State v. Bronston , 2012 Ohio 2631 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Bronston, 2012-Ohio-2631.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97558
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
EDWARD BRONSTON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-451589
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 14, 2012
FOR APPELLANT
Edward Bronston, pro se
Inmate No. 471-390
Marion Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 57
Marion, OH 43302
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Daniel T. Van
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1, the trial court records, and briefs of counsel. Edward
Bronston appeals from the trial court’s order reinstating his reporting requirements under
Megan’s Law. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} In State v. Bronston, 8th Dist. No. 94936, 2011-Ohio-3576 (“Bronston I”),
this court reversed the trial court’s decision reclassifying Bronston under the Adam Walsh
Act and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reinstating Bronston’s Megan’s
Law reporting requirements. On remand, the trial court held a hearing in which
Bronston appeared, through video, with his attorney. The trial court reinstated
Bronston’s Megan’s Law reporting requirements. Bronston, pro se, appealed, raising
five assignments of error.
{¶3} Bronston argues as follows: the trial court erred by not allowing him to
address the court at the hearing; the trial court failed to address erroneous aspects of his
underlying sentence, originally imposed on July 21, 2004; and the trial court failed to
notify him of his right to appeal from the hearing reinstating his Megan’s Law reporting
requirements. We note that his argument about the notice of his appellate rights is moot
in light of the fact that this court granted him a delayed appeal. Bronston’s remaining
arguments are without merit. His arguments generally address issues the trial court was
without jurisdiction to resolve.
{¶4} The scope of the remand from Bronston I was limited to reinstating
Bronston’s Megan’s Law reporting requirements. Trial courts have no authority to
extend the scope of remand limited by a mandate of this court. Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio
St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984), citing Briggs v. Pennsylvania RR. Co., 334 U.S. 304,
306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948). Bronston addressed the court during the
hearing and asked to introduce additional evidence unrelated to reinstating his Megan’s
Law reporting requirements. The court correctly denied his request in light of the
limited nature of the remand. See State v. Gates, 8th Dist. No. 82385, 2004-Ohio-1453,
¶ 9 (jurisdictional concerns dictate that trial courts are not free to exceed the scope of the
limited remand). The sole purpose of the remand was to reinstate Bronston’s original
reporting requirements. The trial court properly carried out its mandate and reinstated
his Megan’s Law reporting requirements. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to address
any aspect of Bronston’s original sentencing or conviction. His assignments of error are
accordingly overruled.
{¶5} The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR