Field v. Summit Cty. Child Support Agency , 2016 Ohio 7026 ( 2016 )

[Cite as Field v. Summit Cty. Child Support Agency, 2016-Ohio-7026.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
DALE P. FIELD, JR. C.A. No. 27817
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
SUMMIT COUNTY CSEA, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellees CASE No. CV 2014 09 4355
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 28, 2016
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Dale Field, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his complaint against Defendant-Appellees, the
Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) and E*Trade Clearing LLC
(“E*Trade”). This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} This suit commenced when Field filed a pro se complaint against CSEA and
E*Trade in which he alleged five separate claims for relief. Four of the claims pertained to
CSEA and alleged that: (1) CSEA fraudulently informed the federal government that Field owed
child support arrears in excess of $5,000; (2) CSEA wrongfully collected more than $4,000 from
him after placing a tax lien on his 2011 tax return; (3) CSEA ignored a court order granting him
a credit toward his arrears that exceeded the wrongfully collected amount; and (4) CSEA placed
an illegal hold on his E*Trade account despite the fact that it contained funds that were exempt
2
from garnishment or attachment. In his single claim against E*Trade, Field alleged that the
company misappropriated his funds by freezing his account and selling its assets in spite of their
exempt status.
{¶3} In response to Field’s complaint, both CSEA and E*Trade filed motions to
dismiss. CSEA argued that the trial court ought to dismiss Field’s complaint because it did not
set forth any claims upon which relief could be granted, Field had failed to name a necessary
party, and CSEA was statutorily immune from suit. Meanwhile, E*Trade argued that the court
ought to dismiss Field’s complaint because it also was statutorily immune from suit. Field
opposed both motions and also filed a motion to add Summit County Prosecutor Sherri Bevan
Walsh as a party defendant. Subsequently, the trial court granted both motions to dismiss and
denied Field’s motion to add Walsh as a defendant.
{¶4} Field now appeals from the court’s judgment and raises five assignments of error
for our review. For ease of analysis, we consolidate several of the assignments of error.
II
{¶5} Initially, we note that Field acted pro se in the trial court and has appeared pro se
before this Court on appeal. With respect to pro se litigants, this Court has held that:
[p]ro se litigants should be granted reasonable leeway such that their motions and
pleadings should be liberally construed so as to decide the issues on the merits, as
opposed to technicalities. However, a pro se litigant is presumed to have
knowledge of the law and correct legal procedures so that he remains subject to
the same rules and procedures to which represented litigants are bound. He is not
given greater rights than represented parties, and must bear the consequences of
his mistakes. This Court, therefore, must hold [pro se appellants] to the same
standard as any represented party.
(Second alteration sic.) State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010549, 2014-Ohio-5738, ¶ 5,
quoting Sherlock v. Myers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22071, 2014-Ohio-5178, ¶ 3. With that in
mind, we turn to Field’s assignments of error.
3
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT ERRD (sic) BY GRANTING STATUTORY IMMUNITY
TO THE COUNTY AGENCY FOR CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY[.]
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Field argues that the trial court erred when it
granted CSEA’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. We do not agree that the
court erred when it granted CSEA’s motion to dismiss.
{¶7} We review a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State ex rel. Dellagnese v. Bath-Akron-Fairlawn Joint
Economic Dev. Dist., 9th Dist. Summit No. 23196, 2006-Ohio-6904, ¶ 8. Factual allegations
contained in the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party. Id., citing State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio
St.3d 545, 548 (1992). “To prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, it must appear on the
face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to
recover.” Raub v. Garwood, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22210, 2005-Ohio-1279, ¶ 4, citing O’Brien
v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, 42 Ohio St. 2d 242, 245 (1975). “The defense of immunity
may be raised in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Thomas v. Bauschlinger, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 26485, 2013-Ohio-1164, ¶ 12.
{¶8} “In order to determine whether a political subdivision is immune from liability,
we engage in a three-tiered analysis.” Moss v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 13CA010335, 2014-Ohio-969, ¶ 10, citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St. 3d 24, 28
(1998). The first tier sets forth the premise that,
[e]xcept as provided in division (B) of [R.C. 2744.02], a political subdivision is
not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or
property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or an
4
employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or
proprietary function.
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). “At the second tier, this comprehensive immunity can be abrogated
pursuant to any of the five exceptions set forth at R.C. 2744.02(B).” Shalkhauser v. Medina, 9th
Dist. Medina Nos. 3238-M & 3249-M, 2002-Ohio-222, ¶ 16. “Lastly, immunity may be
restored, and the political subdivision will not be liable, if one of the defenses enumerated in
R.C. 2744.03(A) applies.” Moss at ¶ 10.
{¶9} It is undisputed that Field only brought suit against CSEA and E*Trade. CSEA,
however, is not a political subdivision. See R.C. 2744.01(F). The agency is a “part of Summit
County,” and “only the county can be sued * * *.” Smith v. McCarty, 9th Dist. Summit No.
15670, 1993 WL 6280, *1 (Jan. 13, 1993). In its motion to dismiss, CSEA specifically argued
that Field had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and had failed to name a
necessary party because, as an agency of Summit County, “CSEA does not constitute a separate
legal entity eligible for suit.” In response, Field sought to add Sherri Bevan Walsh as a
defendant. Field identified Walsh as the “Director of CSEA” and argued that her inclusion in the
suit would “satisf[y] [CSEA’s] request that a necessary party be named in this claim against
CSEA.” Field never sought to join Summit County or the State of Ohio1 as a defendant.
{¶10} The trial court found that CSEA was an agency of Summit County and that it was
not a separate legal entity eligible for suit. The court then went on to determine that, even if
CSEA was a properly named party, it was statutorily immune from suit. On appeal, Field does
not address the trial court’s finding that CSEA cannot be sued as a separate legal entity. His
1
In its motion to dismiss, CSEA also argued that the State of Ohio was a necessary party to the
litigation. Because Field’s complaint included allegations pertaining to a tax offset and the State
of Ohio is responsible for tax offsets, CSEA argued, Field also was required to name the State of
Ohio as a defendant.
5
brief contains a blanket statement that CSEA can be held liable for civil damages to an individual
because it “is a political subdivision at the County Level * * *.” As previously noted, however,
CSEA is not a political subdivision. It is only a “part of Summit County” and cannot be
separately sued. Smith at *1. Moreover, even if Field had named the appropriate party as a
defendant here, he failed to show that the conduct upon which he based his claims satisfied any
of the five sovereign immunity exceptions set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B).
{¶11} Once an entity demonstrates that it is entitled to the general presumption of
immunity afforded by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the burden shifts to the claimant to establish that an
exception to that immunity exists. Szefcyk v. Kucirek, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010742, 2016-
Ohio-171, ¶ 13. In his brief in opposition to CSEA’s motion to dismiss, Field did not cite to any
specific subdivision of R.C. 2744.02(B). Instead, he argued that political subdivisions are liable
when their employees commit negligent acts or “acts done in a wanton or reckless manner.” A
political subdivision is only liable for the negligent acts of its employees, however, “with respect
to proprietary functions.” R.C. 2744.02(B)(2). Field made no attempt to show that the collection
of child support is a proprietary function. Nor did he tie his claim of wanton or reckless behavior
to any statutory subsection. Although R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) references reckless and wanton
behavior, that exception applies to employees of political subdivisions, not the political
subdivisions themselves. See Lamtman v. Ward, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26156, 2012-Ohio-4801,
¶ 30. Accordingly, even assuming that Field could properly bring a suit against CSEA, he failed
to demonstrate that any exception to the general presumption of immunity applied here. See
Szefcyk at ¶ 13.
{¶12} This Court has reviewed Field’s complaint, as well as CSEA’s motion to dismiss
and Field’s brief in opposition to the same. Even viewing all the factual allegations here as true
6
and drawing all reasonable inferences in Field’s favor, we cannot conclude that the trial court
erred by granting CSEA’s motion to dismiss. See State ex rel. Dellagnese, 2006-Ohio-6904, at ¶
8. Consequently, Field’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Three
THE TRIAL COURT ERRD (sic) BY DENYING THE MOTION ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT, ADDING SHERRI BEVAN
WALSH AS A DEFENDANT[.]
Assignment of Error Number Four
THE TRIAL COURT ERRD (sic) IN RULING THAT PROSECUTOR WALSH
ENJOYS IMMUNITY[.]
{¶13} In his third assignment of error, Field argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to add Sherri Bevan Walsh as a defendant. In his fourth assignment of error, he
argues that the court erred when it concluded that, even if Walsh were made a defendant, she
would be immune from suit. Because his assignments of error are interrelated, we address them
together.
{¶14} Field’s motion to add Walsh as a defendant was, in essence, a motion for leave to
amend his complaint. Generally, a party may amend his or her complaint “once as a matter of
course” so long as the amendment occurs “within twenty-eight days after service of a responsive
pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion under Civ.R. 12(B) * * *, whichever is
earlier.” Civ.R. 15(A). Here, however, the trial court would not permit Field to amend his
complaint because it found that the amendment would not change the disposition in this matter.
The court found that, even if Walsh were added to the suit, she would be entitled to immunity, so
Field would not benefit from her inclusion. Accordingly, we begin by reviewing the court’s
immunity determination.
7
{¶15} A complainant may sue an elected official in either his or her official capacity or
in his or her individual capacity. See Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St. 3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483.
When the complainant sues an elected official in his or her individual capacity, R.C.
2744.03(A)(6) applies and the official will be immune from suit unless the complainant can
show that one of the exceptions set forth in that subdivision applies. See id. at ¶ 10, citing R.C.
2744.03(A)(6). Conversely, “[t]he political-subdivision-immunity analysis set forth in R.C.
2774.02 applies to lawsuits in which the named defendant holds an elected office within a
political subdivision and that officeholder is sued in his or her official capacity.” Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus. “[I]f the allegations are directed against the holder of an office in his official
capacity, it is the equivalent of suing the political subdivision itself.” Thompson v. Buckeye Joint
Vocational Sch. Dist., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2015 AP 08 0047, 2016-Ohio-2804, ¶ 39.
{¶16} Field sought to add Walsh as a defendant because he identified her as the
“Director of CSEA.” In his motion to add her as a named defendant, he argued that “the ultimate
responsibility of any governmental agency resides with the director of that agency.”
Accordingly, Field did not allege any individual conduct on the part of Walsh; rather, he sought
to include her strictly because of her employment status. On appeal, he maintains that Walsh is
liable because she either negligently or recklessly failed to perform her duties as the “Director of
CSEA.” He argues that it was her duty to ensure that CSEA operated “within the [para]meters of
the law.”
{¶17} Because Field sought to bring suit against Walsh in her official capacity as the
“Director of CSEA,” Walsh would have been entitled to immunity under R.C. 2774.02, had she
been added as a defendant. See id. In reviewing Field’s first assignment of error, this Court set
forth the three-tiered analysis that applies to an immunity determination under R.C. 2774.02. We
8
determined that CSEA was immune from suit because Field failed to demonstrate that any
exception to the general presumption of immunity applied. See Szefcyk, 2016-Ohio-171, at ¶ 13.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to Walsh.
{¶18} Field has not shown that the trial court erred when it concluded that Walsh and/or
Summit County would be immune from suit, if added as a defendant. See R.C. 2744.03(A)(7).
See also Thompson, 2016-Ohio-2804, at ¶ 39. As previously noted, a political subdivision is
only liable for the negligent acts of its employees “with respect to proprietary functions.” R.C.
2744.02(B)(2). See also Lambert, 125 Ohio St. 3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483, at ¶ 22. Even if Field
could have added Walsh and/or Summit County as defendants, he made no attempt to show that
the collection of child support is a proprietary function. Absent any allegation that Walsh and/or
Summit County had negligently engaged in a proprietary function, Field could not hope to
withstand a dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity. See R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).
{¶19} On appeal, Field also argues that Walsh would have been liable if added as a
defendant because she acted in a wanton and reckless manner. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides that
an employee of a political subdivision will be immune from suit unless the “employee’s acts or
omissions were manifestly outside the scope of [his or her] employment” or undertaken “with
malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner * * *.’” That subdivision
would only apply, however, if Field also sought to bring suit against Walsh in her individual
capacity. See Lambert, supra. Moreover, even assuming that Field meant to bring suit against
Walsh in both her elected and individual capacities, he failed to set forth any factual allegations
that would even suggest that she acted in a wanton or reckless manner. Instead, Field indicated
that he wished to bring suit against her strictly due to her purported role as the “Director of
9
CSEA.” Walsh, therefore, would have been entitled to absolute immunity under R.C.
2744.03(A)(6) as well.
{¶20} Even assuming that the trial court erred by not allowing Field to amend his
complaint as a matter of course, Field cannot demonstrate prejudice as a result of the trial court’s
error. See Princess Kim, L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27401, 2015-Ohio-
4472, ¶ 18 (“To demonstrate reversible error, an aggrieved party must demonstrate both error
and resulting prejudice.”). We agree with the trial court’s determination that, had Walsh been
added as a defendant, she would have been immune from suit in either her elected or individual
capacity. Consequently, Field would not have benefitted from her inclusion in the suit. For the
reasons set forth above, Field’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE TRIAL COURT ERRD (sic) BY RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE SECOND DEFENDANT,
E*TRADE[.]
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Field argues that the trial court erred by
granting E*Trade’s motion to dismiss. He argues that E*Trade is not immune for its actions
because it failed to act in good faith when it froze and released his assets in contravention of a
court order.
{¶22} We incorporate the standard of review set forth in Field’s first assignment of
error. Consequently, we review this assignment of error de novo. See State ex rel. Dellagnese,
2006-Ohio-6904, at ¶ 8. In doing so, we presume the factual allegations in Field’s complaint are
true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id., citing State ex rel. Hanson, 65 Ohio
St.3d at 548.
{¶23} R.C. 3123.26 requires a financial institution to
10
promptly place an access restriction on the account of an obligor who maintains
an account at the financial institution upon receipt of an access restriction notice
with respect to the obligor from the child support enforcement agency. The
access restriction shall remain on the account until the financial institution
complies with a withdrawal directive under [R.C.] 3123.37 * * * or a court or
child support enforcement agency orders the financial institution to remove the
access restriction.
“On receipt of a withdrawal directive, a financial institution shall withdraw the amount specified
from the account described in the notice and pay it to the office of child support * * *.” R.C.
3123.37(C). “A financial institution is not subject to criminal or civil liability for imposing an
access restriction on an account or complying with a withdrawal directive pursuant to sections
3123.24 to 3123.38 of the Revised Code or for any other action taken in good faith pursuant to
those sections.” R.C. 3123.38.
{¶24} E*Trade moved to dismiss Field’s complaint on the basis that it was statutorily
immune from suit. It argued that it was immune from suit because it froze Field’s account and
removed its assets, pursuant to a withdrawal directive from CSEA. See id. Meanwhile, Field
argued that E*Trade was not entitled to the benefit of immunity because it failed to act in good
faith. He argued that E*Trade should have verified that his account funds were eligible for
garnishment or attachment before releasing them. According to Field, E*Trade had previously
frozen his account for thirty days. He argued that, by only freezing his account for two weeks,
E*Trade deprived him of the time he needed to act on the freeze before it released his funds.
According to Field, after he received the access restriction notice, he “promptly issued a letter to
both CSEA, and E*Trade notifying them that the funds were exempt under the Ohio Revised
Code * * *.” On appeal, he maintains that E*Trade did not act in good faith because, before it
released his assets, it was aware of the court-ordered exemption.
11
{¶25} “If [a] statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute ‘as
written.’” Gehlmann v. Gehlmann, 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0015-M, 2014-Ohio-4990, ¶ 8,
quoting Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St. 3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, ¶ 20. R.C.
3123.38 specifically provides that a financial institution “is not subject to * * * civil liability for
imposing an access restriction on an account or complying with a withdrawal directive * * *.”
Neither act is coupled with a requirement that the financial institution act in good faith. The
immunity for either act is absolute. See id. Conversely, “any other action taken” by the financial
institution pursuant to R.C. 3123.24 to 3123.38 must be “taken in good faith.” R.C. 3123.38.
{¶26} Here, Field sought to hold E*Trade civilly liable for placing an access restriction
on his account and for complying with a withdrawal directive it received from CSEA. Pursuant
to R.C. 3123.38, however, E*Trade enjoyed absolute immunity with respect to those two actions.
The trial court, therefore, did not err by granting E*Trade’s motion to dismiss. See Cook Family
Invests. v. Billings, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 05CA008689 & 05CA008691, 2006-Ohio-764, ¶ 19
(appellate court may affirm a judgment that is “legally correct on other grounds”). Field’s
second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Five
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING PLAINTIFF A JURY BY TRIAL.
{¶27} In his fifth assignment of error, Field argues that the trial court erred by denying
his right to a trial by jury. He argues that, by granting CSEA’s and E*Trade’s motions to
dismiss, the court made an “arbitrary ruling.” We have already determined, however, that the
court did not err by granting the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we reject Field’s argument
that the court unfairly denied him his right to a jury trial. Field’s fifth assignment of error is
overruled.
12
III
{¶28} Field’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
SCHAFER, J.
CONCUR.
13
APPEARANCES:
DALE P. FIELD, JR., pro se, Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JOHN F. GALONSKI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.