Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance v. Helms , 2019 Ohio 4554 ( 2019 )

[Cite as Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance v. Helms, 2019-Ohio-4554.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
JOEL HELMS C.A. No. 29329
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF NEIGHBORHOOD COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
ASSISTANCE COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. CV-2018-11-4606
Appellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: November 6, 2019
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Joel Helms, pro se, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This matter concerns the property located at 1117 Ackley Street, Akron, Ohio.
After an inspection of that property on August 2, 2018, the Akron Department of Neighborhood
Assistance (“the City”) issued an order to Helms, as the operator/agent of that property, requiring
him to address a number of housing code violations.
{¶3} Helms appealed the order to the Akron Housing Appeals Board (“the Board”).
On September 18, 2018, the Board conducted a hearing and ultimately denied Helms’ appeal. At
the conclusion of the hearing, Helms was handed a written notice of the Board’s decision. The
following day, Helms signed a copy of the Board’s decision indicating that he received it on
September 19, 2018. Helms also received the Board’s “Conclusion of Fact” indicating that its
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findings were based on “the facts and evidence presented as summarized in the Board’s
Minutes[.]”
{¶4} Helms did not file a notice of appeal with the Board until November 2, 2018. The
City filed a motion to dismiss in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas on the basis that
Helms failed to perfect his appeal within the 30-day timeframe set forth in R.C. 2505.04 and
R.C. 2505.07. On January 30, 2019, the trial court issued an order granting the City’s motion to
dismiss on the basis that Helms did not perfect his appeal in a timely manner.
{¶5} Helms has appealed the trial court’s judgment to this Court and raises three
assignments of error. We consolidate those assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
APPEAL TIME TABLE CANNOT BEGIN TO TOLL UNTIL ALL
DETERMINATE DOCUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR OBSERVATION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
WHAT IS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF DETERMINANT DOCUMENT THAT
REQUIRES VOTE TO FINALIZE? I.E. IF THE DRAFT DOCUMENT IS NOT
RELEVANTLY CHANGED, MAY DRAFT DATE, THAT DATE
DOCUMENT WAS EFFECTIVELY USED TO CREATE FURTHER
DOCUMENT BE EFFECTIVE DATE OF FURTHER DOCUMENT?
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
IS THERE A LEGAL VALIDITY TO A DOCUMENT SIGNED BEFORE
CONTENT BEING AFFIRMED EXISTS, SO VOIDING JUDGMENT
CONTAINED?
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Helms contends that the time for filing his appeal
of the Board’s decision did not begin to run until the Board issued the written minutes from the
September 18, 2018 hearing. In his second assignment of error, Helms argues that the written
notice of decision that he received lacked legal validity because the minutes had not yet been
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approved. In his final assignment of error, Helms maintains that the Board’s decision should be
voided. This Court disagrees with all three arguments.
{¶7} This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mellion v. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
9th Dist. Summit No. 23227, 2007-Ohio-242, ¶ 6.
{¶8} It is well settled that “when the right to appeal is conferred by statute, an appeal
can be perfected only in the manner prescribed by the applicable statute.” Pyramid Ents. L.L.C.
v. Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28623, 2018-Ohio-2178, ¶ 6,
quoting Welsh Dev. Co., Inc. v. Warren City Regional Planning Comm., 128 Ohio St. 3d 471,
2011-Ohio-1604, ¶ 14.
{¶9} R.C. 2505.04 states that “[a]n appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal
is filed, * * * in the case of an administrative-related appeal, with the administrative officer,
agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality involved.” “After the
entry of a final order of an administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal,
commission, or other instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall be
perfected, unless otherwise provided by law, is thirty days.” R.C. 2505.07. See also Chapman v.
Hous., Appeals Bd., 9th Dist. Summit No. 18166, 1997 WL 537651, *3 (Aug. 13, 1997) (“The
period of time within which an appeal from an administrative board must be perfected is thirty
days after the entry of a final order.”).
{¶10} While Helms raises three assignments of error, he has not set forth an independent
argument for each assignment of error in his merit brief. Instead, he offers a consolidated
discussion wherein he references a number of issues related to a purported delay in approving the
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minutes from the September 18, 2018 hearing. We further note that Helms declined to include
citations to law in support of his assignments of error. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶11} Helms’ foremost argument appears to be that the time for filing his appeal did not
begin to run until the Board issued the written minutes from the September 18, 2018 hearing.
Helms posits that while he received a document notifying him that the Board denied his appeal
immediately following the hearing, that notice had no legal effect because the Board had not
formalized its decision by “officially approv[ing]” the meeting minutes. Helms suggests that the
Board’s decision should “be voided” in light of the delay in approving the meeting minutes.
{¶12} In support of its motion to dismiss, the City attached the notice of the Board’s
decision denying his appeal, which was dated “9-18-18[.]” The City also attached the affidavit
of Jodie Forester, a supervisor for the Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance, who averred
that she handed Helms the written notice of the Board’s decision at the conclusion of the
September 18, 2018 hearing. The following day, Helms signed a copy of the decision,
“Received in person by Joel A. Helms 19 Sept. 18[.]” The Board’s decision notified Helms of
his opportunity to appeal to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, “provided an appeal is
perfected within 30 days.”
{¶13} Helms’ arguments are without merit. While minutes may constitute an
administrative board’s actual decision under certain circumstances, “[t]his Court has held that a
board enters its final order for purposes of perfecting an appeal when it sends written notification
of its decision to the party.” Chapman, 1997 WL 537651, at *3, citing Farinacci v. Twinsburg,
14 Ohio App. 3d 20, 21 (9th Dist.1984). Regardless of when the Board approved its minutes
from the hearing in this case, the Board entered its final order for the purposes of perfecting an
appeal when it sent written notification of its decision to Helms. See generally DAMSA, Ltd. v.
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Sandusky, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-15-036, 2016-Ohio-5069, ¶ 11. The City demonstrated that
Helms was handed a notice of the decision immediately after the hearing on September 18, 2018.
The next day, Helms signed off on receiving a written notice of the Board’s decision. Helms did
not file his notice of appeal until November 2, 2019, well outside the 30-day window set forth by
R.C. 2505.07. It follows that the trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion to dismiss.
{¶14} Helms’ assignments of error are overruled.
III.
{¶15} Helms’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
TEODOSIO, P.J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOEL HELMS, pro se, Appellant.
EVE V. BELVANCE, Director of Law, and JOHN R. YORK and BRIAN D. BREMER,
Assistant Director of Law, for Appellee.