State v. Anderson , 2016 Ohio 7814 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2016-Ohio-7814.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 14AP0054
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ALEXANDER T. ANDERSON WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2014 CR-B 000722
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: November 21, 2016
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Alexander Anderson appeals from the judgment of the
Wayne County Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} A.A., then 7 years old, and his sister, then 11 years old, were living with their
father, Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson and the children’s mother were divorced at the time and
had had ongoing issues concerning custody of their children. On May 4, 2014, Mr. Anderson
discovered that the cord of his children’s Wii controller had been chewed. Mr. Anderson asked
both the children who did it, and they both denied involvement. Eventually, A.A. confessed to
damaging the controller. Mr. Anderson’s daughter indicated that Mr. Anderson then “got really
mad[]” and was screaming at A.A. She witnessed Mr. Anderson choke A.A. with the Wii cord
and slap him across the face.
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{¶3} Mr. Anderson called the school the next day and left a message reporting that he
and A.A. had been wrestling over the weekend and that A.A. had some minor bumps and scrapes
that were nothing to worry about.
{¶4} A.A.’s teacher was with A.A.’s class on a field trip that next day. She sat next to
A.A. on the bus ride back to the school and became very concerned because she observed marks
on his cheeks, neck, face, and forehead that appeared to be bruises and scratch marks. She
thought one of the marks resembled a hand print. She had previously heard the voicemail from
Mr. Anderson. A.A. told her the injuries happened from wrestling with Mr. Anderson.
{¶5} Upon returning to the school, A.A. went to see the school medical assistant
because the teacher remained concerned given the severity of A.A.’s injuries. A.A. told the
medical assistant that he got the injuries from wrestling with Mr. Anderson. The medical
assistant described marks that looked like hand prints and indicated that it looked like something
had been wrapped around A.A.’s neck. Due to the medical assistant’s concerns, she then went
and got the school guidance counselor. A.A. again told the school guidance counselor that the
injuries happened while wrestling. However, when the school guidance counselor indicated that
that did not look like what had happened, A.A. told her that Mr. Anderson got mad at him for
having the dog in his room, choked him, put his hands around his neck, and knocked him into the
door knob.
{¶6} Upon hearing this, the school guidance counselor called Wayne County Children
Services (“CSB”). After meeting with A.A., the caseworker called police and implemented a
safety plan. A.A., who had been living with Mr. Anderson, was then placed with his paternal
grandparents. A.A. told police that Mr. Anderson had choked him with a Wii cord for having the
dog in his room.
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{¶7} Police questioned Mr. Anderson about the incident. Mr. Anderson indicated that
A.A. had gotten in trouble for biting the Wii cord. Mr. Anderson admitted to swatting A.A. on
the butt and hitting him in the butt with the side of his foot. Mr. Anderson denied choking A.A.,
but indicated that he did put a hand on the back of A.A.’s neck to guide A.A. to the couch so
they could talk about the Wii cord. Mr. Anderson stated that after he disciplined A.A., he and
A.A. were wrestling and rough housing.
{¶8} Subsequently, a complaint was filed against Mr. Anderson for one count of
domestic violence. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to request the admission of
hearsay statements of A.A. pursuant to Evid.R. 807. The trial court thereafter held a competency
hearing. The trial court determined A.A. to be competent but also found that A.A. had refused to
testify at trial. Following the competency hearing, the trial court allowed the attorneys to present
argument with respect to whether A.A.’s statements were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 807.
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the statements to “professional teachers, counselors,
medical assistants, and police officers[]” were admissible under Evid.R. 807 and issued a
judgment entry with findings related to that conclusion.
{¶9} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of
domestic violence and the trial court sentenced him to 24 months of community control along
with certain conditions, 45 days in jail, and imposed a $250 fine and court costs. Mr. Anderson
filed a motion to stay the execution of his sentence, which the trial court granted following the
posting of a $500 bond plus costs.
{¶10} Mr. Anderson has appealed, raising three assignments of error for our review.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
COMMENTING ON TESTIMONY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS
DEPRIVING [MR. ANDERSON] OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS
GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATE[S’] CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION.
{¶11} Mr. Anderson argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred in
commenting on the testimony of Mr. Anderson’s daughter, a witness for the prosecution.
Specifically, Mr. Anderson asserts that the trial court vouched for Mr. Anderson’s daughter and
bolstered her credibility when the trial court addressed her at the end of her testimony and stated,
“Thank you very much for your testimony * * *. You did a very nice job.”
{¶12} However, we decline to address the merits of Mr. Anderson’s argument because
he did not object to the trial court’s comments and he has failed to develop a plain error
argument on appeal. See State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27479, 2015-Ohio-5096, ¶ 51
(concluding an issue of judicial vouching was subject to plain error review); State v. King, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 27069, 2014-Ohio-4189, ¶ 9 (declining to conduct a plain error review when
the appellant failed to develop a plain error argument).
{¶13} Mr. Anderson’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN THE COURT
REFUSED TO ALLOW [MR. ANDERSON] TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF
THE HISTORY OF CUSTODY DISPUTES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS
EX-WIFE.
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{¶14} Mr. Anderson argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow him to present evidence about the history of the custody disputes between
himself and his ex-wife.
{¶15} “The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial court, and a
reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion
that has created material prejudice.” State v. Spy, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27450, 2016-Ohio-2821,
¶ 14, quoting State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 43. Further, “[i]t is a
fundamental rule of evidence that error cannot be based on a ruling which excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ‘the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context[.]’” State v. Barrios, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 06CA009065, 2007-Ohio-7025, ¶ 8, quoting Evid.R. 103(A)(2).
{¶16} Mr. Anderson argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence pertaining to
the custody issues he and his ex-wife have faced because such evidence would tend to show his
children’s potential bias and motive to fabricate their statements. Mr. Anderson argues that State
v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 49, supports his argument that such testimony is
admissible. However, Muttart, did not deal with the precise issue before us. Muttart dealt with
“whether a child’s out-of-court statements to medical personnel [were] admissible pursuant to
Evid.R. 803(4) in the absence of a judicial determination of the competency of the child as a
witness and whether the admission of those hearsay statements violated [an] appellant’s Sixth
Amendment rights of confrontation[.]” Id. at ¶ 2. In that case, the Supreme Court determined
that, in determining whether a child’s statement was made for the purpose of medical diagnosis
or treatment, courts should examine certain factors, including “whether there [was] a motive to
fabricate, such as pending legal proceeding such as a bitter custody battle.” (Internal quotations
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and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 49. Thus, in certain contexts, the Supreme Court has determined
that custody disputes can be relevant factor in evaluating a child’s statement.
{¶17} On appeal, Mr. Anderson points to two incidents during the trial when he alleges
such testimony was excluded. Both occurred during direct examination of defense witnesses:
Mr. Anderson and Mr. Anderson’s fiancée. During Mr. Anderson’s testimony the following
series of questions and answers took place:
[Defense counsel:] When did you two divorce?
[Mr. Anderson:] I believe it was 2009 or 2010.
[Defense counsel:] And since the time of your divorce have their [sic] issues
regarding issues of custody?
[Mr. Anderson:] Yes, there has been.
[Defense counsel:] Has that been ongoing?
[Mr. Anderson:] Yes, it has.
[Defense counsel:] How many times have you been to court regarding custody?
[Prosecution:] Objection, Your Honor.
[Mr. Anderson:] Numerous times.
[Trial court:] The objection will be sustained. This is not relevant. We are
dealing with this particular case[.] This incident.
During the redirect examination of Mr. Anderson’s fiancée, the following exchange occurred:
[Defense counsel:] * * *. Are you aware of what status of any custody orders are
with [Mr. Anderson’s] children at this time?
[Mr. Anderson’s fiancée:] Yes.
[Trial court:] That is not relevant. We don’t need to get into custody issues
involving these children.
{¶18} To the extent the trial court excluded the statement that Mr. Anderson had been to
court “[n]umerous times” for custody-related issues, even if we were to conclude that the trial
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court abused its discretion in failing to admit it, we can only conclude that any error was
harmless. See Crim.R. 52(A). Prior to the trial court sustaining the objection, Mr. Anderson was
able to testify that he and his ex-wife divorced in 2009 or 2010 and that the two have had
ongoing custody issues. Accordingly, we cannot say that the jury not knowing that Mr.
Anderson had been to court numerous times for custody issues affected Mr. Anderson’s
substantial rights when the jury was aware that Mr. Anderson and his ex-wife had ongoing
custody issues. Crim.R. 52(A).
{¶19} To the extent that Mr. Anderson challenges the trial court’s statement about the
relevancy of custody issues, Mr. Anderson failed to proffer what other testimony he thought
should have been admissible concerning this issue. See Barrios, 2007-Ohio-7025, at ¶ 8. Thus,
Mr. Anderson cannot demonstrate how the exclusion of the evidence prejudiced him. See id.{¶20} Mr. Anderson’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES AS TO WHAT [A.A.] TOLD THEM WAS
ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO EVID.[R.] 807.
{¶21} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Anderson asserts that the trial court erred in
allowing A.A.’s teacher, the medical assistant, the school guidance counselor, the CSB
caseworker, and the police officer to testify about what A.A. told them about the events of May
4, 2014, as such testimony was not admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 807. Mr. Anderson asserts
that the trial court’s finding in its pretrial Evid.R. 807 ruling that the statements provide
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness was not supported by the record.
{¶22} Evid.R. 807 provides:
(A) An out-of-court statement made by a child who is under twelve years of age
at the time of trial or hearing * * * describing any act of physical violence
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directed against the child is not excluded as hearsay under Evid.R. 802 if all of the
following apply:
(1) The court finds that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement provides particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that make
the statement at least as reliable as statements admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 803
and 804. The circumstances must establish that the child was particularly likely
to be telling the truth when the statement was made and that the test of cross-
examination would add little to the reliability of the statement. In making its
determination of the reliability of the statement, the court shall consider all of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, including but not limited
to spontaneity, the internal consistency of the statement, the mental state of the
child, the child’s motive or lack of motive to fabricate, the child’s use of
terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, the means by which the
statement was elicited, and the lapse of time between the act and the statement. In
making this determination, the court shall not consider whether there is
independent proof of the * * * act of physical violence.
(2) The child’s testimony is not reasonably obtainable by the proponent of the
statement.
(3) There is independent proof of the * * * act of physical violence.
(4) At least ten days before the trial or hearing, a proponent of the statement has
notified all other parties in writing of the content of the statement, the time and
place at which the statement was made, the identity of the witness who is to
testify about the statement, and the circumstances surrounding the statement that
are claimed to indicate its trustworthiness.
(B) The child’s testimony is “not reasonably obtainable by the proponent of the
statement” under division (A)(2) of this rule only if one or more of the following
apply:
(1) The child refuses to testify concerning the subject matter of the statement or
claims a lack of memory of the subject matter of the statement after a person
trusted by the child, in the presence of the court, urges the child to both describe
the acts described by the statement and to testify.
(2) The court finds all of the following:
(a) the child is absent from the trial or hearing;
(b) the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the child’s
attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means despite a good faith
effort to do so;
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(c) it is probable that the proponent would be unable to procure the child’s
testimony or attendance if the trial or hearing were delayed for a reasonable time.
(3) The court finds both of the following:
(a) the child is unable to testify at the trial or hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;
(b) the illness or infirmity would not improve sufficiently to permit the child to
testify if the trial or hearing were delayed for a reasonable time.
The proponent of the statement has not established that the child’s testimony or
attendance is not reasonably obtainable if the child’s refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of the statement for the purpose of preventing the child from attending
or testifying.
(C) The court shall make the findings required by this rule on the basis of a
hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury and shall make findings of fact,
on the record, as to the bases for its ruling.
{¶23} Thus, “Evid.R. 807(A) contains four elements that must be satisfied before a
child’s out-of-court statement regarding abuse can be admitted. Yet, the State need not satisfy
the rigors of Evid.R. 807(A) if the child’s statement can be admitted through a different hearsay
exception.” State v. Lortz, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23762, 2008-Ohio-3108, ¶ 20. Mr. Anderson
has only challenged the first element on appeal. See Evid.R. 807(A)(1). The Supreme Court has
held that “Evid.R. 807 contemplates that a pretrial hearing will be conducted at which time the
ability of the child to testify should be addressed and an initial determination as to the
admissibility of the child’s statements should be made.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Storch, 66
Ohio St.3d 280 (1993), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶24} In the instant appeal, we find it difficult to review Mr. Anderson’s arguments on
the merits. Mr. Anderson has not specifically pointed to the locations in the transcript where the
challenged statements were admitted at trial; nor has he identified which specific statements he
believes violate Evid.R. 807. See App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2). Additionally, Mr.
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Anderson has not demonstrated that he objected to the admission of these statements at trial
pursuant to Evid.R. 807. See State v. Allen, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 94CA005944, 1996 WL 48550,
*2 (Feb. 7, 1996); State v. Hardway, 5th Dist. Licking Nos. 92-CA-4, 92-CA-6, 1992 WL
238440, *1 (Sept. 14, 1992). While there are occasional objections by defense counsel during
some portions of some of the aforementioned witnesses’ testimony, it is often difficult to discern
the basis of the objection. Further, some of the objections by defense counsel seem to be based
upon preventing the witness from testifying about what someone other than A.A. said. Given all
of the foregoing circumstances, this Court concludes it is unable to properly review the merits of
Mr. Anderson’s argument and overrules his third assignment of error on that basis.
{¶25} Mr. Anderson’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶26} Mr. Anderson’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wayne
County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County
Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
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instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
NORMAN R. MILLER, JR., Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.