State v. Ruff , 2015 Ohio 3367 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-3367.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-120533
C-120534
Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. B-0907091
B-1000868
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
KENNETH RUFF, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Sentences Vacated in Part,
and Cause Remanded.
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 21, 2015
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel Lipman
Curren, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
The Farrish Law Firm and Michaela M. Stagnaro, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D E W INE , Judge.
{¶1} Kenneth Ruff broke into the homes of three women and raped
them. For this, he was convicted of three counts of aggravated burglary and
three counts of rape. On appeal, we found that the aggravated-burglary and
rape offenses were allied offenses for which Ruff could not be separately
convicted, so we vacated those sentences and remanded the cause to the trial
court. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, determined that in applying the
merger statute, we had failed to consider whether the offenses were of similar
import. It remanded the case so that we could consider the similar-import
question.
{¶2} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the offenses were
offenses of similar import. Thus, we vacate the sentences for the aggravated
burglaries and rapes and remand the case to the trial court. In all other respects,
the judgment of the court is affirmed.
I. The Issue Before Us
{¶3} The facts were set forth in our prior opinion and there is no need
to repeat them in detail here. See State v. Ruff, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120533
and C-120534, 2013-Ohio-3234 (“Ruff I”). Important for our purposes is that
Ruff’s aggravated-burglary convictions came under R.C. 2911.11(A)(1). That
subsection requires that in addition to breaking into an occupied structure with
the intent to commit a criminal offense, “the offender inflict[] or attempt to inflict
physical harm on another.” It is this physical-harm element that elevates the
offense to aggravated burglary. Absent the physical-harm element—or a
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violation of (A)(2) involving a firearm or dangerous ordnance—the offense would
be simple burglary.
{¶4} In the trial court, the state relied solely on the rapes to meet the
physical-harm requirement of the statute. Thus, this case requires us to apply
Ohio’s merger statute, R.C. 2941.25, in a situation where the conduct constituting
one offense also serves as the aggravating element of another offense.
II. Our Prior Decision
{¶5} In Ruff I, we applied the Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. The Johnson
case represented a marked break in the manner in which the Supreme Court had
determined whether offenses were of a “similar import.” Prior to Johnson, the
inquiry had focused on an analysis of the statutory elements—an inquiry quite
similar to the one engaged in by federal courts under the Blockburger test. See
State v. Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-995, __ N.E.3d __ (French, J.,
dissenting). But in Johnson, the court required that we examine the defendant’s
conduct. Johnson at syllabus.
{¶6} We explained in Ruff I that pre-Johnson, it was widely understood
that aggravated burglary was not allied with an offense of violence that occurs
after the defendant has entered the premises. Ruff I at ¶ 30. We observed,
however, that Johnson had changed the analysis:
[t]his court has understood Johnson to mean that if the evidence
adduced at trial reveals that the state relied upon the same
conduct to support the two offenses, and that the offenses had
been committed neither separately nor with a separate animus as
to each, then the defendant is afforded the protection of R.C.
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2941.25, and the trial court errs in imposing separate sentences
for the offenses.
Id. at ¶ 31. Based on this understanding of Johnson, we concluded that the trial
court should have merged the offenses because the conduct relied upon by the
state to establish rape was the same conduct it relied upon to establish the
“physical harm” component of aggravated burglary. We thus vacated the
sentences for the aggravated-burglary and rape counts and remanded the case so
that the state could elect which offenses it wanted to pursue for sentence and
conviction. Id. ¶ 33.
III. The Supreme Court Decision
{¶7} The Supreme Court reversed our decision, concluding that in
determining whether the aggravated-burglary and rape counts as to each victim
should have been merged, we had neglected to consider whether the import of
the offenses was similar. Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-995, __ N.E.3d __,
at ¶ 29.
{¶8} The court took the opportunity to clarify its ruling in Johnson. In
Johnson, it had held that “[w]hen determining whether two offenses are allied
offenses of similar import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of
the accused must be considered.” Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314,
942 N.E.2d 1061, at syllabus. In Ruff, it explained that that analysis was
incomplete because it did not address the question of whether the offenses were
of dissimilar import. Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-995, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶
16. See R.C. 2941.25(B). Thus, the court held that
[u]nder R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports
multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of
dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were
committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses
were committed with separate animus.
Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. Based on its determination that our
analysis of Ruff’s offenses had not taken into account the import of the offenses,
it remanded the case.
IV. Are the Offenses of Similar Import?
{¶9} The sole issue on remand, then, is whether the offenses of
aggravated-burglary and rape were of similar or dissimilar import. If they were
of dissimilar import, Mr. Ruff could be separately convicted of each offense.
Conversely, if the offenses are of similar import, our earlier conclusion stands,
and the court must merge the offenses.
A. The Supreme Court on Import
{¶10} While not deciding whether the offenses in this case were of
similar import, the Ohio Supreme Court in Ruff did provide some guidance on
how to make the determination.
{¶11} The state had urged the court to hold that aggravated burglary and
rape must always have dissimilar import. But the court declined to announce “a
bright-line rule” to “govern every situation”:
Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine
whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis
must focus on the defendant’s conduct to determine whether one
or more convictions may result because an offense may be
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
committed in a variety of ways and the offenses committed may
have different import.
Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2015-Ohio-995, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 30.
{¶12} Looking to its past decisions to pin down a definition of import,
the court explained that offenses are of dissimilar import “when the defendant’s
conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results
from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Id. at ¶ 23. Here, the aggravated-
burglary/rape offenses had one victim each, so we consider whether the harm
that resulted from each offense was separate and identifiable.
B. Separate and Identifiable Harms?
{¶13} We turn now to the harms that resulted from the offenses in the
case. The aggravated-burglary offenses at issue here are somewhat unusual in
that they involve two distinct harms: the intrusion into the sanctity of the home
and the subsequent physical harm (here, the rapes). One harm—the intrusion in
the dwelling—is separate and identifiable from the harm caused by the rape
offenses here, but the other harm—the physical harm—is not separate and
identifiable.
{¶14} Unfortunately, the court in Ruff did not explicitly say what we
should do in a situation such as this one where one offense involves multiple
harms, and one offense constitutes an aggravating element of the other.
Fortunately, though, it did drop a few breadcrumbs.
{¶15} The most obvious clue is the court’s rejection of a “categorical
rule” that aggravated burglary and rape are of dissimilar import. The state
argued in the Supreme Court—as it does here—that rape and aggravated burglary
are of dissimilar import because rape is a sexually oriented offense while burglary
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
is about trespass into structures.1 Under this logic, aggravated burglary would
always have a dissimilar import from rape or any other act of violence
constituting the “aggravating factor,” because aggravated burglary always
involves a separately identifiable harm in the intrusion into a dwelling. The court
in Ruff, however, specifically rejected this analysis: it “decline[d] to create an
absolute rule based upon the definition of the offenses.” Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d __,
2015-Ohio-995, __N.E.3d __, at ¶ 26.
{¶16} If there only needed to be one harm that was separate and
identifiable, then rape and aggravated burglary could never merge because
aggravated burglary will always involve the “separate and identifiable” harm
caused by the intrusion into the dwelling. The same would be true of assault or
any other crime constituting the aggravating element of physical harm for
aggravated burglary. Thus, implicit in its rejection of a categorical rule and
remand to this court is the idea that the offenses are of similar import when the
harm caused by one crime is the same harm that is the aggravating circumstance
of another crime.
{¶17} The court suggested as much in its discussion of similar import. It
explained that offenses are “not allied offenses of similar import if neither is
incident to the other.” Id. at ¶ 23. It supported this proposition by citing to State
v. Moss, 69 Ohio St. 2d 515, 433 N.E.2d 181 (1982), a case the court summarized
with this parenthetical: “aggravated burglary was not an allied offense of
aggravated murder, because it was not incident to and an element of aggravated
1 The state also repeats arguments it raised in Ruff I about Ruff’s animus and whether the
offenses were separately committed. The issue appealed to the Supreme Court and
remanded to us, however, was limited to the import of the offenses. We therefore do not
address the other issues now raised by the state.
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murder.” Ruff at ¶ 23. In this case, the conduct constituting the rape was an
element of the aggravated burglary. The rape was “incident to and an element
of” aggravated burglary in that but for the conduct constituting the rape, the
offense of aggravated burglary would not have established. Only simple burglary
could have been found.
{¶18} Thus, we conclude that the most reasonable reading of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ruff is that where the conduct that constitutes one
offense causes a harm that is not separate and identifiable from the harm caused
by the aggravating element of another offense, then the offenses are of a similar
import.
{¶19} The element of physical harm for each aggravated burglary was
established by Ruff’s rape of the victim. The harm that resulted from the rape of
each victim was same harm that resulted when each burglary escalated to
aggravated burglary. Thus, the harms were not “separate and identifiable.”
{¶20} Perhaps anticipating our conclusion, the state argues that for each
aggravated burglary, Ruff caused or threatened injury to the victims beyond the
rapes. The Ohio Supreme Court faced a similar argument in Johnson, when it
considered whether a sequence of blows to a victim could be seen to support
multiple convictions. The court declined the opportunity to “parse [the
defendant’s] conduct into a blow-by-blow” and concluded that the sequence of
blows was one discrete act. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942
N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 56.
{¶21} Here, there was testimony that Ruff had threatened, choked and
hit his victims. But the state used evidence of those acts to establish the force
element for each rape. It relied solely on the rape offenses—and not other
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actions done by Ruff—to establish the injury element of the aggravated
burglaries. During the hearing on the issue of merger, the state did not argue
that other actions by Ruff established the physical-harm element. And it did not
dispute defense counsel’s assertion that the physical harm for the aggravated
burglary was the rape. Rather, the state argued the offenses were committed
separately because the “[b]urglaries would have been committed and completed
upon his entrance into the house.”
{¶22} The state also has suggested that a decision to merge the
aggravated-burglary and rape offenses under this fact pattern means that a
defendant like Ruff cannot be punished for both the rape and the invasion of the
home. But that is not true at all. There is no reason Ruff could not have been
charged and convicted of both simple burglary and rape. In such a situation, the
convictions would not have merged. See Ruff I, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-
120533 and C-120534, 2013-Ohio-3234, at ¶ 34. The problem only arises when a
defendant is convicted of both rape and aggravated burglary and the rape is the
aggravating element that transforms burglary to aggravated burglary.
V. Conclusion
{¶23} Because the harm that resulted from each aggravated burglary
was not separate and identifiable from the harm caused by each rape, we
conclude that the offenses as to each victim were of similar import. And because
the offenses were not committed separately or with separate animus, Mr. Ruff
could not be convicted of both offenses for each victim. We therefore vacate the
sentences for the aggravated-burglary and rape counts relating to P.F., K.B., and
S.W., and remand the case to the trial court so that the state may elect which
allied offense it will pursue for purposes of sentence and conviction. See State v.
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Whitfield, 124 Ohio St. 3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, paragraphs one
and two of the syllabus. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other
respects.
Judgment accordingly.
CUNNINGHAM, P.J., concurs
STAUTBERG, J., dissents.
STAUTBERG, J., dissenting.
{¶24} I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that the rapes and
aggravated burglaries in these cases are offenses of similar import subject to
merger under R.C. 2941.25.
{¶25} I agree with the majority that the Ohio Supreme Court in Ruff
rejected an “absolute rule based on the definition of the offense” in
determining whether offenses should merge. Ruff, __ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-
Ohio-995, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 28. A similar approach was set forth in State
v. Rance 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999), and disposed of in State
v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, syllabus.
However, the court also rejected the bright-line rule argued by Ruff that
“aggravated burglary, by requiring an element related to physical harm, must
always merge with a violent offense such as rape.” Ruff at ¶ 18.
{¶26} I believe that the Ohio Supreme Court provided plenty of
guidance concerning the appropriate test for the “import” of offenses in its
syllabus: “Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning
of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses
involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is
separate and identifiable.” Ruff at paragraph two of the syllabus.
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{¶27} The syllabus echoes now Chief Justice O’Conner’s concurring
opinion in Johnson that offenses “are of ‘similar import’ when the underlying
conduct involves similar criminal wrongs and similar resulting harm.”
Johnson 128 Ohio St. 3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, at ¶ 64.
{¶28} The Ruff court further explained, “even if Ruff committed the
aggravated burglary and the corresponding rape of each victim with the same
conduct, he could still be convicted of both offenses if the offenses are of
dissimilar significance and have separate and identifiable harm.” Ruff at ¶ 28.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶29} Here, the “significance” of the two crimes is clearly different.
At the core of an aggravated-burglary offense is burglary. At the end of the
day, this is an offense against the security of an occupied structure. That the
harm caused by a burglary offense is different from an offense against a
person is made evident by the fact that a person can be convicted of only one
count of burglary regardless of the number of occupants at the time of the
offense. See State v. Marriott, 189 Ohio App. 3d 98, 2010-Ohio-3115, 937
N.E.2d 614 (2d Dist.).
{¶30} In regard to aggravated burglary,
the purpose of R.C. 2911.11(A) is to elevate burglary to an
aggravated offense when the defendant’s conduct raises the
risk of harm to persons by having a deadly weapon or by
threatening or inflicting physical harm. The aggravated-
burglary statute thus criminalizes and enhances the
seriousness of the trespass under those circumstances.
However, R.C. 2911.11(A) is not meant to criminalize an
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offender’s conduct toward the occupants of the structure;
rather, the prosecutor may charge the defendant with an
assault offense to satisfy that interest.
Id. at ¶ 46.
{¶31} Likewise, the Eighth Appellate District has observed that
“burglary” is primarily defined in terms of the offender’s conduct, rather than
his conduct toward another person. See State v. Lynott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 89079, 2007-Ohio-5849, ¶ 28. “At common law, the offense was
intended to punish the ‘breaking of the close.’ ” Id., citing State v. Powers, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86365, 2006-Ohio-2458, ¶ 12. The Lynott court further
found that while the aggravated burglary statute “raises the degree of the
criminal conduct if certain factors attend the offender’s entry,” it “does not
contain an additional penalty for each person affected by the conduct.”
(Citations omitted.) Lynott at ¶ 29.
{¶32} Rape, by contrast, is a personal crime. It involves physical and
potentially long-lasting mental harm. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 12 MA 168, 2014-Ohio-1398, ¶ 4; State v. Fontenet, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-10-1366, 2013-Ohio-1355 ¶ 26-27; State v. Presley, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 02AP-1354, 2003-Ohio-6069, ¶ 85. Indeed, the sentencing
scheme set forth in Title 29 of the Revised Code recognizes this distinction.
In certain cases, rape carries a life sentence. R.C. 2907.02(B). A defendant
convicted of aggravated burglary is subject to the general sentencing
provisions of R.C. 2929.12 et seq.
{¶33} Understanding that an analysis cannot stop here because the
facts of each case must be considered, I would hold that the facts of this case
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establish that the victim of each rape suffered harm that is separate and
identifiable from the harm resulting from each corresponding aggravated
burglary.
{¶34} I see no impediment to parsing out Ruff’s conduct to determine
if his actions could have been the source of a separate and identifiable harm
corresponding to each crime. Further, I find that the state’s purported
reliance on the rape of each victim to establish the “physical harm” element of
each aggravated burglary to be immaterial. Our import-analysis must turn on
an examination of the evidence adduced at trial and during the sentencing
hearing, not on the state’s argument concerning its theory of the case. See
Ruff at ¶ 26. Further, even if Ruff committed the aggravated burglary and the
corresponding rape of each victim with the same conduct, he could still be
convicted of both offenses if the offenses are of dissimilar significance and
have separate and identifiable harm. Ruff at ¶ 28.
{¶35} The Supreme Court went into greater detail concerning the
facts in each aggravated burglary and rape than this court did in Ruff I:
K.B. * * * was living in a group home so that her meals and
medication could be monitored. She stated that on the night
of the attack, she went to bed at 10:00 p.m. and took her
medicine to help her sleep. The next thing she remembered
was waking up in the middle of the night with a man raping
her. K.B. testified that she started to cry and scream but the
man told her, “Shut up or I will kill you.”
***
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S.W. * * * was living in a basement apartment on the
afternoon of May 27, 2009, when a man came over and asked
for her ex-husband. She told the man that she was no longer
with her ex-husband, and the man left. Later that night, a
noise awakened her, and she saw somebody coming toward
her. When she realized it was not her boyfriend, she told the
person to leave and yelled for help. During the rape, S.W.
grabbed her phone, but the assailant jerked it out of her
hands, placed his thumb on her throat, and pushed down,
saying, “If you don't stop fighting me, I'm gonna hurt you.”
Later, S.W. realized that the man who raped her was the same
one who had come by earlier that day looking for her ex-
husband. S.W. said that after that night she made sure all
windows were locked and slept with all the lights on with a
baseball bat and a pipe in her bed.
* * *
During opening statements, the state represented that the
third woman, P.F., had died before trial. Details of the events
of September 9, 2009, were testified to by a sexual-assault
nurse examiner from the medical history that P.F. gave her
during her examination. The examiner testified that she
writes down word for word what a victim says. According to
the statement, P.F. was sitting on her couch when a black
man entered her apartment and demanded money. When she
said that she did not have any, he pushed her down on the
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couch and raped her. When P.F. yelled for help, the man put
his arm across her neck and said, “I killed once already, and I
won't hesitate to do it again.” He also hit her on the head with
his cell phone and choked her several times. The examiner
stated that P.F. had an abrasion and swelling on the right side
of her forehead and that there were petechiae in front of her
right ear lobe, on the right side of her neck, and on her chest,
which was consistent with being choked.
Ruff at ¶ 3-5.
{¶36} Only one of these three victims, K.B., was interviewed by the
court clinic as part of the court-ordered presentence investigation (“PSI”). In
her interview, K.B. stated that she had been to a hospital’s psychiatric unit
twice since the rape. Each time she had stayed for a two-week period.
{¶37} In the cases before us, Ruff’s rape victims were penetrated,
suffered bruising, were choked, were threatened with death, and also ingested
prescribed prophylactic drugs to prevent any potential sexually-transmitted
diseases. At least one of the victims suffered psychiatric harm from the rape
requiring four weeks of hospitalization. I believe these harms are identifiable
and separate from the harms of the aggravated burglaries, regardless of the
fact that the same conduct was used as the aggravating factor for the burglary
in each case.
{¶38} As Judge Dinkelacker succinctly stated in his dissent in Ruff I:
Perhaps the best illustration of the separation of these two
offenses is the separate harms they caused the victims. The
women in this case no longer feel safe in their homes, and
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have been physically violated in the most intimate, personal
way possible. To characterize what occurred to them as
merely the “physical harm” of an aggravated burglary is
unthinkable.
Ruff I, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120533 and C-120534, 2013-Ohio-3234, ¶ 43
(Dinkelacker, J., dissenting).
{¶39} For these reasons, I would hold that Ruff’s aggravated-burglary
convictions and corresponding rape convictions should not merge.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this
opinion.
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