State v. Huggins , 2015 Ohio 3400 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Huggins, 2015-Ohio-3400.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-15-13
v.
ANTWAN L. HUGGINS, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 13CR0115
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 24, 2015
APPEARANCES:
Antwan L. Huggins, Appellant
Angela M. Boes for Appellee
Case No. 13-15-13
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we have
elected pursuant to Loc.R. 12(5) to issue a full opinion in lieu of a summary
journal entry. Defendant-appellant, Antwan L. Huggins (“Huggins”), appeals the
April 6, 2015 judgment entry of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas
denying his motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest to the indictment. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On August 14, 2013, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Huggins
on: Count One of possession of drugs, with a specification, in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A), (C)(4)(e), a first-degree felony; and Count Two of illegal conveyance
of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility in violation
of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2), (G)(2), a third-degree felony. (Doc. No. 4). The
indictment stated that one of the penalties for Count Two was “a driver’s license
suspension of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years.” (Id.). On
September 6, 2013, plaintiff-appellee, the State of Ohio, moved to amend the
indictment to remove the reference to a driver’s license suspension as one of the
penalties for Count Two. (Doc. No. 12). The trial court granted the State’s
motion on September 9, 2013.1 (Doc. No. 13).
1
On November 26, 2013, the State filed another motion to amend the indictment to remove the statement
that “there is a presumption for a prison term” for Count Two. (Doc. No. 40). The trial court granted that
motion the same day. (Doc. No. 41).
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{¶3} Huggins entered pleas of not guilty to the counts of the indictment
and, on September 23, 2013, moved to suppress evidence. (Doc. Nos. 11, 18). On
November 13, 2013, following a hearing on November 8, 2013, the trial court
denied Huggins’s motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 38).
{¶4} On November 26, 2013, under a plea agreement between Huggins and
the State, Huggins withdrew his pleas of not guilty and pled no contest to each
count of the amended indictment. (See Doc. Nos. 42, 43). The trial court found
Huggins guilty of each count of the amended indictment. (See Doc. No. 43).
{¶5} On December 12, 2013, Huggins filed two pro se motions. (Doc. Nos.
44, 45). In one, Huggins moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 44). In the other, Huggins moved to
withdraw his no-contest pleas and for new counsel. (Doc. No. 45).
{¶6} The trial court granted Huggins’s request for new counsel and, on
March 17, 2014, held a hearing on Huggins’s motion to withdraw his no-contest
pleas. (See Doc. No. 63). On March 21, 2014, the trial court denied Huggins’s
motion to withdraw his no-contest pleas. (Id.).
{¶7} On April 14, 2014, the trial court sentenced Huggins. (See Doc. No.
65). As part of the sentence, the trial court imposed a one-year suspension of
Huggins’s driver’s license on each count, to be served consecutively for a total
driver’s license suspension of two years. (Sentencing Tr. at 11); (Doc. No. 65).
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{¶8} On April 17, 2014, Huggins appealed the trial court’s judgment entry
of sentence. (Doc. No. 67).
{¶9} On September 24, 2014, Huggins, pro se, filed a “petition to vacate or
set aside judgment of conviction or sentence.” (Doc. No. 73). The trial court
overruled Huggins’s petition on October 10, 2014. (Doc. No. 77).
{¶10} On November 10, 2014, this court affirmed the trial court’s April 15,
2014 judgment entry of sentence. State v. Huggins, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-14-10,
2014-Ohio-4999, ¶ 48. Specifically, we overruled Huggins’s assignments of error
arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence and
to withdraw his no-contest pleas. Id. at ¶ 19-47.
{¶11} On April 1, 2015, Huggins, pro se, filed a “motion to withdraw
plea.” (Doc. No. 78). In that motion, Huggins requested that the trial court allow
him to withdraw his no-contest pleas, arguing that he suffered manifest injustice
because “the sentence that was imposed is a sentence that is contrary to law and a
sentence that is different then [sic] the plea contract,” which did not provide that
Huggins might be sentenced to a driver’s license suspension for Count Two. (Id.
at 8). He also argued, “The Judge in this matter even after signing the plea
contract * * * still sentenced the defendant to a driver’s license suspension on
count two when count two did not carry a driver’s license suspension and in
volition [sic] of the plea contract he signed, therein making the sentence contrary
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to law and void.” (Id. at 6). The trial court denied Huggins’s motion on April 6,
2015. (Doc. No. 76).
{¶12} On April 27, 2015, Huggins, pro se, filed a notice of appeal of the
trial court’s April 6, 2015 judgment entry. (Doc. No. 80). He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred and abused it’s [sic] discretion when it
failed to find manifest injustice and allow the defendant to
withdraw his no contest plea on a void sentence.
{¶13} In his assignment of error, Huggins argues that the trial court erred
by denying his April 1, 2015 motion to withdraw his no-contest pleas because, by
imposing a driver’s license suspension for Count Two, the trial court “substituted
a different sentence for [sic] that provided for by statute or one that was greater
than that provided for by law,” resulting in “‘manifest injustice’ in the plea and
mak[ing] the resulting sentence VOID and show[ing] that this mater [sic] must go
back to status quo.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant’s Brief at 5).
{¶14} “Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” State v.
Streeter, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-52, 2009-Ohio-189, ¶ 12, citing State v. Nathan,
99 Ohio App. 3d 722, 725 (3d Dist.1995), citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St. 2d 261
(1977). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St. 2d 151, 157 (1980).
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{¶15} Crim.R. 32.1 provides, “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” “However, a trial court has no
jurisdiction to consider a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty [or no-contest]
plea after the judgment of conviction has been affirmed by an appellate court.”
Streeter at ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of
Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St. 2d 94, 97-98 (1978). Here, because this court affirmed
Huggins’s conviction on direct appeal, we conclude that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider his April 1, 2015 post-sentence motion to withdraw his no-
contest pleas. Id. at ¶ 15. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Huggins’s April 1, 2015 motion to withdraw his no-contest pleas. Id. at ¶
18.
{¶16} Huggins’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J., concurs in Judgment Only
WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs.
/jlr
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