleaded guilty to the indictment in exchange for having some charges
dismissed, he did not have any discussion or reach an agreement with the state on whether
any of the remaining counts were allied, and further failed to raise the issue of allied
offenses at sentencing. Barrett essentially concedes this point by arguing only that there
is the “possibility” that his sentences might be subject to merger. An appellate court
cannot find plain error on the mere possibility that error occurred. See, e.g., State v.
Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 264, 2001-Ohio-189, 750 N.E.2d 90 (finding that “the
possibility of jury confusion * * * does not reach the level of plain error.”); State v. Kelley,
57 Ohio St.3d 127, 130, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991) (criticizing court of appeals for finding
that “the possibility that appealable errors occurred at trial constituted plain error and
negated appellee’s plea of guilty to the lesser included offense for which he was ultimately
sentenced.”) There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the offenses Barrett
pleaded guilty to were allied.
{¶22} This case is more like State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 211, 553 N.E.2d
640 (1990), in which the supreme court found an allied offenses issue forfeited on appeal
because the defendant did not raise it in the trial court. Implicit in the idea of issue
forfeiture in the context of allied offenses is that a party who fails to object waives all but
plain error. See State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶
139 (argument that state failed to prove separate animus for separate offenses was not
raised at trial and defendant “thus waived all but plain error.”).
{¶23} The supreme court did not mention Comen in either Underwood or Johnson.
But it has not overruled Comen or the long line of precedent finding an allied offenses
argument forfeited on appeal because it was not raised at the time of sentencing and the
defendant failed to show the existence of plain error. Although seemingly at odds,
Comen, Underwood, and Johnson can be reconciled: the Comen line of cases ultimately
rests on the absence of plain error; in Underwood and Johnson there were either facts or a
concession showing that plain error occured at sentencing. The present case is like
Comen because the lack of any facts or a concession on the issue of allied offenses makes
it impossible to determine if plain error occurred.
{¶24} The approach advocated by Baker and Corrao essentially makes allied
offenses an issue whenever a defendant pleads guilty to multiple offenses, regardless of
whether those offenses might colorably be allied. The difficulty with this approach is that
it puts a greater burden on the trial judge to advocate for a defendant’s rights than on
defense counsel. In criminal cases that terminate by plea agreement, the court usually has
no involvement apart from taking the plea and sentencing. It is unclear why the
sentencing judge, who would presumably have less knowledge of the facts than defense
counsel, should have the obligation to raise the issue of allied offenses in the first instance
when defense counsel has failed to do so. To be sure, the court has an affirmative duty to
advise a defendant of the consequences of waiving constitutional rights; for example,
guilty pleas, speedy trial, or jury waiver. But we have never required the court to act as
second-chair to defense counsel to point out possible errors in trial tactics that might
result in the defendant’s forfeiture of rights on appeal. If defense counsel fails to preserve
error for appeal, that issue should be the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
in postconviction proceedings.
{¶25} The better practice is that a defendant who pleads guilty to multiple offenses
must take the initiative and not only raise the matter of allied offenses at the time of the
plea or at sentencing, but also take steps to ensure that the record contains the information
necessary to demonstrate a claimed error on appeal. While we have made it clear that
allied offenses are a sentencing issue, Snuffer, supra, at ¶ 10, defense counsel should raise
potential allied offenses as part of the plea bargain. Of course, the parties to a plea
bargain cannot decide on a sentence — that is the court’s prerogative. State ex rel. Duran
v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6. But the parties can
certainly reach an agreement on whether offenses might merge for sentencing and state on
the record why they believe that the offenses should merge for sentencing. In fact, the
state represented during oral argument in this case that it is now addressing potential allied
offenses at the bargaining stage. If the court were to reject a recommendation that allied
offenses merge, a record would exist to review the trial court’s decision.
{¶26} The absence of any facts in the record demonstrating that the counts to which
Barrett pleaded guilty should merge as allied offenses rules out any finding of plain error.
We overrule this assignment of error.
II
{¶27} Barrett next argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a
seven-year cumulative sentence because it failed to consider rehabilitation as a proper
purpose of felony sentencing. He bases this argument on the court’s statement that “I
don’t personally believe that the goal of a prison term in this type of case is rehabilitation *
* * I’m not convinced in 15 years as a Judge and 30 years as a lawyer that sexual offenders
can be rehabilitated.”
{¶28} R.C. 2929.11(A) states:
A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the
overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of
felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender
and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the
court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an
unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve
those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future
crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the
offense, the public, or both.
{¶29} In its journal entry imposing sentence, the court stated that it “considered all
required factors of the law” and further stated that a prison term “is consistent with the
purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” Apart from its sentencing entry, the court mentioned Barrett’s
prospects for rehabilitation, but rejected them out-of-hand. In State v. Nichols, 2d Dist.
No. 2010CA60, 2011-Ohio-4671, the Second District Court of Appeals considered a
similar circumstance in which a sentencing judge told Nichols that “I’m not here to be
concerned about what happens to you. Whether or not you’re rehabilitated * * * — It’s
not my job to worry about what happens to you. It’s my job to punish you, and it’s my job
to protect the community.” Id. at ¶ 36. The Second District criticized this approach,
finding that the judge who sentenced Nichols failed to give the kind of individualized
attention to the matter that “justice” required. Id.
{¶30} The distinction between Nichols and this case is that in Nichols, the court
refused to consider whether Nichols could be rehabilitated, stating “it’s not my job to
worry about what happens to you.” The court in this case did consider whether Barrett
could be rehabilitated, but rejected that idea given its past experience in dealing with
sexual offenders. The court stated that sexual offenders “can perhaps be taught to resist
the urge, but nobody has convinced me yet from any of the literature or studies that
anything makes the urge go away.” Barrett may disagree with the court’s statements, but
those statements did consider rehabilitation.
{¶31} Barrett’s argument is really that the court’s outright rejection of the
amenability of sexual offenders for rehabilitation was tantamount to no consideration at
all. The difficulty with this approach is that Barrett appears to consider one’s prospects
for “rehabilitation” as obviating the need for a prison term. This argument incorrectly
assumes that an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation would necessarily rule out a prison
term. State v. Gilmer, 6th Dist. No. OT-05-028, 2005-Ohio-6435, ¶ 7.
{¶32} Rehabilitation has lost favor in the criminal justice system. State v. Boddie,
170 Ohio App.3d 590, 2007-Ohio-626, 868 N.E.2d 699, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). Under the
rehabilitative theory of sentencing, the courts had broad discretion to order indeterminate
sentences and early release based on the change shown by an offender during confinement.
This was replaced with a more punitive regime in which the goal of sentencing is to
punish and protect. R.C. 2929.11(A). To accomplish the move towards punishment, the
legislature imposed definite sentences that were designed to remove a great deal of the
court’s sentencing discretion. An offender’s prospects for rehabilitation are a
consideration in sentencing, but rehabilitation is certainly subordinate to punishment and
protection in the current statutory scheme.
{¶33} We agree that the court’s statements concerning the viability of rehabilitation
for sexual offenders as a whole may have been broader than necessary in this case. But
those statements do not show an abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion because the
court made it plain that it considered Barrett’s need for punishment to outweigh his
prospects for rehabilitation. In addition to the child pornography counts, Barrett pleaded
guilty to two counts of voyeurism. The voyeurism counts were particularly disturbing to
the court because they involved Barrett rigging a peephole in the shower of a bathroom at
his house to watch his female roommate while she showered. What is more, he went far
beyond mere voyeurism by surreptitiously shooting video of her showering and posting that
video on the internet. The victim gave a compelling statement of the adverse ways in
which Barrett’s actions had harmed her; from the loss of trust she placed in him as a friend
to the unspeakable violation of her privacy by having a nude video of her posted for the
world to see.
{¶34} Barrett told the court that he was receiving therapy and engaging in
Sexaholics Anonymous. These were positive steps for Barrett to take, but the court
determined that they did not overcome his need for punishment. Barrett admittedly
violated the trust placed in him by the victims and told the court that he had given into
temptation. We find that the court rationally concluded that Barrett’s rehabilitation
required a prison term.
III
{¶35} Finally, Barrett argues that his seven-year sentence is disproportionate to
those given for similarly-situated offenders. In his sentencing memorandum, Barrett
offered a list of sentences imposed in child pornography cases in Cuyahoga County from
2008 to October 2011 involving “similar offenses and similar defendants,” showing a
range of punishments from community control to 24 years in prison. He argues that his
punishment should have fallen into the lower range because he had no prior criminal
history and did not manufacture or create the images in question.
{¶36} R.C. 2929.11(B) states that a felony sentence should be “reasonably
calculated” to achieve the goals of punishing the offender and protecting the public from
future crime by the offender “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of
the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶37} R.C. 2929.11(B) states two different concepts: proportionality and
consistency. “Proportionality,” as encompassed in the goal of punishing an offender
“commensurate” with the seriousness of his conduct, refers to the concept of the
punishment fitting the crime. In Collier, 8th Dist. No. 95572, 2011-Ohio-2791, we stated:
“The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between
crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are
grossly disproportionate” to the crime. State v. Weitbrecht (1999), 86 Ohio
St.3d 368, 373, 715 N.E.2d 167, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501
U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in
judgment).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to object to the
proportionality of a sentence are rarely, if ever, successful. Ewing v.
California (2003), 538 U.S. 11, 21, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108(“outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”) This is
because courts are vested with “full discretion” to impose a sentence within
the applicable statutory range. State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, paragraph seven of the syllabus. The
statutory range is established by the General Assembly, and any sentence
falling within that range is presumptively valid. Id. at ¶ 14-15.
{¶38} “Consistency” in sentencing goes beyond considerations of an individual
defendant to consider whether a sentence given in a particular case is consistent with those
given to similar offenders. The goal of “consistent” sentencing does not mean that all
sentences must be identical. In State v. Bonness, 8th Dist. No. 96557, 2012-Ohio-474, we
stated:
The goal of “consistency” in sentencing as stated in R.C. 2929.11(B) does
not mean uniformity. State v. Klepatzki, 8th Dist. No. 81676,
2003-Ohio-1529, ¶ 32. Each case stands on its own unique facts, so we have
concluded that “[a] list of child pornography cases is of questionable value in
determining whether the sentences imposed are consistent for similar crimes
committed by similar offenders since it does not take into account all the
unique factors that may distinguish one case from another.” State v. Siber,
8th Dist. No. 94882, 2011-Ohio-109, ¶ 15. Id. at ¶ 27.
{¶39} In Bonness, we reversed a 40-year sentence on eight child pornography
counts as being inconsistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes. We canvassed a
number of our decisions showing penalty ranges from 10 to 20 years, noting for example
that in State v. Geddes, 8th Dist. No. 88186, 2007-Ohio-2626, we reversed a 30-year
sentence on six counts of pandering sexually oriented materials when Geddes pleaded
guilty to printing images of child pornography from a public library while on parole and
subsequently affirmed an 18-year sentence imposed on remand. Id. at ¶ 28.
{¶40} Bonness was an egregious case because Bonness not only possessed child
pornography, but was caught in a police sting in which he thought he was going to have
sex with a 12-year-old girl and her father. Barrett claimed to have no pedophilic desire
and offered the results of a polygraph examination that indicated the truthfulness of his
negative answer to the question “as an adult, have you ever had sexual contact with a
minor?” Yet he admitted engaging in acts of voyeurism in addition to possessing child
pornography. Furthermore, he explained his conduct as merely “a temptation that I
caved in to.” The court was rightfully concerned by the violation of trust placed in him by
his roommate and his surreptitiously videotaping her in the shower. His act of posting the
video on the internet went beyond mere temptation. The court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing a seven-year sentence.
{¶41} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded
to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCURS
IN JUDGMENT ONLY WITH SEPARATE
OPINION;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTS WITH
SEPARATE OPINION
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:
{¶42} I concur in judgment only because the majority goes beyond what I consider
necessary to affirm the judgment. I concur in all but the majority’s disagreement with the
precedent of this court in Baker and Corrao. Clearly, in the instant case, each file Barrett
saved is a separate offense, and that is why he pled guilty to nine counts of the same crime.
See State v. Hendricks, 8th Dist. No. 92213, 2009-Ohio-5556 (multiple convictions are
allowed for each individual image because a separate animus exists every time a separate
image or file is downloaded and saved). Thus, the record contains enough information
for us to affirm.
{¶43} Moreover, Barrett has failed to meet the standard set forth by this court to
find plain error for these specific charges. He has failed to offer any evidence to make an
obvious case for plain error in the trial court’s failure to merge these nine counts of illegal
use of a minor. Barrett admitted he had obtained the images as part of larger file
transfers. In State v. Snuffer, 8th Dist. No. 96480, 2011-Ohio-6430, and State v. Lindsey,
8th Dist. No. 96601, 2012-Ohio-804, ¶ 13, this court held that defendants must make an
“obvious case” for plain error review to apply. Barrett’s suggestion that “it is possible
that the same conduct could establish a violation of each offense,” does not meet this
requirement, not in light of his admission that he obtained the images as part of larger file
transfers. Therefore, I would affirm.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTING:
{¶44} The majority opinion and this dissent represent two distinct views on the
allied offense issue. In light of all the confusion and inconsistent application of the
principles in R.C. 2941.25 that continue in spite of Johnson, this is a healthy and needed
discourse. Both views raise issues involving the trial court record below, the duty of
prosecutors and defense counsel, the duties of the trial judge, and the burden of who must
raise the issue and how it must be resolved. If this case stands for anything, it calls for
another review of these issues by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Clearly, many courts are
still struggling with these issues, and unless the legislature acts to clarify the statutory
language, the Supreme Court of Ohio will once again have to intervene. See State v.
Anderson, 1st Dist. No. C-110029, 2012-Ohio-3347.
{¶45} While the majority view is well written and well reasoned, it nevertheless
represents an “end run” around the mandates of State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365,
2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923. While Barrett’s guilty plea may be a complete admission
of his guilt, it in no way is an acknowledgment that the facts support the imposition of
separate convictions or that Barrett acted with a separate animus as mandated by State v.
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061.
{¶46} In my view, plain error exists as a result of the trial court’s failure to
determine whether the offenses were allied where the absence of facts in the record makes
that determination on appeal impossible. As the majority notes in paragraph six of their
opinion, images were downloaded by Barrett on three separate dates, resulting in nine
separate charges. There is no specificity in the individual indictment counts or in the
record at any other location explaining “what goes where” to establish separate conduct or
separate animus.
{¶47} In my view, the existence of plain error cannot be predicated on Barrett’s
failure to put facts in the record or his failure to raise the issue in the trial court. The
defendant is under no duty to prove offenses are allied. Entering into a plea agreement to
reduced charges, likewise, does not resolve the issue unless the defendant agreed in the
plea that his conduct was committed with a separate animus.
[N]othing in this decision precludes the state and a defendant from
stipulating in a plea agreement that the offenses were committed with
separate animus, thus subjecting the defendant to more than one conviction
and sentence. When the plea agreement is silent on the issue of allied
offenses of similar import, however, a trial court is obligated under R.C.
2941.25 to determine whether the offenses are allied, and if they are, to
convict the defendant of only one offense.
Underwood, at ¶ 29.
{¶48} Barrett never agreed his counts were allied. If we look solely at the facts in
the record, we cannot determine if his conduct involved separate acts or a separate animus
for each of the nine offenses charged. Barrett downloaded large files containing multiple
images or films on three distinct dates, but there is no specificity detailing the number or
identity of these images or films to these specific download dates. 1 Thus, we are
incapable of determining how, or if, these images are related to the specific charges to
which Barrett pled guilty.
{¶49} It is a fundamental principle that an offender can be punished only once for a
crime. The trial court judge has a duty to ensure this constitutional protection. If the
facts necessary to determine whether offenses are allied are not in the record and the trial
court does not inquire, then plain error exists when the issue is raised on appeal. R.C.
2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10, which
prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense.
This writer has previously affirmed the imposition of separate convictions for the possession
1
of multiple films and pictures involving child pornography under the former Cabrales standard in
State v. Hendricks, 8th Dist. No. 92213, 2009-Ohio-5556. Unlike in the present case, in Hendricks,
the films and pictures were specifically identified and distinct.
{¶50} The majority views our earlier decisions in State v. Baker, 8th Dist. No.
97139, 2012-Ohio-1833, and State v. Corrao, 8th Dist. No. 95167, 2011-Ohio-2517, as
departures from prior precedent only because it deems plain error cannot be found due to
the “absence of facts” in the record. The majority has the cat chasing its own tail in a
hopeless endeavor that can never be realized. The view that it is plain error not to merge
allied offenses, but we do not have facts to find plain error, therefore plain error does not
exist, is a self-fulfilling prophecy that defeats the constitutional protection outlined in
Underwood. In my view, it is the absence of facts, or at least an inquiry into those facts,
that makes the question ripe for review and creates plain error. In a previous case, this
court held that the failure of the trial court to inquire was plain error and required a
remand.
In the present case, the parties did not stipulate that the offenses were
not allied offenses, and the trial court did not make the necessary inquiry.
Furthermore, the record of Quigley’s plea and sentence does not contain the
necessary details as to the timing, circumstances, and animus of the burglary
and theft from which a court can make the determination as to whether the
offenses are or are not allied offenses of similar import. The failure to
make the inquiry was plain error and requires a remand.
State v. Quigley, 8th Dist. No. 96299, 2012-Ohio-2751, ¶ 10.
{¶51} Under the majority’s view, the duty would fall to the defendant to raise the
issue in the trial court and arguably prove the offenses were allied by putting sufficient
facts in the record supporting this position. Short of that, the defendant would be left
with a claim on appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel. This would absolve the trial
court and prosecutors of having to demonstrate why separate punishments were warranted.
I reject this approach.
{¶52} As we noted in Baker,
The trial court is therefore prohibited from imposing individual sentences for
counts that constitute allied offenses of similar import unless the defendant
specifically stipulates to a separate animus or separate acts, either during the
plea or at the sentencing hearing. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365,
2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶26-27. Further, “[a] defendant’s plea to
multiple counts does not affect the court’s duty to merge those allied counts
at sentencing.” Underwood at ¶ 26. A plea to reduced charges, in and of
itself, is not a stipulation to separate animus or separate acts. Waiver of a
fundamental, constitutional right must be an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a right. Id. at ¶ 32. Defendants cannot “acquiesce away”
a constitutional right.
Baker, 2012-Ohio-1833, ¶ 17.
{¶53} As further noted in Underwood,
[A] trial court is prohibited from imposing individual sentences for counts
that constitute allied offenses of similar import. A defendant’s plea to
multiple counts does not affect the court’s duty to merge those allied counts
at sentencing. This duty is mandatory, not discretionary.
(Citations omitted.) Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶
26. Thus, when a sentence fails to include a mandatory provision, it may be appealed
because such a sentence is “contrary to law” and is also not “authorized by law.”
{¶54} The majority plays the Antenori card that has been used before in an effort to
distinguish Underwood. I am well aware that the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the
Antenori appeal as improvidently allowed following the release of Underwood and further
declined to accept it on reconsideration. State v. Antenori, 8th Dist. No. 90580,
2008-Ohio-5987, is an anomaly that, in my view, is in conflict with Underwood. I am
also aware that I cited Antenori in a postconviction Murnahan decision referenced by the
majority. State v. Clementson, 8th Dist. No. 94230, 2011-Ohio-1798. That case was
not a direct appeal and involved a postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. That is a far different circumstance from Barrett’s case now under review.
Nevertheless, I readily acknowledge my view of allied offense analysis has undergone a
transformation, and like many of the nearly 200 appellate decisions released since the
Supreme Court of Ohio released Johnson, conflict and evolution is regrettably the norm
and not the exception in this area of the law.
{¶55} I would also strongly reject the notion that because Underwood was decided
when Rance was still in play, that it somehow has lost its viability in the post-Johnson
world. Underwood was not about the test to determine allied offenses; it was about the
right to be free from separate punishments for the same conduct, regardless of the test
imposed. The principles of Underwood are clear and would be no different if
Underwood was decided under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180,
76 L.Ed 306 (1932); State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 128, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979);
State v. Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 526 N.E.2d 816 (1988); State v. Rance, 85 Ohio
St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999); State v. Cabrales, 118 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-1625,
886 N.E.2d 181; or State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d
1061.
{¶56} In my view, Baker does not go as far as the majority claims that it does in its
analysis. At no point does the term “per se” appear in the opinion. Baker does not
apply a different plain error standard than was used in Underwood. Baker simply points
out that there has to be something in the record that would allow for a resolution or review
of the allied offenses issue once the issue (whether in the trial court or on initial appeal) is
raised. It is not so much a “per se” plain error violation, as it is the inability to resolve the
issue based on the record and the trial court’s failure to inquire. Call the error “plain” or
another adjective of description, but that is where the error occurs. The semantics are not
important. If facts exist in the record for a healthy examination, then the trial court’s
failure to act will not necessarily result in “per se” plain error. The failure to put
something on the record by way of a stipulation, an expression of facts, an assertion, or
even a finding by the trial court of separate conduct or animus results in the issue
remaining unresolved and the constitutional protection potentially undermined.
Appellant’s use of the term “possible” in terms of whether these offenses are or are not
allied is merely a representation of the fact that the matter is not capable of a fair and full
determination based on this record.
{¶57} I also take issue with the majority parsing out distinctions between cases
involving no contest pleas, guilty pleas, bench trials or jury trials or how the manner of
conviction is achieved. This turns the discussion into a debate about trees when the
forest is the issue. In all cases, it is the constitutional protection against multiple
punishments that is critical, not the manner or method of conviction.
{¶58} I respectfully disagree with the majority’s view that Baker creates an unfair
burden on trial judges by having them take responsibility for determining whether offenses
are allied. The view that pleas to multiple counts will always create allied offense issues
is an oversimplification or a “red herring” view of the issue. I think we all know when
allied offense issues are implicated. All we have to do is find a simple way to address
them. I am very much aware that trial judges are frustrated by never-ending mandates
that turn plea sessions and sentencing hearings into mini-trials. Nevertheless, this does
not have to be rocket science.
{¶59} I am well aware that there are offenders who deserve separate convictions
and punishments for certain conduct. Rather than ignoring the question, prosecutors
should relish the opportunity to make the case for why certain offenders deserve
convictions or punishments based on their conduct. Barrett may well be one of them.
{¶60} Prosecutors are free to charge in any manner they see fit. They can charge
as many counts as they conceivably feel cover the gamut of a defendant’s conduct. With
that, there are many opportunities to address the allied offenses issue along the path of
case resolution. Prosecutors can put facts into the individual indictment counts
distinguishing conduct; they can indicate in the response to a bill of particulars what
offenses are not allied; at the time of a plea, they can indicate which offenses are not allied
and why they are not allied; they can also point out at sentencing why offenses are not
allied; they can also enter into a stipulation on what offenses are committed with a similar
or distinct animus. Thus, at any point in the process, they can put facts on the record that
would support a determination that certain offenses are not allied.
{¶61} This does not have to involve long or complicated hearings or witnesses.
Historically, merger of offenses has always been viewed as a part of the sentencing
process. Thus, “the sentencing process is less exacting than the process of establishing
guilt.” State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 14 (2d
Dist.), citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745(1994). Therefore, this process can easily be satisfied by a brief recitation of facts or
circumstances by the prosecutor to aid the trial court in its determination. Nothing more
should be required.
{¶62} The trial judge has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that an offender is
punished only once for a specific crime. That is the ultimate issue that cannot be lost in
this process. A defendant’s conviction on multiple counts, regardless of how achieved,
does not affect the court’s duty to merge those allied counts at sentencing. This duty is
mandatory, not discretionary. Therefore, when a sentence is imposed on multiple counts
that are allied offenses of similar import in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), R.C. 2953.08(D)
does not bar appellate review of that sentence even though it was jointly recommended by
the parties and imposed by the court. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922
N.E.2d 923.
{¶63} If the record does not support it, or the trial court does not inquire, you have
plain error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.