State v. Hall , 2012 Ohio 1051 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Hall, 2012-Ohio-1051.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97035
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
ADAM D. HALL
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-541951
BEFORE: Rocco, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 15, 2012
-i-
2
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Thomas A. Rein
Leader Building, Suite 940
526 Superior Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brian M. McDonough
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
3
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Adam Hall appeals from his conviction after
a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition.
{¶2} Hall presents two assignments of error. He claims his conviction
is not supported by either sufficient evidence or the manifest weight of the
evidence. Upon a review of the record, this court cannot agree with Hall’s
claims. Consequently, his conviction is affirmed.
{¶3} The victim, L.A., provided the following description of the events
leading to Hall’s conviction.
{¶4} L.A., a young, single mother, first met Hall in 2008 and the two of
them had a sexual relationship for a time until Hall left the area. A few
months later, L.A. became involved with a new man; she moved in with him
and bore this man’s child, L.A.’s second, in early 2010.
{¶5} Hall returned to the Cleveland area in June 2010. At that time,
L.A.’s new relationship was under strain, and she was living with relatives.
She began to see Hall again “[a]lmost daily.” L.A. described her relationship
with Hall as “sex friends.”
{¶6} At the end of the summer, her infant’s father persuaded L.A. to
return to his home. L.A. told Hall that she no longer wanted to see him.
4
However, L.A. nevertheless permitted Hall to visit her on at least two
occasions when the father of her infant was not at home. On August 19,
2010, L.A. also met Hall at “his sister’s” residence for a sexual encounter with
him.
{¶7} On the afternoon of August 31, 2010, L.A. awoke from sleep to see
Hall standing in her bedroom doorway. L.A. “lit a cigarette” and asked him
how he had gotten inside. Although she had not heard him, because the air
conditioning unit had been removed from the bedroom window, L.A. surmised
Hall made his entry there.
{¶8} After L.A. put on the television for her older child and gave a
bottle to the infant, Hall drew her into the living room. The two of them sat
next to each other on the couch, and Hall “pleaded for [her] to get back with
him.” Although they spoke for nearly “an hour,” L.A. “told him no,” and “told
him he had to leave.” Hall asked her if she would “at least sleep with him”
one last time. L.A. refused.
{¶9} At that point, Hall became “pushy and started grabbing, like
touching” L.A. “[b]etween [her] legs” and on her “inner thigh and [her]
vaginal area” as he asked her to “give him some.” He became “[s]lowly
angrier,” causing L.A. to become “fearful of him.” L.A. resisted, but Hall
5
“kept persisting.” L.A. eventually arose, telling Hall she wanted to go to the
bathroom.
{¶10} Hall followed her, propelled her from behind, and once they both
were inside the bathroom, shoved her down onto the toilet seat. While
asking L.A. to “just give him five minutes,” Hall tried to take her pants and
panties off. She struggled, but Hall was successful in exposing her; he
“performed oral sex on” L.A.
{¶11} Thereafter, by thrusting her hands into Hall’s face, L.A.
managed to rise, but Hall “tried to like wrestle [her] to the floor.” Once L.A.
was face down on the bathroom floor with her “knees bent,” Hall “had
intercourse” with her. L.A. felt “disgusted.” Hall exited the house shortly
afterward, but helped L.A. to pull the air conditioning unit into the bedroom
before he left her.
{¶12} L.A. reported the incident to the police and proceeded to the
hospital for treatment. As a result, Hall was indicted in this case on four
counts, charged with aggravated burglary, kidnapping, rape, and gross sexual
imposition.
{¶13} Hall’s case proceeded to a jury trial. After considering the
evidence, the jury acquitted Hall of the first three counts, but found him
guilty of gross sexual imposition.
6
{¶14} Hall appeals from his conviction with two assignments of error
as follows:
“I. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for
acquittal as to the charge when the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction.
“II. Appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of
the evidence.”
{¶15} Hall asserts in his first assignment of error that L.A.’s testimony
was “an outright, unbelievable lie” that was unsupported because she
displayed no physical injuries. This argument, however, relates to credibility
and weight, which are not appropriate subjects for a sufficiency analysis.
{¶16} In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to
support the jury verdict as a matter of law, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76,
2009-Ohio-5937, 919 N.E.2d 190, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d
259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶17} Hall was charged with gross sexual imposition in violation of
R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), which prohibits a person from having sexual contact with
7
another, “not his spouse, by purposely compelling such person to submit by
force or threat of force.”
{¶18} Sexual contact is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone
of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic
region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually
arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).
{¶19} According to L.A., as they sat next to each other on the couch,
Hall began to touch her thighs and vaginal area. L.A. indicated Hall did so
despite her resistance, and while telling her he wanted her to sleep with him
one last time. Viewing L.A.’s testimony in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, the jury could have found the state established the elements of
gross sexual imposition. State v. Alsip, 8th Dist. No. 93105, 2010-Ohio-1757,
¶ 14.
{¶20} Hall argues in his second assignment of error that the manifest
weight of the evidence does not support his conviction.
{¶21} The test to be applied when reviewing a claim that a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence was set forth in State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The test is “much
broader” than the test for sufficiency; i.e., this court reviews the entire record
to determine whether in resolving any conflicts in the evidence, the
8
trier-of-fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State
v. Martin, 21 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶22} Moreover, this court must remain mindful that the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are matters primarily for the
trier of fact to assess. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶23} Although Hall argues L.A.’s testimony was simply not worthy of
belief, the jury clearly considered her credibility carefully. The jury
obviously determined that, at least initially, Hall forced himself on L.A. when
he began touching her erogenous areas. Because the jury was in the position
to evaluate L.A.’s demeanor as she recounted the incident, this court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. No.
96627, 2011-Ohio-6886, ¶ 35.
{¶24} Accordingly, Hall’s assignments of error are overruled.
{¶25} His conviction is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
9
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR