State v. Goins , 2016 Ohio 5930 ( 2016 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Goins, 
    2016-Ohio-5930
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 103874
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    IDALE GOINS
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case Nos. CR-15-594492-B and CR-15-592669-K
    BEFORE:           McCormack, P.J., Blackmon, J., and Celebrezze, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 22, 2016
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Robert L. Tobik
    Cuyahoga County Public Defender
    By: Paul Kuzmins
    Assistant Public Defender
    310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Carl Mazzone
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor, Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    TIM McCORMACK, P.J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Idale Goins appeals from his sentence for criminal
    gang activity, felonious assault, having weapons while under disability, firearm
    specification, and gang activity specification. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    {¶2} In January 2015, Goins was charged in a multiple count indictment along
    with several codefendants in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-592669. Goins was charged
    with criminal gang activity, engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, conspiracy,
    attempted murder, felonious assault, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle,
    discharge of firearms on or near prohibited premises, improper discharge of firearm at or
    into habitation or school, criminal damaging, and having weapons while under disability,
    along with several specifications. In March 2015, Goins was charged in a multiple count
    indictment along with one codefendant in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-15-594492. In this
    case, Goins was charged with trafficking, drug possession, possessing criminal tools, and
    illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Both indictments stem from Goins’s
    participation as an active member of the Cutthroat gang.
    {¶3} In September 2015, Goins entered into a plea agreement in both cases. In
    CR-15- 592669, he pleaded guilty to an amended indictment as follows: participating in
    a criminal gang in violation of R.C. 2923.42(A) (a felony of the second degree); felonious
    assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) (a felony of the second degree); criminal gang
    activity specification in violation of R.C. 2941.142(A); a firearm specification in violation
    of R.C. 2941.145(A); and having a weapon under disability in violation of R.C.
    2923.13(A)(2)(a felony of the third degree). In exchange, the state agreed to nolle the
    remaining charges and specifications.
    {¶4} In CR-15-594492, Goins pleaded guilty to drug trafficking in violation of
    R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(a felony of the second degree).        The state agreed to nolle the
    remaining counts.
    {¶5} On October 15, 2015, the trial court sentenced Goins to five years in prison
    on the drug trafficking charge in CR-15-594492. In CR-15-592669, the court sentenced
    Goins to seven years on the criminal gang activity, seven years on the felonious assault,
    and 36 months on having a weapon under disability, to be served concurrently. The
    court ordered the sentences in CR-15-594492 and CR-15-592669 to be served
    concurrently. The court also sentenced Goins to three years on the firearm specification
    and three years on the gang activity specification, to be served “prior to and consecutive
    with” the seven years for the base charge of felonious assault. The aggregate sentence
    imposed was 13 years.
    {¶6} Goins now appeals his sentence, assigning one error for our review: The
    sentence is contrary to law because the court imposed a consecutive sentence without
    making the necessary findings.
    {¶7}     R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, the
    appellate court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences where the reviewing
    court “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing
    court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to
    law.”
    {¶8} In Ohio, there is a presumption that prison sentences should be served
    concurrently, unless the trial court makes the findings outlined in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to
    justify consecutive service of the prison terms. State v. Cox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    102629, 
    2016-Ohio-20
    , ¶ 3; R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that in order
    to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are
    necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, that such
    sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the
    danger the offender poses to the public, and that one of the following applies:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
    offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
    pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
    was under postrelease control for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
    more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
    multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
    prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
    of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
    (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
    by the offender.
    State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    , ¶ 20-22.
    {¶9} An exception to this general rule concerns the imposition of consecutive
    sentences for certain firearm specifications. R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) requires that a trial
    court impose a prison term for a firearm specification consecutively to the prison term
    imposed for the underlying felony.      State v. A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98622,
    
    2013-Ohio-2525
    , ¶ 21. Because the statute mandates the imposition of consecutive
    sentences for the firearm specifications, the trial court is therefore not required to make
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing a consecutive sentence. 
    Id.
    {¶10} Here, the trial court ordered Goins’s underlying offenses to be served
    concurrently; however, it ordered the firearm specification and the gang activity
    specification to be served consecutively. Because the statute required the trial court to
    impose a consecutive sentence on the firearm specification, the court was not required to
    make consecutive sentence findings as it related to that specification.          The only
    remaining issue, therefore, is whether the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive
    sentence on the gang specification, without findings, was contrary to law.
    {¶11} This court has held that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentence findings
    do not apply to specifications. See State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103559,
    
    2016-Ohio-2931
     (repeat violent offender specifications); State v. James, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 102604, 
    2015-Ohio-4987
    , ¶ 41 (third discretionary firearm specification);
    see also State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103174, 
    2016-Ohio-3170
    .
    {¶12} The consecutive sentencing statute applies to “multiple prison terms [that]
    are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses[.]” (Emphasis added.)
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). A specification is a sentencing enhancement; it is not a separate
    criminal offense. State v. Ford, 
    128 Ohio St.3d 398
    , 
    2011-Ohio-765
    , 
    945 N.E.2d 498
    , ¶
    16-17 (a specification is a sentencing enhancement that attaches to a predicate offense).
    “By its own terms, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not apply to penalty enhancing
    specifications.” James at ¶ 47. Thus, where a defendant is sentenced to concurrent
    sentences on the underlying charges, the trial court is not required to make R.C.
    2929.14(C)(4) findings when it orders the specification to be served consecutively.
    Robinson at ¶ 22.
    {¶13} Here, Goins was sentenced to three years on the gang activity specification
    in accordance with R.C. 2941.142 and 2929.14(G), to be served consecutively to the
    underlying offense of felonious assault.1 Because R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not apply to
    a penalty enhancement specification and, therefore, consecutive sentence findings are not
    required and where Goins was sentenced to concurrent sentences on the underlying
    offenses, the court’s consecutive sentence as it related to the gang activity specification
    was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
    {¶14} Goins’s assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶15} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
    R.C. 2941.142 provides for the imposition of a mandatory prison term of one, two, or three
    1
    years pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(G)] upon an offender who committed a felony that is an offense of
    violence while participating in a criminal gang.
    R.C. 2929.14(G) states that “[i]f an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony
    that is an offense of violence also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type
    described in [R.C. 2941.142, criminal gang activity], that charges the offender with having committed
    the felony while participating in a criminal gang, the court shall impose upon the offender an
    additional prison term of one, two, or three years.”
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
    been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
    for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    _________________________________________
    TIM McCORMACK, PRESIDING JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR