State v. Maultsby , 2014 Ohio 5479 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Maultsby, 
    2014-Ohio-5479
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO                     )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )
    STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.       14CA010526
    Appellee
    v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    TERENCE D. MAULTSBY                                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
    Appellant                                     CASE No.   13CR086806
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: December 15, 2014
    BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}     Terence Maultsby appeals from his convictions in the Lorain County Court of
    Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    I.
    {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Mr. Maultsby on two counts of kidnapping with attendant
    sexual motivation and sexually violent predator specifications and one count of rape. Prior to
    trial, the sexually violent predator specifications were dismissed. Following his trial, the jury
    found Mr. Maultsby guilty on all counts and remaining specifications. The trial court merged the
    kidnapping counts for purposes of sentencing and sentenced Mr. Maultsby to an aggregate term
    of eight years in prison.
    {¶3}     Mr. Maultsby has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for our review.
    2
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    THE GUILTY VERDICTS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
    THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF MR. MAULTSBY’S RIGHTS UNDER
    THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
    STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
    STATE CONSTITUTION.
    {¶4}    Mr. Maultsby argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
    evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the appellate court
    [m]ust review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
    consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts
    in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
    ordered.
    State v. Otten, 
    33 Ohio App.3d 339
    , 340 (9th Dist.1986).
    {¶5}    The jury found Mr. Maultsby guilty of violating R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and
    2905.01(A)(4), which provide that
    [n]o person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim under the age
    of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall remove another from the
    place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other person,
    for any of the following purposes:
    ***
    (2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter;
    ***
    (4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the Revised
    Code, with the victim against the victim’s will[.]
    “‘Sexual activity’ means sexual conduct or sexual contact, or both.” R.C. 2907.01(C).
    “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal
    intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
    without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or
    any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of
    another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal
    intercourse.
    3
    R.C. 2907.01(A). “‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of an erogenous zone of another,
    including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a
    female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”         R.C.
    2907.01(B). The jury also found Mr. Maultsby guilty of rape pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(2),
    which provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender
    purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”
    {¶6}    S.P. testified that, on February 18, 2013, she went to her friend’s home in the
    morning for coffee and spent the entire day at her house, leaving only to go to the store to buy
    beer and cigarettes. The women went to the store a second time in the afternoon to get more
    beer. While they were walking to the store, the women encountered Mr. Maultsby in his front
    yard. According to S.P., although she had seen Mr. Maultsby before because he performed
    maintenance work for her landlord, she did not know his name or that he lived just down the
    street from her. S.P.’s friend stopped to talk to Mr. Maultsby, and S.P. continued walking to the
    store. S.P.’s friend caught up with S.P. and asked it if would be permissible for Mr. Maultsby
    come to join them at S.P.’s house. S.P. told her friend that Mr. Maultsby could come to her
    house, and Mr. Maultsby arrived at her house a short time after the women did.
    {¶7}    According to S.P., the three of them sat at her dining room table and drank. S.P.’s
    friend and Mr. Maultsby also smoked marijuana, which Mr. Maultsby had brought. Because S.P.
    did not know Mr. Maultsby, she had to repeatedly ask him what his name was. Mr. Maultsby
    stayed at S.P.’s house for about an hour. During that time, Mr. Maultsby tried to kiss S.P. while
    they were sitting at the table. Later, when S.P. went to check if someone was at the front door,
    Mr. Maultsby tried to dance with her and tried to kiss her again. Both times, S.P. told him no
    4
    and pushed him away. Eventually, Mr. Maultsby left but not before he had programmed his
    number into S.P.’s phone.
    {¶8}   After Mr. Maultsby left, S.P.’s friend discovered that she could not locate her
    phone or her wallet. S.P. and her friend searched the house but could not find the items. S.P.’s
    friend called Mr. Maultsby on S.P.’s phone, and he returned to help them look. Mr. Maultsby
    returned to the house and found the phone and the wallet under a chair. However, S.P. testified
    that she and her friend had previously searched that location and the wallet and phone had not
    been there.
    {¶9}   S.P. testified further that everyone left her house around 8:30, including Mr.
    Maultsby. S.P. shut her front door but did not lock it because her daughter who lived with her
    did not have a key. She went upstairs to take a shower before going out to meet a friend. S.P.
    removed her pants in the bedroom before using the restroom. While she was seated on the toilet,
    she heard her bird making noise downstairs and saw Mr. Maultsby climbing the stairs. When
    Mr. Maultsby looked at her through the open bathroom door, S.P. asked him what he was doing,
    and Mr. Maultsby responded that he was there to spend time with her.
    {¶10} S.P. told Mr. Maultsby to leave, but Mr. Maultsby entered the bathroom and
    grabbed S.P. just beneath her chin. S.P. stood up and Mr. Maultsby grabbed her by her t-shirt
    and took her to the bedroom. He forced S.P. to lie on the bed and pinned her by lying on top of
    her. Then Mr. Maultsby engaged in sexual intercourse with S.P., eventually ejaculating onto her
    stomach and sheets.
    {¶11} According to S.P., she told Mr. Maultsby that she needed to have a cigarette, and
    he let her leave the bedroom. S.P. took her jeans from the bedroom and put them on when she
    went downstairs. Mr. Maultsby called down to her, asking why she was taking so long, and S.P.
    5
    replied that she was calling the police. S.P. testified that she ran to the abandoned house next
    door and stood in the pouring rain waiting for the police to come. Mr. Maultsby ran back to his
    house.
    {¶12} Officer Wesley Fordyce testified that he arrived at S.P.’s house and found her
    sitting inside near the front door. According to Officer Fordyce, S.P. “was very upset. She was
    crying, shaking, almost hysterical.” S.P. did not have any shoes on, and her socks were wet and
    muddy. Officer Fordyce had S.P. sit in his cruiser while he interviewed her. He testified that,
    when he was escorting S.P. to his cruiser, she refused to let him touch or assist her.
    {¶13} According to Officer Fordyce, S.P. told him about what had happened, identified
    Mr. Maultsby by name, and pointed out Mr. Maultsby’s house. Officer Fordyce went to Mr.
    Maultsby’s house, and Mr. Maultsby answered the door. Mr. Maultsby was sweating profusely
    but claimed to have been sleeping. S.P. subsequently identified Mr. Maultsby as the man who
    had raped her, and Officer Fordyce placed him under arrest.
    {¶14} After S.P. was transported to have a rape kit performed, Officer Fordyce entered
    her house and, with the assistance of other officers, took pictures of her bed sheets and collected
    them for evidence. Officer Fordyce testified that the bed sheets had a wet stain on them. Officer
    Fordyce also took pictures of the sidewalk in front of S.P.’s house because there were “footprints
    leading from * * * the front of her house and down the sidewalk around the corner right up to his
    steps and into [Mr. Maultsby’s] house.”
    {¶15} Officer Fordyce testified that he spoke with Mr. Maultsby at the police station
    later that evening. During that interview, Mr. Maultsby initially denied ever being at S.P.’s
    house that evening but eventually told Officer Fordyce that he had brought marijuana to S.P.’s
    house and that he had been “partying, drinking and smoking.” Mr. Maultsby also told Officer
    6
    Fordyce that he had left but came back when S.P.’s friend had called him saying she had lost her
    wallet. However, Mr. Maultsby was adamant that “he hadn’t had sex of any kind with anyone,
    and he specified that he hadn’t had sex with [S.P.’s friend], he hadn’t had sex with [S.P.], and he
    hadn’t had sex with * * * his wife and clarified it was his girlfriend.”
    {¶16} Sergeant Dennis Camarillo testified that he interviewed Mr. Maultsby the
    morning of February 19, 2013, and a video recording of the interview was played for the jury. In
    the video, Mr. Maultsby denied that any sexual activity occurred the prior evening, claiming that
    he had only danced with the women and kissed them on their cheek or forehead. At the end of
    the interview, Sergeant Camarillo asked Mr. Maultsby again if any sexual activity had taken
    place, and Mr. Maultsby again denied that it had.
    {¶17} Sarah Griffith testified that she was a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner and had
    examined S.P. the night of the incident. Ms. Griffith did not observe any physical injuries on
    S.P. but testified that injuries are not always noticeable until a number of hours after an incident.
    Ms. Griffith discovered traces of semen below S.P.’s navel and collected samples. She also took
    samples from S.P.’s vaginal and anal areas.
    {¶18} Mr. Maultsby stipulated to the admission of reports from the Bureau of Criminal
    Investigation, which indicated that DNA testing had been performed on the vaginal and anal
    samples collected by Ms. Griffith. According to the reports, it was a near certainty that Mr.
    Maultsby was the source of the semen found on those samples.
    {¶19} Mr. Maultsby’s appellate argument appears to be that his convictions for
    kidnapping and rape are against the manifest weight of the evidence because S.P.’s testimony
    lacked credibility. Notably, Mr. Maultsby does not address any of S.P.’s testimony about the
    alleged offenses. Instead, he points to potential contradictions in her testimony about issues
    7
    tangential to the offense, essentially arguing that these inconsistencies call her entire testimony
    into doubt.
    {¶20} Specifically, Mr. Maultsby points to differences between S.P.’s testimony that she
    stood in the rain waiting for the police and Officer Fordyce’s testimony that he found S.P. inside
    her house when he arrived and that it had not been raining. Mr. Maultsby also points to S.P.’s
    testimony that she knew him only in passing despite living nearby and knowing his full name.
    Finally, he argues that her testimony is not credible because, if she was standing at the front door
    or at the house next door, she would have seen him leave “[b]ut[ S.P.] did not testify that she saw
    Mr. Maultsby leave[] or where he went.”
    {¶21} We initially note that S.P. did testify that Mr. Maultsby ran back to his house
    without his shirt on. Thus, while S.P. may not have directly testified that she saw Mr. Maultsby
    leave her house, that fact was implicit in her testimony, making Mr. Maultsby’s argument to the
    contrary tenuous at best. Similarly, although Officer Fordyce’s testimony contradicted S.P.
    regarding whether it was raining on the night in question, Officer Fordyce also testified that
    S.P.’s socks were wet and muddy, from which a reasonable juror could conclude that S.P. had
    run outside only in her socks. Furthermore, given the testimony of Officer Fordyce that S.P. was
    “almost hysterical[,]” the jury could have reasonably believed that S.P.’s memory of the events
    immediately following the assault could have been affected by her emotional state. See State v.
    Williams, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010298, 
    2014-Ohio-971
    , ¶ 17 (The trier of fact is “entitled
    to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.”) (Internal quotations and citations
    omitted.).
    {¶22} In any case, the jury was aware of these potential issues with S.P.’s testimony and
    could weigh them in assessing her credibility. See 
    id.
     (“This Court has recognized that the trier
    8
    of fact is best able to view witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,
    and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.”) (Internal
    quotations and citations omitted.). Furthermore, none of the evidence at trial contradicted S.P.’s
    account of the attack, specifically, that Mr. Maultsby grabbed her while she was in her bathroom
    and dragged her to her bedroom to have sexual intercourse with her. Semen found on vaginal
    and anal swabs taken from S.P. almost certainly came from Mr. Maultsby, and Nurse Griffith’s
    examination of S.P. revealed semen on her navel, which was consistent with S.P.’s testimony.
    Additionally, Officer Fordyce testified that Mr. Maultsby initially denied having been at S.P.’s
    house before admitting that he had been there; in other words, Officer Fordyce testified that Mr.
    Maultsby had lied to him. Similarly, the DNA evidence in this case suggests that Mr. Maultsby
    almost certainly engaged in sexual intercourse with S.P. notwithstanding his repeated denials.
    Given the physical evidence undermining Mr. Maultsby’s statements, the jury could well have
    concluded that portions of the statements Mr. Maultsby gave to the police corroborated S.P.’s
    testimony and that Mr. Maultsby’s absolute denial that any sexual activity took place with S.P.
    was not credible.
    {¶23} Accordingly, after a thorough review of the record and in light of Mr. Maultsby’s
    appellate arguments, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way and created a manifest
    miscarriage of justice when it found Mr. Maultsby guilty of kidnapping and rape.              His
    assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶24} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common
    Pleas is affirmed.
    Judgment affirmed.
    9
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
    this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellant.
    EVE V. BELFANCE
    FOR THE COURT
    MOORE, J.
    CARR, J.
    CONCUR
    APPEARANCES:
    NICHOLAS HANEK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
    DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14CA010526

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 5479

Judges: Belfance

Filed Date: 12/15/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2014