State v. Evans-Goode , 2016 Ohio 5361 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Evans-Goode, 2016-Ohio-5361.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 15CA10
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
SUSAN EVANS-GOODE, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 08/08/16
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Eric M. Hedrick, Assistant State
Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Colleen S. Williams, Meigs County Prosecutor, and Jeremy L. Fisher,
Assistant County Prosecutor, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.
{¶1} Susan Evans-Goode appeals her convictions and sentences in the
Meigs County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found her guilty of one
count of illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, a second degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.04(A), and illegal assembly or possession of
chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine, a third degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.041(A). On appeal, Appellant contends that 1) she
was denied her right to due process and a fair trial when the jury found her
guilty of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 2
methamphetamine when there was not sufficient evidence presented to
sustain a conviction; and 2) the trial court erred in violation of her rights
under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, and R.C.
2941.25, when it failed to merge for sentencing offenses that had a similar
import, arose from the same conduct, and were not committed separately or
with a separate animus. Upon review, we find no merit to Appellant’s
arguments. Accordingly, we overrule both of her assignments of error and
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
{¶2} Appellant Susan Evans-Goode was indicted on one count of
illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, a second degree felony in
violation of R.C. 2925.04(A), and one count of illegal assembly or
possession of chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A). The indictment arose from
activities which occurred on or about January 21, 2015, when officers
arrived at 22688 Bucktown Road, Racine, Ohio, to conduct a “knock and
talk,” which eventually led to obtaining and executing a search warrant. The
search warrant led to the identification of various items used in the
production of methamphetamine, as well as an active one-pot meth lab in
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 3
Appellant’s vehicle, which was parked on the premises. Although the
residence was owned by Terri Carmichael, the record indicates that
Appellant had been living at the residence for approximately one month on
the day the search warrant was executed. Appellant’s boyfriend, Mark
Russell, was also present at the residence that day, but was not living there at
the time.
{¶3} Appellant was tried before a jury on June 30, 2015. The State
presented testimony from the following individuals: Ronald Duvall, a
pharmacist employed at Rite-Aid Pharmacy in Pomeroy, Ohio; Stanton
Wheasler, a forensic scientist employed by the Ohio Bureau of Criminal
Identification and Investigation (BCI); Sergeant Robert “Adam” Smith of
the Meigs County Sheriff’s Department; and Terri Carmichael, Appellant’s
co-defendant. Appellant did not present any witnesses in her defense.
{¶4} The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of both charges
contained in the indictment. The trial court subsequently sentenced
Appellant to prison terms on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for
a total term of eleven years. It is from this order that Appellant now appeals
her convictions and sentences, setting forth two assignments of error for our
review.
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 4
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. SUSAN G. EVANS WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE JURY FOUND HER
GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY OR POSSESSION OF
CHEMICALS FOR MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
WHEN THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
PRESENTED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF MS. EVANS’
RIGHTS UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE
I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, AND R.C.
2941.25, WHEN IT FAILED TO MERGE FOR SENTENCING
OFFENSES THAT HAD A SIMILAR IMPORT, AROSE FROM
THE SAME CONDUCT, AND WERE NOT COMMITTED
SEPARATELY OR WITH A SEPARATE ANIMUS.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Appellant contends that her
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. A claim of
insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern and raises the question
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of
law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses
primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence,
if believed, reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thompkins, syllabus. The standard of review is whether, after
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 5
viewing the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). Furthermore, a
reviewing court is not to assess “whether the state's evidence is to be
believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would
support a conviction.” Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).
{¶6} Thus, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an
appellate court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution. State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996);
State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993). A reviewing
court will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim
unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion that the trier of fact
did. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749 N.E.2d 226 (2001); State
v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001).
{¶7} R.C. 2925.04(A) states: “No person shall knowingly * * *
manufacture or otherwise engage in any part of the production of a
controlled substance.” Thus, in order to sustain appellant's conviction, the
greater weight of the evidence must show that Appellant (1) knowingly (2)
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 6
manufactured or (3) otherwise engaged in the production of (4) a controlled
substance, i.e., methamphetamine. R.C. 2925.041(A) states: “No person
shall knowingly assemble or possess one or more chemicals that may be
used to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II with the intent
to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I or II in violation of
section 2925.04 of the Revised Code.”
{¶8} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is
aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably
be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is
aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “With
regard to the ability to prove an offender's intentions, the Ohio Supreme
Court has recognized that ‘intent, lying as it does within the privacy of a
person's own thoughts, is not susceptible [to] objective proof.’ ” State v.
Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-2298, ¶ 41;
quoting State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).
Thus, “whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a
defendant's admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances
* * *.” State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563, 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st
Dist.2001).
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 7
{¶9} “ ‘Manufacture’ means to plant, cultivate, harvest, process,
make, prepare, or otherwise engage in any part of the production of a drug,
by propagation, extraction, chemical synthesis, or compounding, or any
combination of the same, and includes packaging, repackaging, labeling, and
other activities incident to production.” R.C. 2925.01(J). Further, "the
[S]tate is not required to prove that [A]ppellant is the individual who
assembled all of the materials[,] but rather need "only prove that [A]ppellant
engaged in any part of the production of methamphetamine, which includes
extraction and other activities incident to production." State v. Wickersham,
4th Dist. Meigs No. 13CA10, 2015-Ohio-2756, ¶ 37.
{¶10} “ ‘[P]ossession’ is defined as ‘having control over a thing or
substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or
substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the
thing or substance is found.’ ” State v. Gavin, 4th Dist. Scioto No.
13CA3592, 2015-Ohio-2996 ¶ 35; citing R.C. 2925.01(K). “Possession may
be actual or constructive.” Gavin; quoting State v. Moon, 4th Dist. Adams
No. 08CA875, 2009-Ohio-4830, ¶ 19; citing State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d
174, 175, 538 N.E.2d 98 (1989) (“[t]o constitute possession, it is sufficient
that the defendant has constructive possession”).
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 8
{¶11} “ ‘Actual possession exists when the circumstances indicate
that an individual has or had an item within his immediate physical
possession.’ ” Gavin at ¶ 36; State v. Kingsland, 177 Ohio App.3d 655,
2008-Ohio-4148, 895 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.; quoting State v. Fry, 4th
Dist. Jackson No. 03CA26, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 39. “Constructive
possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and
control over an object, even though that object may not be within his
immediate physical possession.” Gavin, supra; quoting State v. Hankerson,
70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362, syllabus (1982); State v. Brown, 4th
Dist. Athens No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-5390, ¶ 19. For constructive
possession to exist, the State must show that the defendant was conscious of
the object's presence. Gavin, supra; Hankerson at 91; Kingsland at ¶ 13.
Both dominion and control, and whether a person was conscious of the
object's presence, may be established through circumstantial evidence.
Gavin, supra; Brown at ¶ 19. “Moreover, two or more persons may have
joint constructive possession of the same object.” Id.{¶12} Appellant argues that the State failed to show the presence of
any chemicals used to make methamphetamine and also failed to show that
Appellant possessed a chemical used to make methamphetamine. More
specifically, Appellant argues that while Sergeant Smith identified various
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 9
different packaging and containers for some chemicals commonly used in
making meth, he did not testify that any of the containers contained the
indicated chemicals and no testing was performed to confirm the identity of
any chemical used to make meth. She further argues that even if it is
determined that the search yielded chemicals used to make meth, there was
insufficient evidence to prove that she possessed the chemicals. Based upon
the following, we reject Appellant’s arguments.
{¶13} As set forth above, the State introduced testimony from four
witnesses at trial, including a Rite-Aid pharmacist, a forensic scientist from
BCI, a Meigs County Sheriff’s Sergeant, and Appellant’s co-defendant, in
support of its theory that Appellant possessed and assembled chemicals used
in the manufacture of methamphetamine and also manufactured
methamphetamine. Rite-Aid Pharmacist Ronald Duvall testified that Rite-
Aid maintains a central database that monitors purchases of
pseudoephedrine, an ingredient in methamphetamine. He testified that
business records maintained by Rite-Aid demonstrated that Appellant
attempted to purchase Zyrtec-D, which contains pseudoephedrine, on
January 7, 2015, but was blocked from making the purchase due to the fact
that she had purchased more than the maximum amount allowed by law over
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 10
a thirty-day time period. He further testified that she successfully purchased
Allegra-D, which also contains pseudoephedrine, on January 13, 2015.
{¶14} BCI Forensic Scientist Stanton Wheasler also testified on
behalf of the State and was qualified as an expert. He testified that he tested
four items that were provided to him in connection with this case. One of
the items contained an insufficient sample, one was not able to be identified,
but two of the four items, which consisted of a bag containing powder and a
plastic bottle with glass vials, contained methamphetamine. Plastic tubing
submitted with the plastic bottle also contained trace amounts of
methamphetamine. The BCI records indicate that the item determined to
contain methamphetamine came from a one-pot lab, which the record
reveals was recovered from Appellant’s vehicle.
{¶15} Meigs County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Adam Smith
testified that he had obtained specialized training with regard to meth labs
and is a certified meth technician. He testified that the certification enabled
him to identify, dismantle and neutralize meth labs for transport and
disposal. He testified that his experience included responding to over sixty
meth labs. He further testified that he initially arrived at the residence in
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 11
question on January 21, 2015, after his review of NPLEx logs1 and his
investigation at two other residences pointed him there. He testified that he
planned to conduct a “knock and talk,” but that when Mark Russell opened
the door, he saw Appellant and Terri Carmichael sitting on the couch
holding aluminum foil with smoke coming off of it. He also testified that in
plain view was what appeared to be Drano and tubing under the kitchen
sink. Smith testified that based upon his findings he removed Appellant,
Russell and Carmichael from the residence, obtained a search warrant, and
then searched the residence as well as the vehicles parked at the residence.
{¶16} Contrary to Appellant’s argument that his testimony was vague
and lacking in specificity, the record indicates Sergeant Smith testified in
great detail as to the items recovered during the search and also testified
regarding nearly sixty photos introduced by the State. Overall, between the
residence, the trash and a burn pile, Smith testified that he found salt,
solvents, Coleman fuel, liquid fire, drain cleaner, lithium batteries that had
been cut in two, ice packs, boxes and water bladders from ice packs and
pseudoephedrine. Smith testified that these items are all precursors or
ingredients required for the manufacture of methamphetamine. He also
testified that he located scales in Appellant’s bedroom that actually had
1
Smith testified that NPLEx is a national database for anyone that buys Sudafed and that at the time he was
monitoring approximately thirty individuals, including Appellant, on a watch list he had compiled from the
database.
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 12
Appellant’s name written on them in paint marker. Smith further testified
that he located an active one-pot meth lab in Appellant’s vehicle that was
parked at the residence. He testified that he submitted the four items,
including the one-pot, to BCI for testing.
{¶17} Finally, Terri Carmichael, the owner of the house and
Appellant’s co-defendant, testified on behalf of the State. Carmichael
testified that Appellant was at her house and they were “smoking a little bit
of meth” when law enforcement knocked on the door on January 21, 2015.
She testified that Appellant had been living at her house for about a month
and that although Appellant’s boyfriend, Mark Russell, was present that day,
he did not live there. She testified that she had purchased Sudafed on prior
occasions, approximately eight times, to give to Appellant, in return for
money and meth.
{¶18} Carmichael testified that she saw Appellant and Russell
manufacture methamphetamine the night of January 20, 2015, and that the
meth was “finished” at her house. She said that earlier in the day on January
21, 2015, and before law enforcement arrived, she, along with Appellant and
Russell, had gone to Walmart in Gallipolis to purchase Sudafed. She
testified that they also stopped at Wetter’s/Tru Value Lumber that day to
purchase Coleman fuel. She testified that they arrived back home at
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 13
approximately 3:00 p.m., and that police arrived at about 3:15 p.m. Finally,
Carmichael testified that she was arrested on January 21, 2015 and had
already pleaded guilty to possession of chemicals, but not manufacturing.
She testified that she contacted Sergeant Smith to set up a deal for a plea
agreement, and that she was awaiting sentencing pending providing
testimony in this case.
{¶19} In the case sub judice, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, we
believe that Appellant's illegal manufacture and illegal assembly convictions
are supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, we conclude that a
review of the evidence leads to a rational conclusion that Appellant knew
that methamphetamine was being manufactured in the residence, that
Appellant engaged in some part, if not all, of the manufacturing process, and
also that she had assembled and possessed chemicals used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, both prior to and after the cook that took
place either the night of January 20, 2015, or early morning of January 21,
2015.
{¶20} In sum, the evidence and reasonable inferences show the
following: (1) Appellant was living in the residence; (2) stripped lithium
batteries and cold pack bladders were located in and around the residence as
well as the trash; (3) cutting open or stripping lithium batteries and removing
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 14
water bladders from cold packs is part of the production of
methamphetamine; (4) evidence in the form of NPLEx database records and
co-defendant testimony demonstrate Appellant’s repeated attempts to
purchase and/or acquire pseudoephedrine, including testimony from
Appellant’s co-defendant that additional pseudoephedrine and Coleman fuel
were purchased the day after Appellant cooked meth on January 20, 2015;
(5) an active one-pot meth lab was found in Appellant’s vehicle; and (6) due
to the number of ingredients and precursors found in the residence, as well
as scales with Appellant’s name on them located in Appellant’s bedroom,
and an active one-pot meth lab found in Appellant’s vehicle, Appellant was
aware that methamphetamine was being manufactured on the premises, and
she was actively involved in the manufacture as well as the ongoing illegal
assembly and possession of chemicals used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
{¶21} Further, we find no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the State
was required to formally test and identify the chemicals found, such as the
Coleman fuel, the Drano, or the lithium from the batteries. Instead, we
conclude that the fact that the active one-pot was confirmed to contain
methamphetamine leads to a reasonable inference that the various other
chemicals found in the residence were, in fact, what they appeared to be.
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 15
Additionally, Sergeant Smith testified that he had obtained specialized
training in the identification of meth labs. As such, we conclude that his
testimony, if believed, establishes that chemicals used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine were identified.
{¶22} Additionally, with respect to Appellant’s argument that the
State failed to prove she possessed any chemical used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, the testimony at trial indicates that Appellant had
successfully purchased pseudoephedrine on January 13, 2015, that she,
Carmichael and Russell purchased additional pseudoephedrine on January
21, 2015, that she lived in the residence where all of the various different
chemicals and precursors were located, that scales with her name on them
were located in her bedroom, and that what was confirmed to be a one-pot
meth lab was found in her vehicle. Therefore, the jury could have rationally
determined that given these circumstances, Appellant illegally possessed and
assembled chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and also
engaged in some part, or all, of the manufacture of methamphetamine.
{¶23} Finally, after viewing the probative evidence and inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential
elements of these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, we
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 16
conclude Appellant’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶24} In her second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the
trial court erred in failing to merge her convictions for purposes of
sentencing, convictions which she argues are for allied offenses of similar
import. Appellant did not raise this issue during the proceedings below so
she has forfeited all but plain error. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however,
has previously recognized that a trial court plainly errs when it imposes
multiple sentences for allied offenses of similar import. State v. Wilson, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3542, 2015-Ohio-2016, ¶ 63 (internal citations and
footnote omitted).
{¶25} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,” and this protection
applies to Ohio citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment and is
additionally guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
This constitutional protection prohibits multiple punishments for the same
offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072 (1969),
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 17
overruled on other grounds; Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201(1989).
{¶26} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2941.25 to specify when
multiple punishments can be imposed:
"(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in
two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed
separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment
or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
defendant may be convicted of all of them."
{¶27} Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review in an
appeal challenging a trial court's determination of whether offenses
constitute allied offenses of similar import that must be merged under R.C.
2941.25. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983
N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28; State v. Cole, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA49, 2014-Ohio-
2967, ¶ 7. Merger is a sentencing question, and the defendant bears the
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 18
burden of establishing his entitlement to the protection of R.C. 2941.25.
State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661,
¶ 18.
{¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently clarified the applicable
analysis in determining when two offenses merge under R.C. 2941.25 in
State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892. “In
determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the
meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors—the
conduct, the animus, and the import.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
“Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple
offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the following is
true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the
conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the
conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.” Id.at paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶29} As set forth above, Appellant did not raise the issue of merger
during the proceedings below. Likewise, the record bears no indication that
the trial court addressed the issue of allied offenses of similar import or
made a determination regarding merger before sentencing Appellant. This
Court has previously remanded cases to the trial court to make initial
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 19
determinations and findings regarding allied offenses of similar import,
rather than deciding the issue for the first time on appeal. However, we have
more recently determined that "we do not believe that a trial court's failure to
consider the merger issue mandates a remand in all cases. Instead, a remand
is unnecessary when the evidence in the record sufficiently allows for
independent review." State v. Wilson, supra, at ¶ 82; citing State v. Whitaker,
2013-Ohio-4434, 999 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 66.
{¶30} Because we conclude that the record before us sufficiently
allows for independent review of this issue, and in the interests of judicial
economy, we will address this argument on the merits rather than remanding
the case to the trial court for a determination. Further, based upon the
following, we conclude that the offenses presently at issue were committed
separately and with a separate animus and thus, are not allied offenses of
similar import subject to merger.
{¶31} Here, although the dates specified in the indictment list both
offenses as being committed on or about January 21, 2015, the record
demonstrates that the offenses were ongoing and expanded beyond that date
alone. For instance, there is evidence in the record that Appellant purchased
pseudoephedrine on January 13, 2015, approximately 7 days prior to the day
the meth was cooked on the night of January 20, 2015, and that Carmichael
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 20
had purchased pseudoephedrine on eight different occasions, which she gave
to Appellant in exchange for meth. There is also evidence in the record that
Appellant, Carmichael and Russell together traveled to two different
locations on January 21, 2015, the day after the meth was cooked, to buy
additional pseudoephedrine and Coleman fuel. Further, there is evidence in
the record that aside from the used, but still active, one-pot meth lab that was
located in Appellant's vehicle, law enforcement found an abundance of
additional ingredients scattered throughout the residence "over and above"
what was used for the January 20, 2015 cook.2
{¶32} Appellant argues that our prior decision in State v. Sluss, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 13CA24, 2014-Ohio-4156, is controlling and dictates
that the offenses at issue must be merged for purposes of sentencing as the
indictment herein alleges that both the illegal assembly/possession and the
manufacturing occurred on January 21, 2015. Appellant also argues that
because law enforcement only had one encounter with her, the offenses at
issue should have been merged for sentencing. We disagree.
{¶33} First, in Sluss, we were assuming a hypothetical and even then,
we essentially stated that such hypothetical "may" result in a different
outcome, i.e. offenses being determined to be allied and requiring merger,
2
Sergeant Smith, a certified meth technician, testified upon cross-examination in response to defense
counsel's questioning that an active lab is any lab that has not been neutralized.
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 21
not that a different outcome would be required. Sluss at ¶ 22. Second, we
are more inclined to apply the reasoning of the concurring opinion written
by Judge Harsha in Sluss, which seems to place more weight on the fact that
the evidence indicated Sluss had "chemicals used to manufacture
methamphetamine 'over and above' what he used in the two 'cooks' * * *."
Sluss at ¶ 31 (concurring opinion).
{¶34} We further conclude that the facts before us are similar to the
facts in State v. Chandler, 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA11, 2014-Ohio-5215,
¶ 1, 3, which involved charges of illegal assembly or possession, as well as
manufacturing of methamphetamine, and which stemmed from a single
encounter with law enforcement. In Chandler, we determined that the
crimes were not committed with the same conduct or with the same animus.
Id. at ¶ 26. In reaching that decision, we found:
"determinative the fact that Appellant appears to have
purchased pseudoephedrine, cold packs and other materials on
different days that [sic] the actual manufacturing at issue in this
case took place, as well as the fact that additional cold packs,
over and above those needed to manufacture the meth made on
November 1, 2013, were found in Appellant's bedroom during
the search."
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 22
We find the reasoning in Chandler to be persuasive and determinative to the
facts presently before us. Although Chandler was decided under the rubric
of State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061,
and without the benefit of the more recent clarification of the test issued by
the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Ruff, supra, we believe the reasoning set
forth in Chandler nevertheless provides appropriate guidance for the
determination of this issue and is applicable to the case presently before us.
{¶35} In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not commit plain
error in failing to merge these offenses because they are not allied offenses
of similar import. Accordingly, Appellant's second assignment of error is
overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Meigs App. No. 15CA10 23
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be
assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a
continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio
an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If
a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a
notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date
of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignment of Error I;
Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignment of Error II.
For the Court,
BY: _______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this
document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for
further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.