Covender v. State , 2019 Ohio 3715 ( 2019 )

[Cite as Covender v. State, 2019-Ohio-3715.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
JOEL COVENDER C.A. No. 18CA011355
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
STATE OF OHIO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 13CV181182
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 16, 2019
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Joel Covender, appeals the judgments of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for summary judgment and granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, State of Ohio.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Covender commenced this wrongful imprisonment action on August 15,
2013. Proceeding on an amended complaint, Mr. Covender sought declaration that he was a
wrongfully imprisoned individual, pursuant to R.C. 2743.48, based on the underlying criminal
actions initiated in Case Nos. 94CR045253 and 94CR045912.
{¶3} Mr. Covender filed a motion arguing that summary judgment was warranted
because he presented sufficient evidence to satisfy each element of R.C. 2743.48(A), thereby
demonstrating that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The State opposed Mr.
Covender’s motion, and then filed the State’s own motion for summary judgment. The State
2
asserted the following arguments in support of its motion: (1) as it relates to Case. No.
94CR45912, Mr. Covender’s wrongful imprisonment claim was filed outside of the statute of
limitations; (2) neither of Mr. Covender’s criminal convictions were “vacated, dismissed, or
reversed on appeal” as required by R.C. 2743.48(A)(4); and (3) Mr. Covender cannot satisfy the
actual innocence prong of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). Mr. Covender filed a brief in opposition
challenging summary judgment on each basis argued in the motion.
{¶4} The trial court simultaneously issued two separate journal entries: one denying
Mr. Covender’s motion for summary judgment, and the other granting the State’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Covender’s amended complaint. Mr. Covender timely
appealed, presenting a single assignment of error for our review.
II.
Assignment of Error
The lower court erred when it granted [the State]’s motion for summary
judgment and denied [Mr. Covender]’s motion for summary judgment
because [Mr.] Covender satisfies all of the requirements under []R.C.
2743.48(A)(1)-(5) and this matter was timely filed.
{¶5} In his assignment of error, Mr. Covender argues that he satisfied the “actual
innocence” prong of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), that his convictions were “vacated, dismissed, or
reversed on appeal” as required by R.C. 2743.48(A)(4), and that his action with regard to Case.
No. 94CR045912 was filed within the six-year statute of limitations applicable to a wrongful
imprisonment claim.
{¶6} As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Covender indicates in his assignment of
error that he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment. It is the
duty of the appellant, not this Court, to present an argument demonstrating error on appeal.
Angle v. Western Reserve Mut. Ins. Co., 9th Dist. Medina No. 2729-M, 1998 WL 646548, *1. In
3
his brief, however, Mr. Covender does not articulate a specific argument in support this
contention. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, we disregard the portion of his assignment of
error challenging the denial of his motion for summary judgment. See App.R. 12(A)(2).
However, this does not affect our ability to review Mr. Covender’s contention that the trial court
erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his amended
complaint.
{¶7} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when:
(1) [no] genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from
the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing
such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for
summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327 (1977). To succeed on a motion for
summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of
genuine issues of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292 (1996). If the moving
party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 293.
{¶8} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St. 3d 102, 105 (1996). However, our review on appeal involves “a different
focus than the trial court.” Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St. 3d 356, (1992). The trial
court’s decision is a part of the de novo review process and its reasoning and analysis for
granting summary judgment are subject to appellate review. Mourton v. Finn, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 26100, 2012-Ohio-3341, ¶ 8. Although a de novo review means that we afford no deference
to the decision of the trial court, this Court is unable to conduct a proper review of an award of
4
summary judgment when the movant asserts multiple arguments in favor of summary judgment
and the trial court’s entry provides no indication as to what it actually decided. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶9} Here, the State presented three distinct arguments in support of its motion for
summary judgment. The State argued that: (1) as it relates to Case. No. 94CR45912, Mr.
Covender’s wrongful imprisonment claim was filed outside of the statute of limitations; (2)
neither of Mr. Covender’s criminal convictions were “vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal”
as required by R.C. 2743.48(A)(4); and (3) Mr. Covender cannot satisfy the actual innocence
prong of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). In addition to calling upon the trial court to resolve issues of law
and determine the absence of factual issues, the State raised a statute of limitations argument that
would not necessarily have disposed of the entire complaint. Despite the relative complexity of
these issues, the trial court’s judgment entry lacks any analysis or explanation for its decision to
enter summary judgment. Aside from reciting the applicable Civ.R. 56 standard, the trial court
gave no indication as to the basis for entering judgment in favor of the State.
{¶10} The lack of detail in the trial court’s judgment entry left the parties “‘unsure why
the trial court rendered the decision it did’” and “‘essentially forced [the parties] to simply refile
their summary judgment motions’” in their briefs to this court. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Tillman,
9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011090, 2018-Ohio-629, ¶ 10, quoting Mourton, at ¶ 9. Furthermore,
the trial court’s decision placed this Court “in the unfortunate position of being unable to provide
meaningful review.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Hunt v. Alderman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27416, 2015-
Ohio-4667, ¶ 19. Consequently, we find that it is necessary to reverse and remand the matter so
that the trial court can enter a decision sufficient to permit appellate review. Id.
5
III.
{¶11} The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.
TEODOSIO, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
6
APPEARANCES:
W. SCOTT RAMSEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DAVID YOST, Attorney General, and THOMAS E. MADDEN, Assistant Attorney General, for
Appellee.