State v. Williams , 2016 Ohio 7782 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-7782.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 104202
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
ANTOINE D. WILLIAMS
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-15-597808-C
BEFORE: Boyle, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 17, 2016
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
James R. Willis
1144 Rockefeller Building
614 West Superior Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: John Farley Hirschauer
Gregory J. Ochocki
Assistant County Prosecutors
Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Antoine Williams, appeals his convictions. He raises
two assignments of error for our review:
1. The court erred when it denied the pretrial motion to suppress, and in
doing so failed to state its essential findings on the record as required by
[Crim.R. 12(F)].
2. The court erred and due process was denied when the court refused to
allow the accused to plead no contest to the charges in this indictment.
{¶2} After review, we find merit to Williams’s second assignment of error,
vacate Williams’s guilty plea, and remand for the trial court to hold a new plea hearing
with instructions for the trial court to consider the facts and circumstances of Williams’s
case before deciding whether to accept Williams’s no contest plea.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶3} Williams was indicted on four counts, including one count of illegal
conveyance of drugs into a detention facility in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), a
third-degree felony; drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a third-degree
felony, with schoolyard and forfeiture specifications; drug possession in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), a fourth-degree felony, with forfeiture specifications; and possessing
criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony, with forfeiture
specifications.
{¶4} Williams moved to suppress evidence against him, asserting that his Fourth
Amendment rights against an unreasonable search and seizure were violated. After a
hearing, the trial court denied his motion.
{¶5} Williams subsequently entered a guilty plea to the indictment after the trial
court judge would not accept his plea of no contest. The court, however, accepted
Williams’s guilty plea “with a full understanding” that the plea was conditional upon
Williams reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
{¶6} The trial court sentenced Williams to nine months for each of the four
counts and ordered them to be served concurrent to each other for a total of nine months
in prison. It is from this judgment that Williams now appeals.
II. Plea
{¶7} In his second assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred
when it refused to allow him to plead no contest. Because the trial court did not permit
Williams to plead no contest as a matter of policy, and not based on the facts and
circumstances of Williams’s case, we agree.
{¶8} Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(2), a
plea of no contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an
admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or
complaint and such plea or admission shall not be used against the
defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.
Unlike a guilty plea, a plea of no contest does not prevent the defendant from appealing
from the trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion. Crim.R. 12(H). The trial court has
discretion to accept or reject a no contest plea. Crim.R. 11(A). Absent an abuse of that
discretion, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. See State v. Mehozonek, 8
Ohio App.3d 271, 273, 456 N.E.2d 1353 (8th Dist.1983).
{¶9} This court has held, however, that a trial court abuses its discretion when it
rejects a plea agreement by relying on a blanket policy rather than considering the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Fitzgerald, 188 Ohio App.3d 701,
2010-Ohio-3721, 936 N.E.2d 585, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Switzer, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 93533, 2010-Ohio-2473. Other courts have held the same. See State v.
Graves, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-272, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5608 (Nov. 19, 1998)
(finding an abuse of discretion after trial court refused the defendant’s plea based upon its
blanket policy of not accepting no contest pleas); State v. Hunt, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 1536,
1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8937 (Oct. 22, 1985) (finding abuse of discretion when the trial
court refused to accept a plea agreement because it had a policy of rejecting agreements
after jury cards were mailed to prospective jurors in a case); State v. Beasley, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-150431, 2016-Ohio-1603 (“there is little doubt that a trial court’s blanket
policy to refuse to accept no-contest pleas is error”).
{¶10} At the beginning of the plea hearing in this case, the parties advised the
court that they had reached a plea agreement. The state and defense counsel informed
the court that Williams wished to plead no contest to the indictment. The trial court
responded, “We don’t do no contests up here. * * * He would have to plead guilty.”
Defense counsel responded that Williams would plead guilty then, but with the condition
that he could preserve his right to appeal the motion to suppress. The court responded,
“absolutely.”
{¶11} In State v. Carter, 124 Ohio App.3d 423, 428, 706 N.E.2d 409 (2d
Dist.1997), the court explained:
We find that the trial court’s policy of not accepting no-contest pleas
constituted an abuse of discretion in that the trial court arbitrarily refused to
consider the facts and circumstances presented, but instead relied on a fixed
policy established at its whim. Although the trial court has the discretion
to refuse to accept a no-contest plea, it must exercise its discretion based on
the facts and circumstances before it, not on a blanket policy that affects all
defendants regardless of their situation. In short, the trial court must
exercise its discretion in each case. Cf. Billington v. Cotner (1972), 32
Ohio App.2d 277, 280, 61 Ohio Op.2d 344, 290 N.E.2d 862 (“It is within
the appellate ambit to determine that a trial judge must exercise his
discretion though refraining from telling him how to do it.”), reversed on
other grounds (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 17, 20, 66 Ohio Op.2d 9, 305 N.E.2d
805.
{¶12} Thus, we agree with Williams that the trial court abused its discretion when
it arbitrarily rejected his no contest plea based on its blanket policy of not accepting pleas
of no contest. Williams’s second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶13} Based on our disposition of Williams’s second assignment of error, we find
Williams’s first assignment of error to be premature.
{¶14} Judgment reversed and remanded. We vacate Williams’s guilty plea and
remand for the trial court to hold a new plea hearing with instructions for the trial court to
consider the facts and circumstances of Williams’s case.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR