State v. Bowling , 2015 Ohio 3123 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Bowling, 
    2015-Ohio-3123
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    State of Ohio,                                      :
    Respondent-Appellant,              :
    No. 15AP-36
    v.                                                  :           (C.P.C. No. 09MS-323)
    Charles R. Bowling,                                 :       (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
    Petitioner-Appellee.               :
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on August 4, 2015
    Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for
    appellant.
    Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Emily L. Huddleston,
    for appellee.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
    BRUNNER, J.
    {¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from a final judgment of the
    Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that granted petitioner-appellee, Charles R.
    Bowling's, petition to contest reclassification of his status in Ohio as an offender under
    Florida's criminal code concerning one or more sexually oriented crimes committed and
    adjudicated in Florida. We conclude that the trial court correctly vacated the
    reclassification imposed on Bowling by the Ohio Attorney General and the State of Ohio,
    reinstating for purposes of Ohio law the classification of sexually oriented offender as to
    his previous crimes. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    No. 15AP-36                                                                                2
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} On May 8, 1997, Bowling was convicted of attempted capital battery in
    Florida. On his relocation to Ohio, he registered as a sexually oriented offender and, after
    the passage of S.B. No. 10, the Adam Walsh Act ("AWA"), he became aware that he had
    been reclassified as a Tier III sex offender.         He filed a petition contesting the
    reclassification on May 19, 2009. He also moved to stay enforcement of community
    notification.
    {¶ 3} On May 27, 2009, the state filed a motion for leave to file a memorandum
    opposing the petition. While the trial court did not issue a ruling on the motion for leave,
    Bowling filed a response to the state's included memorandum. Though a hearing date
    was set for August 7, 2009, the record contains no indication that any hearing transpired.
    On January 9, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Bowling's petition to contest
    the reclassification, reinstating his original classification upon moving to Ohio of sexually
    oriented offender, along with the previous registration orders. The court stated: "The
    requirements imposed upon [Bowling] by the Adam Walsh Act are a nullity."
    II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶ 4} The state appeals with the following assignment of error:
    THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
    RELIEF THAT REINSTATED PETITIONER AS A SEXUALLY
    ORIENTED OFFENDER WHEN OHIO LAW PROVIDED
    THAT PETITIONER IS TREATED AS A SEXUAL
    PREDATOR UNDER MEGAN'S LAW.
    III. DISCUSSION
    {¶ 5} The state maintains that the trial court had no grounds to reinstate
    Bowling's classification as a sexually oriented offender under the argument that Bowling
    qualified as a sexual predator under Megan's Law before the enactment of the AWA.
    Megan's Law required persons convicted of certain listed "sexually oriented offenses" to
    register their address and annually verify it for ten years. See former R.C. 2950.04
    through 2950.07.      Those determined to be habitual sex offenders had a 20-year
    registration period (increased to lifetime in 2003). See former R.C. 2950.09. Those
    found to be sexual predators were required to register for life with quarterly verification.
    No. 15AP-36                                                                                3
    Sexual predators were subject to community notification, while habitual sex offenders
    were subject to such notification if the court ordered it. See former R.C. 2950.11.
    {¶ 6} Former R.C. 2950.01(D)(6) provided that out-of-state offenders would be
    treated as sexually oriented offenders if any out-of-state offense of which they were
    convicted was substantially equivalent to a sexually oriented offense in Ohio. An offender
    residing in Ohio on or after July 1, 1997 was required to register if the jurisdiction in
    which he was convicted required it. See former R.C. 2950.04(A)(4) (effective March 30,
    1999). If such an offender completed a term of imprisonment or detention after July 1,
    1997, he was required to register regardless of any duty to register in another state. See
    former R.C. 2950.04(A)(5) (effective March 30, 1999). A later amendment created a
    presumption that the offender was a sexual predator where the state of conviction
    required lifetime registration. See former R.C. 2950.01(G)(5) (effective July 31, 2003).
    {¶ 7} The Florida entry on which the state relies is a pre-printed form with the
    words "sexual predator" handwritten. The record does not bear any indication that this
    form, which the state relies on in making its arguments, is certified as a true and accurate
    copy from the records of the state of Florida. No formal or certified adjudication
    document has been submitted to support the state's claim that Bowling was determined
    by Florida to be a sexual predator. Nor does the Ohio statute, R.C. 2950.031(E), authorize
    the trial court or us to interpret Florida (or any other state) law for purposes of
    determining whether the original classification applied by Ohio is correct. The statute
    authorizes only a determination of whether the new Ohio "Tier" classification applies to
    the offender.
    If at the conclusion of the hearing the court finds that the
    offender or delinquent child has proven by clear and
    convincing evidence that the new registration requirements
    do not apply to the offender or delinquent child, the court
    shall issue an order that specifies that the new registration
    requirements do not apply to the offender or delinquent child.
    The court promptly shall serve a copy of an order issued under
    this division upon the sheriff with whom the offender or
    delinquent     child  most     recently    registered    under
    section 2950.04, 2950.041, or 2950.05 of the Revised Code
    and upon the bureau of criminal identification and
    investigation.
    R.C. 2950.031(E).
    No. 15AP-36                                                                             4
    {¶ 8} The trial court issued no ruling on the state's motion for leave to file a
    memorandum opposing Bowling's petition to contest his reclassification as a sexual
    predator. We therefore presume that the trial court denied the motion. Seff v. Davis,
    10th Dist. No. 03AP-159, 
    2003-Ohio-7029
    , ¶ 16.
    {¶ 9} Under State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , the
    appropriate remedy for those individuals who have been convicted of sex offenses and
    who have been reclassified under the AWA Tier classification scheme, is petitioning for
    reinstatement of their prior classification under Megan's Law. In State v. Williams, 
    129 Ohio St.3d 344
    , 
    2011-Ohio-3374
    , ¶ 21, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that imposing
    current registration requirements on a sex offender whose crime was committed prior to
    the enactment of S.B. No. 10 is punitive. Therefore, the AWA, "as applied to defendants
    who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, violates Section 28, Article II of the
    Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws."
    Id.; State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-6, 
    2012-Ohio-465
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶ 10} Under Bodyke and Williams, Bowling was entitled to have his pre-AWA
    classification as a sexually oriented offender reinstated. Bowling's petition was not a
    vehicle for the state to challenge his original classification.    R.C. 2950.031(E).   We
    overrule the state's assignment of error.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    {¶ 11} Having overruled the state's assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of
    the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
    KLATT and HORTON, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15AP-36

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 3123

Judges: Brunner

Filed Date: 8/4/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/11/2015